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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the expressivist, or extra-legal, effects of the transitional justice 
process in Croatia that began following the 1991-1995 conflict. It analyses how international 
and domestic war crimes trials, as well as civil society efforts, have led to deliberation over 
norms and narratives related to the war. This is based on a deliberative understanding of the 
transitional justice process, which focuses on the potential for trials to initiate public 
deliberation that involves multiple representations of the past. The primary method of data 
collection was focus groups with teachers, pensioners and members of war veterans’ groups 
across several locations, while follow-up interviews, a brief survey and Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) were used to verify results. The results of the analysis question 
theories of human rights norm cascades, since in the case of Croatia stronger “everyday” 
narratives have undermined the trickle-down effects of transitional justice narratives 
advocated by authorities. Chief among these highly trusted “everyday” narratives is the 
predominant Croatian war narrative, one of defence against a larger Serbian aggressor, 
which permeates across Croatian society and aspects of which are not questioned at all. 
The effect of this is that transitional justice efforts work in an atmosphere of cynicism and 
distrust with institutions, unless their narrative is in line with “everyday” expectations, and 
they therefore struggle to compete with personal and local narratives. These narratives 
strongly affect how the Croatian public understands the rule of law and history, as well as 
how it regards the Serb minority in the state.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction  
 
The smell of decaying bodies from a nearby town, sitting in a bomb shelter as another round 
of artillery fire began or watching the television as the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) enter 
the destroyed city of Vukovar. These are the memories that many participants in this study 
associated with the Croatian Homeland War.1 They all express, to varying degrees, the 
powerful and traumatic images that individuals associate with war and with the recent history 
of the young state. For some, these memories define their lives and present day Croatia. For 
others, these memories play a lesser role in their lives, but nevertheless continue to provide 
a lens through which to interpret Croatian politics and society. The Homeland War provides 
a basis on which to interpret, not only present day events, but also the past, such as the 
whole of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and even the Second World War. 
Today many Croatians are still living the war and the memory of it remains a crucial factor in 
how individuals orientate themselves in the world around them. 
 
This study explores how the memory of the 1991-1995 conflict has affected Croatia. It 
investigates the expressivist, or extra-legal, effects of the transitional justice process on 
Croatian society by analysing how international and domestic war crimes trials, as well as 
civil society efforts, have led to deliberation over norms and narratives related to the war. It 
addresses the question: what effect has the transitional justice process in Croatia had on 
norms and narratives related to the 1991-1995 conflict? The thesis is predominantly based 
on focus groups, dyads and interviews conducted with 52 individuals across Croatia in 2014 
and 2015 (discussed in more detail in Chapter 3). The small sample size means that the 
conclusions are not representative of the broader public, although survey data is drawn upon 
as often as possible, but they do provide more depth on how the conflict is remembered. 
Individuals and institutions remember the conflict and the serious human rights breaches 
that occurred during it through various narratives, or stories that help make sense of the past 
as well as the present world around them, and in particular, the predominant war narrative. 
At times these narratives work in concert and are aligned, but at others one narrative 
dominates over another as they are being propagated by various sources with different 
interests at stake. In some cases, deliberation occurs over narratives as they are contested 
and reproduced, at the elite level of institutions (top-down) or at the level of the everyday 
                                                
1 The Homeland War, or Domovinski Rat, was the name given to the 1991-1995 conflict in Croatia by 
the Tuđmanist narrative of the 1990s (Jović, 2009). The term can be interpreted as loaded and only 
representing the Croat side of the conflict, but it has come to be accepted across most of Croatian 
society since the 1990s. Today it is commonly used in Croatian politics, culture, education and media.  
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(bottom-up). The thesis, thereby, also deals with several subquestions: what kind of 
atmosphere did the transitional justice process in Croatia take place in? How has the 
process influenced participants’ understanding of the world around them (for example, in 
terms of understandings of law, trust in institutions, attitudes towards the Serb minority)? 
And, how have everyday narratives interacted with top-down justice narratives? 
 
The multidimensional process of transitional justice began after the conflict and has defined 
the Croatian domestic political scene, judiciary, foreign policy and cultural space during the 
post-war period. It has been primarily led by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, domestic courts, including specialised war crimes 
chambers, and various civil society efforts. The ICTY had the capability to influence the 
Croatian political system and judiciary, which it sometimes used; however, it generally gave 
the state leeway to conduct its domestic affairs as it saw fit, as long as it complied with 
Tribunal demands (Lamont, 2010; Subotić, 2009). Cooperation with the ICTY rarely, 
however, involved any efforts at “fact-finding”, “truth-telling” or “coming to terms with the 
past”, which enabled the state to retain the nationalist understanding of the character of the 
Homeland War and Croatia’s role in it, without experiencing any normative shifts towards 
human rights norms (Lamont, 2010; Subotić, 2009).2 Croatia was not unique in this sense, in 
Serbia the ICTY lacked an awareness of domestic political circumstances that curtailed its 
ability to affect the transitional justice process. The Serbian government felt threatened by 
what “truth-telling” efforts could do, such as endanger its stability and legitimacy, which 
ultimately meant that transitional justice policies generally only had a superficial effect 
(Ostojić, 2014: 2). In Kosovo, on the other hand, the top-down approach to transitional 
justice focused on institutions and ignored truth-seeking, victim support, reparations and 
community-level reconciliation (Di Lellio and McCurn, 2013).  
 
Transitional justice in this study is defined as the on-going process of institutional response 
to the political changes and human rights abuses that were the result of state policy or were 
committed by members of the Croatian government, army and associated military or 
paramilitary units in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 and 1995.3 The analysis 
does not concern itself with activity that may have continued past this point elsewhere in the 
region, such as for example Kosovo, nor does it analyse cases where crimes were 
committed by any other army or military organisation. It includes activity in legal and non-
legal spheres, both restorative and retributive, together with a range of other extra-legal and 
                                                
2 These studies are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.  
3 “Bosnia-Herzegovina” will from this point on be referred to as “Bosnia”.  
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truth-seeking elements. In other words, the thesis focuses on legal responses to crime and 
what effects they have on society, rather than the crimes themselves.  
 
The study argues that in the aftermath of mass atrocity society needs transitional justice in 
both the legal, political and cultural sense. This is because law, politics and culture are 
intrinsically connected. Culture does not constitute politics, but it does provide it with 
parameters within which to function (Almond and Verba, 1989). It is the sphere of activity 
within which narratives are developed and diffused. Transitional justice uses the instruments 
of law to produce effects on the level of politics and hopefully, through a trickle-down effect, 
culture (Gordy, 2014: 271). These different levels of society do not, however, function in 
such a rigid fashion and their interaction is in fact far more fluid and complex. While culture 
does have a certain degree of coherence, it is also constantly changing and its boundaries 
are not clearly delineated. Politics and law have the capacity to influence culture, but this 
does not occur automatically.  
 
Given the high number of studies of transitional justice, another case study may seem 
superfluous. In Croatia, at the very least, the process of transitional justice and the memory 
of the war remain acutely relevant. Issues such as lustration and relations with Serbia are 
not only common newspaper headlines, but also key policy issues.4 The true effect of these 
legacies, however, becomes apparent in times of conflict or polarisation, when these 
underlying tensions can have serious, even lethal, consequences, especially for minority 
groupings that are vilified in predominant narratives. Events in Croatia have also shown that 
minorities are often hijacked for political purposes and that the legacy of war in the region 
continues to define much of its politics and culture.  
 
 
1.1 Norms and transitional justice 
 
The study takes a constructivist view of norms and, therefore, views them as historical and 
social constructions. Actors respond to cultural factors in their environment and the world 
around them is “talked into existence” through narratives (Carlsnaes et al., 2012). Norms in 
the study are defined as as collective expectations for the proper behaviour, values and 
perceptions of actors with a given identity (Katzenstein, 1996). Under this theory, norms can 
                                                
4 Lustration (the legal process of removing from public life and government institutions anyone who 
had performed active duty in the Yugoslav regime or secret services) has been suggested in Croatia 
during the late 1990s, but has recently becoming a recurring electoral promise for right wing 
politicians. 
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either define identities or prescribe behaviour, or they can do both. In some situations, 
norms can operate as rules that define the identity of an actor, therefore, having certain 
constitutive effects that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognise a 
particular identity. In other types of situations norms can function as standards that guide the 
proper enactment of a previously defined identity. At such times norms have regulative 
effects that specify standards of proper behaviour. Finally, norms can serve these purposes 
but also coexist and come into conflict with one another. 
 
According to this definition, norms not only influence actors’ goals and how they go about 
achieving them, but they also affect other related normative concepts. Broad, underlying 
norms can reverberate throughout a society and shape the identities and behaviour of actors 
at different levels. Models, such as the spiral or boomerangs ones, show how norms at one 
level can cascade to others (Risse et al., 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Lutz and 
Sikkink, 2001). Such models assume the presence of norm advocates who promote certain 
normative ideals to stimulate normative shifts. These actors were present in Croatia, but it is 
debatable how much influence they ever had. As such, the country provides a useful case 
study for how the spiral model of norm change, developed by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 
(1999), may not work in all situations and may need to be tweaked. This model assumes 
that pressure on human rights norm violating governments will come from below, through 
domestic norm believers and transnational human rights networks, following a trickle-down 
of norms from above. In this sense, it does not investigate pressure against such 
movements by any actors other than the government (for example war veterans in Croatia) 
and it views norm change as a one-directional movement in favour of human rights norms. 
Subotić (2009) finds that the spiral model underestimates the strength of elite resistance and 
overestimates the power of norm supporters, since norm believers can be absent in these 
situations or lack the power to influence social change. She revises the model by adding 
more actors to it, who can all either promote or resist human rights norm change. This 
analysis provides a further case study for this theory and will show how pressure for norm 
change (for or against human rights) comes from a variety of sources. It argues that norm 
advocates from below were strong in the case of Croatia, but that they were not advocates 
of human rights. 
 
Norms of behaviour are also intrinsically connected to identity narratives, which form the 
basis for actors’ behavioural choices (Wendt, 1999: 366). Norms are not isolated variables, 
instead they are connected to narratives that individuals or communities use to relate to the 
world around them (Meyer, 2005). They also constitute actions, since action only “becomes 
meaningful in the process of narrating a constitute story of the self” (Browning, 2008: 11). 
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Narratives, therefore, are norms and by studying societal narratives this study 
simultaneously delves into societal norms. It is, however, difficult to present evidence that is 
directly applicable to norms, the study instead traces the contestation of narratives. 
Narratives are also better to analyse than concrete outcomes such as official apologies and 
criminal convictions, since these can far too easily be used for political purposes. The fact 
that they occur is not necessarily indicative of a change in beliefs or attitudes in society, 
although such acts may themselves have an effect on populations. Focusing on criminal 
convictions would be to judge the transitional justice process along legal criteria alone (for 
example in terms of precedents set, number of successful prosecutions, indicted individuals 
brought to trial, cases completed, etc.), instead the focus here is on how the political and 
cultural environments in Croatia have been affected.  
 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have expanded on the work of Katzenstein with a purpose to 
relate this to processes of transitional justice. They show that we can only have indirect 
evidence of norms, just as we can only have indirect evidence of most other motivations for 
political action. Norms, by the above-mentioned definition, embody a quality of “oughtness” 
and shared moral assessment. They prompt justifications for action and leave a trail of 
communication among actors that researchers can search for and analyse. Norms as 
shared assessments also raise the question of how many actors must share the assessment 
before it is called a norm. Furthermore, the norm may be regional, but not global, or even 
only exist within a small community. Norms are “continuous, rather than dichotomous, 
entities… [They] come in varying strengths.” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 892). 
Agreement has to be reached among a critical mass of actors on an emergent norm in order 
to create a tipping point, after which agreement becomes widespread in numerous empirical 
cases and only then can evidence be found about common features of critical mass. This 
theory goes a long way to help in the identification of norms but it also shows the danger that 
ambiguity poses to a study, which requires certain steps to facilitate analysis. This study 
attempts to achieve this by tracing deliberation of narratives associated with norms, rather 
than by trying to establish the dominance of a norm.  
 
The theoretical framework also draws inspiration from the “norm localisation” concept, first 
introduced by Acharya (Acharya, 2009; Acharya, 2004) and recently furthered by Tholens 
(2012). This model of norm diffusion differs from previous ones in that it focuses on 
domestic, rather than international norms and it places these in a dynamic process. 
Moreover, it engages a broader range of local actors in the matchmaking process, rather 
than only institutions. The analysis adapts this theoretical framework slightly: it assumes that 
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the process is even more dynamic and that norms are not simply matched, but that they are 
negotiated, contested and deliberated.   
 
 
1.2 Deliberating the past 
 
The study also employs a deliberative understanding of the transitional justice process, as 
proposed by Rangelov (2014), which is suited to the study of normative contestation in the 
process. This approach, inspired by previous works of Osiel (1997) and Teitel (2000), 
focuses on the capability of trials to bring about the discursive engagement of actors through 
public deliberation, which involves multiple representations and perspectives of the past 
(Rangelov, 2014: 48). While trials are quite rigid instruments for societal change, they can 
act as a mechanism for public debate that can change narratives of nationalism (Rangelov, 
2014: 46). Trials can encourage multiple interpretations of the past and contestation in the 
public domain (Rangelov, 2014: 48). This study, drawing on the theory of deliberative 
transitional justice, therefore, views trials as vehicles for public debate that provide an 
opportunity to produce dialogue about the past with diverse audiences outside of the 
courtroom (Rangelov, 2014: 48). Public discourse does not guarantee what interpretation of 
the past will be discussed in public, but it is this uncertainty that is filled with opportunity 
(Rangelov, 2014: 48). The process is not without its pitfalls: trials can help a state or nation 
distance itself from committed crimes by framing them as exceptional or by drawing a line 
with the past and not analysing the present. But given the diverse and often ambiguous 
goals of transitional justice institutions, such as “reconciliation” or “coming to terms with the 
past”, the less ambitious goal of fostering deliberation may at the very least provide an 
opportunity for marginalised or castigated parties to engage in narratives and to contest 
them (Rangelov, 2014: 49). As this work will show, “Deliberative justice starts with the 
stories and interpretations offered by the participants in the courtroom drama; it is sparked 
by the trial, but takes on a life of its own” (Rangelov, 2014: 51). It is possible that the removal 
of justice from the Balkans to The Hague forced publics in the region to have a discussion 
about war crimes. The opposite is, however, also possible: that a distant court has less 
contact with its target public and is, therefore, open to challenges to its legitimacy. 
 
Narratives are essentially stories that make the past real and shape understanding of both 
the past and the present (Subotić, 2015a: 179; White, 1984). Individuals use narratives to 
understand the world and to create their own identities, both at the individual and at the state 
level (Sommers, 1994). Because of these characteristics, they spread through interaction, 
often with counter-narratives based on “opposing” stories (Subotić, 2015a: 180). What may 
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have been institutionally produced can spread and become stronger in culture, art, 
education or any other corner of society. While homogenous narratives may be desirable in 
normative terms, they may not actually be possible in practice (Obradović-Wochnik, 2013: 
139). This interactive understanding of narratives is based on the notion of a “self” and an 
“other” that helps define the “self” (Neumann, 1999; Subotić, 2009). Narratives, therefore, 
gain meaning through interaction with other narratives (Subotić, 2015a).  
 
There is a difference in how elite narratives, produced from above, and everyday narrative, 
from below, are reproduced and how individuals accept them. Elite narratives (top-down) are 
often imposed, from either domestic or international institutions (political, judicial, economic, 
military, media, etc.), and can be ignorant of cultural specificities that may hamper their 
work. They are often, therefore, fragmented and not fully implemented. Everyday narratives 
(bottom-up) on the other hand are reproduced through networks of families, friends and 
smaller scale social groups, which are quite powerful in the region. Moreover, the nation as 
a discursive construct is shaped through everyday conversation, choice, performance and 
consumption (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 538). 
 
All of the above amount to memory being a process and “dealing with the past” in a 
constructive fashion involves multiple memories interacting with each other (Smith, 2004: 
263). It involves fact-finding, self-criticism and facing off to denial. Silence and agreement 
are intrinsic to this process, although not necessarily in a constructive way. Dialogue has to 
occur, both at the micro and macro levels. Halbwachs and Nora (1992) argue that memory 
only has meaning in the larger system of group meaning and that there are as many 
memories as there are groups. Less obvious social divisions also need to be borne in mind, 
such as those that are not only divided by different memories of war but also by historical 
structural inequalities (Ströhle, 2013: 264). Institutions seeking to influence memory need to 
take this into account in their work and address narratives at multiple levels in order to be 
successful.  
 
 
1.3 The war in Croatia 
 
Violence erupted in Croatia in 1991 as the dissolution of Yugoslavia gathered momentum, 
and lasted until 1995. The conflict encompassed much of Croatia and left 13,000 – 16,000 
dead, 500,000 internally or externally displaced and about 12% of housing structures 
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destroyed or damaged, as well as 30% of industrial infrastructure.5 As much as 21% of the 
economy’s GDP is estimated to have been wiped out, as well as US $37 billion accrued in 
damages (London, 2003). To this day 2,138 individuals remain missing and many of the 
over 2 million mines laid in the country are yet to be demined.6 The conflict in Croatia ended 
following two Croatian military offensives, Operation Flash and Operation Storm, and the 
peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium.  
 
Croats had first-hand experience of the war and a large part of the population witnessed 
violence of some sort. This is in contrast to, for example, the nature of the conflict in Serbia, 
where much of the conflict was experienced second-hand.7 Moreover, the conflict had an 
international nature, as ICTY trials and judgments have shown that Bosnian Croat forces 
operating in Bosnia had continuous and significant military support from the armed forces of 
Croatia. A chain of command existed, official or unofficial, between Zagreb and armed forces 
in Bosnia.  
 
The wars in the region were unique in that they were the first to have an international 
criminal tribunal overseeing their conduct as they took place. They were also the first 
conflicts that took place in a global environment where human rights had become an 
important part of international rhetoric (especially so in countries with close ties to Croatia, 
such as Germany) and in which civil society had a significant international presence. In 
addition, they were the best-recorded conflicts to date and their day-to-day progress was 
reported globally. This meant that the situation in which the conflict in Croatia took place, 
although not completely original and without precedent, contained unique and new 
elements.  
 
Croatian transition from Yugoslav socialism was not to liberal democracy, but to the 
competitive authoritarian regime of President Franjo Tuđman and the HDZ (Hrvatska 
Demokratska Zajednica or Croatian Democratic Union). Formal democratic institutions were 
in place, but they were primarily a means for Tuđman’s HDZ of obtaining and exercising 
political authority, which meant conventional standards of democracy were not met (Levitsky 
and Way, 2002: 52). Media and judicial freedoms were neither fully repressed, nor were they 
                                                
5 Estimates for the number of dead vary from 13,583 (Croatian Memorial and Documentation Centre 
for the Homeland War, 2006; Ivo Goldstein, 1999) to 15,790 (Živić, 2003). Cruvellier and Valinas 
(2006) estimate that roughly 500,000, of both Serbs and Croats, were displaced due to the conflict in 
Croatia alone. The figures for damaged structures are taken from Tanner (2001: 278).  
6 For figures on missing persons see the Croatian Red Cross database of missing persons 
(familylinks.icrc.org/croatia/en). For figures on landmines in Croatia see Soldo et al. (1999). 
7 The 1999 NATO bombing campaign, was, however experienced directly in Serbia and is also the 
strongest memory associated with the conflict there.   
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completely free. For example, Tuđman’s attempts to revoke the licence of the independent 
radio station, Radio 101, divided the HDZ and sparked public protest (Levitsky and Way, 
2002: 58). Likewise, judges did not always limit media freedom, although anti-government 
outlets often found themselves dealing with the judiciary. Moreover, as later chapters will 
outline, Tuđman’s regime also used language policy as a method of national identity building 
(Chapter 8) and gave more power to Croatian war veterans (Chapter 9). Tuđman died in 
1999 and the HDZ lost the parliamentary elections in 2000 to a centre-left coalition that 
began Croatia’s process of transition to liberal democracy in earnest.  
 
This study only concerns itself with the period beginning with the first regime change 
following the Homeland War, on the 27th of January 2000, when Ivica Račan came to power 
as Prime Minister. During the Tuđman regime, Croatian cooperation with the ICTY (at the 
time the main instrument of transitional justice) was minimal and the process of transitional 
justice as a whole was scarcely present.8 Only from the 2000 regime change was the 
process of transitional justice in the country allowed to gather pace. Not all discussion about 
the past began at this point, but up until then the HDZ government that ruled the country 
during and after the war took serious steps to restrict this and hardly encouraged it.9 To a 
certain extent, it had prepared the public to resist the temptation to deal with the past 
according to any narratives other than its own. 
 
 
1.4 The ICTY 
 
The United Nations (UN) Security Council set up the ICTY in May 1993 with the aim of 
restoring regional security and addressing the serious human rights violations that had 
occurred during the conflict. The asserted goal was to restore peace in the midst of the on-
going conflict; it had secondary, broader aims of dispensing justice and achieving 
reconciliation in the region (Chapter 7 provides a more detailed overview of these aims). 
These additional aims were gradually added to the Tribunal’s long list of goals as time 
passed, ultimately leaving a range of expectations that no court could be expected to meet. 
Since inception, the ICTY has at one point or another been expected to create a historical 
record of events, heal war wounds, reassign collective guilt to individuals, prepare societies 
for reconciliation and deter future violence (Allcock, 2009: 379). 
 
                                                
8 Some initiatives did exist for post-communist transitional justice, such as for example the restoration 
of property that was taken following 1945, but this was not aimed at the 1991-1995 conflict. 
9 It should be noted, however, that the post-2003 HDZ government did not do this. 
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The trial chambers did sometimes state expressivist goals in verdicts, such as to strengthen 
social solidarity and incubate moral consensus in the public, despite causing a high degree 
of controversy amongst lawyers, who often rejected any kinds of goals that were not 
narrowly legal (see: ICTY Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, IT-95-14/2-A). Trials aimed to 
draw a line for the future and achieve a sense of legitimacy in the transition (Teitel, 2005: 
845). A way of doing this was to create a clear division between the past and present. Other 
participants in the process may have, however, had different goals and a different 
perspective on the concept. They could have attempted to use transitional justice to 
establish their own innocence or lay guilt on another party; an outside power may have seen 
the process as absolving it of responsibility for a conflict (i.e. making amends); or actors may 
have hijacked it for their own political agendas. 
  
While the ICTY’s success in the region more broadly has been considered imperfect, 
Croatia’s achievements have been relatively impressive in terms of compliance with the 
Tribunal and handover of indictees. Subotić (2009) and Nettelfield (2010) argue that the 
particular circumstances that the Croatian state was in since 2000 has allowed for the 
Tribunal to be more effective there than in other neighbouring states. By December 2005 the 
ICTY had secured the transfer of all Croatian citizens indicted, with the exception of Janko 
Bobetko, who died before any final decision was reached about his handover to The Hague, 
while certain cases, such as those of Mirko Norac and Rahim Ademi, were transferred to 
domestic courts by the ICTY. As of June 2016 the ICTY has in total concluded 153 
proceedings, with 8 ongoing. Of these, 29 involved Croats, but the only Croats to be 
sentenced at the ICTY (rather than in national courts, following a transfer from the ICTY) 
were guilty of crimes committed in Bosnia. Moreover, as of 31 December 2014, 3,553 
individuals have been tried for war crimes in domestic courts, of which 589 have been 
sentenced.10 Many of these, especially shortly after the war, were against ethnic Serbs who 
were sentenced in absentia (Rangelov, 2014: 100). These statistics, although impressive in 
their own right, do not account for the numerous individuals who would have been indicted 
had the Tribunal acted more quickly, nor do they show how domestic prosecutors could 
have helped, and often did not, by filing charges themselves. Most authors, even those who 
initially regarded the ICTY with a great deal of scepticism, now agree that it may be too early 
to adjudge the effects of transitional justice in Croatia, as well as most other similar 
situations around the globe (discussed in Chapter 2).11  
 
                                                
10 The Croatian State Attorney’s Office provides these figures. See: www.dorh.hr/fgs.axd?id=1841 
11 Drumbl (2007) and Osiel (1998; 2009) provide detailed legal analyses of the ICTY and how it 
compares to other mechanisms for dealing with mass atrocity.  
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There was essentially no precedent to compare the progress of transitional justice in Croatia 
to, other than possibly the Nuremberg Trials and the 1946-1948 Tokyo Tribunal. It is, 
however, worth noting that these were both military tribunals, imposed by states that had 
won an armed conflict. Bass (2000) compares these institutions to the ICTY and regards 
Nuremberg as the best-case scenario and exception to the rule for international criminal 
tribunals, which he sees as not particularly successful. Specifically, he finds the high volume 
of testimony and documentation that was produced by the project as its clearest success. 
He does point out that the Nuremberg Trials are often seen as such a success due to the 
much greater success of the broader German rehabilitation following Second World War. In 
Bass’ eyes the trials were only the most spectacular and public element in a more general 
Allied program of denazification. He argues that this shows how war crimes tribunals are not 
a quick fix, but need to be a part of a wider social project (Bass, 2000: 296). More recent 
analysis of denazification has, however, proven the process to be much more short-lived 
and half-hearted than was originally thought (Vogt, 2000). In fact, Nuremberg may have had 
a stronger influence than previously thought since denazification is now seen as resulting in 
a shunning of all issues related to dealing with the past and more thorough domestic 
processes only came along many years later. The case study of Nuremberg is of limited 
comparative use to future situations; post-war Germany was going through one of the most 
unique situations of the modern era and is hard to relate to anything else. In relation to the 
Croatian situation in particular, Germany had been defeated in a war and was under military 
occupation, which allowed for certain things to be completed without parliamentary debates 
or a particular care for public opinion. In a legal sense it is also unfair to compare Nuremberg 
to the ICTY, since those trials were concerned with German aggression first, war crimes 
second, and crimes against humanity third. Moreover, it could not rule on genocide since the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG, or simply 
the Genocide Convention) did not yet exist (although the word was used in indictments and 
judgments). The ICTY, on the other hand, considered war crimes first, then crimes against 
humanity and genocide, respectively.  
 
 
1.5 Civil society efforts  
 
It is easy to criticise the ICTY for having fallen short of supposed reconciliatory goals and of 
having hampered coming to terms with the past in the region. It is equally easy for the ICTY 
to claim it had narrow legal aims in mind for its work. The relationship is, however, far more 
complex. In Croatia, independent media and NGOs have played a significant role in truth-
seeking initiatives while authorities have, in contrast, made only limited efforts to officially 
expose and publicise the facts surrounding the events that took place during the war on 
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Croatian territory.12 Most such initiatives have unfortunately become a testament to the 
complicated environment that these efforts have to operate in and how easily they can be 
used for ethno-national purposes. Equally, the ICTY has not always been willing to 
cooperate with efforts for truth and reconciliation, further hampering the work of such 
initiatives. If the ICTY had such narrow aims in mind from the outset, but it was also not 
willing to support efforts along the lines of a truth and reconciliation commission, then what 
other options existed? With ICTY work slowly coming to a close (current deadline for 
completion is set at 2023) and domestic war crimes trials remaining reliant on political and 
administrative backing, it is possible that civil society efforts have more sticking power than 
legal institutions, despite the dwindling funding for such projects.  
 
Several attempts at creating non-legal truth-seeking projects highlight the complicated 
environment such efforts have to work in. The Croatian Memorial and Documentation Centre 
for the Homeland War (Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata), set 
up in 2005, is the most prominent such project in Croatia. The aims of the Centre are the 
collection and investigation of documentation and materials related to the Homeland War. It, 
however, became clear early on in the work of the Centre that it was going to propagate a 
specific narrative of the conflict, thereby choosing to follow its own version of the truth. 
Historian Ante Nazor, its Director, has been seen as politically aligned to the right side of the 
spectrum in Croatia and much of his work features the use of loaded terms, for example one 
of his books is titled “Greater-Serbian Aggression Against Croatia in the 1990s” (Nazor, 
2011). He made it clear, before any pertinent verdicts were given by the ICTY, that he 
believed operations Flash and Storm to be legal and legitimate actions by the Croatian army 
to liberate occupied territory (Cruvellier and Valinas, 2006: 25).13  
 
The second example, the coalition for RECOM, consists of a large network of civil society 
groups that are attempting to set up a regional truth commission. Besides the important but 
limited contributions of trials at the ICTY and domestic war crimes chambers to the 
establishment of certain facts that relate to the war, the most visible truth-seeking efforts 
have been pursued by local and international NGOs, many of which take part in RECOM. It 
is probably the most successful truth-seeking effort in the region, despite some obvious 
setbacks: the project has not established the desired commission, support for it in Croatia 
(measured by the number of signatures collected) has been low and the effort was not 
                                                
12 The most prominent of these are RECOM, Documenta and Croatian Memorial and Documentation 
Centre for the Homeland War. See Cruvellier and Valinas (2006).  
13 The ICTY trials did not directly concern themselves with the legality of the Operations. They could 
have found the actions themselves to have been legal, but for crimes to have been committed 
nonetheless. This means a “guilty” verdict in the case would not have made the Operations illegal.  
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helped by unfortunate timing; the petition campaign coincided with the trial chamber verdict 
in the Ante Gotovina case. Even these NGOs, however, have long recognised that it is 
highly unlikely they would ever receive serious parliamentary support for the establishment 
of more formal mechanisms for dealing with the past, such as truth commissions.14 Certain 
governments have shown their support for the project, but it is hard to believe that it is more 
than symbolical at this stage, especially given the dismal track record of domestic 
government supported initiatives in Croatia and Serbia. Consequently, local NGOs such as 
Documenta have been directing their efforts to information gathering and the promotion of 
fact-finding initiatives. In doing so, they have focused on a regional approach to truth 
seeking – both because of the lack of progress at the national level and also because of the 
regional dynamics that played a role in the conflict.  
 
Apart from the ongoing effort by RECOM, three attempts at creating a truth commission took 
place in Bosnia between 1997 and 2006, one in Serbia from 2001 until 2003, as well as two 
at the local level in Sarajevo and Srebrenica respectively. Dragović-Soso and Gordy (2010) 
identify three main reasons for the dismal record of such projects in the region, which so far 
have produced no significant results.15 They see this failure as the result of a lack of political 
will among influential actors in the region; a dysfunctional relationship with international 
institutions, such as the ICTY, which have not helped shape domestic conditions in favour of 
truth commissions; and, ingrained and irreconcilable views of the past throughout the region, 
held by different ethnic groups as well as civil societies of the same national group 
(Dragović-Soso and Gordy, 2010). 
 
The Yugoslav Commission for Truth and Reconciliation is an excellent example and shows 
how easily a truth-seeking project can be hijacked for political purposes. Established in 
March 2001, with the support of Serbian President Vojislav Koštunica, it faded away by 2003 
after a significant amount of infighting and with little success (Ilić, 2004). From the outset, the 
Commission advocated the need for an explanation of what happened in the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s as its primary concern and it was quickly seen as an opportunity to 
consolidate a nationalist narrative and an attempt to appease the ICTY (Fagan and Ostojić, 
2008). Serious human rights violations consistently came second to the investigation of 
“causes and reasons”, which were directed at international audiences, not domestic ones 
(Ilić, 2004). Due to a mix of external factors, divisions among domestic civil society and a 
                                                
14 Truth seeking as a tool for peace building in post-conflict societies, especially when based on 
personal testimony, is beset with a range of practical issues. The instability of human memory is 
particularly problematic. See Petrović and Dulanović (2011).  
15 The Srebrenica commission produced a report, although this had limited impact.   
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lack of political will, the project quickly proved to be unworkable (Dragović-Soso and Gordy, 
2010). The commission became anathema to Serbia’s pro-transitional justice civil society 
segment, in particular, which viewed it as an effort to rationalise the state’s involvement in 
the most recent conflict (Dragović-Soso and Gordy, 2010: 207). 
 
Conceptually, truth-seeking efforts through commissions, but also through trials, face the 
inherent conceptual problems that “coming to terms with the past” faces. The term is too 
broad, since it connotes so many different ideas (for example remembrance, 
commemoration, acknowledgment, truth-seeking, etc.), but it is also too narrow since it 
expects that the only successful outcome of the process is for a society to come to terms 
with its past by facing the truth that has been uncovered (Obradović-Wochnik, 2013). This 
can lead projects in this realm to failure, as the connection between knowledge and 
acknowledgement is not always linear (Obradović-Wochnik, 2013). Forcing individuals to 
accept or reject war crimes, without any middle ground, also simplifies the process of 
coming to terms with the past to focus on acceptance or rejection of the truth. It ignores the 
complex process that leads to this, in which a person needs to discuss, interpret, understand 
and finally come to terms with a past that may be painful or contested (Gibson, 2006; 
Obradovic-Wochnik, 2013). All of the above examples are a testament to the complicated 
environment that these efforts have to operate in and how easily they can be used for ethno-
national purposes. They present an all too easy opportunity for individuals with motivation 
and capability to hijack the projects for their own political purposes, under the banners of 
truth and reconciliation. 
 
 
1.6 Relevant ICTY trials   
 
The thesis focuses on three particular ICTY cases, those of Ante Gotovina, Dario Kordić and 
Tihomir Blaškić. Many other trials were, however, also frequently brought up in discussions 
and were relevant at the time of fieldwork. Most notably, these were the ones of Slobodan 
Milošević (President of Serbia during the conflict, who died in ICTY custody in 2006, but 
remains a popular topic), Radovan Karadžić (President of Republika Srpska during the 
conflict, who was sentenced by the ICTY in 2016), Ratko Mladić (a prominent Bosnian Serb 
leader during the conflict, who is currently on trial at the ICTY) and Vojislav Šešelj (a 
prominent war time and current nationalist politician, who was found not guilty on all charges 
by the ICTY in 2016).  
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1.6.1 Ante Gotovina 
 
Ante Gotovina was the Croatian general in charge of the controversial Operation Storm. 
After a 2001 indictment by the ICTY, he spent four years in hiding, before being captured. In 
2011 he was convicted of committing crimes against humanity and sentenced to 24 years’ 
imprisonment, but in 2012 he was acquitted on appeal and immediately released. The 
former general has inspired the strongest public reactions in Croatia and also led to the most 
serious tensions with the ICTY (Cruvellier and Valinas, 2006: 9). More than any other case 
or individual, this one has been emblematic of the nexus of politics, symbols, rituals and 
collective memory in Croatia (Pavlaković, 2010).  
 
 
1.6.2 Dario Kordić and Tihomir Blaškić 
 
Dario Kordić and Tihomir Blaškić were initially indicted in 1995 together with a number of 
other individuals for the events that occurred in the Lašva Valley part of Bosnia, but their 
cases were later separated. Blaškić was sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment in 2000 after 
being found guilty of committing, ordering, planning or otherwise aiding in crimes against the 
Bosnian Muslim population in the region. In 2001 Kordić was sentenced to 25 years’ 
imprisonment for many of the same or similar crimes, committed in the same localities, as 
Blaškić. The trial chamber in the case showed that various military units in the region acted 
under the direct orders of Kordić, despite him not holding a formal position in the chain of 
command. Furthermore, it showed that when he was involved in HVO (Hrvatsko Vijeće 
Obrane or Croatian Defence Council – the name of the official military formation for Croats in 
Bosnia) attacks, he intended to commit the crimes associated with them and that at the time 
he held both political and military authority. In 2004 Blaškić had his sentence reduced on 
appeal after his legal team successfully showed that, due to the Kordić judgment, it was 
clear that Blaškić did not have effective control of troops in the area. The appeal was based 
on evidence that had been withheld until President Stjepan Mesić provided documents from 
the intelligence services, showing the presence of a parallel chain of command. In other 
words, Kordić’s conviction allowed for Blaškić’s release; moreover, the good outcome for 
Blaškić was a bad outcome for the Croatian state. 
 
The trails of Kordić and Blaškić, as well as the “Lašva Valley” case as a whole, are 
interesting due to their social, political and legal intricacies. They allowed for the study to 
analyse how trials for crimes based outside of Croatia may have an effect in the country. 
They also raise the issue of the involvement of the Croatian state in the conflict in Bosnia, 
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which changes the nature of the conflict there to an international one. Combined, the two 
trials show that the conflict in Bosnia was politically driven and that Croatian state 
intelligence services operated an unofficial chain of command with Bosnian Croat forces. 
Additionally, at the time of his trials, Blaškić was the highest-ranking person to be tried at the 
Tribunal.16   
 
 
1.7 Relevant domestic trials   
 
1.7.1 Mirko Norac 
 
During the war Mirko Norac was a General in the Croatian Army and in 2003 he became the 
first Croatian army General to be found guilty by a domestic court. This initial trial (of two) 
was for the killings in Gospić of a number of ethnic Serb civilians and was run in Rijeka. In 
2004 the ICTY issued an indictment against Norac for crimes committed during Operation 
Medak Pocket, but promptly transferred the case to a Zagreb court in 2005, where he was 
subsequently found to be guilty. The issuing of the initial arrest warrant against Norac, in 
2001, stands out as one of the most striking examples of public demonstration against the 
transitional justice process in Croatia, with somewhere between 120,000 and 150,000 
people demonstrating on the streets of Split. The scale of the initial public reaction, in 
particular, took the Croatian government by surprise and shows the power that civil society, 
together with allied political actors, holds to challenge the state (Rangelov, 2013: 78). The 
Norac trial is interesting from a legal perspective since it was started at the ICTY and was 
then transferred to domestic courts; it involved a significant public reaction from the outset 
and initial demonstrations were organised under the populist slogan of “We are all Mirko 
Norac”; and, it was relevant during different time periods, starting in 2001 and ending in 
2008.17  
 
 
1.7.2 Branimir Glavaš and Tomislav Merčep 
 
Branimir Glavaš is most well-known as the wartime leader of Osijek (at the very least 
unofficially, as the person who commanded the local paramilitary and military groups) and 
later as a member of Croatian parliament, a role he was still in during his war crimes trial. 
Following the 2005 indictment for the torture and murder of Serb civilians in Osijek during 
                                                
16 Since then the Prlić et al. (IT-04-74) case has involved more senior Croat officials in Bosnia.  
17 See: Slobodna Dalmacija (2001).    
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the war, legal proceedings against Glavaš were met with frequent setbacks, but in 2009 the 
Zagreb County Court found him guilty and he fled to Bosnia, where he remained at large 
until his arrest in 2010. In 2015 he was released from prison as the sentence was rescinded.  
 
Tomislav Merčep was a senior HDZ politician before and during the war in Vukovar, and 
later Zagreb, who ultimately came to command a large number of paramilitaries across 
several of fronts of the war. He was implicated in war crimes (including murder, torture and 
the blowing up of Serb homes) in Vukovar, Zagreb (the Zec family murders and the 
detention centre in the Zagreb Fairgrounds), Pakračka Poljana and a number of locations 
around Gospić. The Zec family murders remain prominent in the Croatian media to this day. 
The ethnic Serb family was murdered (husband, wife and their 12-year-old daughter, 
Aleksandra. Their younger son survived) in Zagreb in 1991 by paramilitaries belonging to a 
unit run by Merčep. The murder of Aleksandra Zec, in particular, has caught the public’s 
imagination and Oliver Frljić, Director of the Croatian National Theatre in Rijeka, has written 
and directed a play about her murder that featured prominently in Croatian media. Despite a 
significant degree of investigative reporting on Merčep during the war and in the 1990s, he 
was only arrested in 2010. The trial is still on-going. 
 
The trials of Merčep and Glavaš deal with the very essence of a wartime narrative since both 
individuals rested on their laurels from the war in order to avoid prosecution for war crimes. 
These ex-paramilitary commanders enjoyed what was essentially untouchable status in 
Croatia and their cases are examples of local judicial institutions attempting to overturn this 
form of protection.   
 
 
1.7.3 The Lora prison 
 
The Lora prison trials involve crimes committed in Lora, an army prison camp in Split that 
was open from 1992 until 1997 and mainly housed civilian Serb residents of Split and 
prisoners of war. A number of these prisoners were tortured and killed, although the exact 
number remains unknown. In the initial 2002 trial all eight of the accused were quickly 
acquitted, in a case marred by intimidation and harassment of witnesses. In a retrial, in 
2006, all eight individuals were subsequently found guilty. Since then further investigations 
have taken place into events at Lora, which may lead to further trials (named “Lora 2”, “Lora 
3” and “Lora 4”). The Lora trial is a case study for the exploration of domestic judicial 
capacity and possible bias in the system. There were two instances of contradictory verdicts 
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in this case as it was moved between different types of domestic courts. Perhaps, this is also 
indicative of change in institutional capacity over time. 
 
 
1.8 Croatian society and the war  
 
At best, the Croatian public remains ambivalent about its relationship with the Tribunal and 
war crimes prosecutions in general. The Croatian public’s engagement with issues of 
transitional justice, at the very least in the form of mass public showings of support or 
opposition to certain issues, has undoubtedly shrunk. The frequency of and attendance at 
such events has decreased significantly (Cruvellier and Valinas, 2006). In 2001, for 
example, there were about 120,000-150,000 people demonstrating in Split in support of 
Norac and Gotovina, respectively. In 2005 when Gotovina was arrested, on the other hand, 
only about 40,000 gathered. Similarly, in 2002 there were daily demonstrations in front of the 
court of the “Lora” case, whereas by 2005 there were none. Turnouts are not necessarily 
always signs of opinion, rather than mobilisation, but they can provide clues to general 
sentiment that can be investigated further. Among human rights activists and journalists, 
there is a shared feeling that public acknowledgement of and debate about crimes 
committed against Croatian Serbs have increased. It is now more generally accepted that 
Croats also committed war crimes and cases have reflected this (Cruvellier and Valinas, 
2006: 19). Prosecutions against Croats in domestic courts have increased significantly and 
include the notable cases of Norac, Merčep and Glavaš. This picture, however, is not 
necessarily a true reflection of the importance of the topic in Croatian society, since it still 
holds the capability of prompting mass support.  
 
The acquittals of Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač, retired generals in the Croatian Army, 
on 16th of November 2012 are demonstrative of this. The former generals were greeted by 
the top echelons of Croatian politics and the Roman Catholic Church upon their return to 
Zagreb, as well as a jubilant crowd of over 100,000 people. It is not surprising that the 
acquittals elicited such a public reaction and variety of interpretations, chief of which was 
that the acquittals defined Operation Storm as legal and legitimate, since the case of 
Gotovina has for a long time defined the Croatian relationship with the ICTY and the 
transitional justice process more broadly. They were also seen as vindicating the Croatian 
state of joint criminal enterprise in this instance, supporting the claim that war crimes 
committed by Croats were of a sporadic and isolated nature. These reactions can, however, 
be misleading if interpreted as signs of public sentiment. Up until this point, public 
demonstrations were consistently decreasing in scale, hence it is illogical to argue that the 
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size of demonstrations alone is a reflection of support for issues related to transitional 
justice. The fact that the public outpouring in 2012 was so much greater than in 2011 may 
show that issues of transitional justice were important in the society even in the absence of 
large-scale demonstrations, only at this point the motivation behind the public turnout had 
changed from protest to celebration. This sentiment can be traced more deeply in the media 
discourse and also hints at the dependence of civil society on political allies. As the HDZ 
started to support ICTY efforts, civil society mobilisation against such efforts increasingly 
came from the margins of Croatian politics and war veterans’ associations’ capability to 
attract significant crowds became limited to Zagreb, Split and, more recently, Vukovar 
(Rangelov, 2013: 81). There, however, remains a pervasive attitude in a large part of the 
Croatian public that officials and soldiers who have been indicted or sentenced by the ICTY 
or domestic courts are considered heroes, not criminals (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about ICTY? Our officials and 
soldiers indicted/sentenced by the ICTY or domestic courts are heroes, not criminals. 
 
 
Source: Kolstø (2011) 
 
Serbs remain the largest ethnic minority in Croatia and make up 4.36% of the population, 
down considerably since the 1991 level of 12.2% (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2011). The 
UN Human Rights Committee expressed concerns in 2015 over the level of discrimination 
and violence against Serbs and Roma, in particular (UN Human Rights Committee Report, 
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2015). Moreover, Serb returnees continue to struggle to access government programmes 
aimed at facilitating their return (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Most recently, a Council of 
Europe Report (2016) expressed concern over: the surge of nationalism and political 
radicalisation having an impact on minority rights, especially in war hit areas; the small 
number of minorities employed in public service; the limited right to use minority languages 
and scripts in certain locations; the use of hate speech in media and political discourse; and, 
the public debate concerning minorities being dominated by anti-minority rhetoric and 
prejudice.18  
 
 
1.9 Research Design 
 
The thesis takes a single case study approach, since such a research design can effectively 
capture the complexity and particular nature of the research question (Stake, 1995). This is 
essential in a process as complex as transitional justice or with social constructions such as 
norms. This type of study can still be comparative if it uses and develops concepts, such as 
transitional justice, which are applicable to other countries and if it can make inferences that 
are relevant outside of this single case, which this attempts to do (Landman, 2008: 28). Such 
intense examination can lead to deeper theoretical analysis and theory development, albeit 
often at the expense of generalisability. That is not to say that single case studies cannot be 
generalised with at all; a well executed one can address theory and issues that have wider 
intellectual relevance, it can use concepts which are applicable in other contexts and it can 
make inferences that apply to countries or time periods beyond the scope of the original 
case (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 205). The conclusions have to, however, be “contingent 
generalisations” that should not be mistakenly overgeneralised with (George and Bennett, 
2005: 84).  
 
Single case studies on transitional justice have become more popular in recent times, 
despite showing ambigious results thus far (discussed further in Chapter 2). These have 
highlighted the expressivist aspects of war crimes trials, but they have also noted the highly 
complex nature of each case, making comparison difficult. This does not mean that such 
studies are of no comparative use, rather it means that cases need be chosen carefully: that 
they should provide a fair test of the theory in question and that the cases testing arguments 
should be different from the cases in which the arguments were induced (Geddes, 2003). 
                                                
18 For more information on the current status of the Serb minority in Croatia also see the Serb 
National Council (Srpsko narodno vijeće or SNV) sponsored SNV Bulletin #6, available at: 
http://snv.hr/file/attachment/file/bilten6-compressed.pdf 
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Consequently, the thesis uses both idiographic and nomothetic approaches, since it draws 
conclusions about transitional justice broadly, whilst also making reference to the unique 
characteristics of Croatia and its experience with the process. The thesis is based on 
qualitative methods and descriptions of variance, while employing an inductive approach to 
the relationship between theory and research.  
 
In this thesis, Croatia provides a critical and exemplifying case study. It is critical, since well-
developed theories exist which this thesis tests and provides a better understanding of 
(Bryman, 2016: 62-63). It is exemplifying, also known as respresentative or typical, since the 
objective of the thesis is to capture the circumstances of an everyday situation (Bryman, 
2016: 63; Yin, 2009: 48). It is a mixture of the two since many instances of transitional justice 
exist across the globe, but each is also highly unique. In other words, the case study 
provides more description of the process in this instance, it uses established theories to 
explain a single case and it also tries to develop theory and identify new variables worth 
pursuing in future research, although it is far from an outlier case (George and Bennett, 
2005: 75). Finally, the case study is both internally and externally valid. It makes conclusions 
about the Croatian case, but it also says something about transitional justice that may be 
applicable to other cases.  
 
 
1.10 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis, and themes particular to each chapter, are organised along an initial 
methodological plan, which involved a literateture review, followed by a media analysis, 
followed by the fieldwork that involved survey, focus group, dyad and interview discussions 
based on themes previously noted in the literature (and discussed in more detail in the 
respective chapters) and finally the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The themes 
covered were: sources of information on the transitional justice process; the dominant war 
narrative; understandings of law; Croat perceptions of the Serb minority in Croatia; and, the 
position of the war veterans in Croatia. This thematic construction is based on already 
existing literature, providing additional validity to the themes, but potentially limiting the 
creation of new themes that the literature may have missed. New themes were, therefore, 
added to the respective chapters and elaborated on within pre-existing frameworks present 
in the literature.   
 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 outlines the relevant literature in the area of 
transitional justice, both globally and specifically in the former Yugoslavia. The third chapter 
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provides an overview of the methodologies used for the study and mainly focuses on the 
experience of conducting focus groups in a post-conflict scenario. It includes a discussion of 
the benefits, but also the possible pitfalls, of such a socially interactive method when 
approaching potentially sensitive topics.  
 
The fourth chapter presents the results of the media analysis that preceded the fieldwork 
and helped inspire the interview guide. Based on the tradition of agenda-setting theory, the 
chapter analyses thematic reports on a series of ICTY and domestic war crimes trials. It 
looks at how different types of media portrayed trials; which trials dominated the news; and, 
what kind of societal values are reflected in the media or which the media may be 
influencing.  
 
Chapters 5 to 9 are wholly based on the focus group, dyad and interview data. The fifth 
chapter follows up on the media analysis by providing an overview of participants’ 
perceptions of sources of information available to them. Participants seem to trust few 
sources in an atmosphere of general distrust and pessimism with institutions. They, 
therefore, only trusted participants and television pictures. This paved the way for everyday 
narratives to have more of an influence than narratives presented from above by institutions.  
 
Chapter 6 provides a detailed overview of the war narrative and its various characteristics by 
drawing on prior research, but also adding certain nuances that became obvious in the 
fieldwork. Many of these characteristics are universally accepted across the public and with 
all participants, while others are deliberated on and others yet only exist with certain target 
segments (especially the notion that the war is not over). The chapter argues that the war 
narrative is so strong that it often undermines other narratives due its powerful everyday 
nature, which makes it difficult for trickle-down effects of norms to occur. This outline of the 
war narrative sets the background for the subsequent chapters, which look at what effect the 
war narrative has on other narratives and attitudes.   
 
Chapter 7 focuses on how the justice narrative has affected the rule of law and 
understandings of law in Croatia. It finds that the development of them has been stymied 
and that a tolerance for certain crimes exists, such as revenge crimes, crimes of passion or 
killings of Serb civilians. This is partly due to the strength of the war narrative and partly due 
to the distrust of the ICTY and domestic judiciary. A further consequence of this is discussed 
in Chapter 8, which looks at attitudes towards the Serb minority. Participants displayed 
contradictory attitudes that featured many facets of the war narrative. Most agreed Serbs 
should be equal members of Croatian society, but they also did not believe Cyrillic signs 
 36 
should be put up in Vukovar. The introduction of bilingual signs reduced trust in government 
institutions and was interpreted as a continued threat against Croatia. Finally, the ninth 
chapter looks at the position of branitelji (or “defenders”, the name given to Croatian war 
veterans in Croatia) in society; how they are viewed by others and how they view 
themselves. Much of the narrative surrounding them is unifying, especially since they 
embody much of the war narrative, but their associations are on the other hand seen in a 
highly negative light, even by war veterans themselves. Much like war veterans feel that 
Croatia is still threatened by external or internal forces, so they also feel that their position in 
society is continuously threatened.    
 
The tenth chapter presents the results of a Qualitative Comparative Analysis performed on 
all of the fieldwork data. It provides a systematic comparison based on the presence of 
deliberation on topics (discussed in more detail in each chapter), in order to be able to make 
comparisons across target segments. It highlights the unanimity on many themes, but it also 
shows how teachers stand out from the other two target segments due to their high levels of 
deliberation and how war veterans stand out due to their high levels of distrust and 
pessimism. Distrust of institutions proves to be a key differentiator in many of the analysed 
areas. Chapter 11 concludes the thesis with an amalgamation of QCA results with 
observations from previous chapters. It then presents a discussion of what lessons can be 
learned from the Croatian case for future transitional justice processes, whether the process 
can be deemed to have been successful (if it can ever be deemed as such) and if this 
analytical framework, of deliberation, is at all useful or not.  
 
 
1.11 Key terms  
 
Several terms are used throughout the thesis that can be difficult to translate or have broad 
and potentially ambiguous meanings in Croatian. Firstly, “Serb” is used to denote someone 
of ethnic Serb origin in Croatia, whereas “Serbian” denotes someone who is from Serbia, it 
does not denote ethnicity. Likewise “Croat” denotes ethnicity, while “Croatian” only someone 
from Croatia (they may be Serb and Croatian, for example).  
 
The most prominent of the words that struggle to be translated is narod, which can be taken 
to mean people or nation, defined in an ethnic sense. The word is composed of the root rod, 
from the verb roditi, to give birth (Hayden, 1996: 791). By definition, this view of the people 
or the nation only encompasses those of a specific ethnicity. Narod was left in the original 
Croatian form in excerpts to highlight this.   
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Related to this is the notion that there exist “our people” (naši or literally “ours”) and “your 
people” (vaši or literally “yours”). The concept of naši features frequently in the transcripts 
and, depending on the situation, it can mean either Croats, Croatians or even former 
Yugoslavs as a whole. Most often, it refers to the narod. These instances are translated, but 
they are worth highlighting since they may look out of place in English syntax. Branitelji 
(Croatian war veterans of the Homeland War) was left in its original Croatian format.  
 
Various transitional justice efforts, norms and discourses are referred to under the umbrella 
term of the “justice narrative”. These are defined as they arise in the following chapters, but 
the overall term is, much like the process, quite broad. It is used throughout to describe the 
efforts of transitional justice authorities. Finally, the quoted excerpts from the focus groups, 
dyads and interviews have been translated from Croatian into English and kept as close to 
the original as possible. The language is both natural and spontaneous, which means that it 
is often poorly structured, grammatically incorrect and full of factual inaccuracies (although 
at times these are telling of deeper meaning).  
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature review  
 
This study aims to further the literature on transitional justice, norm diffusion, the ICTY and 
the legacy of the Homeland War in Croatian society. Since research on transitional justice 
started in the 1990s, and proliferated significantly after 2000, there has been little consensus 
over exactly what is being studied and what effect the process has had on societies. 
Generally, reviews have been pessimistic and positive outcomes have only been identified in 
highly specific areas, such as expressivist aspects of trials. In comparison, studies on 
Croatia are few but they do highlight particular areas of interest, such as competing 
narratives and ambiguous politics of compliance.  
 
 
2.1 Transitional justice in theory 
 
The literature on transitional justice is both broad and varied. Transitional justice was first 
used to describe societies in transition from undemocratic to democratic regimes (Kritz, 
1995). The term has since then taken on a variety of broad and specific meanings, 
encapsulating both political and legal transformations (Nagy, 2008; Sriram, 2007). There is 
little consensus over what the term means, it can apply to different types of transitions and 
there is no consensus as to what criteria to measure the process by (Nettelfield, 2010). 
Concepts it is frequently linked to, such as “coming to terms with the past” and 
“reconciliation”, have been plagued with an equal degree of ambiguity. For example, 
Dragović-Soso and Gordy (2010) have attempted to define “coming to terms with the past” 
as “genuine transformation in popular consciousness”, but as Dragović-Soso admits, the use 
of the term remains limited by the inconsistent use of the phrase (Dragović-Soso, 2014). 
Obradović-Wochnik (2013) has even argued that this ambiguity has prevented Serbian civil 
society initiatives working on “coming to terms with the past” to connect with the public, due 
to the narrow and binary definition of the term they used.  
 
Teitel (2000) coined the specifically legal definition, most relevant to this study, which 
focuses on legal responses to deal with the repercussions of human rights abuses 
committed by repressive regimes. Since then numerous studies have looked at the process 
through this narrow view, often focusing on the dynamic between deterrence, retribution and 
expressivism (Mani, 2002; Roht-Arriaza, 2006; Teitel, 2000). Even the literature on “coming 
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to terms with the past” has started to assume the existence of a relationship between truth 
and the process of coming to terms with it (Gibson, 2006).  
 
Many studies, based on both broad and narrow definitions of the term, have been relatively 
critical of the transitional justice process and its application (Baines, 2007; McEvoy and 
McGregor, 2008; Millar, 2012; Miller, 2008; Shaw, 2007). Early analyses of the ICTY 
(discussed below) were equally pessimistic. Bass captured the general sentiment of these 
studies when he stated that war crimes trials represent “the least awful alternative” (Bass, 
2000: 304), a view that remains prevalent in more recent studies (Dembour and Kelly, 2007; 
Haslam, 2007). Comparative and quantitative large-N analyses have shown ambiguous 
results: predominantly that they have no effect or little effect on societies (Hafner-Burton and 
Ron, 2007; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007; Horne, 2015; Lynch and Marchesi, 2015) but 
at times that they do have an effect (Sikkink and Walling, 2007). Thoms et al. (2010) provide 
a contemporary review of the efficacy of transitional justice efforts globally by focusing on 
state level policies and institutions. They find that empirical evidence remains insufficient, 
that second-generation systematic approaches have only just started and that, as discussed 
above, current conclusions tend to be highly varied (Thoms et al., 2010). They believe this is 
because most studies focus on short-term outcomes and often use narrow criteria for 
success. Their general conclusion is that most studies find transitional justice to have either 
positive or no effects, rather than negative ones, but they stress that even that observation 
has to be treated with caution, given the lack of comparative analyses (Thoms et al., 2010). 
Bass (2000) does, however, point at the expressivist legacy of documentation that these 
trials often create, which have been noticed in single case qualitative research. These 
produce more fruitful analyses of the microcosms that these processes take place in. 
 
Rangelov and Teitel (2011) argue that today transitional justice is different in a variety of 
ways. It has moved from exceptional transitional responses in times of crisis to normalised 
or entrenched justice seeking; increasingly disassociated from the politics of transition and 
less frequently linked to periods of conflict, whether past or current. It has also started to 
involve a growing variety of actors beyond the realm of the state, who are often agents in the 
globalisation of transitional justice. These actors have diverse interests and aims at stake in 
the process, but they nevertheless largely adopt a judicialised discourse. The process has 
changed so much that it is debatable how “transitional” it actually is and if the terminology 
and concept are still relevant.  
 
Rangelov (2014) proposes a different interpretation of transitional justice, one of 
deliberation, by drawing on the earlier works of Osiel (1998) and Teitel (2000). He focuses 
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on the capability of trials to bring about the discursive engagement of actors through public 
deliberation, which involves multiple representations and perspectives of the past (Rangelov, 
2014: 48). This deliberation has the potential to question the role of nationalism and the 
complicity of the nation in past events (Rangelov, 2014: 49). More generally, he identifies a 
shift from legalisation to judicialisation and from state to private actors. Law, therefore, 
currently has multiple politics and purposes. The key effect of this is the normalisation of 
justice-seeking across a range of social conditions, such as conflict, peace and transition. 
Similarly, Kent (2011) argues that transitional justice is about the past and working through 
it.  
 
This study, as well as a number of recent studies focusing on former Yugoslav states 
(Gordy, 2014; Nettelfield, 2010; Obradović-Wochnik, 2013; Ostojić, 2014; Pavlaković, 2014; 
Subotić, 2009), analyses the expressivist aims and effects of war crimes trials. Osiel (1998) 
argues that law’s key goals of deterrence and retribution should not receive the same 
amount of attention in transitional situations, when prosecutions should be evaluated on their 
pedagogical potential. When such trials are effective as public shows, they can lead to a 
shift towards more liberal values. These aims also have to be proven to work effectively in 
unison with the more traditional aims of deterrence and retribution. Domestic and 
conventional criminal courts also have expressivist aims in their work (Anderson and Pildes, 
2000; Feinberg, 1970) and court decisions hold a greater significance than most other 
occurrences (Brooks and Gewirtz, 1996). Even retribution has been argued to be a form of 
expressivism (Hampton, 1984).   
 
The discord between retribution, deterrence and expressivism arises from the application of 
traditional criminal law, developed to address conventional deviance, to mass atrocity, which 
is a unique phenomenon. Despite the acknowledgement of this by most scholars and 
practitioners, Drumbl (2007) points out that the methods of punishment and sentencing for 
such crimes remain surprisingly ordinary when compared to Western legal systems. Courts 
often prove to be insensitive to the nuances of affected societies, especially with regards to 
reconciliation (Osiel, 2009). For example, Ostojić (2014) shows how a disregard of local 
political nuances in Serbia alienated transitional authorities and threatened the legitimacy 
and stability of domestic institutions. Transitional justice efforts are, therefore, most likely to 
succeed if they act in accordance with the domestic political situation.  
 
Drumbl (2007) concludes that domestic or international tribunals designed for the purpose of 
punishment for war crimes struggle to achieve the aims of retribution and deterrence, while 
greater success (although still limited) is achieved in pursuing expressivist goals. 
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Expressivist goals are not held in the same high regard by courts and practitioners as 
retribution or deterrence, but such aspects of trials can have a strong messaging effect and 
can help affirm the value of law in society (ICTY Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, IT-95-
14/2-A). This can lead to a level of pedagogical performativity that can be hard to reproduce 
via any other legal mechanism.  
 
 
2.2 Norm diffusion 
 
The premise that expressivist messages of courts may lead to norm change in societies is 
based on the belief that norms “cascade” or “spill-over” from one level of society to another. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 895) outline the process of normative change as a three-
stage “cascade”. During the initial stage of norm emergence, norm entrepreneurs use their 
organisational platforms to call attention to issues by naming, interpreting and dramatizing 
them. They attempt to persuade a critical mass of norm leaders to embrace these new 
ideas. Once these entrepreneurs achieve widespread success, the second stage begins, as 
a tipping process pushes the norm toward universal acceptance and other actors join in.  
 
The second stage is characterised more by a dynamic of imitation, as norm leaders attempt 
to socialise other actors to become norm followers. The reasoning for this second stage, 
where the “cascade” through the rest of the population begins in proper, can vary. It can 
range from a combination of pressure for conformity; desire to enhance legitimation (both 
domestic and international); processes of socialisation or institutionalisation; and, 
demonstration effects. During the third stage norm internalisation occurs and norms acquire 
a taken-for-granted quality. They are no longer debated, but instead, they are widely 
accepted. In other words, the logic of appropriateness (discussed below) is so heavily 
integrated in law, bureaucracy and expectations of behaviour that people and states conform 
to them naturally, out of conviction and habit.  
 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 897) additionally outline three logics that guide norms: the 
logics of appropriateness, consequences and emotion. Of these, the logic of 
appropriateness is the most relevant to this study and leads to several conclusions in the 
realm of international criminal justice. First, as norms of criminal accountability for war 
crimes and other violations of international humanitarian and human rights law begin to 
cascade, the notion of individual responsibility should also gain international momentum. 
Local actors in affected states, not only advocates in advanced liberal democracies, should 
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increasingly blame atrocities on individuals (i.e. specific leaders), rather than collectives (i.e. 
whole communities or ethnicities).  
 
The logic of appropriateness, coupled with the theory of norm cascades, captures the 
mentality and tactics of advocates of international criminal accountability. It remains, 
however, debatable how norms gain social force in a situation when the institutional and 
social requirements for the rule of law are absent. The difficulty in accounting for this 
scenario arises from the potential absence of norm leaders or a lack of willingness in the 
population to accept a norm. Justice cascades have since been identified in comparative 
regional studies, most notably of Latin America. Lutz and Sikkink (2001) offer such a study, 
in which they also go on to identify a larger human rights norm cascade in the region that the 
justice cascade was a part of. They argue that the success of these processes is inextricably 
linked to the wider progress of human rights and democracy norms in the region. 
 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) provide an analysis that looks at human rights norm change 
specifically in a transitional situation at state level. They identify a “spiral model” that they 
claim is universally applicable in such circumstances. The model’s first phase involves state 
repression that is serious enough to disallow any significant opposition to challenge the 
state’s violations of international human rights norms. A state may never move past this 
phase. If a state does move past this, then the next two phases involve the gathering of 
information on the norm-violating state by human rights networks and the government 
making concessions to domestic opposition. This allows for the opposition to gain strength, 
which can lead to pressure from above and below. Finally, the fourth phase involves human 
rights norms attaining prescriptive status in the state, which can eventually lead to the full 
acceptance and implementation of them. This means that even actors opposed to the norm 
change may start using the language of human rights norms. This may be only for show or 
for strategic purposes, such as to avoid punishment, but it does lead to a spill-over effect. 
 
The authors claim that the model is universally applicable, despite the exclusion of the 
former Yugoslavia from their study. They reach this conclusion by treating collective 
understandings embedded in domestic institutions and political cultures as fixed, rather than 
dependent on politics. This questions if the model is actually universally applicable and if it 
has been over-applied. After all, it is debatable if any model could accurately capture 
transition in all situations. Despite this, the authors make some useful points. Firstly, they 
identify socialisation and institutionalisation of norms as important. Second, they show that 
international organisations, both governmental and not, can act as “teachers” of norms. 
Third, they confirm that human rights norms are more likely to be implemented and complied 
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with, if they resonate or fit with existing collective understandings. This last point is 
particularly relevant to a society such as Croatia, where a long tradition of human rights 
norms already existed and was present in the law but eroded during the conflict. 
 
Subotić (2009) and Lamont (2010) have questioned the universal validity of these models by 
focusing on the former Yugoslav states. In her analysis of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, 
Subotić argues the “spiral model” is incorrect as it assumes that domestic norm believers are 
required to take the lead in norm change. In many states these are absent or lack the 
authority to influence social change, while states may still display institutional markers of 
compliance. Lamont (2010) agrees with this and points out that most Latin American 
analyses studied NGOs that were initially composed of direct relatives of victims. The 
Krajina Serb community, for example, was almost completely ejected from Croatia in 1995, 
which may help to explain the relative absence of local NGO pressure since the victims of 
human rights abuses were no longer members of the domestic political community. Subotić 
(2009) identifies three types of international pressure that lead to normative change. 
Coercion ties compliance with material rewards; symbolic pressure appeals to a state’s 
desire to be perceived as a legitimate international actor; and, bureaucratic pressure works 
under conditions of uncertainty when states comply because they think it will resolve internal 
problems.  
 
International pressure on states does not enter a domestic political vacuum; rather, it always 
interacts with domestic political conditions to guide strategies of compliance. Relevant 
factors for this are domestic demand from below, veto players (also known as spoilers) and 
competing coalitions (Subotić, 2009). Subotić identifies three major coalitions that can act as 
agents of normative and institutional compliance, other than the ones mentioned by 
Finnemore and Sikkink. Norm resistors are political elites that are opposed to policy change 
and who will use international norms to further consolidate their rule. Instrumental adopters 
use norms to distinguish themselves from other groups and to position themselves as 
international reformers in society. Compliance in this case is still driven by external 
incentives, such as appeals to legitimacy. Finally, true believers fully accept international 
norm models and often spearhead norm adoption, but are frequently internally divided and 
weak. Subotić’s work, as well as this genre of research in general, provides some common 
sense observations on transitional justice and norm change that are useful for guiding future 
research.  
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2.3 Transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia  
 
Much of the early work on transitional justice looked at the process globally and initial case 
studies were based on Latin American experiences. Since then authors have incorporated 
newer cases, such as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and South Africa, among others. 
These have employed a varied and inconsistent set of methodologies and the resulting 
conclusions have been equally diverse.  
 
 
2.3.1 Early works 
 
Initial studies of the ICTY were generally critical of the Tribunal’s work and concluded that it 
has negative effects, if any. Bass (2000) saw the ICTY as a gesture by Western powers to 
give the appearance of moral concern for the Yugoslav states. Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003), 
in a seminal study on the Tribunal, argue that the prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities 
according to universal standards risks causing more atrocities than it could ever prevent, 
because it does not pay sufficient attention to political realities. They claim that a norm-
governed political order must be based on a political bargain among competing groups and 
on the creation of robust administrative institutions that can predictably enforce the rule of 
law. Preventing atrocities and enhancing the rule of law will frequently depend on striking 
politically expedient bargains that create effective political alliances to contain the power of 
potential perpetrators of abuses, which the authors call spoilers.  
 
With regards to the ICTY, Snyder and Vinjamuri claim that trials did not deter subsequent 
atrocities or contribute to bringing peace to the region. More broadly, they argue that neither 
the Yugoslav nor the Rwandan tribunals had a significant impact on reducing atrocities 
globally or on changing the reasoning of actors in East Timor, Chechnya, Sierra Leone and 
any other conflicts. The authors admit that, although the Tribunal may not have prevented 
the emergence of peace, it may have hindered efforts to diffuse ethnic tensions. The 
conclusion of the work is that purely pragmatic approaches are inadequate if they do not 
address the long-term goal of institutionalising the rule of law in transitional societies. It 
identifies amnesties as the best first step towards neutralising spoilers so that institutional 
transformation can proceed. In situations where legal accountability is not prevented by the 
threat of spoilers, trials should be carried out through domestic judicial institutions so as to 
strengthen their capability, credibility and legitimacy. In general, the authors argue that 
improvements in Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian democracy and human rights preceded and 
facilitated improved relations with the ICTY, and were not caused by it.  
 45 
 
Snyder and Vinjamuri view the ICTY, and domestic criminal tribunals, pessimistically and as 
a tool of retributive justice. It should, however, be kept in mind that the authors lacked the 
benefit of longer-term hindsight during their analysis. They were assessing short-term 
impacts of what is, by its nature, a long-term project with matching effects. This can make 
their analysis seem generalised, especially regarding the expectation for the ICTY to 
immediately prevent violence in region, given its initially small amount of power and financial 
backing.  
 
Stover and Weinstein (2004), in another seminal study, also focus on short-term effects as 
they look for a connection between the processes of reconciliation and justice. They 
investigate how societies affected by war and mass atrocity pursue justice for past crimes 
and, at the same time, rebuild their communities. Specifically, they look at what effect the 
international community’s involvement in criminal trials of suspected war criminals was 
having on the rebuilding effort. They claim that justice is most effective when it works in 
concert with other processes of social reconstruction and reflects the requirements of 
victims. They see this as perhaps the greatest lesson learned by the courts. 
 
Stover and Weinstein contend that a primary weakness of writings on justice after war and 
mass atrocity is the lack of objective evidence to substantiate claims about how well criminal 
trials achieve the goals ascribed to them. They believe insufficient attention has been paid to 
the effects, both positive and negative, that tribunals have had on post-war societies. They 
claim that any goals of attempting to broaden the ICTY mandate to include extra-legal goals 
in order to promote reconciliation among opposing parties, was unrealistic. Trials alone 
could not establish an incontrovertible historical record since each group could reinterpret 
the facts according to their own views. They do raise two important implications on public 
pedagogy of trials: that the relationship between a tribunal and the local populace is a critical 
dimension of its success; and, that the domestic legal system in a state must be influenced 
by the international one for effective war crimes trials to take place in the country where the 
crimes were committed. In Bosnia, specifically, a strong rule of law system would not be 
delivered by the ICTY, but by national courts. The tribunal’s judgments can, however, build a 
body of norms that national courts can apply.  
 
Stover and Weinstein, much like Snyder and Vinjamuri, take a pessimistic view of the court 
by looking at short-term effects through the lens of retributive justice and find it hard to judge 
the effectiveness of transitional justice. They argue that there is no direct link between 
criminal trials (international, national and local/traditional) and reconciliation, although this 
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could change over time. Social reconstruction after ethnic conflict is a slow and fragmented 
process, occurring at multiple levels (individual, community and state) that are influenced by 
a range of different factors, including social identity, fear, collective memory, governmental 
policies, security and protection, and past experience with the international community.  
 
In response to this, the authors present an ecological model of social reconstruction for post-
war countries that have experienced serious breaches of human rights, including genocide 
and ethnic cleansing. Drawing on research by developmental and community psychologists, 
they suggest that social change in post-war countries must be aware of the relationships and 
dependencies that exist between and among individuals, institutions, and community and 
societal groupings. Social reconstruction must therefore engage all levels of society, from 
the individual to the state, although most probably at different times and in different ways. 
Much like Snyder and Vinjamuri’s analysis, this study also analysed short-term effects and 
focused on an ambiguous and broad theme, that of reconciliation, which makes for a difficult 
analysis. Other than these studies, the often quoted and pessimistic literature on the ICTY is 
extensive. Studies, such as those by Cobban (2006), D’Amato (1994), Kerr (2004), 
Lombardi (2003) and Zacklin (2004), are all in a loose sense relevant to this study, but they 
do not provide any specific contributions to warrant a further discussion in this instance. It is 
also worth noting “insider’s tell-all” types of works, most notably by Hartmann19 (2007) and 
Del Ponte20 (2008). These have a limited academic value, but they are significant since at 
times they were cited by focus group participants in this study as proof that the Tribunal was 
biased in its work.  
 
 
2.3.2 Single case studies 
 
Single case studies of ICTY effects on specific states have yielded ambiguous, although 
generally more optimistic, results. McMahon and Forsythe (2008) find that the ICTY had little 
progressive effect on Serb political leaders, parties, institutional change or society, primarily 
due to the strength of traditional Serb nationalism. The ICTY did, however, play an important 
role in maintaining the concentration of the international community focused on Serbia by 
building a network of governments, regional organisations, and NGOs committed to peace 
building in the region. The authors also highlighted such networked pressures at play in 
                                                
19 Florence Hartmann was the official spokesperson for Carla del Ponte while she was the Chief 
Prosecutor of the ICTY.  
20 Carla del Ponte was Chief Prosecutor at the ICTY from 1999 to 2008, and the ICTR from 1999 to 
2003.  
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neighbouring states. In Croatia, this often came in the form of demands from the EU, NATO 
and the United States’ government, who even went as far as threatening to block IMF and 
World Bank loans. Although they find no evidence for the Tribunal influencing actors when 
acting in isolation, they do ask the important question of whether similar transnational 
pressures could have been achieved in Serbia in the absence of the ICTY.  
 
Ostojić (2014) is also pessimistic and attributes Serbia’s lack of cooperation with the ICTY to 
the international community’s disregard of the domestic political situation (as opposed to the 
prevalence of “norm resistors”), which ultimately alienated domestic authorities. Dragović-
Soso and Gordy (2010), on the other hand, adjudge the record of transitional justice in the 
region and country to be mixed with regards to a range of transitional efforts. They find that 
judicial institutions have lacked consistency, efforts at truth commissions have consistently 
failed and that civil society has been divided with regards to reconciliation. Despite the 
plethora of negative views in the literature, Gordy (2014) warns that the progress of 
transitional justice should be put into context and that disenchantment with particular 
incidents can all too easily be allowed to taint the whole process. The fact that these painful 
memories are being discussed and confronted at all is exceptional, while the speed at which 
it has happened is unprecedented. Gordy (2014) admits the international community had a 
key role in bringing about this confrontation, at times even forcing it, but he also points to the 
participation of civil society in the region, which often spearheaded efforts in documentation, 
research and debate. These initiatives operated on the cultural level, as much as on the 
political and legal ones. The studies discussed above show, once again, that time is needed 
to see the full effects of the ICTY and that transitional justice in a region can be affected by 
multiple causes with many domestic and international variables at play. This is made all the 
more complex by the emphasis on dangerously ambiguous terms, such as “reconciliation” 
and “coming to terms with the past.” 
 
Subotić (2009) also stresses the importance of complexity in this environment. She regards 
the Tribunal as one instrument in a range of options that can pressure states to comply with 
international human rights norms. She finds that in the cases of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia 
compliance with such norms becomes a political strategy that allows states to go through the 
motion of fulfilling international demands while actually rejecting the profound social 
transformation that norms require. This challenges accounts that predict increasing social 
support for international models of transitional justice through the creation of lasting 
coalitions with domestic allies and application of pressure on domestic governments to 
change their politics. In Serbia this led to the transitional justice process being hijacked by 
domestic political actors who used it as an international and domestic strategy to achieve 
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specific local goals. In Bosnia, on the other hand, the process was politicised by the internal 
structure of the Bosnian state, which was restricted due to the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
Her analysis of Croatia is discussed in a later section.  
 
Nettelfield (2010) provides a more optimistic view of the ICTY. She argues that, contrary to 
much contemporary analysis, Bosnia would have been much worse off without the ICTY. 
She claims that the most effective way to address the question of effectiveness, without any 
agreed-upon criteria, is to be explicit about the methods utilised and about the basis for 
findings in the course of evaluation. She shows how the ICTY has contributed to expanding 
the norm of accountability for war crimes; increased civil society’s support of the criminal 
justice process; built a fact-based historical record to remove any myth-based narrative of 
the war; raised the military’s trust in judicial investigations of war crimes; and, developed 
domestic capabilities for prosecutions.  
 
The premise of the work is that local courts are more effective than international ones and 
that the latter should only be used when needed. The rule of law is a realistic target in 
transitional situations, even if only by establishing local judiciary capacity. The presence of 
the ICTY shaped formation of activism and social mobilisation. It also encouraged other, 
similar, civil society groups and initiatives. It can be considered a “channel of political 
socialization” that helped shape attitudes (Almond and Verba, 1989). In Bosnia, the court did 
this by providing an opening for collective action by creating a space for discussion about 
atrocities, legitimacy for others to follow suit, and a flow of information about the war, that 
was led by victims. Furthermore, court documents provided a source against which claims 
about crimes could be evaluated.  
 
Nettelfield identifies the lack of institutional support as the greatest obstacle to norm change 
and pedagogy in Bosnia. International trials, however, led to local institutional change by 
creating local judicial capacity. The ICTY furthered this by providing experienced legal 
professionals, advising on lessons learned in The Hague and passing on information gained 
in court. International officials in the country headed the process to create a favourable 
environment for local trials. She concludes that the promotion of the rule of law during 
transition itself helps build stronger institutions, especially where members of the former 
regime are still in power, as was the case in Bosnia. More generally, the book shows that the 
court’s work has aided processes of democratisation. 
 
Nettelfield clearly shows that international criminal law has its rightful place in transitional 
circumstances, but it can only be a small part of the process of post-conflict social repair. 
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Bosnia is a unique state, which limits the number of comparisons that can be drawn with it. 
Nevertheless, the powers the courts have to facilitate political participation from below and to 
create judicial capacity are useful in the former Yugoslavia and beyond. Overall, she sees 
the ICTY as a positive influence in the region, although it could have achieved more. In 
particular, it could have used the Outreach Programme more efficiently. This useful analysis 
looks at previously ignored areas, such as the role of civil society and local forces that used 
the ICTY’s work to achieve democratising ends. It shows that domestic political crises arise, 
not so often from the mechanism itself (in this case the ICTY), but from the denial of crimes 
and behaviour surrounding that denial. Elites’ admission of wrongdoing often paved the way 
for further social reconstruction, which can be viewed as a norms cascade. It also highlights 
the importance of the internalisation of human rights norms and identifies the presence of a 
spill-over effect (or norm cascade), created by the establishment of the rule of law.  
 
Nettelfield agrees that parallels can be drawn between her study and the situation in Croatia, 
and with that in mind, offers certain observations. She believes that no concerted effort has 
ever existed to demystify the Homeland War or to challenge the glorification of Croatian 
Generals, and sees this as a significant obstacle to progress. She views Croatia’s 
relationship with the ICTY as fraught, but thinks that the positive contributions are more 
easily identifiable than elsewhere. The country’s greater overall desire for EU and NATO 
membership made ICTY cooperation a priority, which much like Serbia, meant that the 
citizens of Croatia take a highly pragmatic approach to the court.    
 
A further area of note in the literature focuses on the involvement of civil society in the 
transitional justice process. Dembour and Kelly (2007) find a variety of sites of activism 
where the role of civil society can be observed, inside and outside of the courtroom setting, 
sometimes in cooperation with other actors. The challenge for law and associated 
professionals is to provide a legal framework that acknowledges the parallel requirements of 
civil society consent and contestation in international criminal law. Rangelov and Teitel 
(2011) expand on this theme further by claiming that global civil society represents a site of 
struggle for discursive hegemony over the meaning and conception of justice. In this model, 
civil society becomes an arena where the legitimacy of justice claims and structures is 
produced, fought over and negotiated. They see the ICTY’s lack of engagement with civil 
society as one of its greatest and clearest shortcomings. That is not to say that there was a 
significant civil society to engage with since, as Bilić (2012) and Dvornik (2009) point out, 
broad civic formations with such interests were not present at the time. 
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As the relationship between civil society and the rule of law evolved in the former Yugoslav 
states, civil society mobilisation to further this cause helped both strengthen and weaken the 
rule of law (Rangelov, 2013). Rangelov stresses that the role of civil society in shaping the 
rule of law in the region as a whole frequently reflected the ability of civil society actors to 
harness their relationships with political and legal institutions (Rangelov, 2013: 80). This 
meant that, in particular when dealing with sensitive issues, actors often played contradictory 
roles. Subsequently, the rule of law was simultaneously weakened and strengthened as civil 
society produced and questioned the legitimacy of legal institutions. Obradović-Wochnik 
(Obradovic-Wochnik, 2013) highlights another contradictory dynamic: that civil society in 
Serbia struggled to connect with the public due to misinterpretations over what “coming to 
terms with the past” entails. NGOs in the country simply ignored narratives about the past 
that did not fit into their own interpretations of the process, leading to a binary system of 
rejection or acceptance (Obradovic-Wochnik, 2013: 217). This reduced the public’s 
relationship with the past to accepting the truth, ignoring the complex processes that are 
necessary when the past is painful or disputed. 
 
Little consensus exists over the efficacy of transitional justice mechanisms in the former 
Yugoslavia. Initially pessimistic studies, analysing the region as a whole, have now given 
way to single case studies that have produced more ambiguous results. They point to a 
highly complex situation on the ground in which few parallels can be drawn from state to 
state. These studies do, however, highlight the importance of certain actors (such as 
domestic courts and civil society) and the positive legacy that has been left behind (such as 
a protection of human rights). Research on Croatia has partly reflected this, although 
through a much narrower set of studies. 
 
 
2.4 Transitional justice in Croatia 
 
2.4.1 Identity, ICTY compliance and competing influences 
 
Most studies of the transitional justice process in Croatia have focused on political elites. 
Many authors discussed below argue that politicians proved to be more effective at 
preventing the spread of transitional justice norms than trials were at enabling their spread. 
Peskin and Boduszynski (2003) found that ultimately politicians had more influence over 
how the Tribunal was accepted by the population than anything that the Tribunal or the 
Outreach programme had to say. They also point out that there was effectively no domestic 
pressure from civil society in Croatia to investigate war crimes committed by the Croatian 
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government and impetus for this was almost completely external (Peskin and Boduszynski, 
2003: 1123).21 Lamont (2010) frames this in the larger strategy of successive Croatian 
governments to accept the normative and legal framework of the Tribunal system, while also 
occasionally mounting legal challenges to specific indictments and investigations. This 
meant that the state was propagating countervailing norms that often limited its ability to 
cooperate with Tribunal requests. Despite prosecution and conviction of Croatian generals, 
Croats continued to believe that its own citizens did not perpetrate war crimes (Lamont, 
2004). Prime Minister Ivo Sanader and his government regarded compliance as an 
unavoidable legal obligation, while at the same time attempting to challenge the Gotovina 
indictment before a domestic audience. Strategic compliance with the Tribunal was designed 
to fit within a broader legalistic strategy of defiance that allowed HDZ-led governments to 
present their formal compliance with international obligations, while also contesting ICTY 
indictments.  
 
Lamont (2010) identifies this as particularly evident in Croatian civil society, which served to 
harden non-compliance attitudes. While elites continued to advocate human rights norm 
affirming rhetoric, as per ICTY requests, civil society pushed more aggressively for a 
complete rejection of the court’s jurisdiction. This came for the most part from war veterans’ 
and victims’ organisations, which were driven by recent war memories and access to state 
funding. Domestic and foreign human rights NGOs were comparably weaker and faced 
opposition from other groups and the media. Subotić (2009) also found that in Croatia the 
overriding goal of integrating the state into the EU was so strongly shared by most political 
actors that it superseded all other ideological differences. This was due to a “European” self-
identity, defined in many ways in opposition to Serbia, which overpowered existing 
nationalist narratives. Instrumental adoption served the Croatian state well and allowed for 
governments to present transitional justice as a necessary step to Europe. This meant that 
Croatia was proactive internationally and reactive domestically to the needs of the process. 
The strategy allowed the state to prove to the international community that they respected 
international rules while preserving almost intact the national understanding of the character 
of the war and Croatia’s role in it. 
 
Zambelli (2010) frames this within Croatia’s attempt to distance itself from the Balkans 
through a process of “othering”. This meant that Croatia’s situation shifted from the identity 
of a post-war victim of aggression that viewed the outside world with suspicion and fear, 
towards an active advocate of change in the region and a supporter of international 
                                                
21 This is no longer wholly true and since the 2003 study there have been a greater number of efforts.  
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institutions such as the ICTY. In order to achieve this, the state had to redefine the nature of 
its cooperation with the ICTY and rearticulate the definition of sovereignty it was employing 
in its official discourse. Croatia’s identity as a law-abiding and law-governed state began to 
depend heavily on its cooperation with the ICTY. Being capable of trying criminals in 
domestic tribunals, as well as allowing their trials abroad, demonstrated the state’s maturity 
and its belonging together with Western European countries. An important question that 
arose in the early stages of this discourse was concerned with whether collaboration with the 
Tribunal would erode state sovereignty. Croatia had to comply with EU conditions, among 
many reasons, in order to conform to its identity as a Western and democratic country. Non-
compliance would have meant staying at the “Balkan” level of closed-minded nationalism 
and pursuing of antiquated interpretations of sovereignty and state interests. In other words, 
it would have brought it closer to the feared “other”. Moreover, Zambelli stresses the 
importance of the potential criminalisation of the Homeland War as a significant obstacle to 
the new coalition government that followed the Tuđman era. After all, the war was and still is 
considered one of the foundations of the modern Croatian state and a cornerstone of 
Croatian national identity. This also extended to the ICTY, which was and is seen as 
potentially criminalising the Homeland War.   
 
 
2.4.2 Competing understandings of the past  
 
Zambelli (2010) also discusses the other common theme of the transitional justice literature 
on Croatia, that of interpretations and understandings of the past in Croatian society and 
politics. Pavlaković (2010) analyses the process of constructing the past in the country and 
argues that association of memory with one’s own ethnicity is in turn a potentially significant 
barrier to reconciliation. If people view the past through the prism of ethnicity, they are likely 
to view the present and future in the same way, thereby further reinforcing ethnic divisions. 
The presence of ethnic narratives critically influences an individual’s response to the ICTY 
and the truths that it establishes. Pavlaković presents this issue as a juxtaposition between 
the Croatian politicians’ version of the truth, constructed through public commemorations to 
create a purely victorious narrative, and the counter-narrative that the ICTY has created, 
which casts the country as a victim and a perpetrator of crimes. 
 
The above issue is further exacerbated by selective truth acceptance in Vukovar 
(Pavlaković, 2010). Serbs and Croats typically accept only those truths that support and 
corroborate their own ethnic narratives, while at the same time discarding or denying those 
that do not. Because both the Serb and Croat meta-narratives are firmly based around the 
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notion of a defensive war, they are often not willing to accept that their own side may have 
committed war crimes. When they somewhat begrudgingly do concede that crimes were 
carried out, it is usually attributed to individual excesses, while crimes committed by the 
other group were premeditated and sanctioned. Clark (2012) provides an insight into this 
and the interplay between war facts and war myths. She adopts a micro-level approach to 
the Tribunal’s legacy, looking at its impact on the ground and, specifically, at whether and to 
what extent it has aided inter-ethnic reconciliation in Vukovar. The fact that the Tribunal has 
held so few trials in relation to Vukovar has impacted on inter-ethnic relations in two crucial 
ways. First, as guilt has not been individualised to any significant extent, this has created the 
space for individuals to decide for themselves who is culpable, and all too frequently they fall 
back on notions of collective guilt. Second, because neither side believes that it has received 
justice from the Tribunal, this has encouraged people to focus and draw attention to the 
suffering and pain that members of their own ethnic group endured during the war. Clark 
concludes that it is simplistic to assume that trials contribute to reconciliation by 
documenting the truth and that we cannot assume the existence of one “truth” that everyone 
can agree upon. She identifies the prevalence of competing truths in Vukovar and that the 
ICTY, therefore, operates in an environment of opposing and competing truths. Truth is a 
highly contested concept in the former Yugoslavia and there are few shared truths about the 
events of 1991. For example, Serb interviewees consistently referred to the war as a civil 
war, while Croat interviewees highlighted that it was a war of Serbian aggression. Clark’s 
work concludes that the ICTY has had little positive impact on reconciliation between Serbs 
and Croats in the city. In doing so, it has effectively problematized two commonly used 
claims: that criminal trials aid reconciliation through the dispensing of justice and through the 
establishment of truth. 
 
Closely related to this is the interplay between legitimate defenders and war criminals. Clark 
frames this around Operation Storm, the case of General Gotovina and what she calls 
rejected truths. In Vukovar, and in Croatia more generally, there exists a strong identity 
based upon defence. This is particularly so among former combatants and it is one of the 
principal reasons why the “truths” that the ICTY uncovers may fail to gain local acceptance. 
The Tribunal’s original judgment against General Gotovina fundamentally challenged the 
accepted wisdom that the Homeland War was a purely defensive war. In order for the 
population to accept the Tribunal’s judgment, they would have had to radically review their 
views and perceptions of the war. In other words, they would have been forced to go against 
the national meta-narrative.  
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The biggest obstacle to this, according to Clark, is that Croatia’s politicians and media have 
continued to promote the national meta-narrative and have cultivated a deep sense of 
Croatian victimhood. Moreover, the majority of the media has only sporadically and often in 
a biased manner reported about decisions in favour of Croatian Generals. By doing so, they 
have contributed to the escalation of an obviously deeply imbued attitude in a major part of 
Croatian society, that of denying or justifying that crimes were committed by their own side. 
There appears to be little will to settle and reconcile these competing versions of the truth in 
Croatia. There were, however, some notable exceptions, such as Feral Tribune, Novosti, 
Novi List, as well as a range of newer online portals that reported on these issues in a more 
objective and critical manner. These have, however, all come under attack recently and 
many have been forced to change, if they still exist at all (Chapter 4 will provide a more 
detailed outlined of these).  
 
Pavlaković (2010) delves into the issue of General Gotovina in more detail and finds the 
case emblematic of the nexus of politics, symbols, rituals and collective memory in Croatia, 
as well as more broadly in Yugoslavia. He points out that history is constructed not only 
through facts, but also through myths that are often more influential than statistics. In 
another study, Pavlaković (2007) highlights that commemorations and trials have 
significantly affected the way history is being constructed in Croatia, for the most part without 
the participation of historians. As discussed above, Croatian politicians used public 
commemorations to create a purely victorious narrative of the founding of the state, while the 
ICTY has attempted to construct a counter-narrative. 
 
Today, the rhetoric at the anniversary of Operation Storm has changed a number of times, 
due to the initial judgments and later acquittals in the cases of Gotovina and Markač. 
Croatian politicians now acknowledge that war crimes did occur and that there were Serbian 
victims as well as Croatian ones, something that would not have realistically been possible 
during the Tuđman era. Even if the ICTY can be discredited as a “historian”, Pavlaković 
reminds readers that the archives collected by the Tribunal and the transcripts from the trials 
have become invaluable resources to researchers working on this time period. He concludes 
by identifying two key trends with regards to the dynamic between legitimate defenders and 
war criminals. That Croatian leaders are now willing to cooperate with the ICTY and in doing 
so, admitting that war crimes have taken place. On the other hand, that no systematic effort 
has ever existed and may never exist to demystify the Homeland War or challenge the 
glorification of General Gotovina and others like him. The most recent acquittals of Croatian 
Generals show that the construction of history and a national meta-narrative in Croatia 
remains an actively on-going process.  
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The most recent relevant work by Rangelov (2014) argues that Croatia provides an 
opportunity to analyse how judicial processes can promote public deliberation about 
nationalist narratives and representations of the past (through the lens of deliberative 
justice). The predominant war narrative, however, continues to affect judicial outcomes: 
most cases are conducted in the lower courts (which remain biased) and participation of the 
accused in the war (if they were a member of the Croatian police or armed forces) is often 
used as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing (Rangelov, 2014: 150). Rangelov also 
highlights the central role that local courts play in the process of transitional justice.   
 
Overall, although works on Croatia are few, they do highlight the most relevant themes to 
the transitional justice process in the country. First, they focus on the importance of identity 
in elites’ strategies of compliance with the ICTY. Second, they investigate the concept of 
competing narratives within the state, both among elites and the public. Together they point 
to an ambiguity both messages and actions from a top-down perspective that translates into 
competing “truths” at the micro level of everyday interaction.   
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Transitional justice has been assessed from a vast range of perspectives, leading to an 
equally broad range of conclusions, with no consensus over whether the process helps 
societies recover from past human rights abuses or not. Both positive and negative studies, 
however, stress that local and collective understandings of law and the past are the key to 
such rehabilitation. Transitional justice, and associated processes, occur not only at the level 
of politics or law, but also on the levels of culture and emotion. The interplay between these 
is highly dependent on the relationships that exist between individuals, institutions and 
societal groupings. Analysis of these processes requires cross-disciplinary approaches that 
can research social change in its many guises. 
 
This can help shed further light on the effects of transitional justice and if norm spill-over 
does occur in the mechanistic fashion some models describe. The little literature that exists 
on Croatia focuses on themes that can help with this, such as the mythology surrounding the 
Homeland War and competing narratives among elites and the public. Broad concepts, such 
as identity and reconciliation, have been studied at the micro level in specific locations, such 
as Vukovar. Specific concepts that are arguably better suited to analysis, such as norm 
compliance, have also been studied, but only at the level of elites. These studies do not take 
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enough steps to avoid the methodological trap of interpreting state compliance as indicators 
of norm entrenchment or diffusion.  
 
Norms and narratives as constituent parts of identity could provide a more easily analysed 
concept in this sense. Moreover, analysis of everyday norms and narratives is missing in 
Croatia, other than in Vukovar. This means that there is a lack of research on how top-down 
and bottom-up narratives interact in Croatia, which this study hopes to fill.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Researching norms and narratives in a post-conflict situation 
 
The study called for a methodology that can allow for research depth, rather than width, 
since the issues being investigated were both complex and sensitive. Qualitative methods 
were, therefore, considered more effective than quantitative ones, due to the nature of the 
research information that the study required. The primary method of data collection in the 
study was focus groups in conjunction with follow-up interviews, as well as dyads and 
individual interviews for particularly hard to organise. These were supplemented with a 
media analysis, a brief survey and QCA. Questions in the survey, focus groups and 
interviews were inspired from a media analysis and nationally representative surveys 
covering similar themes, which allowed for representative comparisons of responses. This 
chapter will discuss the reasoning behind the methodology and the experience of fieldwork, 
including the problems encountered. Discussions sometimes led to sensitive topics that 
were particularly personal and emotional to participants, which brought about 
methodological issues that are rarely discussed in the transitional justice literature and that 
may add a new set of problems to focus group research. The discussions had the potential 
to cause significant upset among participants when a high amount of importance was 
attached to topics, such as the war narrative. The methodology behind the media analysis 
will be discussed in the following chapter, as it ties in closely with the results of the media 
analysis.  
 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that we can only have indirect evidence of norms, just 
as we can only have indirect evidence of most other motivations for political action. This 
poses a methodological problem since norms can be hard to measure (if they can be 
measured at all), they often only present themselves in interactions between individuals and, 
consequently, often take a lot of time to observe or study. Norms can benefit from an 
interactive method of inquiry, such as focus groups, which can help explore narratives that 
become more apparent through group interaction. They can highlight which narratives are 
contested, which are reinforced and which are perceived as threatened by others.  
 
Much of the scholarship on narratives has focused on the level of elite political narratives, 
thereby missing how ordinary people build and negotiate their concept of identity and the 
nation. These are taken-for-granted and implicit understandings, which can be made explicit 
through the use of focus groups and in-depth interviews (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 540). 
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Wodak et al. (1999), for example, used focus groups and interviews to explore how ordinary 
Austrians constructed their national understanding. Söderström (2010) also found the 
approach useful due to the spontaneous responses it elicits, thereby giving more honest and 
natural answers to relatively specific questions. The method is particularly well-suited to 
exploring everyday narratives that are reproduced in the micro setting (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 
2008: 542). 
 
Surveys could also research this concept by studying attitudes, perceptions, and 
stereotypes, in order to provide a representative picture of how a public constructs the world 
around them. They are, however, not good at studying the nuanced variation that occurs in 
everyday speech, which also involves non-verbalised gestures such as shrugs, nods, 
laughter and silence (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 555). Moreover, exclusive use of survey 
methodology would not be fit for this purpose, as it can only analyse public perception along 
one dimension, without investigating the reasons behind these perceptions. Ordinary 
conversation can, for example, show cynicism where surveys would have merely shown 
answers that are societally acceptable or appealing to researchers’ perceived expectations.  
 
Questions about the Homeland War will elicit discussions that refer to the war. Left to their 
own devices, however, ordinary people may ignore such references in favour of other 
categories that are more suitable for a given situation (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 556). 
Here participant observation could prove to be particularly useful, since the method would 
not guide participants towards particular responses. Focus groups, however, can 
compensate for this by, at times, using indirect questioning that can shed light on the 
interpretive frames that people employ (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 556).  
 
In other words, focus groups provide a healthy middle ground: they allow for relatively 
natural expression of narratives, which can effectively highlight taken-for-granted concepts, 
whilst also keeping conversations relatively on-topic. Some degree of structure allows for 
comparison to nationally representative surveys, while follow-up interviews and indirect 
questioning provide more open-ended depth to discussions. Finally, focus groups are useful 
in post-conflict scenarios, where recent history is both a sensitive and emotional topic. 
 
 
3.1 Survey elements 
 
The study employed survey methodology in two ways: one was the referral to previous, 
nationally representative surveys conducted in Croatia, the second was a survey that was 
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handed out to all participants prior to the focus groups, dyads or individual interviews. The 
representative studies helped inspire both the survey and focus group questions in this study 
(see Appendices A and B). They allowed for a representative comparison to be made with 
the collected data, thereby helping alleviate the problem of representativeness that is 
inherent to focus group methodology.  
 
The nationally representative surveys that were used and referred to throughout this study 
are:22 
 
• The Kolstø (2011) survey that focused on the war narrative in Croatia and attitudes 
towards reconciliation, war crimes and forgiveness (2011). 
• The Belgrade Centre for Human Rights survey on attitudes towards the ICTY in 
Croatia (2011).  
• Several studies by Ilišin (2011) published in one paper, which provide a comparative 
analysis of youth attitudes in 1986, 1999 and 2004, supplemented by a control 
sample of older individuals (over 30) and members of the Croatian political elite in 
2004. 
• A post-2011 election survey by Ipsos Puls (2012). 
 
The survey handed out before focus group sessions was relatively short and the initial part 
of it was only concerned with personal details about participants, while the rest asked for 
their opinions and attitudes towards certain issues. This allowed for comparison of the 
respondents to the general population. This proved to be useful, but it was not without its 
shortcomings, primarily because most respondents came to an organised group discussion, 
prior to which they were asked to be as open and honest as possible. Having signed the 
consent forms, participants were then given the surveys, the content of which they frequently 
discussed with the researcher and amongst themselves. In other words, they often (although 
not always) influenced each other and even answered questions in unison. In some cases 
parts of the group or the entire group decided that a question was inappropriate and in 
unison wrote in a more appropriate question or answer. For example, three members of the 
Zagreb war veterans group discussed and then in unison wrote down a comment to the 
question “To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Croatian officials and 
soldiers convicted at the ICTY or in domestic courts are heroes, not criminals.” They 
commented that this was not a relevant question since the ICTY did not sentence a single 
                                                
22 Other surveys are referred to, but not as consistently and often as the above. 
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member of the Croatian Army, only members of the HVO.23 The group dynamic, therefore, 
did not allow for the survey to be conducted in a rigorous fashion. It did, however, help 
initiate discussion amongst the group and in many instances acted as a useful introduction 
to the topics about to be discussed. In this sense it served a useful purpose outside of the 
comparison of results.  
 
 
3.2 Focus groups, dyads and interviews 
 
3.2.1 Why focus groups? 
 
As was already touched upon above, focus groups were chosen since they can best gather 
data on the complex interactional dynamics that lead individuals to share some truths, 
withhold others, and build alternate versions of reality in a group (Hollander, 2004). They do 
not “force” opinions on individuals (such as surveys may do) and they strongly reflect the 
independence of human opinion by further removing the interviewer from the study (by 
encouraging the group to discuss amongst themselves, rather than directly with the 
moderator, especially compared to individual interviews) and by focusing on social context, 
where opinion tends to be created, thereby increasing external validity (Albrecht et al., 1993; 
Söderström, 2010: 4). These perspectives may exist independently outside of the group 
setting, but they are more likely to be revealed through the social gathering and interaction 
that is inherent to the focus group (Gibbs, 1997). The methodology uses social context by 
encouraging group interaction to show how people talk about an issue and, therefore, 
effectively displays and discusses differences in the group (Lewis, 2003: 60). When used 
properly, they are also exceptionally useful in giving a voice to marginalised groups (Morgan, 
1997: 133). Overall, focus groups provide sequences of narrative to analyse, rather than 
only instances.  
 
In terms of the nature of the topic, focus groups are good at tackling abstract concepts and 
investigating issues that could be illuminated by the display of social norms (Lewis, 2003: 
60). Moreover, anthropological research has shown that publics that have recently 
witnessed violence or atrocity (even if from a distance) may hold coping practices that are 
taken-for-granted in society (Das, 2001).24 Focus groups are adept at exploring taken-for-
                                                
23 This is factually ambiguous, since some were members of the Croatian army when convicted, but 
for crimes committed whilst in the HVO.  
24 It is questionable how “recent” the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are, as nearly 20 years has 
passed since they ended. Obradović-Wochnik (2013) has shown that the public in Serbia similarly 
continues to speak as if past is still continuing, as if the wars are not over.  
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granted concepts since, more so than any other interview method, they permit spontaneous 
expression of ideas by participants by allowing individuals to employ the language that they 
are used to using to discuss an issue to an extent that is difficult to replicate in a more 
structured and formal interview (Bertrand et al., 1992). Essentially, the approach shows not 
only how individuals feel but also why they feel that way and how they construct narratives.  
 
The method is useful in the case of Croatia and transitional justice since it is effective in 
gaining trust when interviewing ex-combatants (who also made up a large proportion of the 
pensioners interviewed in this study), whose trust can be hard to attain and who often 
attempt to provide narratives that fit with their ideas of what the researcher is looking for 
(Christensen and Utas, 2008; Söderström, 2010). When constructed with the appropriate 
care and run properly, they also become effective in discussing sensitive issues. Moreover, 
this spontaneity adds to reliability since respondents are not able to coordinate their answers 
in advance, as they may do in surveys or individuals interviews with a similar number of 
participants (Söderström, 2010: 4). Much of this can also be completed through participant 
observation, although this would take longer and the topics of interest may never actually 
arise (Söderström, 2010).  
 
Finally, in terms of the research population, the small geographical area and centralised 
nature of Croatia suited focus group research well. Groups could be arranged easily in both 
urban and rural areas, as travel between the two is cheap, quick and well organised. This 
means that a study need not focus only on the major urban hubs while costs and time in the 
field can be kept under control. This allowed for the usual problem of representativeness in 
focus group research, which is discussed in more detail below, to be somewhat alleviated. 
 
 
3.2.2 Issues to be aware of with focus groups 
 
The predominant problem for focus group research is representativeness, especially when 
compared to surveys. It is important to keep in mind that the methodology does not serve 
the same purpose as surveys and is better used to highlight types of responses and 
attitudes that can be valuable in directing future, more quantitative research. The best 
solution to this problem is to use existing quantitative research as a secondary source or as 
a control, in order to allow the study to explore perspectives in more detail, without having to 
worry if these are the most widely shared ones. While focus groups do not provide a basis 
for empirical generalisability, they do allow for conclusions to be drawn about narratives as 
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types of collective experience by looking at sequences rather than merely instances of 
speech (Stanley, 2016: 244).  
 
Group process provides the opportunity for a researcher to collect rich experiential 
information by using group interactions; it is the unique advantage of focus group research, 
but it can also undo it (Carey and Smith, 1994). Limitations of the approach arise from 
psychosocial factors that can potentially limit the quality of the data; the impact of 
participants censoring and conforming in the group setting can severely limit results (Carey 
and Smith, 1994). Alternatively, instead of participants withholding information, it is also 
possible that their contributions may not represent their “true” underlying beliefs and 
feelings, which they may have altered due to the context of the group.25    
 
The social context in which focus groups are held is inextricably linked to the group process 
and it is a dynamic that warrants specific attention. The social contexts of focus groups, in 
other words the relationships among the participants and between the participants and the 
researcher, as well as the more comprehensive social structures within which the discussion 
takes place, all influence the way the data is generated and the nature of what is produced 
(Albrecht et al., 1993; Hollander, 2004; Morgan, 1997; Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990). The 
effects of this are yet to be investigated in any depth, so it was important to avoid 
contaminating the data by paying careful attention to the composition of a group. For 
example, when interviewing teachers, the presence of a head teacher in the discussion may 
force other teachers to adapt their answers to what their superior would like to hear. This 
was not always possible; the non-urban pensioners group involved a husband and wife, who 
may have tailored responses based on each other’s participation.26 The collection of 
individual data after discussions, either through individual in-depth interviews or through a 
survey, is a popular method used to alleviate this problem. This approach allows for 
discussants to elaborate on views they expressed during the discussion, fill in gaps in their 
contributions, describe thoughts or memories in more detail, or share their reactions to the 
focus group discussion, including their comfort with discussing their experiences and 
feelings (Kitzinger, 1994; Morgan, 1997). 
 
                                                
25 The list of studies highlighting these, and other closely related issues, is comprehensive. For more 
details see: Albrecht et al. (1993), Hollander (2004), Morgan (1997) and Stewart and Shamdasani 
(1990).   
26  The couple did not seem to influence each other, but in order to alleviate this further, the follow-up 
dyad included the husband. At the very least his opinions did not seem to change, although this does 
not account for the wife.  
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Standardisation can be problematic in loosely structured focus group interviews. As a project 
level design issue, this concept addresses the extent to which identical questions and 
procedures are used in all groups (Morgan, 1997: 142). The advantage of such an 
approach, and its most common justification, is the high degree of comparability that it 
allows across different groups (Morgan, 1997). This comparability is particularly useful when 
the aim of the research is to compare the responses of different categories of participants. 
The disadvantage of standardisation, on the other hand, is that a study must stick with 
whatever questions and procedures were chosen prior to commencing field research. This 
can be restrictive when investigating fluid concepts, such as those that focus group research 
often tackles, and can limit the liberty of respondents to develop a topic during a session. 
Overall, some standardisation is necessary, but researchers working with sensitive or 
controversial topics need to pay special attention to achieve the correct balance of freedom 
of expression mixed with comparable results. Focus groups in this study were consequently 
semi-structured; a core set of questions was used in all groups while the rest depended on 
the specific discussions.   
 
Finally, as with most qualitative methods, lack of quantification can lead to undue subjectivity 
on the part of the researcher in analysing results and arriving at conclusions (Bertrand et al., 
1992). A range of solutions and tools exist to deal with this problem, for example QCA was 
used as a control in this study to alleviate the problem, as well as the aforementioned 
longitudinal analyses.   
 
 
3.2.3 Why follow-up interviews? 
 
Follow-up interviews were used to alleviate the risk of the social context of the focus groups 
from affecting the data, and they were a means to further explore the most interesting 
opinions expressed. This particular method was chosen as previous focus group studies 
have used it effectively to gain more depth. Moreover, it produces a narrative that addresses 
the continuity of personal experiences over time (Morgan, 1997).  
 
In terms of the nature of data, individual in-depth interviews are effective at generating deep 
personal accounts, understanding personal context and exploring specific issues in greater 
detail (Gillham, 2000). In this sense, they can further investigate what leads to the narratives 
that will have arisen during the focus groups. In terms of the nature of the topic, individual 
interviews are effective at understanding complex issues and processes, such as 
motivations and decisions (Gillham, 2000). Much like focus groups, they allow for subjects 
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involving social norms and sensitive issues to be discussed, but with the addition of being 
able to explore private topics in greater detail. Finally, in terms of the research population, 
interviews can reach participants who are likely to be less willing or able to travel (Gillham, 
2000). Once again, Croatia was well-suited to this since travel to any one interview was 
quick, affordable and convenient.   
 
There was a notable difference between focus groups, dyads and interviews, especially 
follow-up interviews. As the following chapters will show, data from focus groups proved to 
be far richer and more useful in the analysis. In some ways, follow-up interviews were 
unnecessary other than to confirm that social context did not contaminate focus group data 
in any way (and narratives did not change in the individual setting). Their main use was to 
cover areas that were not discussed in focus group discussions, especially with particularly 
talkative groups, such as war veterans and pensioners. Individual interviews or dyads were 
often used with teachers since focus groups proved hard to organise. The lack of group 
dynamic did affect the nature of the data, but focus groups with teachers were relatively well 
structured compared to other target segments (they were the least verbose). Dyads and 
interviews, therefore, did not differ as much from focus groups as they may have with other 
target segments.   
 
 
3.2.4 Conducting the focus groups 
 
Overall the focus group interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner and the 
researcher moderated all groups.27 Each section began with a broad topic, where the 
researcher would let the participants speak relatively freely and develop the topic as they 
saw fit. Following this the researcher asked more specific questions and was involved more 
actively (at least compared to the initial phase) in directing the discussion. The different 
stages of the focus groups were planned based on the analysis of group processes and 
models of small group behaviour provided by Finch and Lewis (Finch and Lewis, 2003). By 
understanding these dynamics, it was possible to choose the best approach for the 
discussion as it moved through different phases of the group process. 
 
The initial phase set the atmosphere for the discussion and laid out the ground rules (Finch 
and Lewis, 2003: 177). The researcher would introduce himself, welcome participants and 
outline how the discussion would work. The key aim of the phase was for the researcher to 
                                                
27 The literature on focus groups does not reach a consensus over how structured discussions should 
be, therefore, a middle ground has been chosen (see: Morgan, 1996). 
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make participants feel comfortable. After this the information sheet, consent form and survey 
were passed around, one after the other rather than simultaneously. Following this, in the 
brief second stage, the voice recorder was turned on and introductions would be made on 
the recording for transcription purposes (Finch and Lewis, 2003: 177). 
 
Stages three and four were differentiated by their semi-structured and structured 
discussions; in this study they were repeated a number of times. Initially, in the third stage, 
the researcher would introduce the general topic of discussion and start it off (Finch and 
Lewis, 2003). The goal would be to encourage discussion and involve as many participants 
as possible. The researcher’s job during this early phase was to note down certain more 
general opinions about the war, war crimes and the transitional justice process. The key aim 
was to balance group interaction against the need for individual detail, as well as the value 
of free-flowing debate against the need for coverage of specific topics (Finch and Lewis, 
2003). The next stage would follow-up on this debate with a more structured discussion. It 
was the researcher’s job to move on to the more specific topics that are directly related to 
the norm or narrative under investigation. 
 
The final sixth stage would bring a close to the group discussion. The aim was to finish on a 
positive note, for example by discussing potential solutions to the problems discussed. This 
was particularly important when discussing sensitive and emotionally charged topics, as is 
the case with the Homeland War. At this point the recording device would be turned off and, 
once again, as at the beginning of the focus group, confidentiality would be reaffirmed. The 
researcher could note any further comments down later on, if they were deemed to be 
relevant to the discussion (always ensuring that anonymity is protected). 
 
A digital recording device was used to record discussions. The researcher also took notes to 
capture any physical gestures, changes in tone or other aspects of conversation that a 
recording device cannot. Using an assistant was not deemed to be economical or necessary 
in this study, although this hindered the recording of physical gestures, especially in 
sensitive or emotional discussions where maintaining eye contact with participants was 
important. The researcher transcribed the records as soon as possible after the sessions, 
ideally on the same day or the day after. These were rough copies, which were later 
supplemented by a paid transcriber who took greater care with the transcription in order to 
allow for more rigorous linguistic analysis.  
 
The approach to transcription outlined above is necessary in focus group research in order 
to capture the full richness of the data. A transcript alone cannot easily represent the 
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complex process of communication (elements such as tone, pace, inflection and physical 
gestures) and subsequent meaning (satire, humour, sarcasm, emotion, intensity, etc.), both 
of which can be attained through the immediate and detailed recording of field notes (Carey 
and Smith, 1994: 126). The advantages of such an approach are the completeness of 
transcription, the detailed record of the original language used and that the data will remain 
intact for subsequent analysis. The drawbacks, on the other hand, were that the sessions 
had to be split up to allow for transcription, with often at least one day between each, and 
that the researcher could be selective and biased when writing the notes up, due to the 
memories being so recent.  
 
Finally, the group context must once again be kept in mind during this part of the process. 
Most writers admit that such group interaction is an important feature of focus group 
methodology, however, they continue to use the method as a tool for collecting individual 
level data in a group setting, thereby ignoring the impact of group dynamics (in particular, 
see: Bertrand et al. 1996; Carey and Smith, 1996; Hollander, 2004; and Morgan, 1997). This 
proved difficult in the actual analysis, since it requires rich discussions with little moderator 
involvement, ideally across all focus groups to allow for comparison. While this was 
attempted in the following chapters when possible, ultimately many of the groups did not run 
smoothly enough to allow for in-depth sequential analysis. For example, teachers often gave 
binary (“yes” or “no”) answers, even when asked to elaborate, and war veterans often went 
into individual narratives with little group interaction. While such instances also hold 
analytical value (for example, what does the silence or the lack of willingness to elaborate 
mean?), in most cases it did not allow for effective analysis of narrative sequences. Such 
sequences allow for a particularly in-depth look at how norms and narratives are 
constructed.   
 
3.2.5 Analysing the transcripts 
 
The transcripts were analysed using narrative analysis. This approach was suited to the 
qualitative, single case and constructivist nature of the study, since it focuses on identifying 
the key narrative (or story) that is being told by participants, it looks at how this narrative is 
constructed, what the intention of the participant is, what the nature of the audience is and 
what the meaning of the narrative is (Riessman, 1993). It also suits the open-ended nature 
of the focus group discussions, which allow for narrative segments and follow-up questions. 
Other approaches in discourse analysis are instead based on segmenting data, which can at 
times lead to an incomplete analysis or to a “culture of fragmentation” that decontextualises 
the data (Atkinson, 1992).  
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In narrative analysis, the focus shifts from “what actually happened” to “how do people make 
sense of what happened” (Bryman, 2016: 589). Narrative analysis is, therefore, well-suited 
to gaining an insight into how individuals construct the world around them and to a 
constructivist approach to research design. In qualitative analysis, it focuses on the stories 
that individuals employ to account for events and it has effectively been used to retell 
traumatic and major life events (Riessman, 1993). This means that narrative analysis is both 
a data collection and a data analysis technique. It is an approach to analysing the data 
generated from focus groups, but the focus group themselves form a part of the narrative 
analysis since they are used to stimulate the telling of narratives to be analysed (Bryman, 
2016: 590). The transcripts were then categorised and examined as instances and, when 
the data allowed for it, as sequences.  
 
The categories were, when possible, derived from existing literature so as to increase the 
validity and reliability of the analysis. When this was not possible, then categories were 
formed in a manner that took into account the highly subjective nature of such an 
endeavour. Given the thesis’ constructivist approach (although this is true in social science 
research more broadly), it was important to be aware that interpretation of data is a reflexive 
endeavour in which meanings are constructed, rather than discovered (Mauthner et al., 
1998). The researcher, the method and the data are reflexively interdependent and 
interconnected. (Mauthner and Doucet, 2003: 414). This thesis is, therefore, infused with the 
researcher’s epistemological and ontological assumptions. Moreover, the story present in 
the thesis cannot be decontextualized from the researcher’s own personal background (a 
Croatian citizen of Croat ethnicity who has lived abroad for some time) and institutional 
surroundings (studying for a PhD at a British university, but also the broader academic 
environment such a project takes place in). It was, therefore, important to ask how 
participants’ accounts were meaningful in this particular research context and how data was 
constructed. Different researchers, especially those with differing backgrounds or those 
looking at the data during later time periods, may interpret these categories differently. This 
is why attempts were always made to connect conclusions to existing literature or to include 
a more systematic research design (for example, one using mixed methods and QCA) in 
order to increase validity, reliability and, hopefuly, replicability.  
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3.3 Events relevant during fieldwork 
 
The fieldwork took place from September 2014 until March 2015, during which time a 
number of events relevant to the research were ongoing in society. These in great part 
featured in discussions and are listed below in descending order of relevance. 
 
3.3.1 Cyrillic signs in Vukovar 
 
The 2011 Croatian census found that Serbs comprise over one third of the population in 
Vukovar, thereby requiring bilingual signs in the city. This resulted in a series of 
demonstrations in Vukovar in late 2013, as well as some other Croatian cities, to protest this 
move. The initial rally involved over 20,000 individuals, featured slogans such as 
“VUKOVAR, NE ВУКОВАР”28 and was likened to previous public shows of support for the 
Croatian generals in Split.29 The proposed bilingualism frustrated war veterans and many 
ordinary citizens due to the wartime experience of the city. Signatures were also collected 
across the country for a referendum to change the law on minority rights and bilingualism. 
The topic was directly addressed in the interview guide (see Appendix A), but frequently 
arose spontaneously before the moderator had a chance to move on to it.  
 
 
3.3.2 War veterans’ protest on Savska Road 
 
The demonstrations on Savska Road, in front of the Croatian Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs, 
lasted from October 2014 until April 2016. They involved a number of war veterans’ 
associations asking for the resignation of the Minister of Veterans’ Affairs. They continued 
despite a change in government and, therefore, Minister. They were not in the interview 
guide, but were frequently brought up as an example of the plight of war veterans in Croatia, 
of their connection to Croatian right wing parties or of their privileged position in society.   
 
 
3.3.3 Provisional release of Vojislav Šešelj  
 
Vojislav Šešelj was provisionally released from the ICTY on medical grounds in November 
2014. Not only did this lead to a marked increase in criticism of the Tribunal in focus groups, 
it even led to a participant cancelling a follow-up interview as they found the event too 
                                                
28 This translates to “Vukovar (in the Latin alphabet), not Vukovar (in Cyrillic).” 
29 “Vukovarska Riva”, Index.hr, 18 February 2013.  
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upsetting. From that point on the release was often used by participants as an example of 
ICTY inefficiency.  
 
 
3.3.4 Arrest of Milan Bandić and the sale of INA 
 
Corruption and the generally poor economic situation in Croatia featured heavily in all 
discussions. This was exacerbated in October 2014 by the arrest on corruption charges of 
the long-standing Mayor of Zagreb, former Presidential candidate and current member of 
parliament, Milan Bandić. In addition to this, during December 2014 there were a number of 
large demonstrations in Sisak to protest against the selling off and subsequent redundancies 
at the largest Croatian oil company, INA, whose refinery is based in the city. All discussions 
in Sisak, as well as in some of the other locations, featured much discussion on this topic. 
This is relevant to the thesis because, as Chapter 9 shows, participants did not make a 
semantic distinction between the processes of transitional justice and neoliberal transition. 
Instead, they saw them as inherently connected.  
 
 
3.3.5 2015 parliamentary elections 
 
The 2015 parliamentary elections were announced in September and held in December of 
that same year. Informal campaigning had begun far in advance so the topic of an upcoming 
election was common throughout discussions. Moreover, the centre-right “Patriotic Coalition” 
led by the opposition HDZ, frequently employed war veterans, nationalist symbols and war 
memories in their rhetoric.  
 
 
3.4 The participants 
 
The participants in this study were ordinary, inasmuch as they did not form a part of any 
elites. They were also targeted, since the study spoke to only middle and high school history 
teachers, members of smaller war veterans’ associations and pensioners in Zagreb, Sisak, 
Zadar and a non-urban location for each segment.30 The participants took part in focus 
groups, for the most part, but when it was not possible to organise one then they took part in 
dyads or individual interviews. Follow-up interviews were held with a number of these 
                                                
30 There was an additional non-urban group of members of war veterans’ associations, since the two 
were simultaneously organised.  
 70 
individuals. In total, 52 individual took part in 13 “groups” (Table 1). 30 were male, 22 were 
female. Pensioners were predominantly male (only two females), teachers were roughly 
evenly split, while three of the five war veterans’ groups were wholly female.  
 
Table 1. Overview of focus groups.31 
Location Target segment Number of participants 
Number of follow-up 
interviews 
Zagreb Pensioners 4 2 
Zagreb War veterans 4 2 
Zagreb Teachers 2; 1; 1 0 
Zadar Pensioners 4 0 
Zadar War veterans 6 2 
Zadar Teachers 3 1 
Sisak Pensioners 5 2 
Sisak War veterans 3 0 
Sisak Teachers 3 2 
Non-urban Pensioners 5 2 
Non-urban (Banovina) War veterans 5 1 
Non-urban (Slavonia) War veterans 2 0 
Non-urban Teachers 2; 1; 1 0 
 
 
Middle and high school history teachers were targeted because they are central to the 
process of teaching young people about norms, values and narratives. Holding the groups 
across four locations allowed for a comparison across communities that had different levels 
of exposure to the war and to the transitional justice process. The target segment was small 
enough to reach a good portion of the population in each location, somewhat alleviating the 
lack of representativeness in focus group research.  
 
Pensioners, the second target segment, are a highly politicised and large grouping in 
Croatian society. They are particularly interesting since they lived through Yugoslavia, the 
Homeland War, the Tuđman regime and the post-Tuđman period. They were educated 
under a different system than the one currently in place. Finally, pensioners were evenly 
spread between the urban and non-urban settings, especially compared to the other target 
segments. 
 
                                                
31 If a dyad was held with, for example, two additional individual interviews then this is denoted as “2; 
1; 1”. 
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The third target segment was composed of members of war veterans’ associations. As an 
influential and vocal grouping, they allowed for an exploration of attitudes about transitional 
justice in this influential part of Croatian civil society. The aim was to target veterans’ groups 
that are not consistently being quoted in the newspapers, since their opinions are readily 
available. 
 
The focus groups were held in and drawn from the cities of Zagreb, Sisak and Zadar, as well 
as one non-urban location for each segment other than for war veterans. Zagreb was used 
as it is the largest city in Croatia and it remains the political and cultural centre of the 
country. It also provides an example of a large metropolis that was not on the frontline of the 
war. Sisak was selected because it was directly affected by the war, a domestic war crimes 
trial dealt with crimes committed in the city and, as an industrial hub, it has a larger working 
class population than most cities. Zadar was used since it is in a different region of Croatia 
than Sisak and was also directly affected by the war. Moreover, the region is known as a 
hotbed for Croatian right wing, often nationalist, politics.32 The non-urban locations were 
determined based on where it was possible to find participants, although an attempt was 
made (relatively successfully) to keep the locations within a close distance to the three 
chosen cities, rather than in completely different parts of Croatia. 
 
Questions may be raised as to why cities such as Vukovar, Knin, Split and Osijek were not 
chosen, given their relative importance during the war and in Croatian society. Firstly, this 
study is not targeted at the ethnic Serbian population in Croatia, therefore there was no need 
to seek out communities with clear ethnic divides. Moreover, these communities have been 
investigated in great detail; the lacuna of research on attitudes is not as significant in these 
locations. Split was not chosen since it is too similar to Zagreb and does not have the image 
of being as staunchly right wing as Zadar. Finally, the region of Slavonia is the largest 
omission from the study, other than the one dyad. It is not be feasible to focus on all regions 
of Croatia, but Slavonia offers existing research that this analysis can draw upon.33 The 
region can also be used in the future to expand the scope of this study and validate results. 
Results from the survey, focus groups, dyads and interviews have all been anonymised. 
Below are some further details on all of the groups and how they were organised.  
 
                                                
32 Indicative of this are the 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 parliamentary election results where right wing 
parties have consistently fared better than in other parts of Croatia. See: 
http://www.izbori.hr/2003Sabor/index.htm; http://www.izbori.hr/izbori/izbori07.nsf/fi?openform; 
http://www.izbori.hr/2011Sabor/rezultati/rezultati.html; 
http://www.izbori.hr/140zas/rezult/1/nrezultati.html 
33 In particular, see Blanuša (2002) and Clark (2012).  
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Zagreb Pensioners (ZG.P34) 
 
The group was organised via two contacts, which led to a group of three acquaintances and 
one separate individual attending. The group was relatively well-educated (two had finished 
university level education, a third was a highly skilled worker) and the average age at the 
time of the discussion was 76. Some of the participants were from war hit areas, but only 
one was on the frontline during the war. The group ended in a walkout after several 
arguments had taken place.    
 
 
Zagreb War Veterans (ZG.V) 
 
The group was organised by a small war veterans’ association that invited members of 
several others to take part. This included a victim’s association from Vukovar. Only one 
person was from a location on the frontline, but all were there during the war. Their average 
age at the time of the discussion was 50 and half had completed higher education.  
 
 
Zagreb Teachers (ZG.T) 
 
As with all groups of teachers, this was one was particularly hard to organise. The initial 
focus group saw two cancellations on the day (these were later organised as individual 
interviews), so a dyad was initially held. All members were recruited separately, all were 
highly educated, all bar one were not on the frontline during the war and the average age 
was 42.  
 
 
Zadar Pensioners (ZA.P) 
 
This group was difficult to organise and was ultimately organised through the help of the 
Zadar war veterans’ association that took part in the study. The participants were not all 
familiar with each other before the focus group, although some were. They were from many 
parts of Croatia, but were all in Zadar during the war, three out of four held university 
degrees and their average age was 74.  
 
                                                
34 This denotes the code used to identity different participants in the transcripts.  
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Zadar War Veterans (ZA.V) 
 
This group was referred by one of the Zagreb war veterans. All participants came from a 
single association, which was both a war veterans’ and a victims’ association for women. 
Half had university degrees, the average age was 53 and all were from and spent the war on 
the frontline.  
  
 
Zadar Teachers (ZA.T) 
 
One participant from this group invited two others to take part. The group was, again, difficult 
to organise and two of the three were currently out of work (reflective of the cuts common in 
Croatian education). Two were from the frontline and lived there during the war, all were 
highly educated and their average age was 28.   
 
 
Sisak Pensioners (SI.P) 
 
The participants were all good friends and were recruited through a single contact. They 
were all highly educated and highly skilled workers who had been involved in the local oil 
and steel industries. A number were also war veterans and all of them were from frontline 
locations and were on the frontline during the war. Their average age was 67. 
 
 
Sisak War Veterans (SI.V) 
 
The Sisak war veterans were the most suspicious group encountered in the fieldwork. One 
participant refused to complete the survey and they constantly questioned the researcher’s 
motivations. The group was wholly composed of a single women’s war veterans’ 
association. They did try to invite another association (for men), but they cancelled on the 
day. The group was educated to high school level, all were from the frontline, all fought on 
the frontline and their average age was 59.  
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Sisak Teachers (SI.T) 
 
The Sisak teachers were composed of two friends and one other individual who was 
considerably younger than the others. The group was difficult to organise since schools in 
Croatia have two shifts, one morning and one afternoon, so teachers are rarely free at the 
same time, especially in smaller locations. They were all from Sisak and were on the 
frontline during the war. Their average age was 33. 
 
 
Non-Urban Pensioners (NU.P) 
 
These pensioners were a group of friends from a small village roughly half way between 
Zagreb and Karlovac. The village was close to the frontline for a period of the war. The 
group was highly suspicious and a silent ally (discussed in more detail below) was used to 
organise the group and to help run it. All were not from the frontline, three spent the war on 
the frontline, two of which were war veterans that had fought on several fronts. The average 
age was 63 and the group was educated to high school level.  
 
 
Non-Urban War Veterans Banovina (NU.V) 
 
This group was organised through a human rights NGO and was both a war veterans’ and a 
victims’ association for women. Through the discussion it became obvious that they were 
also in close contact with more than one of the other associations involved in the study. 
They were all from the frontline and took part in the war, they were highly educated and their 
average age was 57.  
 
 
Non-Urban War Veterans Slavonia (NU2.V) 
 
This dyad was organised simultaneously as the above via the Zagreb war veterans’ group. It 
consisted of two friends who were the only ones locally who were willing to speak. Both were 
55 at the time of the conversation, held high school diplomas, were from the frontline and 
fought locally in the war.  
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Non-Urban Teachers (NU.T) 
 
This group was also quite hard to organise, especially due to the shift problem in smaller 
localities where they may only be two history teachers. One such locality involved two 
teachers interviewed separately (close to Sisak), the other involved a dyad (close to 
Zagreb). Only one was from the frontline and was there during the war, their average age 
was 37.  
 
 
3.5 Comparison of survey results  
 
Other than personal details, participants also answered eight other questions that were 
drawn from previous survey questions on topics relevant to transitional justice (in other 
words, dependant variables). Below is a brief overview of how these 52 respondents 
compare to the rest of the population. Only the most relevant results will be expanded upon 
for the sake of brevity. Generally, these results were similar to nationally representative 
studies, other than for teachers who stood out from the representative results, as well as 
from the two other target segments. 
 
 
How interested are you in your national history and the fate of your nation? 
 
This question is hard to compare to other surveys, since it featured in the Ilišin (2011) study 
that asked respondents to rank a list of priorities, including themes such as “sex and love”, 
“work” and “friendship”, on which national history and the fate of the nation ranked quite low. 
The below results (Figure 2), however, highlight a slight difference between pensioners and 
teachers, but especially war veterans, since pensioners did not seem to express as high an 
interest in the topic in question. 
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Figure 2. How interested are you in your national history and the fate of your nation? 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Croatian officials and soldiers 
convicted at the ICTY or in domestic courts are heroes, not criminals. 
 
The respondents were relatively similar to the nationally representative study conducted by 
Kolstø (2011) in that most respondents agreed that convicted Croatian officials and soldiers 
are heroes, not criminals. Teachers stand out in this regard, which hints at a different 
understanding of law and the war by teachers in this study.  
 
Figure 3. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Croatian officials and soldiers 
convicted at the ICTY or in domestic courts are heroes, not criminals. 
 
Source: Own compilation; Kolstø (2011) 
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To what extent do you agree with the following statement: The Croatian side could not 
commit war crimes in a defensive war.  
 
Again, the total results are quite similar, especially in terms of overall agreement, to the 
nationally representative results. The teachers, once again, stand out due to their 
disagreement with the legal notion and important facet of the war narrative, that war crimes 
were not possible in a defensive war.  
 
Figure 4. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: The Croatian side could not 
commit war crimes in a defensive war. 
 
Source: Own compilation; Kolstø (2011) 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: schoolbooks about Croatian 
history in the 1990s present the history of Croatia correctly. 
 
This question also featured a great divergence between the opinions of teachers and other 
segments, although none seemed to agree. Teachers did complain about schoolbooks 
during conversations, but not enough to warrant making it a grave issue of concern, whereas 
(as subsequent chapters will show) war veterans particularly lamented how authorities and 
schoolbooks presented Croatian history. The Kolstø (2011) survey asked a similar question 
(Figure 6), the results of which are relatively similar to those obtained in this study’s survey.  
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Figure 5. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: schoolbooks about Croatian 
history in the 1990s present the history of Croatia correctly. 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
 
Figure 6. Do you think that the state authorities of Croatia present the history of Croatia in a correct 
way? 
 
Source: Kolstø (2011) 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: representatives of the Serb 
minority in Croatia should be involved in the development of museums about 20th century 
Croatian history. 
 
This question could also not be directly compared to nationally representative results, but 
the comparison that can be made shows slightly divergent results in that respondents in this 
study seemed more accepting of Serb minority involvement in the development of history 
museums in Croatia. War veterans and pensioners were typical in this regard and matched 
results from the Kolstø (2011) survey. History teachers, however, diverged considerably and 
expressed more positive attitudes (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: representatives of the Serb 
minority in Croatia should be involved in the development of museums about 20th century Croatian 
history. 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Do you think representatives of Croatian Serb institutions should be involved in the 
development of history museums dealing with the 20th century? 
 
Source: Kolstø (2011) 
 
How important is it to you to demonstrate your national belonging and being true to your 
national tradition?  
 
This question had no comparison to prior surveys, but it did serve to better understand the 
participants. In particular, it showed a clear distinction between the three target segments, 
since war veterans found demonstrating national belonging and being true to national 
tradition very important, while teachers were far more neutral on the subject.  
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Figure 9. How important is it to you to demonstrate your national belonging and being true to your 
national tradition? 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
 
How important do you believe the following principles of the Croatian constitution to be? 
Ensuring human rights, ethnic equality and the rule of law. 
 
Respondents were asked to rate each of these principles on a scale from not at all important 
(1) to very important (5). This is the type of question in which most individuals will rate all 
principles highly. This was the case for all groups, but all groups also prioritised ethnic 
equality slightly less than than the other two principles (Figure 10). Results were similar to 
the nationally representative study by Ilišin (2011), which asked respondents to classify 
responses in order of preference. There, ensuring human rights ranked highly (second), 
while ethnic equality and the rule of law were at the bottom of the list.  
 
Figure 10. How important do you believe the following principles of the Croatian constitution to be? 
 
Source: Own compilation 
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To what extent should future governments focus on achieving the following aims? 
 
The final question of the survey asked participants to rank a set of government aims, once 
again on a scale from not at all important (1) to very important (5). Teachers stood out since 
they ranked “finding out the truth about what happened during the Homeland War” much 
lower than the other two target segments. The high priority given to fighting corruption, 
present with all three target segments, has also been replicated in nationally representative 
surveys (see: Ilišin, 2011; Ipsos Puls, 2012). 
 
Table 2. To what extent should future governments focus on achieving the following aims? Ranked in 
order of highest importance. 
 War Veterans Teachers Pensioners 
1. Finding out the truth about 
what happened during the 
Homeland War. 
Ensuring human rights and 
freedom. 
Finding out the truth about 
what happened during the 
Homeland War. 
2. Fight against corruption. Fight against corruption. Fight against corruption. 
3. Protecting the dignity of the 
Homeland War. 
Harmony among ethnic 
minorities and Croats. 
Ensuring human rights and 
freedom. 
4. Ensuring human rights and 
freedom. 
Finding out the truth about 
what happened during the 
Homeland War. 
Protecting the dignity of the 
Homeland War. 
5. Punishing war crimes Punishing war crimes Punishing war crimes 
6. Harmony among ethnic 
minorities and Croats. 
Protecting the dignity of the 
Homeland War. 
Cooperating with the ICTY. 
7. Cooperating with the ICTY. Cooperating with the ICTY. Harmony among ethnic 
minorities and Croats. 
Source: Own compilation 
 
 
3.6 Problems specific to the situation 
 
During the fieldwork it became apparent that there were problems associated to the study of 
norms in post-conflict societies that were not well-covered in the methodological or 
transitional justice literatures. The topics being discussed in the focus groups were not 
sensitive, but they did touch upon sensitive issues and in the group setting (as opposed to 
the individual or survey setting) had the potential to cause significant upset to participants. 
The challenges to the researcher focused on recruitment problems and general suspicions; 
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insider/outsider status; and, ethical concerns, in particular the prevalence of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD). 
 
 
3.6.1 Recruitment and suspicion 
 
The study employed snowball sampling to recruit participants within the chosen target 
segments. In other words, participants referred the researcher on to other potential 
participants, which was useful to overcome general distrust of researchers and unease with 
talking about the Homeland War, despite the limitations this puts on representativeness. 
This was particularly helpful with war veterans’ groups, where many had overt connections 
to political parties. In one instance, a group even admitted to having had to first gain 
permission from the local leader of a political party to participate in the focus group. Often a 
gatekeeper was used in such a situation in order to gain access to participants. This usually 
involved meeting a member of the group for a coffee to provide more information on the 
research, to answer any questions, but most importantly, to build a rapport. In some 
instances several such meetings took place before gaining the trust of the gatekeeper or 
gatekeepers, who were then willing to help organise a focus group and sometimes even 
introduce the researcher to similar groups in other cities. 
 
In particularly suspicious groups (most notably non-urban pensioners) a so-called “silent 
ally” was employed. This person, usually also the gatekeeper, was an individual trusted by 
the assembled group who would partake in the focus group (regardless if they were also a 
member of the target segment). The person would be prepared by the researcher as to what 
the group was about and instead of actively participating in the group, they would sit there in 
silence, providing prompts and reassurances as and when was necessary. Most often this 
took the form of looks and nods, as unsure participants would look to the silent ally for 
affirmation that they could speak openly. The gatekeeper and silent ally also have a 
responsibility to the participants, must understand the research and be sensitive to the 
needs of the participants while researchers, on the other hand, must be aware of the 
complexities of the gatekeeper’s and silent ally’s role (Homan, 2004).  
 
Examples of suspicions were present in many situations. Interviewed teachers who were 
asked to recruit colleagues in several instances stated that they could not recruit older 
colleagues because they were too scared to talk to about the Homeland War. In another 
instance, with a non-urban war veterans’ group, the researcher was asked at the outset if he 
held a Croatian passport, as this was crucial to holding the discussion. These suspicions 
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were often exacerbated by the presence of the recording device and the consent form. War 
veterans, for example, were worried that the researcher would not report truthfully on the 
discussion, so the transcripts were sent to a number of groups for approval. This offer, more 
than the actual act, often assuaged any fears.  
 
The required consent forms proved to be even more problematic. Several gatekeepers and 
silent allies suggested handing them out at the very end, which was not possible due to 
ethical concerns and in a number of groups a significant amount of time had to be spent 
explaining and stressing anonymity and data protection. This further stresses the need for 
gatekeepers and silent allies who strongly trust the researcher and can serve as a powerful 
helper in such a situation, as long as they are aware of the requirement for voluntary 
consent. The ability to convince participants of a researcher’s good intentions constitutes a 
significant practical problem, but if dealt with in a sensitive fashion, it should not compromise 
the ethical integrity of a study (Roberts, 2012).  
 
 
3.6.2 “On je naš”: Insider/outsider status 
 
It is important to be aware that, while the researcher and participants may share many 
aspects of their identities, thereby facilitating a harmonious relationship, it is equally possible 
that parts of their identities can lead to a significant social distance between the two parties. 
In order to avoid such a scenario and to encourage a more harmonious relationship with 
participants it is wise for a researcher to focus on commonalities (Kempny, 2012: 47). 
Overall, techniques from anthropology proved invaluable in the research and can be used 
extensively in qualitative data collection in political science. 
 
The researcher (as a Croatian citizen who has lived abroad for the majority of his life) was 
able to gain access to certain situations due to an understanding of Croatian cultural 
specificities that an outsider would not be able to easily, or at least quickly, attain. The 
advantage of a certain cultural intimacy and understanding of the society’s values and 
feelings of empathy is that it makes it easier to establish trust (Van Ginkel, 1998: 256). This 
very insider status and intimacy can also be a curse, especially when discussing norms that 
have a certain taken-for-granted status, which the researcher can also take for granted 
(Kempny, 2012: 43). While an outsider will struggle to “get into” the field, an insider struggles 
to “get out” in order to have a more objective view of a familiar environment (Van Ginkel, 
1998: 258). Moreover, it necessitates the researcher to take on a position of naïveté in front 
of participants, who may otherwise assume a researcher is familiar with (taken-for-granted) 
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concepts or norms and may, therefore, not feel the need to elaborate on them at all. 
Nevertheless, the insider status helped immensely in this study, sometimes explicitly (such 
as with the citizenship question) while at others times tacitly through an understanding of 
implicit rules or “socio-cultural grammar” that helps guide behaviour and interpretations 
(Fleisher, 1995: 12; Wolcott, 2005). This intuitive insider knowledge helps better understand 
social situations, which in turn helps maintain good relationships with participants (Kempny, 
2012). 
 
The outsider status was also present, as a researcher coming from “the West” it was often a 
hindrance in the form of distrust. In such situations it often helped to refer to shared 
backgrounds in order to build rapport, which helped overcome the social distance between 
London and the group location, but also the social distance between the researcher’s place 
of birth (the largest city and capital, Zagreb) and rural locations, in particular. Such 
connections immediately made participants feel that they could, at least on some basic level, 
relate to an outsider (both in terms of location but also, often, in terms of education). These 
methods are commonly used by anthropologists doing fieldwork, but as Kempny (2012: 46) 
warns, they must be used carefully so as not to tread into the realm of manipulation. 
 
 
3.6.3 Sensitive topics: The minefield of PTSD 
 
The most concerning issue throughout the fieldwork, and one that at times caught the 
researcher by surprise, was the prevalence of PTSD among participants. This manifested 
itself exclusively in the focus groups and highlighted the powerful and potentially harmful 
effects of the group dynamic. A large proportion of the participants in the war veterans’ 
group discussions had suffered extreme trauma and loss during the war (some groups had a 
dual role as victim support groups). Many were diagnosed with severe PTSD, in extreme 
cases this had led to suicide attempts (which the group openly acknowledged during 
sessions) and recurring health problems. This, however, only showed itself in focus group 
discussions rather than prior to them, further exemplifying the unpredictable but also truthful 
nature of the group dynamic. Precautions were taken so that at the outset of every focus 
group conducted in the study, the researcher stressed that the issues to be discussed were 
potentially of a sensitive nature, that it was wise for participants not to take part if they were 
concerned that the issues could cause distress and that they could remove themselves from 
the group at any time. Additionally, extra care was taken to follow through all of the phases 
of the group discussion in particularly sensitive groups.  
 
 85 
Regardless of the precautions taken, PTSD did present a serious problem in the fieldwork 
and a significant peril to participants’ health. In one group of veterans, with pronounced 
problems with PTSD, a participant admitted to suffering from the condition before the 
recorded discussion started. Despite the researcher insisting the participant not take part, 
the individual thought it was important to put their views across, especially because they 
suffered from it and thought the research could highlight the problem (a recurring theme 
across the groups). During the group certain topics were consciously avoided if it seemed as 
if the participant was become agitated and the group finished relatively uneventfully, despite 
some crying by participants, which was a common occurrence in other groups as well. Two 
weeks after the focus group, however, the gatekeeper from the group made the researcher 
aware that the participant in question had to re-enter rehabilitation for PTSD as a 
consequence of participation.  
 
PTSD was also present in the other groups, since many of the pensioners also took part in 
the war. One such group highlighted, quite starkly, that many individuals might not be aware 
that they are suffering from some kind of mental trauma. In the said group of pensioners, a 
respondent broke down in tears whilst speaking about what, at the time, seemed like a 
relatively non-sensitive topic. This was not in response to a question but came out during a 
short narrative by the participant. The participant removed himself from the group for a brief 
period, before returning once again. There is, therefore, a constant need for the researcher 
in the field to be cautious and aware of how such sensitive topics can affect individuals. 
 
The above description paints a highly fraught picture of fieldwork, but certain practical 
measures can help alleviate such problems. For one, as in many other disciplines that deal 
with sensitive issues, general care must be taken to not cause feelings of distress or 
emotional harm (Kempny, 2012). Respondents must be reassured that the group is a safe 
environment to speak about the problem, that they can stop at any time and help, in 
whatever form is practicable, should be provided after the session. It is also always wise to 
attempt to find out if enough time has passed since the event occurred, although in this case 
at least the time period was clear (Kempny, 2012). 
 
Small steps can also be taken during the actual sessions. Other than following the phases of 
focus groups quite strictly, an attempt can be made to increase eye contact during 
particularly sensitive moments in order to show interest and attentiveness, albeit at the cost 
of note-taking. Finally, in this particular study, a sign that a participant was uncomfortable 
with the topic was a general unwillingness to participate or organise a follow-up interview. In 
such instances it was important to find a balance between being pushy enough to be 
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effective (which is sometimes necessary), but not so pushy to make a participant 
uncomfortable or to risk causing (potentially further) harm. Usually gatekeepers or silent 
allies were effective at providing advice on this matter.  
 
Participants often responded to the researcher’s warnings about the potential harm caused 
by the discussion by insisting that they saw the benefits in such a study. It can be argued 
that the greatest benefit of such research is the creation of knowledge, but this has to be 
placed in context with the potential burden placed on participants (Traianou and 
Hammersley, 2012). It can often also be therapeutic to discuss such issues in the group 
setting, but the researcher must carefully manage the group to achieve this effect. In other 
words, although benefits do exist (and on balance the researcher would not be exposing the 
participants to such risk if the benefits did not outweigh potential risks), it is important to 
keep in mind that the concept of benefits is not only highly complex, but also specific to a 
time and location. Ultimately, however, no study justifies the hospitalisation of a participant.   
 
Discussing war crimes and related trials risks putting the researcher in yet another rarely 
discussed ethical dilemma. During the fieldwork a participant from a group of pensioners, in 
relatively vague language, made it known to the group that they knew someone who had 
killed a family of civilians in an act of revenge. Such situations put the researcher, and group 
as a whole, in a moral dilemma that is hard to deal with. In these instances, it may be 
acceptable to break with the promise of confidentiality in order to discuss the issue with a 
trusted third party (for example an academic). Moreover, it is the duty of the researcher to 
inform authorities of any criminal offences that may have been confessed to in interviews. In 
practice, however, such admissions or stories are not always particularly clear. Much of the 
above hints at a certain lack of preparation in the current academic ethics preparation and 
approval process. 
 
It is common practice in anthropological and ethnographic research to take great care to 
understand the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the researcher and participants, 
and, to therefore aim to give something back to the informants for their help and services 
(Kempny, 2012). As such, the researcher often offered help to all participants, gatekeepers 
and silent allies after meetings. Examples of this include offering help and advice on 
university applications for a participant’s daughter, offering translation services, providing 
further literature to groups interested in reading about certain related topics, providing 
supplies (snacks, beverages, etc.) for the next war veterans’ association meeting and so on. 
Ultimately no ethical code is perfect and their use in real-life situations will never be simple, 
because of this disjoint between the abstract and the practical, it is important for the 
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researcher to think about what they should do as researchers and what is ethical or not in 
doing research (Traianou and Hammersley, 2012). It should also be borne in mind that the 
researcher can experience considerable stress in such situations. This was alleviated by 
allowing at least a day of rest between groups, not only to transcribe, but also to “recover” 
from sessions, as well as by keeping in touch with local academics and colleagues who had 
shared similar experiences. 
 
 
3.7 Benefits of focus groups in practice: Silence and laughter 
 
The spontaneity of responses and the consensus that is built among, as well as across, 
groups showcases the usefulness of focus group methodology when studying norms and 
narratives. For example, war narratives draw on emotional reactions based on symbols of 
struggle (Pavlaković, 2014); focus groups are adept at exploring such emotional stories. 
They can also elicit a discussion of the logic the public uses to justify why certain verdicts 
are not accepted as valid while others are not. Subsequent chapters will discuss how 
particular images that came up naturally in discussions and dyads were used to justify why 
crimes in the eyes of international or domestic courts are at times interpreted as acts of self-
defence.  
 
The social nature of insights gained using focus groups can also become apparent through 
less direct interactions, such as pauses and laughter. Pauses were often indicative of a lack 
of knowledge among participants. Groups, for example, often struggled to define what a war 
crime is:35 
 
Researcher – How would you define a war crime? 
 
(Long pause) 
 
ZG.T.1 – Interesting.  
 
(Long pause) 
 
ZG.T.1 – How to explain that? 
 
ZG.T.2 – I suppose what is done in war but does not follow the Geneva Conventions.  
 
ZG.T.1 – The breaking of human rights. 
 
                                                
35 Some of the passages reproduced and themes discussed in this section will also be used in other 
chapters. In this chapter, they primarily serve to highlight the benefits of the methodological approach, 
rather than to make any arguments about the data.   
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ZG.T.2 – What is outside those rules. As far as I listened to The Hague tribunal, roughly 
speaking (dyad with Zagreb teachers). 
 
The pauses also highlighted awkwardness or an unwillingness to answer questions. This 
was quite stark in the case of the Sisak war veterans who refused to discuss Croatian 
involvement in the Bosnian conflict:  
 
Moderator – What is your opinion of the trial of Dario Kordić? 
 
(Long pause) 
 
SI.V.1 – I would rather not talk about that. 
 
SI.V.2 agrees 
 
Moderator – Could I maybe then ask you about Tihomir Blaškić? 
 
SI.V.1 – I would rather not talk about individuals at all. 
 
SI.V.2 – You asked us about a defensive war, not about individuals.  
 
Moderator – Not a problem, we can skip this (focus group with Sisak war veterans).  
 
Croatian military involvement in Bosnia was not of a defensive nature and it, therefore, has 
the potential to undermine the official defensive war narrative. This is particularly the case 
with groups that strongly believe in the war narrative, such as war veterans’ groups. The 
above response illustrates how the group struggled to deal with a question relating to ICTY 
trials concerning Croatian involvement in Bosnia, first by struggling to provide an answer and 
then by asking to move on from the question. SI.V.2 finishes the exchange by hinting at the 
potential that individuals’ actions (or what can be interpreted as court cases) have to 
undermine established narratives.  
 
Laughter provided another social insight into particular topics. At the most basic level, it 
showed the poor opinion individuals or whole groups had of certain institutions, such as the 
ICTY, domestic tribunals, the United Nations, the Croatian government, the media and so on. 
These types of responses were common across all groups: 
 
Moderator – What is your opinion of the outcomes of trials at domestic war crimes trials?  
 
All laugh 
 
ZA.V1 – We have so many stories. 
 
ZA.V.3 (pointing at a picture on the wall) – Do you see that picture, the one in yellow, 
read what it says. 
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ZA.V.4 – Yes, that is just one of the Croatian soldiers who has been sentenced for war 
crimes. 
 
ZA.V.1 – In a Croatian court. 
 
ZA.V.4 – In a Croatian court. I do not even think we can call the Croatian judiciary the 
Croatian judiciary (focus group with Zadar war veterans). 
 
Much like pauses, however, laughter at times indicated unwillingness to answer or a lack of 
knowledge about a topic. This was striking across a number of groups when discussing the 
role of the Church (with no specific mention of which Church) as a source of information on 
the war or its role in the war: 
 
Moderator – What about the Church as a source of information? 
 
ZA.T.2 – Oh no (laughs). I think all three religions present in these parts are quite biased 
in the portrayal of anything. The Islamic community, the Serbian Orthodox Church and 
the Catholic Church all strongly adhere to… 
 
ZA.T.1 (interrupts) – Their Church. 
 
ZA.T.2 – Their flock (laughs). And the infallibility of their own ethnicity. I really think… 
 
(Long pause and researcher moves on to the next question) 
 
(Focus group with Zadar teachers)  
 
There were few uniform answers on this topic and, as the above passage showed, the 
exchanges were always brief and awkward among the group. At other times respondents 
claimed to lack the knowledge to be able to answer. Overall these answers hint at the taboo 
nature of the topic of Church involvement in the conflicts, which became apparent through 
these social interactions, rather than direct discussion of it.  
 
 
3.8 Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
A range of solutions and tools exist to deal with the lack of quantification in qualitative 
research, however, only QCA, which was used as a control in this study to alleviate the 
problem, will be discussed here. The basic premise of QCA is that combinations of 
necessary and sufficient combinations can causally explain outcomes in qualitative research 
(Ragin, 1989). Initially, a truth table is used to list all possible combinations of conditions and 
outcomes, which shows how often they appear in the set of cases that is being considered 
(Ragin, 1989). Boolean algebra is then employed to derive implicants, which are used to 
conclude what combinations of conditions are necessary or sufficient for the outcome to 
occur or not (Ragin, 1989). The method has been commonly used in political science 
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(Avdagić, 2010; Krook, 2010; Pennings, 2003; Vis, 2009; Werner, 2009) and international 
relations (Chan, 2003; Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; Maat, 2011; Thiem, 2011). It has also been 
applied to a lesser degree in law (Arvind and Stirton, 2010; Miethe and Drass, 1999; 
Musheno et al., 1991; Williams and Farrell, 1990) and anthropology (Moritz et al., 2011). 
 
QCA is based on dichotomization, which can introduce problematic measurement biases in 
fundamentally non-dichotomous phenomena (Rihoux, 2006). Two pitfalls need to be kept in 
mind when using QCA. Firstly, few authors using the various types of QCA consider possible 
measurement error in enough detail; as with any research tool, it cannot be applied blindly. 
Secondly, contrary to the original design of QCA as a tool for testing propositions of 
deterministic necessary and sufficient conditions, many scholars implicitly or explicitly 
employ it as a tool for inductive theory generation (Hug, 2013). In this study, however, the 
purpose of QCA is to illustrate and to validate. QCA helps illustrate patterns that occurred 
across the interviewed target segments and to help ascertain why they occurred. The QCA 
was completed using R and the QCA package for R developed by Dusa and Thiem (2012).  
 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
Norms and narratives require an interactive method of inquiry since they only become 
apparent in interactions between individuals. Focus groups can provide this by effectively 
exploring the construction of narratives, contestation over some and agreement over others. 
Other methodological approaches exist but often cannot reach the necessary depth of 
inquiry over the same period of time or suffer from issues of representativeness as much as, 
or more than, focus groups. Focus groups do not provide a solution to all of these problems, 
but they can provide a useful alternative in specific situations, such as when investigating 
social norms in a post-conflict society. In such circumstances focus groups effectively reflect 
the independence of opinions by allowing for free flowing discussion, they lead to more 
truthful answers through spontaneity, they probe taken-for-granted concepts and they help in 
gaining trust with cautious individuals, such as ex-combatants. The approach also allows for 
the investigation of opinions through its interactive nature, which enables the narrative 
analysis of pauses and laughter in sequences of discussions. 
 
Focus groups suffer from issues of representativeness and the group context can undo their 
usefulness as much as it can be the cause of it. In the post-conflict context, however, there 
are additional issues that can affect the research, even when the topics to be discussed are 
not directly sensitive. Firstly, general suspicions made recruitment and the signing of 
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consent forms difficult, which resulted in the extensive use of gatekeepers and silent allies 
who also had to be briefed on necessary ethical considerations. Secondly, the interplay 
between being an outsider as well as an insider provided opportunities for further exploration 
of taken-for-granted concepts, but it also threatened to limit research by creating too wide a 
gulf between the researcher and participants or by participants believing the researcher was 
too familiar with concepts. Finally, PTSD and various ethical concerns threatened the health 
of participants and put whole groups in difficult moral dilemmas. Entering the field without 
preparation for such eventualities can have serious consequences for both participants and 
the researcher. This hints at a certain lack of preparation in the field of transitional justice for 
undergoing this type of fieldwork, since topics are sometimes not expected to be sensitive, 
although they frequently are. The set of problems that occurs in the group setting also shows 
how the methodology has a unique potential to reach narratives that are otherwise hard to 
research. This study will highlight the usefulness of focus group research within certain 
parameters, such as when research would benefit from an observation of group interaction 
in a limited time frame and on a specific topic.  
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CHAPTER 4  
Media analysis: How the media reported on transitional justice 
 
The domestic media played a significant role in disseminating news about the transitional 
justice process in Croatia. The nature of this dissemination is an important factor in the 
success, or lack thereof, of transitional justice efforts in the country. This chapter aims to 
shed light on this relationship by showing what the press media wrote about war crimes trials 
and events in the civic sphere in Croatia from 2000 until 2015. It also describes the position 
that the media hold in terms of shaping opinions on war crimes trials in Croatia and generally 
how the media can shape opinion. The chapter asks the question, how does media portrayal 
influence opinion on justice? It deals with media portrayal of events relevant to the 
transitional justice process and sheds light on what the implications of this might be. The 
chapter is, however, far from conclusive, instead it points to a lacuna of research studying 
the relationship between prevalent norms in society (discussed in the rest of this study) and 
media framing. Its purpose in the thesis is to contextualise the environment that participants 
live in and that the norms operate in.   
 
Several assumptions guide the analysis. First, results from focus groups, interviews and 
prior survey data show that the media, including the written press, continue to play a role in 
how the Croatian public forms attitudes about political and societal issues (a detailed 
discussion of trust in sources of information is left to Chapter 5). Second, information on 
transitional justice is, for the most part, gained from the media, rather than directly from the 
ICTY or domestic courts. Third, the media do not tell audiences what to think, but rather 
what to think about (Cohen, 1963). This means that what the media discuss and how they 
frame issues has the potential to have a great impact on how the public perceives war 
crimes trials and the transitional justice process as a whole. 
 
 
4.1 Setting the agenda 
 
The media analysis is grounded in the theories of agenda-setting and priming. This literature 
is vast and at its core it is concerned with the transfer of issue salience from the media to the 
public (McCombs et al., 2014: 790). It has been expanded to cover a range of forms of 
communication, from social media to political advertising (Bantimaroudis et al., 2010; Kliger-
Vilenchik, 2011). The source of the effect has been argued to originate from a “need for 
orientation”; as the need rises so does the power of the media to influence the public agenda 
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(Chernov et al., 2011). This is important in a conflict or post-conflict situation since during 
such uncertain times, publics become particularly susceptible to the agenda-setting effect 
(Bratić, 2006). The confusing experience of war is usually witnessed at a distance36 and is, 
therefore, confusing to the majority of the public, making the need for orientation acute 
(Bratić, 2006). Key events, such as negotiations, strategic battles or human rights violations 
require media reports and these are essential in satisfying the need for orientation (Bratić, 
2006). Post-conflict periods, when fates of a state can be decided, are equally, if not even 
more so, viewed at a distance. It is in this context that the media can effectively frame public 
agendas. Moreover, political considerations discussed at this level, if internalised, can 
become reasons for why an individual takes a particular stance on a political issue (Zaller, 
1992: 266).  
 
Audiences in modern liberal democracies, including in post-2000 Croatia, have a choice in 
media outlets. Each individual draws from a variety of media sources (for example national 
television broadcasters, online portals and weekly magazines, covering anything from 
politics to sports) depending on personal interest. These include both broader, nationally 
focused outlets, as well as niched, special interest media, which match their own 
preferences and experiences. This social process of “agendamelding” is based on the 
interaction between the vertical media that reflect the basic institutions of society (national 
broadcasters and radio stations, the largest dailies), the horizontal media that are more 
varied and focussed on special interests (magazine, specialist online portals, Facebook, 
Twitter) and the individual who receives these messages (McCombs et al., 2014: 793-794). 
A high level of agreement between individuals’ media of choice and the audience on basic 
issues helps build a stable civic community (unless publics are somehow coerced; 
McCombs et al., 2014: 794).  
 
Media frame selection has a significant effect on the audience’s perception of reality and 
journalists are no different to the publics they write for: they also attempt to interpret masses 
of information, which they then package into more understandable frames (Camaj, 2010; 
Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Iyengar, 1991; Neuman et al., 1992; Norris, 1995). The 
process of framing involves the selection of certain aspects of events and making 
connections between them in order to promote a specific interpretation of the events 
(Entman, 2004: 5). Media framing is, therefore, the central idea of a news story that provides 
a method to understand events or to conceptualise information (Gamson and Lasch, 1983: 
398; Neuman et al., 1992: 60). Competing interests aim to further the issues they see as 
                                                
36 Even when not, only events in close proximity are seen directly, whereas major events are still seen 
at a distance.  
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important and mass media news is crucial in this respect, since they select how much 
attention is given to issues, according to a variety of “pressures”, such as political elites, 
public opinion and real-world events (McQuail, 2010). Consequently the media give public 
recognition to the current agenda and further influence political opinions (McQuail, 2010). 
 
Journalists do not work in a vacuum, the society they live in influences their work. Social 
norms, ideological orientations, audience considerations, organisational influences, 
economic pressures and a vast range of other factors, all influence news production 
(Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). In this sense the media reflect the norms and values of the 
society they operate in. Further studies have supported this: that media framing is influenced 
by the national contexts that journalists work in and that international events are interpreted 
along national priorities (Bennett, 1990; Camaj, 2010; Clausen, 2003; Dimitrova et al., 2005; 
Ryan, 2004; Yang, 2003). Moreover, frames embedded in culture are both long lasting and 
slow to change (Van Gorp, 2007: 63). Major events hold the potential to change such 
attitudes (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989), although it is debatable what constitutes major in 
the realm of transitional justice since, as Gordy (2014) has shown in Serbia, even major 
events that held the potential to shock the public did not seem to have any kind of 
permanent effect. 
 
 
4.2 Different types of frames 
 
McCombs (2004) expands on the original agenda-setting theory by showing how the effect 
occurs on two levels: the first is the transmission of issue salience (traditional agenda-
setting); the second is the transmission of attribute salience (attribute agenda-setting). The 
first level involves an issue gaining enough prominence to appear on the public agenda. The 
second and subsequent level is one of comprehension, in other words, how much salience 
certain attributes of an issue gain (McCombs 2004, 41). Media messages usually contain 
information on both levels, but the nature of the influence is separate and not necessarily 
connected (McCombs, 2004). More broadly, the effects of agenda-setting are limited in that 
they are both peripheral and short-term, so the more recent news stories are often more 
salient in public eyes (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987).  
 
Iyengar (1991) outlined how the news can be presented in either episodic or thematic form, 
a framework that this chapter employs. Episodic news frames take the form of a case study 
of event-oriented reports and depict public issues in terms of concrete instances. Thematic 
news frames, by contrast, place public issues in a more general or abstract context. The 
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essential difference between the two formats is that episodic framing tends to lead to 
individualistic attributions of responsibility for issues, rather than societal, while thematic 
reports tend to have the opposite effect (Iyengar, 1991: 16). Few news reports are 
exclusively composed of one frame or the other, although usually one clearly predominates 
(Iyengar, 1991: 14). The dominance of the episodic frame means that many vital issues do 
not receive the coverage that will allow the public discourse to critically analyse them and 
many societal problems may be ignored due to the lack of traceable symptoms (Gamson 
and Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980). In conjunction with agenda-setting, the theory of priming 
helps further explain the effects of media on the public. It is based on the belief that by 
focusing on some issues while ignoring others, the media influences the standards by which 
political elites are judged (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987: 63).  
 
For example, a recent study by Camaj (2010) found that international news agency reporting 
on the Kosovo status negotiations (2006-2007) predominantly used the episodic news frame 
by focusing on specific events instead of discussing context or the interpretation of the 
events or the issue as a whole (Camaj, 2010: 649). The superficial reporting stressed 
conflict and rarely discussed causes of the problems, potential solutions or broader socio-
economic impacts (Camaj, 2010). The implication of this is that audiences may not gain a 
full understanding of the pertinent issues and may, therefore, be alienated from international 
news in general (Camaj, 2010).  
 
Other conceptualisations of framing exist, many of which overlap with one another and many 
that break framing down into more detailed components (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; 
Dimitrova et al., 2005; Price and Thompson, 2002; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). For the 
purposes of this study, however, it was important to merely ascertain the degree of thematic 
reporting and the nature of those thematic reports. Furthermore, many analyses of more 
detailed framing breakdowns require representative, quantitative analyses that were outside 
the scope of this study.  
 
The conceptual framework has further potential shortcomings. Most people receive 
information from a variety of sources, which they trust in varying degrees, the media form 
only one set of these. For example, Iyengar and Kinder (1987: 118) found that people who 
were more involved in public life experienced a weaker agenda-setting effect, presumably 
because their priorities were already decided upon quite strongly. There are also differences 
among the media: radio and print are sometimes more or less trusted than, for example, 
television. Moreover, evidence regarding causality remains inconclusive and it is not 
possible to tell the exact nature of the interaction between different agendas (those of the 
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media, public and political elites). Rogers and Dearing (1987) argue that these need to be 
clearly distinguished and that their interactions are not unidirectional, but complex and 
multifaceted.  
 
 
4.3 The media in Croatia  
 
The media have historically bred distrust in much of communist Europe, so the effect of the 
media may be different in Croatia than in North America and Western Europe, where many 
of the above-mentioned studies took place. Media systems in Central and Eastern European 
countries have had to both transition and transform since the 1990s (Gross and Jakubowicz, 
2013: 1). Both processes are still on-going and so far the variety of outcomes has made it 
hard to draw any firm regional parallels, other than that it is wise to be cautious with any 
attempts at comparison (Gross and Jakubowicz, 2013: 2). Whereas some systems 
immediately began removing the legacy of communism, others, such as Croatia, moved 
towards repressive tendencies once again, even if only briefly. Media systems across 
Central and Eastern Europe continue to wrestle with problems of political influence, 
economic pressures and culture (Gross and Jakubowicz, 2013: 11), all of which can be seen 
in Croatia as well. Political communication in the region has become Westernised and 
politicians now try to follow, rather than lead, public opinion (Bajomi-Lázár, 2013: 62). 
Recently, however, media freedom has decreased in Croatia (Vale, 2016). 
 
Since 2000, pluralism and diversity have become stressed values in the Croatian media, 
before which state interests and state sovereignty were seen as paramount (Peruško, 2007: 
231). Limits on private ownership were relaxed in 1998 and then again in 2003, leading to a 
diverse variety of owners in the industry (Peruško, 2007: 232). Both the print media and 
television sectors are marked by significant foreign ownership (Peruško, 2011: 11). 
Europapress Holding (EPH) is the largest domestic media print company and it owns Jutarnji 
List (one of the top three dailies), Slobodna Dalmacija and Globus, as well as the press 
distribution company Tisak (Peruško, 2011: 11). Večernji List and 24 Sata (the other two of 
the top three dailies), are on the other hand owned by Austrian company Styria (Peruško, 
2011: 11).  
 
Six daily newspapers, out of 15, have national reach. In 2009 24 Sata, a free nearly wholly 
episodic newspaper, had 31% of the market share, followed by Jutarnji List (13.6%) and 
Večernji List (13.4%; Peruško, 2011). Slobodna Dalmacija had 6.8%, but around 50% in 
Dalmatia due to its regional focus, much like Novi List, overall fifth with 4% market share but 
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over 50% in the Rijeka region (Peruško, 2011). Increase in Internet and smartphone use 
means that all of the major newspapers have a website and these feature among the top 20 
Croatian sites (Burić, 2016). There has also been an increase in Internet portals, which 
make up the top visited websites in Croatia. Overall, however, the written press in Croatia 
are in decline and becoming more tabloid-like in an attempt to attract readers (Burić, 2016). 
Television remains the predominant source of information, although official figures are 
infrequent and hard to obtain (all of the above are from 2009).  
 
Generally, the written press in Croatia are not trusted, especially in comparison to the rest of 
Europe. The Eurobarometer 82 (2014) results on media use are indicative of this. When 
given the choice between “tend to trust” or “tend not to trust”, the Croatian public 
overwhelmingly (62%) responded, “tend not to trust”, versus 33% to the opposite effect. 
Other sources were also predominantly not trusted, although not to the same degree: 
television was split 55% to 41% and the Internet 44% to 35% (Eurobarometer 82, 2014). 
According to the Eurobarometer media trust index, which amalgamates these scores into 
one metric, Croatia scored lowest in Europe for media trust, as 52% of respondents had “low 
or zero trust” in the media (Eurobarometer 82, 2014). This is further supported by a 2012 
survey that ranked trust in the media as less than the President’s office, Parliament, 
government, army, police, church or NGOs (Ipsos Puls, 2012) It was only more trusted than 
political parties and the judiciary (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. Trust in institutions in Croatia. 
 
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
Despite the above, when it comes to the transitional justice process, the Croatian public 
seems to have used the media as a primary source of information. Klarin (2009) offers two 
potential explanations as to why the Croatian public, as well as the publics of other former 
Yugoslav states, may not see the ICTY or courts in general as fit for this purpose. First, 
because the publics have no experience of an independent judiciary, they may simply see 
the ICTY as an instrument to be used by the international community, much like Yugoslav 
courts were used as “an instrument in the hands of the ruling class” (Klarin, 2009: 95). 
Second, the publics the ICTY had to interact with have grown accustomed to widespread 
corruption and to violent nationalism, so there was a need by the political structures and 
media in the countries to educate against these (Klarin, 2009). In Croatia, as elsewhere in 
the region, it was these structures that often produced the opposite effect (Klarin, 2009).  
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4.4 Method and analysis 
 
The media analysis, inspired by agenda-setting theory, encompassed all thematic press 
reports on selected war crimes trials and civil society instances from 2000, when press 
liberalisation started, until 2015. Printed media were chosen since they provide an 
opportunity to analyse both vertical and horizontal media sources, thereby providing a 
broader overview of frames. Additionally, printed media mirror television coverage 
(Funkhouser, 1973: 64) and agenda-setting has been associated with them as much as with 
other types of media. Peruško (2011: 12) has also shown that media concentration 
(measured by audience and advertising share of the top three sources in each medium) is 
high for both television and daily newspapers (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Concentration of the media audience at the national 
level (0-100: 0-35 low concentration, 35-55 medium 
concentration, over 56 high concentration). 
Medium 
Market concentration of 
top three sources  
Television 75 
Daily newspapers 58 
Internet portals 39 
Radio 25 
Source: Peruško (2011: 12) 
 
The media analysis included most of the major news outlets in Croatia, both weeklies and 
dailies, as well as a range of online portals, some of which focus on issues of transitional 
justice. All dailies37 and the two online editions of the major television broadcasting channels 
represented vertical media (that reflect the basic institutions of society) and the others all fell 
into the category of horizontal media, which was composed of weeklies and Internet portals 
(Table 4).  
  
                                                
37 Arguably Slobodna Dalmacija and Novi List could be classified as horizontal sources since, 
although they are dailies, they have relatively niche audiences. Slobodna Dalmacija is, however, now 
owned by one of the major press publishers in Croatia and Novi List has indicated its strong 
institutional affiliation when, for example, in 2015 it was accused of letting a journalist go due to 
pressure from a political party. 
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Table 4. List of written media sources used in study. 
Type of source Vertical media sources Horizontal media sources 
Dailies Jutarnji List; Večernji List; 24 Sata; 
Novi List; Slobodna Dalmacija 
 
Weeklies  Feral Tribune; Globus; Nacional; Novosti; 
Vojna Povijest 
Online portals Dnevnik (Nova TV); HRT Dnevno.hr; H-Alter; Index.hr; Tacno.net; 
T-Portal 
 
Most of these sources had a history of political leanings; in fact, some were created with that 
express purpose in mind. This is of relevance inasmuch as some will have been supportive 
or opposed to the transitional justice process based on their political orientation. This does 
not mean that these sources were consistently and wholly supporting or opposing the 
process, they may have had inconsistent reports or editorials, but on the whole they often 
leant one way or stayed relatively neutral. An attempt was made to balance these as much 
as possible, but the table is also a rough reflection of the media picture in Croatia, which is 
composed of several online portals that support transitional justice and one particularly vocal 
portal that is staunchly opposed to it (Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Sources’ support or opposition to transitional justice. 
Type of source Supportive of 
transitional justice 
Neutral/Both Opposed to transitional 
justice 
Dailies Jutarnji List; Novi List 24 Sata Večernji List; Slobodna 
Dalmacija 
Weeklies Feral Tribune; Novosti Globus; Nacional Vojna Povijest 
Online portals H-Alter; Index.hr; 
Tacno.net; T-Portal 
Dnevnik (Nova 
TV); HRT 
Dnevno.hr 
Source: Own composition 
 
The analysis focused on key trials at the ICTY and in domestic courts, as well as events in 
the civic sphere. These involved better and lesser known trials and events spread out over 
the period of analysis (Table 6).  
  
 101 
 
Table 6. Overview of analysed trials and events. 
Trial/event Issue Year(s)38 
 
ICTY trials 
Ante Gotovina 
Emblematic of the nexus of politics, 
symbols, rituals and collective memory in 
Croatia. 
2001 - 2012 
Dario Kordić and Tihomir Blaškić39 
Crimes committed outside of Croatia in 
Bosnia. 
1995 - 2005 
 
Domestic trials 
Mirko Norac 
Public reaction to a trial and change over 
time, since the case was relevant during 
different time periods. 
2001 - 2008 
Branimir Glavaš and Tomislav Merčep40 
Influence of the war narrative on the 
judiciary. 
2005 – 
present 
Lora prison 
Domestic judicial capacity and possible 
bias in the system. 
2002 – 
present 
 
Events in the civic sphere 
Death threats sent to the leading investigative 
journalist of the independent newspaper Feral 
Tribune, Drago Hedl, directed at him and a 
witness in a war crimes trial. 
Freedom of the press and who has the 
right to report on the Homeland War and 
associated trials. 
2005 
Assault on Zoran Pusić, President of the Civic 
Committee for Human Rights, by individuals who 
claimed to be war veterans from Vukovar. 
The role of civil society in the transitional 
justice process and which groups are 
allowed to participate in this. 
2006 
Public skirmish between Croatian President Ivo 
Josipović and Milorad Pupovac, President of the 
Serbian National Council. 
Who is allowed to represent the Serbian 
minority’s views and interests. 
2012 
Introduction of Cyrillic as an official alphabet in 
Vukovar. 
 
Recognition that ought to be provided to 
different communities (in this case, the 
Serbian minority in Vukovar). 
 
2013 
Heckling of Prime Minister Milanović during the 
2013 Operation Storm commemoration in Knin. 
Who has the right to discuss the 
Homeland War and the presentation of 
opposing views. 
2013 
                                                
38 For trials this denotes the period from the initial indictment to the final verdict; for events in the civic 
sphere this denotes when the event occurred.  
39 These are analysed as separate cases in the analysis. 
40 These are also analysed as separate cases. 
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The search for articles was completed using online archives, predominantly from the news 
outlets themselves, sometimes via electronic repositories.41 This was done with a variety of 
broad keywords (for example, the names of the Generals) until no significant number of new 
articles was turning up. Although some articles were published only online, all of the printed 
articles were also reproduced online. All of the dailies had archives that covered printed and 
online articles to 2000. Articles deemed to be wholly episodic were discarded and a tally was 
not kept of these. There was no need for this given the analysis did not investigate episodic 
reporting and these were easy to discard since they were often considerably shorter than 
their thematic counterparts.42 They would often include brief updates on court dates, witness 
testimonies or investigation progress. In total 4,795 thematic or semi-thematic articles were 
analysed, most of which dealt with war crimes trials, rather than civil society instances. 
These were broken down by year of publication and presented as such below, when 
appropriate. The analysis focused on key trials at the ICTY and in domestic courts, as well 
as events in the civic sphere. These were broken down by year of publication and presented 
as such below, when appropriate.  
 
 
4.5 Reporting on war crimes trials 
 
In line with global trends, reporting on war crimes trials in Croatia was predominantly 
episodic by a large margin. There was also a strong emotional aspect to reporting on the 
ICTY specifically and reports often stressed collective memory by using terms such as “us” 
or “all of us”, with a particular focus on victimhood (Ristić, 2014: 132-133). When the media 
were writing thematically about war crimes trials, then they were for the most part writing 
about the trial of Ante Gotovina, since this trial alone dominated so much of the reporting. 
The total number of thematic reports broken down by trial shows the stark difference 
between the Gotovina trial and the others (Table 7).43 
  
                                                
41 Most notably for Feral Tribune, which is held in the Central and Eastern European Online Library 
(www.ceeol.com). 
42 For example, a typical episodic article would state that a trial has resumed on a certain date and 
who was called to give evidence. This would often be no longer than one or two paragraphs. A typical 
thematic article would be an editorial, which could be exceedingly long (over ten paragraphs).  
43 The Merčep and Glavaš legal processes are still on-going and are likely to feature more reporting.  
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Table 7. Total number of thematic articles per case from 
2000 until 2015. 
Trial Total Thematic Reports 
Gotovina 1996 
Glavaš 468 
Blaškić 338 
Norac 302 
Merčep 280 
Kordić 185 
Lora 119 
Total 3,688 
Source: Own compilation 
 
The total number of articles does also seem to indicate that there is no difference, at least in 
these trials, between reporting on ICTY and domestic war crimes trials in terms of number of 
reports. Other than the Gotovina trial, other trials are all reported on relatively evenly. Not 
only was the Gotovina trial the overall most reported on, but since 2003 there were only two 
years when other trials were reported on more than it, and even then only slightly so. Figure 
12 tracks this over time and clearly shows that, even when the trial was “quiet”, it was still 
written about more than or nearly as much as any other case. 
 
Figure 12. Number of articles per case from 2000 until 2015. 
 
Source: Own compilation 
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This is important since, according to the agenda-setting hypothesis, problems that receive 
the most prominent attention in the news also become the problems the public views as the 
most important (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987: 16). In other words, transitional justice may come 
to be defined by the Gotovina trial. This is further supported by a study conducted by 
Documenta, in which they analysed all of the evening news broadcasts by the main national 
television channel (HRT) following the sentencing of generals Gotovina and Markač in 2011 
(Jakovčić and Kunac, 2011). This study found similar results: that reports during the two-
week period of analysis involved little reporting of context regarding the trials or the war 
(Jakovčić and Kunac, 2011). In other words, the reports did not involve discussion of why 
the former generals were in The Hague in the first place. 
 
The case of Tihomic Blaškić was the initially most reported on trial, which is not surprising 
since it was one of the earlier high profile trials at the ICTY. The only other trial to feature 
more reporting in 2006 and 2015, respectively, was of Branimir Glavaš. The latter period is 
particularly interesting since most of these articles discussed his role in Croatian politics in 
the run-up to the 2015 parliamentary elections. His role on the Croatian political scene 
garnered more media interest than his wartime past, although the two were frequently 
connected. Likewise, reporting on Gotovina in 2014 and 2015 also predominantly focused 
on party politics.  
 
 
4.6 Themes 
 
The dominant war narrative dictates media discourse on war crimes trials and discusses the 
conflict nearly exclusively in terms of Croatian defence and victimhood in the face of Serbian 
aggression (Jović, 2009; Ristić, 2014). Reporting on the Gotovina trial predominantly 
focused on five topics: Western integration (discussed in 15% of total reports); party politics 
(15%); ICTY bias or inefficiency (13%); the rule of law in relation to the predominant war 
narrative (13%); and, the aims of the war (11%). During the 2002-2006 period Western 
integration, in other words Croatia’s accession to NATO and the European Union, was the 
most discussed theme, while the second intense period of reporting from 2010 to 2012 
focused predominantly on the rule of law. Reporting dropped off drastically in 2013 (following 
the acquittals of the generals in 2012) and since then has featured rarely in the media. 
Moreover, Operations Flash and Storm saw positive wording and positive value ascription in 
a broader discursive strategy of justification (Ristić, 2014: 122). The crimes during the 
operations were not denied, but they were instead declared irrelevant since they took place 
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in the context of far more important issues, such as the foundation of the country (Ristić, 
2014: 123).  
 
Especially during the initial phases of the search, capture and trial of Gotovina, reporting on 
him and the trial focused on Croatia’s accession to the EU and NATO, which at the time was 
preconditioned on his capture and extradition to The Hague. As the daily Novi List argued in 
2004, the escaped general was the “personification of the final reliability of our country’s 
relations with the EU and the international community in general.”  This was often interpreted 
in a negative sense by the vertical media (the main dailies), which saw it as blackmail by the 
EU and ICTY, which “had become an instrument through which they blackmail and demean 
us” (Canki, 2004). Many of these debates were connected to Croatian party politics, internal 
workings of government and elections. Jutarnji List lamented, “It is a sad fact that the main 
representatives of the Croatian government, in fear of election results, are still not ready to 
say that one important line ‘I insist that General Gotovina is arrested and extradited to The 
Hague as soon as possible’” (Butković, 2005). It was also common later, especially in 2012 
before the acquittal, to write about the politicisation of the generals and how the government 
may have sold them out. For example, online portal Index.hr wrote, “Everyone is arguing 
about who betrayed Tuđman. But who betrayed Gotovina?” (Klauški, 2012). 
 
Towards the later period of reporting, surrounding the first-degree verdict of Gotovina, the 
discussion centred on the rule of law, which was often contrasted with the aims of the war (in 
terms of what was allowable in order to achieve them) or with the predominant war narrative 
(in terms of how unearthing facts through trials may contradict or support the narrative). 
Some outlets saw this as an opportunity to bolster the war narrative, “After the brutal 
aggression, rampage, never before seen suffering, destruction and humiliation of a third of 
the territory under occupation, through which the country was divided, Operation Storm 
came and Croatia was liberated. As the commander of this operation, Gotovina will turn from 
the hero he became following the indictment, into a national myth” (Ivkošić, 2011). Others 
saw it as an opportunity for the Croatian public to confront the past, “Franjo Tuđman, Gojko 
Šušak, Jure Radić, Gotovina, Markač and the others conducted a criminal enterprise and 
Croats now have to come to terms with this” (Novi List, 2011). Moreover, Ristić (2014: 134-
135) showed that reporting on the Gotovina trial for the most part ignored issues of 
transitional justice, European norms and the benefits of EU or NATO membership, in lieu of 
the emotional destruction, lost national pride and threats to national identity that the trial 
triggered. 
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Reporting on domestic war crimes trials followed a slightly different pattern. Articles on 
Glavaš, Merčep, Norac and Lora generally focused on two issues: the efficiency (or lack of 
it) and bias of Croatian courts on the one hand, and the importance of finding out the facts 
about what happened during the war on the other. Discussion of court efficiency and bias 
was particularly dominant in the cases of Glavaš (discussed in 31% of thematic articles) and 
Lora (51%), although it featured heavily in all other cases too (13% for Norac, 16% for 
Merčep). Jutarnji List, saw the freedom of the accused in the Lora trial (who had fled from 
court) as “mocking their victims and the judicial system of Croatia” (Modrić, 2006). While 
Lora was often seen as a blemish, the case of Norac was seen as a success (domestically 
but also by outside observers, such as the OSCE) and discussed as such, “… the long-term 
track record, except in the trial of Mirko Norac and Tihomir Orešković in Rijeka – shows that 
in high profile trials, [the courts] most frequently free the accused, even when there is no 
doubt that they killed someone” (Butković, 2004). 
 
Reporting on fact-finding was often juxtaposed with the predominant war narrative, although 
as with Gotovina, fact-finding was not always considered to argue against the war narrative. 
For example, in 2000 Feral Tribune wrote about the Glavaš trial, “What else should take 
place to prompt the state prosecutor to show interest for all those murders and summon 
those who know a lot about them to testify? The case of Čedomir Vučković… could be an 
interesting beginning of the uncovering of Osijek’s dark stories. Of course, if someone does 
not believe that to also be an attempt to criminalise the Homeland War” (Hedl, 2000). 
Reporting on the Norac trial stands out compared to all other domestic war crimes trial in 
that it featured the highest degree of discussion about the fact-finding and the war narrative, 
which were discussed in 48% of thematic articles. Index.hr summarised this well, when they 
stated that “Norac will still not officially lose his title of General, the convicts in The Hague 
will be celebrated as heroes, and the Homeland War will remain torn between politics and 
history” (Klauški, 2008). This article is an example of a range of articles common at the time 
in the horizontal media, who hold the potential to actively question the broader issues at 
stake in this trial. Horizontal media differed in one other important aspect from vertical 
media: they reported on topics for much longer. In the cases of Kordić, Norac and Merčep, 
both Dnevno.hr and more liberal portals such as H-Alter and Tačno.net, continued to report 
thematically on the trials far past the point where vertical media had stopped doing so. 
 
 
4.7 Reporting on events in the civic sphere 
 
The nature of events in the civic sphere is different to trials since most of them (except the 
instance of Cyrillic signs in Vukovar) happened at one fixed point in time and were not on-
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going in the same sense as trials. Other than the events in Vukovar, the other events also 
did not capture the attention and imagination of the public in same way as the trials did, 
consequently overall reporting was lower. The most reported on instances did, however, 
occur recently and, given the short-term effects of agenda-setting (that more recent issues 
will be far more important in the eyes of the public), this means that there is a great potential 
for such events to shape the public agenda (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987: 46). As subsequent 
chapters will show, many of the themes discussed in the articles analysed below also 
reverberate strongly in the survey, focus group and interview data.  
 
Much like with reporting on war crimes trials, there was a large discrepancy in the number of 
reports on different events. As Table 8 demonstrates, reports on Vukovar outnumbered 
reporting on all other instances by a large margin.  
 
Table 8. Total number of thematic articles on events in the civic sphere. 
Event Total number of Thematic Articles 
Vukovar Cyrillic signs (2013)44 792 
Josipović vs Pupovac argument (2012) 171 
Hedl death threat (2005-2011) 72 
Milanović heckling (2013) 64 
Pusić assault (2005) 8 
Source: Own compilation 
 
It is unclear why Vukovar took such a focus, although as later chapters show, the city forms 
a key symbol in the Croatian war narrative. Much of the debate about Cyrillic in Vukovar taps 
into the war narrative and the amount of reporting exemplifies the central place the city 
occupies in the Croatian version of the war narrative (these concerns outweigh, for example, 
potential economic concerns or other issues). Reporting on this instance also usefully 
exemplifies the higher proportion of Internet portal involvement in reporting on civil society 
instances (which may also partly explain the increase in reports over time). Of the total 792 
thematic reports on Cyrillic in Vukovar, 301 were recorded on the right wing, often 
nationalistic, portal Dnevno.hr. This further shows the importance of Vukovar in the Croatian 
war narrative, but also the growth of horizontal media in Croatia. These media hold the 
potential to question events in society and, as Dnevno.hr shows, allow for views from both 
sides of the spectrum.   
 
                                                
44 Reporting also occurred in 2014, but only a minimal amount.  
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4.7.1 Vukovar: Themes discussed 
 
The short-term effects of agenda-setting mean that this issue, covered so intensely and 
recently, may have exerted a strong influence that remains on the public agenda today. The 
amount of protest and the referendum attempt surrounding this further highlight the 
importance of the issue on the public agenda, although it is important to keep in mind that 
public protest is not always reflective of an issue’s salience and these events have also seen 
the involvement of many extreme but vocal groups and individuals. For the most part the 
issue (that on the face of it was primarily concerned with the recognition that ought to be 
provided to the Serb community in the city) was discussed in relation to four broad themes: 
the rule of law and the interpretation of it (24%); party politics and government efficiency 
(17%); minority equality and relations (15%); and, the war narrative (13%).  
 
For many vertical media outlets, the events were an example of the lack of rule of law in 
Croatia, in that this was a law that had to be enforced but the state was struggling to do so, 
while others saw it as a misinterpretation or misuse of the law, since it should not apply to 
Vukovar. For example, Novi List quoted the President of the Croatian Parliament, “Vukovar 
is Croatia, Vukovar is Croatian and Croatian standards and laws have to be implemented in 
it for the sake of all the citizens of Vukovar, but also for all the citizens of Croatia” (Novi List, 
2013). The discussion of minority laws also stood out: it was sometimes discussed as a 
problem in terms of the rule of law, at other times it was presented in terms of human rights 
and democracy. Party politics in particular were often referred to in these debates, as the 
two sides in it were seen as reflecting the political make up of Croatia. Jutarnji List wrote “the 
balance of power between the conservative and liberal options in the country are transparent 
when we talk about Cyrillic in Vukovar” (Butković, 2013). 
 
When discussing the events with regard to minority equality or relations, sources often 
argued that dialogue was necessary. Večernji List wrote, “Everyone has to sit down at the 
table, including the government of the Republic of Croatia, members of the Stožer45for the 
Defence of Croatian Vukovar, war veterans’ organisations, representatives of the Serbs, and 
talk until they find a solution” (Zadro, 2013). At the same time, the newspaper, much like 
many other sources, associated Cyrillic with the memory of the Homeland War, “the Serbs 
                                                
45 Stožer, meaning both committee and headquarters, for the Defence of Croatian Vukovar is the full 
name of the group organising the protests in Vukovar, however, they are most commonly simply 
referred to as the Stožer. The use of stožer as “headquarters” highlights the use of military 
terminology in war veterans’ associations’ post-war activities.  
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also have a great role in this since they have to accept the fact that it was under this 
alphabet that a lot of evil happened in the nineties” (Zadro, 2013). Articles frequently tapped 
into the war narrative (discussed in more detail in Chapter 6), in which Vukovar holds a large 
symbolic role of victimhood. Much of this debate was centred on the atrocities committed in 
the city during the war by Serb forces and on the missing victims. So it was not uncommon 
to read, “while the residents of Vukovar are still looking for the bones of their children, Cyrillic 
should not be brought in” (Sabolić, 2013). 
 
On the other hand Dnevno.hr wrote about the theme of the war narrative more than other 
sources, so much so that it was discussed as frequently as the rule of law and party politics. 
Their point of view was relatively specific: they saw the events as proof that the Homeland 
War was not over; they stressed the need to first find the missing victims; and, they saw 
Cyrillic as a symbol of Greater Serbian aggression against Vukovar specifically and Croatia 
generally. They connected this to what they see as broader issues in Croatian society, which 
are also reflected in the focus group data: the existence of a conspiracy in Croatian 
government; many parts of the government being pro-Serbian or Yugonostalgic; and, the 
view that Croatian politics is defined by a conflict between communists and Ustashe (a 
recurring theme). An article from April 2013 titled “The Fight for Croatian State 
Independence Continues” summarises the various facets of this in saying, “The introduction 
of Cyrillic in Vukovar is not the main goal of the Yugoslav-minded politicians in the Republic 
of Croatia, instead their goal is to help the Greater Serbian politics to take down the Croatian 
state, the Republic of Croatia, and to once again create a new kind of ‘Yugoslavia’ that 
would be, as those before it, the grave of the Croatian narod. This would be nothing else 
than ‘Greater Serbia’” (Ćuk, 2013). This article also exemplifies a common dynamic in the 
Croatian horizontal media. The original article was taken from Dragovoljac.com, another 
similar Internet portal. It is common practice for Croatian media outlets to “borrow” articles 
from one another, thereby increasing their dissemination. 
 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
Given the predominance of episodic reporting in the written press and television (at least in 
the case of Gotovina on the main national channel) it is possible that the public does not 
draw connections between various connected issues, such as for example war crimes trials, 
unearthing facts about the conflict or the general inefficiency of Croatian courts. These 
would not be discussed in episodic reports, leading to a general ignorance of broader 
societal problems. When the public did read thematic reports about war crimes trials then 
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they were more than likely to be reading about the trial of Gotovina (something that is likely 
to also hold true for episodic reporting). Reporting on this trial alone made up 55% of total 
thematic reporting in the 3,475 articles analysed in this study and was the predominant war 
crimes trial news story during all years from 2000 until 2015. This does not, however, mean 
that the Gotovina trial made up 55% of total reporting on war crimes trials, since this study 
did not analyse all trials or even all transitional justice related reports. 
 
When the public read about Gotovina, they read reports that connected the trial to Croatian 
accession to the EU and NATO; Croatian party politics; ICTY bias or inefficiency; and, the 
rule of law and its interaction with the aims of the war or the war narrative. No one topic took 
precedence in terms of frequency of reports overall, although some were more frequent 
during certain periods, so further studies could reveal what elements have remained on the 
public’s agenda. If individuals did read about domestic war crimes trials, then they would 
have read something slightly different. The focus in these reports was for the most part split 
in two ways, on the one hand was a discussion about the efficiency of Croatian courts and 
on the other a discussion about fact-finding, which could be in support of or against the 
predominant war narrative. The trial of Norac, however, stood out compared to other 
domestic trials. Not only was it one of the few trials considered to have been well-run, but it 
also featured a much higher proportion of reporting on the war narrative being juxtaposed 
with a fact-finding effort. This opens up the question whether a well-run trial features less 
discussion about the judicial system and, therefore, opens up space for debates about other 
aspects of transitional justice (for example expressivist aspects). Moreover, the growth of 
horizontal media, from Internet portals to social media outlets, has allowed for a proliferation 
of views that have questioned many of the mainstream issues that have received shallow 
episodic coverage. Horizontal media were particularly active in their coverage of events in 
the civic sphere, again exemplifying their potential for the building of dialogue in society.   
 
Assuming the hypotheses of agenda-setting and priming hold true: that issues which receive 
more attention in the news become the ones the public sees as most important and that the 
media, by focusing on some things instead of others influences how political actors are 
judged (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987), then what does this mean for the Croatian public’s 
opinion of transitional justice? Given that frames are highly influenced by the environment 
that journalists work in, it is possible that the prevalent norms in society affect framing as 
much as framing may affect them. In other words, the media may be reflecting societal 
values rather than influencing them. Causality is hard to ascertain, the influence could flow in 
both directions, and a deeper analysis of narratives in Croatian society may at least shed 
more light on this.  
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The confusion of post-conflict transition means that the media do have a greater potential 
impact on audiences, especially in a situation where many people claim to be unfamiliar with 
events occurring around them, a common response in the focus groups. Messages that 
were more in support of transitional justice norms do, in this sense, have the potential to 
lead to a more positive agenda. The results in this study are, however, inconclusive in many 
ways. Focus group, interview and survey data show that many issues within the realm of 
transitional justice are not questioned seriously and that both the Croatian public and media 
share narratives surrounding the Homeland War. A future analysis could break the framing 
down into more detailed categories to gain a better understanding of how the media write 
about transitional justice. In tandem with nationally representative quantitative studies, such 
analyses could make broader conclusions about agenda-setting effects in Croatia.  
 
Agenda-setting is about how much importance an audience attaches to certain issues and is 
usually measured quantitatively. The focus groups, however, showed that the importance of 
the issue was taken-for-granted and was importance as a topic was rarely discussed, 
interpretations were instead disputed in group discussions. This highlights a disjunction 
between agenda-setting and media distrust (discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter). Generally, despite high levels of distrust in the media, individuals nevertheless 
reproduced what the media write. Consequently, for many historical issues the primary 
source of information for individuals is the media or sensationalist publications, rather than 
academic, historical works, creating a reliance on the media for historical interpretation. 
Among certain groups this is further exacerbated by a sense that the Yugoslav regime 
falsified history and, therefore, nothing from communist historiography could be trusted, 
creating a vacuum that was filled by amateur journalists and quasi-historians, rather than 
scholars. Agenda-setting does seem to occur in this context, but it competes with agendas 
that already exist in the audience (gained from personal experience, hearsay, media images 
rather than articles or reports, and so on) and the media material is then recast using these 
other sources. This places an emphasis on the interpretation of an issue, rather than the 
salience of it. It also helps explain why many narratives related to the transitional justice 
process in Croatia feature so many contradictions, which are further explored in the focus 
group and interview analyses.  
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CHAPTER 5  
Sources of information: Who and what is trusted 
 
Key facets of the Croatian war narrative are commonly reproduced in the media, at sporting 
events, in music and film, as well as by elites (Baker, 2010; Brentin, 2013; Pavlaković, 
2014). The sources of this narrative and of information on transitional justice have been both 
imposed from the top-down by elites, institutions and predominantly vertical media and from 
the bottom-up, through everyday interactions among the public and horizontal media. This 
chapter explores what sources of information on the war narrative or the transitional justice 
process as a whole are available to the Croatian public. It compares how the public views 
elite, top-down sources compared to “everyday” bottom-up sources.  
 
Political institutions and elites in Croatia are distrusted both in general and specifically as a 
source of information. “Everyday” narratives, such as for example stories about the war from 
individuals who participated in the conflict, resonated much more strongly with participants in 
this study. Despite this inherent distrust, elite narratives do seem to have contributed to this 
process in two ways. First, the Declaration on the Homeland War is seen as fact and its 
claims are rarely, if ever, questioned. In this sense, it has set the parameters for the 
discussion of the conflict. Second, while the government is highly distrusted, so are 
institutions of transitional justice, which means that the public is faced with two highly 
distrusted sources of information with regards to the war narrative and the justice narrative. 
The Croatian public generally, however, tend to see the ICTY as the greatest threat to the 
official war narrative and, therefore, to the legitimacy of the Croatian state itself (Pavlaković, 
2014: 40). This still seems to be the case today, despite the fact that the only case involving 
Croatian officers ended with an acquittal (the fieldwork was conducted after the acquittals of 
Gotovina and Markać). 
 
The analysis focuses on how elite, media and “everyday” sources are perceived as sources 
of production and reproduction of the war narrative, which forms an essential part of nation-
building. Elites often “perform the nation”, for example through the use of national symbols 
and rituals to generate national solidarity (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 546). The message 
this conveys is mixed since it depends on individuals’ interpretations, which vary (Kolstø, 
2006). In other words, people do not simply consume the meaning of national symbols; they 
simultaneously produce their meaning (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 546). The media, on the 
other hand, often fall into the realm of “choosing the nation”; people “choose” the nation from 
a set of options defined in national terms (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 542). This can be 
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defined by choice of newspaper (if a choice exists), of school for one’s children or by the 
group one chooses to socialise in (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 546). The result of these two 
nation and narrative-building processes is that top-down messages are interpreted by the 
public, who construct their own meaning, which may not always be the one intended by 
elites. Additionally, such narratives have a certain taken-for-granted status in society (Billig, 
1995: 37; Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 544).  
 
The theory and empirical data point to the conclusion that, even in a state that has 
witnessed and continues to witness polarising nationalist politics, the ordinary public is often 
indifferent to the messages it receives from elites or the media (Brubaker, 2006; Fenton, 
2007). This means that political messages (often nationalist ones) do not resonate evenly in 
everyday life, which is not to say that they do not somehow shape them. At the bare 
minimum, although elites and the media as a source may be highly distrusted, they do 
together set the parameters within which narratives are produced and reproduced, thereby 
possibly limiting the discursive space available in everyday life. In Croatia, both rarely 
questioned the predominant war narrative and most sources operated within this framework. 
As Pavlaković (2014: 39) points out, the use of loaded terms such as Homeland War, 
branitelji and Greater Serbian aggression remain prevalent across Croatian society. An 
alternative theoretical interpretation leads to similar conclusions: although the media may not 
be successful in promoting particular messages, they do establish the boundaries of what 
kinds of interpretations are acceptable. In other words, the media provide the public with the 
symbolic and normative environment through which they interpret the world around them 
(Gerbner, 1973).  
 
While the distrusted elites and media may set the parameters within which the war narrative 
is discussed, it is unlikely they are the sole source of production and reproduction of the war 
narrative. The war narrative becomes far more meaningful in everyday life by people talking 
about it (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 538). In Croatia, this micro-level narrative production is 
also far more trusted than any other source. It is at this level of ordinary people talking 
between themselves and often about themselves and their surroundings, in which the war 
narrative and associated worldview are reinforced (Fox, 2004).46 Actors wishing to promote 
their messages to the public, for example as part of transitional justice efforts or nation-
building projects, function within this complex interactive process.     
 
 
                                                
46 Moreover, in nation-building, the public also “consumes the nation’, for example through museum 
displays, state media, state school curricula or consumer products (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 551). 
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5.1 The (generally) distrusted media  
 
The written press in Croatia are not trusted, especially in comparison to the rest of Europe. 
The Eurobarometer 82 (2014) results on media use, discussed in the previous chapter, are 
indicative of this. The focus group data highlight why this is: respondents did not see the 
media as independent, serious or useful, although this was not necessarily something only 
attributed to the Croatian press. As a teacher in Zadar remarked, “I think the media generally 
in all of these countries are at a very low level, especially in Serbia and Bosnia” (focus group 
with Zadar teachers). Teachers across the board agreed with this view, that the media are 
unreliable and that they had no “skilled improvement, but rather it is just listening to 
someone’s story, which may or may not be correct” or that “they are no embodiment of 
morality or objectivity. They frequently complain about lack of media freedom, but they only 
have themselves to blame for this” (dyad with non-urban teachers). Moreover, they were 
seen as selective and editorialised, “As far as the media are concerned, this is selective 
information release. The media are not at all relevant in creating a picture about it [the 
Homeland War]. The trend is to cover up the picture of it and to present a different one” 
(focus group with Sisak teachers). This can have the effect that individuals do not even try to 
stay informed, if the sources are not trusted: 
 
ZG.T.4 – I have the impression that unfortunately we do not have any newspapers that 
are serious, where you can with certainty read something smart. We listen to everything, 
but with suspicion. In some way I feel that I cannot even remember it all. And then this 
happens, I hear but I also do not hear. If you do not believe in them, then you do not 
even try to remember what they say (interview with Zagreb teacher). 
 
There was a feeling across all of the groups that the media were biased, often against 
Croatia, Croats and the predominant war narrative, in that they were trying to equalise 
crimes, something the ICTY is often accused of doing, “As time passes, [the media] provide 
less information on the Homeland War… They are aimed at ultimately creating a balance 
between the warring parties. And this is the link that has been dragged across all of this. Our 
media, if they talk about it, they are generally subjective and they always have the goal of 
equalising one side and the other” (focus group with Zadar pensioners). The reasons given 
for this were varied, but ultimately all related to some kind of corruption. As a Sisak 
pensioner remarked, “Corruption in Croatia is well-known. I think that journalism is very 
corrupt, just that we do not know about it” (focus group with Sisak pensioners). In this sense, 
the corruption in this specific industry is simply connected to the widespread corruption 
present in Croatian business and society. Respondents agreed that the motivations for this 
were a combination of politics and profit, although politics seemed to be the perceived prime 
culprit. This was evident in numerous instances: 
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NU.P.4 – In the beginning it was all realistic. 
 
NU.P.1 – Yes, while the war was going on. But now every government, every 
department, has its journalist to write about it like this or like that.  
 
NU.P.3 – In the beginning they wrote the truth, but later this all changed.  
 
NU.P.1 – Sanader had his journalists and they were not allowed to say anything else 
(focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.1 – Specifically, one of the two leading dailies, Jutarnji List, is exclusively on the 
side of the government, the President and the Prime Minister. It is generally assumed 
that this is because the owner, EPH, is in large debt, but only they are not being 
persecuted by the state and they are given space to act, despite being millions in debt 
(interview with non-urban teacher).  
 
Throughout the group discussions it became clear that the views of the media were also 
closely tied to views about party politics in Croatia, where the left side of the political 
spectrum (in power during the focus groups) is often referred to by Yugoslav or Second 
World War labels, such as “communist” or “Bolshevik”. As the below passage demonstrates, 
certain individuals feel that the mainstream media in Croatia is controlled by these political 
elements, that other voices in the space are purposely marginalised and, as the discussion 
progressed, they connected this to corruption in Croatia. In other words, depending on an 
individual’s political leaning, they connected corruption and the state of affairs in Croatian 
media and politics to either a left wing or right wing party and history.   
 
ZA.P.1 – This [the media] is all under the strong influence of the Bolshevik, communist 
government.  
 
ZA.P.3 – That is right, it is all in their hands. 
 
ZA.P.1 – Here and there you find a good journalist. 
 
ZA.P.3 (interrupts) – These are rare… 
 
ZA.P.1 – And they immediately get.  
 
ZA.P.3 (interrupts) – And they are outcasts…  
 
ZA.P.1 – And they immediately get... 
 
ZA.P.2 (interrupts) – They now write at Sedam, Dnevno and so on. 
 
ZA.P.3 – That is right, they are no longer present. They cannot express themselves. 
 
ZA.P.2 – Bujanec and so on. 
 
ZA.P.4 – Top Croatian journalists that have been laid off from the big publishers, 
newspapers and so on. 
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ZA.P.3 – Look at Jutarnji List, the Croatian state, this communist establishment, gave 
them, 800 million krunas to cover all of their losses (focus group with Zadar pensioners). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.1 – Today the information depends on who is in power. Right now the communists 
are in power (follow-up interview with Zagreb pensioner). 
 
The war veterans’ groups not only felt that the media were biased, but also that they aimed 
to create a split in the Croatian public, often between the veterans and the rest of the 
population. The Zadar war veterans called the media the “creators of chaos” and generally 
the media in this case were seen to be ignoring the plight of the veterans and to be 
excluding them from the public scene (by not allowing them to have a voice): 
 
NU.V.4 – The demonstration on Savska has lasted for 60 days. In the news it gets a 
minute or not even a minute.  
 
NU.V.5 – What minute? 
 
NU.V.3 – This is already old news, it does not exist anymore. 
 
NU.V.4 – They are once again trying to create a barrier between the civilian victims and 
the branitelji (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.4 – They removed all of the comments on the articles because they did not want to 
hear any other arguments. The message was sent that those who do not agree with the 
authors and think like them, for example on H-Alter or Jutarnji List, that they should go to 
their “Ustasha” media houses and not pollute the air here (focus group with Zagreb war 
veterans). 
 
Despite distrust of the overall media, there is a disjunction in Croatia between the written 
press and television. Survey results show that television is far more trusted in terms of 
reporting on transitional justice issues than any other form of media. When asked which 
source respondents trusted most on ICTY reporting, two of the three national television 
broadcasters scored highest by some margin (TV Nova 39%; HRT 25%; and RTL 5%) 
compared to the main dailies (Jutarnji List 3%; Večernji List 3%; 24 Sata 2%; Novi List 2%; 
and Slobodna Dalmacija 1%), although it is significant that a whole 20% of respondents 
claimed to trust none of the sources listed (Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, 2011). 
Eurobarometer 82 (2014) showed that while 67% read newspapers at least once a week 
(which is significant in and of itself, given potential agenda-setting and priming effects), 87% 
watched television. This is not surprising given the global predominance of television, but the 
focus group discussions indicated that television and pictures, in particular, are considered 
as far more reliable than the written press.  
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In this sense, videos were seen as evidence of Croatian innocence in front of the ICTY. Most 
of the groups mentioned the videos of Knin after Croatian forces retook it, and Gotovina’s 
speech to his soldiers before the start of Operation Storm as proof that the ICTY’s indictment 
was misguided:  
 
SI.T.3 – The trial of Gotovina, when they discussed the excessive shelling of Knin, was 
one of the most important points. But you have a huge amount of videos of the army 
entering Knin, not only in archives, but on YouTube.  
 
All agree 
 
SI.T.1 – That no one cared to watch. 
 
SI.T.3 – They watched it for sure, it is just, (pause) well you can see that the city is not 
destroyed (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.3 – Gotovina was always threatening “Do not do this!” He is clean. 
 
ZG.P.2 – He is a soldier, a professional. 
 
ZG.P.1 – You have that video, where he organised a meeting before the start of 
Operation Storm. To act honestly, not to be savages, not to steal or to rob, and he even 
shouted at them. But look, I also believe that some things happened. But you need to 
know that this happened around Knin, it was liberated by the 4th Guards Brigade. These 
were all boys who during the war had to flee from the surroundings of Knin. They went to 
defend, they signed up. 
 
ZG.P.4 – The Dalmatian Brigade. My uncle’s son was in it. 
 
ZG.P.1 – The boys probably, arriving in liberated Knin after four years of occupation, 
probably committed some crimes in revenge.  
 
ZG.P.2 – But look, this happens in every war. Of course emotionally, when someone has 
killed, stolen from you, that you want revenge. It is just that the state has to prevent that 
in some way, so that it does not happen.  
 
ZG.P.4 – To process it (focus group with Zagreb pensioners). 
 
Participants in this last passage also use a common strategy among the groups: to first 
admit that Croatian crimes did occur, but then to justify or relativize them somehow. In the 
passage above, first the professional soldier Gotovina is portrayed as innocent, then a 
participant says that crimes did happen, but that these were done by “boys” under emotional 
stress (including a referral to personal experience) and, finally, that blame should be put on 
the state that should have done more to deal with the crimes. In other words, this group as 
many others, attributed responsibility for the crimes on another actor, the highly distrusted 
state.  
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Videos were also seen as proof of Croatia’s victimhood and they helped construct such a 
narrative. Whereas most sources on the war and the transitional justice process were seen 
as unreliable or poor; personal experience, hearsay (both discussed later in this chapter) 
and pictures or videos were seen as the most reliable. This gives television a huge potential 
to shape attitudes and opinions: 
 
ZG.T.2 – That what I remember is the most reliable. I know that I experienced 
something, that I saw it on television. Also people I spoke to, who I know well.  
 
ZG.T.1 – Yes, not so much books, because books can be manipulated. 
 
ZG.T.2 – They are not necessary in this instance (dyad with Zagreb teachers). 
 
Ultimately some information may be only available or easily accessible through the media. 
With regard to transitional justice, this is also as a consequence of the perceived lack of 
information given out by transitional justice instruments, namely the ICTY and the Croatian 
judiciary. A war veteran in Sisak summed it up well, when they said, “You receive 
information from journalists, not courts. What you read, you read in newspapers” (focus 
group with Sisak war veterans). This perception that courts, and specifically the ICTY, do not 
publish information is wrong. The ICTY publishes information through a variety of means: 
including streamed broadcasts of hearings, publishing of transcripts, production of easy-to-
digest case summaries, making court documents and press releases generally available, as 
well as other Outreach Programme activities.  
 
The Eurobarometer 82 (2014) results discussed above are indicative of the fact that the 
media, including the written press, remain in widespread use. How much the media 
influence public opinion on topics of transitional justice, however, remains ambiguous. 
Survey data has also shown that the Croatian public inform themselves about elections and 
political parties primarily through television, followed by radio and daily press, and only then 
family and friends (Ipsos Puls, 2012). Weeklies, the Internet and party activities lag behind 
significantly (Ipsos Puls, 2012). This means that there is evidence that the media is shaping 
at least some political attitudes. 
 
Horizontal media sources were distrusted just like all sources other than television. 
Horizontal media were, however, the only ones that provided alternative views on the media 
landscape. Television pictures, on the other hand, were considered highly reliable or 
“truthful”, but they have also reproduced the dominant war narrative, much like most vertical 
media. The Kolstø (2011) survey findings further support this, most respondents felt that the 
best way to remember the Homeland War was through television documentaries (24.9%), 
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ahead of educational programmes (21.3%) and books and memoirs (17.7%). This means 
that the framework produced by the most trusted media source is one that does not allow for 
questioning of the dominant war narrative. Moreover, even if it had, experience from Serbia 
hints that even this may not lead to a significant change in societal norms and 
understandings of the recent conflict (Gordy, 2014).  
 
  
5.2 Highly distrusted elites: Courts, the government and political parties   
 
Other survey data, on the other hand, shows that 73% of the public think that the ICTY is not 
prominent enough in the media to be acquainted with its work (Belgrade Centre for Human 
Rights, 2011). Focus group participants across the board felt that this was because the ICTY 
and domestic courts did not publish information actively, if at all. Publishing of information 
was not seen as the job of courts, be they domestic or international, and information about 
their work was considered to only be available through the media: 
 
SI.V.1 – Courts cannot give information. 
 
SI.V.2 – There is none. 
 
SI.V.3 – They can protect citizens, if they even do that. 
 
SI.V.1 – Information you get from journalists, not courts. What you read, you read in the 
newspapers (focus group with Sisak war veterans). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.2 – To be honest, I cannot get information from our courts. I cannot reach it unless 
the proceedings are published in the media (interview with non-urban teacher). 
 
These discussions often alluded to an inherent lack of transparency that this resulted in. 
Respondents, therefore, frequently discussed how the work of the courts is unclear, murky 
or conducted in secret (also helping feed conspiracy theories). : 
 
ZG.P.1 – [The ICTY] did not give us information. 
 
ZG.P.2 – We do not really know how much information they even have. 
 
ZG.P.4 – It is hard to say. Does America know what happened here? 
 
Moderator – What about domestic courts as a source of information on the war? 
 
ZG.P.2 – I do not really understand the question, because courts are not the ones who 
give information.  
 
ZG.P.1 – The newspapers would report. Today is the trial of so and so. He has been 
sentenced to this amount of years. That was in the newspapers. But how the court 
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works, who or what it calls up, the functioning of the court, no one wrote about that (focus 
group with Zagreb pensioners). 
 
This passage highlights that courts are ignored as sources of information. The participants, 
even after prompts, are unaware of any such functions of courts, which puts into question 
the hoped for expressivist effects of the ICTY. It would have been or is necessary to change 
the understanding of courts, or at least of the ICTY, in order to achieve such an effect with 
the public. The statements outlined above in combination with previous survey data show 
that the media, including the written press, do continue to play a role in how the Croatian 
public forms attitudes about political and societal issues. Moreover, they show that 
information on transitional justice is for the most part gained from the media, rather than 
directly from the Tribunal or courts. This means that what the media discuss and how they 
frame issues has the potential to have a great impact on how the public perceives war 
crimes trials and the transitional justice process as a whole. The media play a central role in 
the dissemination of information about war crimes trials and the Homeland War in general, 
despite being distrusted as a source. Courts, international or domestic, continue to provide 
information on their work, but the public do not see them as a source of information. It can 
also be argued that they should not be sources of information since this is not their primary 
role, but this does limit their potential to help audiences come to better understand the past 
(if that is an aim they aspire for). It is, therefore, the media that “set the record straight” when 
they report on the work of courts, not the courts themselves.  
 
Much like the judiciary, the government in Croatia is not seen as particularly efficient or 
reliable. This general disenchantment with its work seems to extend across all parties, in 
that people find the whole system to be broken. Again, much like with the judiciary, the more 
extreme ends of the spectrum see the government as manipulative and infiltrated by 
unwanted elements. This is seen as being a consequence of the communist legacy of 
Croatia, but more specifically, as an effect of the lack of lustration in the country. 
Eurobarometer results from 2004 until 2014 show the staggering amount of distrust of the 
government in Croatia: in 2014 78% of respondents claimed not to trust the government 
versus 16% who did. Figure 13 shows how this compares over time with the EU average 
(Eurobarometer, 2004-2014). 
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Figure 13. Comparison of trust in government (Croatia and EU). 
 
Source: Eurobarometer (2004 – 2014) 
 
 
The reasons given in the focus groups for why the government is considered to be inefficient 
or useless range from the poor climate it has to work in to more pessimistic notions of it not 
even having an interest in helping people. As a consequence, it is not considered a reliable 
source of information. It is seen as sharing the same problems as the judiciary, those of 
staffing and an unfavourable working environment: 
 
SI.P.4 – Plants can only grow in an appropriate climate. Same here. Just like with the 
trials. 
 
All agree 
 
SI.P.4 – It is not that the judiciary did not do well; no element did well. There are no 
oases. 
 
SI.P.3 – The judiciary is a reflection of the whole situation (focus group with Sisak 
pensioners). 
 
The Sisak pensioners semantically connected the judiciary and the government, who they 
did not see as separate, but as one and the same. Many respondents found that the 
government was not doing its job or as a non-urban war veteran put it, “My own state, 
government and system, in my country, do not function” (focus group with non-urban war 
veterans Banovina). Many groups were more pessimistic, believing that the government was 
not willing to help “ordinary people” and victims of the war felt that they were being ignored: 
 
NU.P.1 – And those who are [in parliament], they are reading the newspaper, playing on 
their smart phones. They paid millions of euros for the voting system so that they do not 
have to raise their hands and signs. This is disgraceful. They gave nothing to people, 
ordinary people, who pay them, who they are there for. 
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NU.P.2 – They give nothing to the tax payer (focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
- 
 
NU.V.4 – Here in this town we have a family from Vukovar who cannot live there any 
longer because their girl, now a grown woman, was six years old when she was raped. 
Six years! What are we talking about! To this day she has such horrible trauma.  
 
NU.V.1 – You cannot stay normal.  
 
NU.V.5 – I can conclude on behalf of us all. This is a huge injustice.  
 
NU.V.3 – Horrible. 
 
NU.V.5 – A huge injustice. I will say something that may be blasphemy. My state is in an 
incredible financial crisis, but we are morally at rock bottom. I love this country, but we 
cannot take any steps forward until we clear up some things. It pains me horribly. We are 
all sick from the injustice, I dare say this. We are sick from being brainwashed. When 
someone persistently tells you that you are not a victim and that everything is good, to 
forget, to continue. 
 
NU.V.3 – And let us reconcile! 
 
NU.V.5 – But you cannot move forward until the truth is not clear (focus group with non-
urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
War veterans and victims were particularly distrustful of the government since they were 
seen as letting the victims down. The non-urban war veterans (above) saw the lack of 
recognition of their suffering as an attempt at manipulation and brainwashing, which 
prevented potential reconciliation. The government was painted as sinister and working 
against them. As a source of information the government was not trusted, since they were 
expected to only release what suits them at the time. History teachers, for example, did not 
find this particular to the Croatian government or to this time period. All of the groups viewed 
the government, and all parties in general, as opportunistic and willing to “sell out” in order to 
win elections. Once again, the idea that the public was being manipulated was often present: 
 
SI.T.1 – No government will say everything it knows. Only what suits them. 
 
SI.T.2 – Yes. And this is normal for every government. In the future they will not release 
any more information.  
 
SI.T.3 – Throughout history it has always been like that. It has never changed, from 
Rome until now. 
 
All laugh and agree (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
 
- 
 
Moderator – What about the government, current or previous, as a source of 
information? 
 
ZG.T.1 – (laughs) Each in their own way. Whatever suited them, what they could use 
they used.  
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ZG.T.2 – If I were to compare it to how the American government justified the invasion of 
Iraq, then I would not trust any government (dyad with Zagreb teachers). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.2 – Our government is such that our Prime Minister or any minister is ready to 
announce on the anniversary of the SDSS47 how the Serbs are whatever they need to 
be, to gain votes, that they are also the ones who helped lead to victory. And in the 
afternoon they will, if need be, say something else. Our government is definitely not good 
at telling the truth about the war, since ultimately, they are also responsible that all of the 
criminals who are still free and receiving pensions have not been indicted and 
sentenced. Not only on the side of the Croatian Army, but how would you say? Also on 
the side of the rebels (interview with non-urban teacher). 
 
The end of this last passage is particularly interesting. Not only does it hint at the general 
disenchantment with Croatian party politics, but it also blames the government for not doing 
more to tackle the problem of war criminals, be it on the Croat or Serb (or as the respondent 
calls it, “rebel”) side of the conflict. The government is seen as failing both “sides” of the 
conflict and, particularly among teachers, is not seen to have any ethnic bias. As further 
passages below will show, other participants disagree with this, since they see the Croatian 
government as being infiltrated by anti-Croat elements. Again, survey data supports the 
perception that the government only works for its own self-interest. In the Ipsos Puls (2012) 
survey, respondents generally agreed that politicians only look after their own interests; that 
wherever there was politics, criminals were nearby; that democracy is only the mask the rich 
use to keep people obedient; and, that parliament is only a performance for the public, that 
the real decisions are made elsewhere (Figure 14).  
 
Figure 14. How much do you agree with the following statements? 
 
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
 
                                                
47 The Independent Democratic Serb Party (Samostalna demokratska srpska stranka – SDSS) is one 
of the Croatian political parties that represents the Serb minority in the country.  
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Parliament is only a performance for the 
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Politicians only look after their own interests 
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I generally agree I completely agree DK 
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Certain individuals were opposed to the ruling coalition at the time and expressed such 
opinions, to varying degrees. For the most part, however, group discussions revolved 
around general disappointment with all parties, which led to poor information on the war. 
Survey data suggests that political parties are trusted even less than the government (Figure 
15; in 2014 78% did not trust the government, 86% did not trust political parties; 
Eurobarometer, 2004-2014) and Croats more often than not do not feel close to any political 
party (62.5% do not, 34.6% do; Ipsos Puls, 2012).  
 
Figure 15. Comparison of trust in political parties (Croatia and EU). 
 
Source: Eurobarometer (2004 – 2014) 
 
Group discussions reflected this: 
 
Moderator – And the government as a source of information on the war? 
 
ZA.V.2 – Well they block! Not just this one, but previous ones as well (focus group with 
Zadar war veterans). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.3 – Not a single one dealt with serious issues, the economy, and the war least of 
all. They were all governments only for themselves, separate from the narod. I do not 
defend the HDZ or the SDP (focus group with Zagreb war veterans). 
 
- 
 
ZA.T.2 – The statute of the city of Vukovar, in which the use of Cyrillic is included, was 
brought in by the HDZ, who have now of course changed their minds. As we said earlier, 
politics in opposition and in power is different (focus group with Zadar teachers). 
 
- 
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NU.P.5 – We have the same problem in this country, during the time of the SDP and 
during the time of the HDZ. We once again have no money (focus group with non-urban 
pensioners). 
 
The evidence suggests that the general preoccupation of political parties to win elections 
has led to a broken political system. In this sense, the government is mistrusted because 
political parties and their intentions are hugely distrusted. Moreover, some of the more 
extreme opinions saw the government as using information in order to split and manipulate 
the public, much like some participants saw the Croatian judiciary: 
 
SI.P.1 – The biggest problem is that everyone, governments and those and these, they 
all talk about half-truths and half-lies. No one says the whole truth and everyone makes 
things sound nicer (focus group with Sisak Pensioners). 
 
Numerous groups and individuals also distrusted the government since it was seen as being 
run by Europe or that it had been infiltrated by unwanted elements (Serb, Orthodox, UDBA, 
communist, Yugonostalgic, etc.). This is not all too surprising given the prevalence of 
conspiracy theories in the Balkans (Obradović-Wochnik, 2013: 198). There was a general 
impression that the lack of lustration in Croatia and the legacy of communism had led to this 
state of affairs. The first passage below is particularly striking: a question about domestic 
war crimes trials is connected to corruption and then to this type of infiltration. It is then 
juxtaposed with Croatian defense, creating a sense of a continued struggle for Croatian 
independence (in this case judiciary independence):  
 
Moderator – What is your opinion of domestic war crimes trials? 
 
ZA.P.2 – They are very susceptible. For example, the State Attorney’s office. My 
personal opinion is that these people are not bad judges or bad people. But they are 
looking out for their own positions. They cannot do anything by getting approval from the 
side. They are told where to go, should they sentence someone, free someone and so 
on. There is no independent judiciary with us. That is my opinion. 
 
ZA.P.3 – I am sorry, but imagine what kind of judges they are. That is this communist 
mentality. The mentality of the UDBA. 
 
ZA.P.4 – That is right, that is right. 
 
ZA.P.3 – Starting with Stipe Mesić. Just remember that he used to work for Dr. Franjo 
Tuđman. European should have made Tuđman a saint. Him and the Croatian army. 
Because this is truly an example to all of Europe of what it has done throughout all of 
history. And here Croatia only defended itself. And it showed how in this suffering, in this 
pain, how great the Croatian man is. And this I am proud of. But this, the judiciary. Still 
today, I personally am only waiting for the day when we will free ourselves from this 
UDBA and communist mentality. Because this is something horrific. An ideology crafted 
in hell. Truly (focus group with Zadar pensioners). 
 
- 
 
SI.V.3 – Politics blows from France or England or Germany. 
 
 126 
SI.V.2 – I will tell you now, that our politics is run how Europe says. Europe blows a little, 
your Englishman David Cameron strikes the table with his fist in Parliament and says 
that Great Britain wants something. And as the big brothers say, so small Croatia does 
(focus group with Sisak war veterans). 
 
- 
 
NU2.V.1 – Greater Serbs, Yugonostalgics, persecutors of the Croatian national spirit 
throughout history, UDBA members. Today they have completely infiltrated all the pores 
of Croatian economic, political and daily life (dyad with non-urban war veterans 
Slavonia). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.4 – We are still deeply in the process of transition because we have not undergone 
a single type of lustration (focus group with Zagreb war veterans). 
 
While war veterans strongly expressed such concerns throughout all of the groups, other 
respondents either did not believe in this or focused on the lack of lustration following the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, more than the infiltration of UBDA, communist or Yugonostalgic 
elements in Croatia (although a minority of pensioners shared the same opinion as the war 
veterans). The topic was capable of causing heated debate and in one group even led to a 
walkout, indicative of how much importance is attached to the legacy of communism in 
Croatia, but also show how damaging being branded a “communist” can be. Participants 
judged other individuals, and their opinions, based on their views of the past. In other words, 
current politics is judged based on understandings of communist and Second World War 
history:  
 
ZG.P.1 – Today the information depends on who is in power. Today the communists are 
in power.  
 
ZG.P.3 (shouts) – But there are no communists!  
 
ZG.P.4 – You cannot talk about communists! There are no communists!  
 
ZG.P.1 – How are there not? What is the SDP?  
 
ZG.P.4 – There are no communists.  
 
ZG.P.3 – Objectively speaking, there are more communists in the HDZ.  
 
ZG.P.4 (shouts) – All of the HDZ are communists!   
 
ZG.P.1 – And what is the SDP, is it not the successor to the Party?  
 
ZG.P.4 (shouts) – The social democrat party!  
 
ZG.P.1 (shouts) – Ah! And where did it come from! It is a successor to the Party!  
 
ZG.P.3 (shouts) – And where did the HDZ come from (focus group with Zagreb 
pensioners)? 
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The issue of lustration following the Homeland War remains a dividing line in Croatian 
politics and society. War veterans and some pensioners strongly expressed a desire for it 
and the concept featured in many of the focus groups. The theme was more broadly 
connected to discussions over Second World War Ustasha/communist divisions, especially 
with older participants.  
 
 
5.3 Trusted everyday sources: Participants and historians 
 
Whereas the sources discussed above were for the most part distrusted; the ones discussed 
below are all considered more reliable, beginning with the Church. Discussions about the 
Church in Croatia, which was often taken to mean the Roman Catholic one, were often 
awkward. The topic was frequently ignored or laughed off, although as Figure 11 shows, the 
Church is relatively more trusted than most other institutions in the Croatia. This is to be 
expected given the central role the Roman Catholic Church plays in Croatian society and in 
the nation-building project of the state (Pavlaković, 2014: 29). It was often referred to as 
educational and reliable (especially compared to the state): 
 
Moderator – Do you think you have a good understanding of the Homeland War? 
 
SI.P.4 – I believe on the basis of my upbringing, and in terms of upbringing I mean what I 
learned from my wider family, in Church, in school from elementary school to university. 
These were all of my educators. And in society, and later when I worked, these were all 
educational measures that influenced me. On the basis of these criteria, which 
developed over time in me, I believe I understand [the Homeland War] (follow-up dyad 
with Sisak pensioners). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.1 – With regard to any question connected to the Homeland War or trials, the 
opinion of the Church is very important to me. More so than the domestic media. It really 
means a lot to me, for one single reason. If I ever have to explain this, the Church has 
been with the narod for 13 centuries. The only such institution. I have been convinced by 
many, maybe unimportant and tiny examples, how the Church is better than the state 
because it is monolithic. It has existed with us Croats for 1300 years, while governments 
and states change (interview with non-urban teacher). 
 
The above statement from the non-urban teacher is, however, slightly extreme and most 
groups ignored the topic or laughed it off. Teachers in particular responded with laughter: in 
Zagreb, Zadar and Sisak the question about the Church as a source of information was 
immediately followed by laughter. Respondents otherwise generally agreed that the Church 
only has a spiritual role in society and not a political one: 
 
SI.V.1 – The Church takes care of souls. It does not care about this [the Homeland War]. 
 
SI.V.3 – Very little. 
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SI.V.2 – The Church preaches about the Lord. And to have faith in the Lord. Not in 
Milanović. In him I have no faith at all. But in the one up there I have faith. That is what 
the Church says (focus group with Sisak war veterans).  
 
- 
 
SI.T.1 – The Church is concerned with spiritual work, not political.  
 
SI.T.2 – And charity.  
 
All laugh (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
 
The topic of the Church seemed to be generally ignored through these two methods: 
laughter or insisting it only has a spiritual role. The Church as a topic was, therefore, 
particularly hard to analyse as a sequence of narrative rather than just an instance, since it 
was difficult to gather the necessary data. This shows the participants’ deliberate attempts at 
ignoring the topic, but it does mean that this type of data collection and analysis approach is 
limited in such situations. 
 
The role of the Church in Croatian society remains large, although its role as a source of 
information on the Homeland War is ultimately limited. It is not an active publisher of 
information in the same way that historians, participants or courts might be. Moreover, it 
does receive criticism from certain segments of society, which was obvious in a number of 
discussions with teachers, who found it to be biased and political, though not universally so: 
 
NU.T.4 – It misinforms. 
 
NU.T.3 – I would never use it as a source on the war. It is clearly tainted with some 
ideology. 
 
NU.T.4 – It is propaganda (dyad with non-urban teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZA.T.2 – In my opinion all three religions in this region are very biased in representing 
anything (focus group with Zadar teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZG.T.4 – More than anything I have the impression that there is not enough education in 
this institution or an honest attitude towards information, instead they push for an 
interpretation that had nothing to do with facts. Unfortunately. And their influence is big 
(interview with Zagreb teacher). 
 
Across all target segments and locations, it was clear that participants of the war, 
predominantly former combatants but also victims, were consistently considered to be the 
most reliable source of information on the Homeland War. As might be expected, war 
veterans in particular felt that this was the case. Their passages (such as the one from 
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Zadar below) also highlighted the large role that fear plays in their lives, be it of infiltration or 
conspiracy in society, which they use to justify their position as defenders of this society. As 
in other groups, they also referred to physical repositories of their testimonies, the books 
published by them (which occurred with three of the five war veterans’ groups): 
 
ZA.V.6 – The most reliable source for people who did not live through the war are the 
ordinary small people and the types of interview that you [the moderator] are doing. That 
is how you will get the best picture. 
 
ZA.V.2 – Exactly. 
 
Moderator – So participants? 
 
All agree 
 
ZA.V.4 – Active participants who are still alive.  
 
ZA.V.6 – Who can speak without burden. 
 
ZA.V.2 – Because they have nothing to fear. 
 
ZA.V.6 – We have nothing to fear in telling you to the truth. 
 
ZA.V.2 – Because we have looked death in the eyes. 
 
ZA.V.3 – Here we have a book of testimonies from women who took part in the 
Homeland War. When there are more books of testimonies like this one. When there are 
more branitelji who write down their testimonies, each putting their own on paper, what 
they lived through, that will be the best source of information (focus group with Zadar war 
veterans). 
 
- 
 
Moderator – What do you think is the most reliable source of information on the war? 
 
NU2.V.2 – We, who are the participants of the times, witnesses, who can say what 
happened.  
 
NU2.V.1 agrees 
 
NU2.V.2 – No one waged war here other than Croats and Serbs. We were attacked here 
on our territory of the state of Croatia by Serbian citizens from what at the time was the 
Republic of Serbia, and their fellow nationals who lived with us. We know exactly what 
happened here. Why should someone from England, France, Germany, the EU, the 
USA, Canada, Australia, wherever, talk about the Homeland War? We waged the war, 
not them (dyad with non-urban war veterans Slavonia). 
 
- 
 
SI.V.2 – The most reliable source are those who were in the war, those who were on the 
frontline and who experienced and saw all kinds of things (focus group Sisak war 
veterans). 
 
This sentiment was shared across all of the other groups, which often also involved 
individuals who had participated in the war, as combatants or as victims. For example, in the 
non-urban pensioners group individuals commented more than once that it is difficult to talk 
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about “if you were not there” (focus group with non-urban pensioners). This is not overly 
surprising given how much of the population witnessed violence directly (55% according to a 
2001 survey; Caritas Croatia and the Franciscan Institute for the Culture, 2001). Other 
respondents, who did not partake themselves in the war, also referred to participants of the 
conflict as the most reliable source and even cited hearsay from participants as highly 
trustworthy:  
 
ZG.P.1 – I have a lot of information and this theme is close to me. I went around to many 
areas hit by the war as a humanitarian aid worker… So I have first-hand information 
(follow-up interview with Zagreb pensioner). 
 
- 
 
ZG.T.2 – That what I remember is the most reliable. I know that I experienced 
something, saw it on television. People who I spoke to, and who I know well.  
 
ZG.T.1 – Yes, and not so much books, because books can also be manipulated.  
 
ZG.T.2 – They are not even necessary in this instance (dyad with Zagreb teachers). 
 
The discussion between the two Zagreb teachers, also quoted earlier in the chapter, is 
particularly meaningful. The teachers not only find participants (and television pictures) to be 
the most reliable source, but they directly compare it to books, since books can be 
manipulated. Participants and television in this case are seen as making books redundant. 
Some groups specified that certain types of participants were more useful in this sense than 
others, for example both the non-urban pensioners and the non-urban teachers commented 
that commanders and their diaries would be particularly useful, compared to soldiers who 
may have “quite a narrow picture of a specific location” (interview with non-urban teacher). A 
number of respondents, much to the agreement of their groups, also pointed out that 
participants were only a reliable source inasmuch as both sides of the conflict were referred 
to: 
 
NU2.V.1 – The most honest and fairest account about everything will be given by the 
very participants of these events, including members of the Croatian Army, and of the 
other army, on the other side, civilians who lived in these areas where it happened, and 
least of all career politicians (dyad with non-urban war veterans Slavonia). 
 
- 
 
ZA.T.2 – When we consider war veterans, including the ones from the other side, they 
can help serious, objective historians to create quality scientific and expert works, books 
and monographs (focus group with Zadar teachers). 
 
These statements not only allude to the potential openness to hearing other views (although 
it is debatable how agreeable they would find those views), but also indicate that reliability is 
considered to include multiple perspectives. This is, however, based on the understanding 
that the war could have only been defensive in nature and only the details of this defence 
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are up for debate, not the defence itself. Moreover, participants were seen as an ideal 
source for objective historical works, ones that hold the most potential to be trusted. Oral 
history, a possible avenue for this, was mentioned across several groups as a useful method 
to capture the experiences of participants in specific locations. In fact, many of the war 
veterans’ associations had produced such works, some brought them to the focus groups 
and all of them readily spoke about the works. A respondent in Zadar, for example, said that 
the “people who lived through these horrors and who this happened to, that is the source. 
For example, our group has already published two books. Let it stay written down” (focus 
group with Zadar war veterans). War veterans referred to these oral histories as their duty; 
to record what had occurred and in some ways to continue the defence of Croatia, by 
legitimising its defence and foundation.   
 
Despite participants of the Homeland War being highly trusted as a source of information, 
war veterans’ associations were not trusted at all. Even all of the war veterans’ groups 
interviewed found the general grouping of war veterans’ associations to be a highly 
unreliable source of information on the war. Across the board they were considered to be too 
numerous, fragmented and unclear in expressing their aims, mainly because they are 
perceived to only have their own monetary or political interests in mind.48 In addition to this, 
there is a sense that every person looking to swindle a bit of money could create an 
association, which lead to such a great number being created. This perception is discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 9, but for now it provides an interesting juxtaposition with the 
notion that participants, on the other hand, were highly trusted. Whilst they rank highly, 
possibly highest, as a source of information, war veterans’ associations were placed at the 
opposite end of the spectrum. This was made all the starker since war veterans themselves 
find the groups to be poor sources of information. 
 
As several of the above passages hinted at, objective historical works are sought after, but 
their reliability seems to be based on the need to involve participants and to present sources 
from both sides. Currently it seems that works by historians are, with one exception, 
considered to be poor. For example, the Sisak war veterans claimed that what “pained” them 
was what Croatian historians wrote about Croatia, while the Zadar war veterans were 
worried that the books of Carla del Ponte or Florence Hartmann were writing the history of 
Croatia. So while war veterans were unhappy with historical works for these reasons, history 
teachers saw the works as limited due to the short timespan since the war ended and the 
fact that participants, discussed above, can be biased. A Zagreb teacher commented, “The 
                                                
48 The Croatian Ministry of War Veterans’ Affairs runs a registry of war veterans and their 
associations. They record circa 6,300 associations. See: https://registri.uprava.hr/#!udruge 
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advantage and the disadvantage is that we all survived that time, me included, so that this 
picture was also built through personal experience. No one can run away from that” 
(interview with Zagreb teacher). What all groups agreed on was that both sides had to be 
heard or seen for a source to be reliable:  
 
NU.T.4 – Purely historically, there cannot only be one source. 
 
NU.T.3 – There have to be more historical sources. 
 
NU.T.4 – Yes, there always have to be multiple historical sources. You have to listen to 
one side and the other. For example, when I teach about the Homeland War, I always 
start by asking how do you think they talk about it in Sarajevo or Belgrade (dyad with 
non-urban teachers)? 
 
- 
 
Moderator – What do you think is the most reliable source of information on the war? 
 
NU.V.5 – Documents that our boys captured when they came to Petrinja. Those are 
documents that say exactly what happened among the Serbs.  
 
NU.V.3 – So Serb documents (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
The preoccupation with collecting documents or hearing from both sides and the trust in 
participants as sources of information opens up the space for a historical source that can tap 
into both. Historian Ante Nazor, the Director of the Croatian Memorial and Documentation 
Centre for the Homeland War (the individual and the institution were referred to 
interchangeably throughout all of the discussions), fills all of these requirements: he was a 
participant in the war as a conscript and he actively, as well as openly, collects documents 
from both sides of the conflict.49 War veterans’ groups found him to be highly reliable and 
referred to him as the best source on the war, apart from participants; pensioners for the 
most part shared this sentiment; whilst teachers at times aired some doubts, but were also 
generally positive. This has the potential to build a historical narrative based on participants’ 
accounts from both sides, but it can also give a source heightened credibility simply because 
they were a participant and because they collected information from both sides. It does not 
take into account the importance of the interpretations being imposed on the data, which 
were rarely mentioned in discussions. The non-urban war veterans group quoted above, 
went on to say: 
                                                
49 Ante Nazor is a Croatian historian who also runs the Croatian Memorial and Documentation Centre 
for the Homeland War. The aims of the Centre are the collection and investigation of documentation 
and materials related to the Homeland War. Ante Nazor has been seen as politically aligned to the 
right side of the spectrum in Croatia and much of his work features the use of loaded terms, for 
example one of his books is titled “The Greater Serbian Aggression Against Croatia in the Nineties”. 
This study does not judge the value, quality or credibility of Ante Nazor or the Croatian Memorial and 
Documentation Centre for the Homeland War based on academic merit. Instead, it tries to show how 
the Croatian public view them and the potential they hold as source of information on the Homeland 
War.  
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NU.V.5 – [The Serb documents] are now with Nazor in the Memorial and Documentation 
Centre. 
 
All agree  
 
NU.V.3 – This is a very good thing.  
 
NU.V.5 – These are reliable sources. You should turn to them.  
 
NU.V.1 – They needed trucks since there was so much documentation.  
 
NU.V.5 – And in there it is written exactly what happened, who killed who, all of the 
information (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
- 
 
ZA.P.3 – Facts. He only publishes facts.  
 
ZA.P.1 – We have listened to him, we have read his work. 
 
ZA.P.3 – This is what makes Ante Nazor great, so rare in Croatia. He has a doctorate in 
history, he will not even discuss things without the facts. He has the facts.  
 
ZA.P.2 – Everything with documents. 
 
ZA.P.1 – All documents. 
 
ZA.P.3 – All with documents. And this is his greatness (focus group with Zadar 
pensioners). 
 
These exchanges highlight the potential pitfall of this type of endeavour: where “facts” are 
not disputed because data collection is seen as being good. In the case of the non-urban 
war veterans this gesture is particularly strong, as they witnessed the collection of literal 
truckloads of documents. In other words, the reliability of the source is judged based on the 
volume of documents collected from a certain location. Moreover, Nazor is seen as 
collecting documents from both sides of the conflict, giving him added reliability: 
 
NU.T.1 – I consider [the Memorial Centre] reliable based on what I have heard and 
followed, because I deeply believe that they are trying to show, as historians, the real 
truth. And that certainly involves the basic principle: not only one source and one side, 
instead they have definitely collected information from the opposing side. These include 
the captured documents and videos of Krajina, as well as more recently statements from 
Serb rebels. I believe they have also, if I recently heard correctly, involved some Serbs 
into the work of centre, so that they can also give their contribution to the real truth 
(interview with non-urban teacher). 
 
- 
 
SI.T.3 – That is how the Memorial Centre for the Homeland War works. To listen to one 
side and the other (focus group with Sisak teachers).  
 
Teachers generally had a positive outlook on the work of the Centre and of Nazor, but they 
were the only group that also sometimes expressed doubts about the project. Many actually 
had direct contact with Ante Nazor himself, either through their studies (for example, if he 
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was their supervisor) or through lectures that the Centre organised in their school 
(something Nazor is actively involved in). When they occurred, criticisms were levelled at 
Nazor’s political leaning, the danger of an official historical narrative and the fact that it is still 
too early to conduct serious historical analyses: 
 
NU.T.3 – He is distinctly politically oriented toward the right and he presents exclusively 
those sources that help the Croatian side. He will rarely present sources that can blemish 
the Croats in the Homeland War. So these sources are not good to me (dyad with non-
urban teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZG.T.3 – I think that as an idea, as a centralised place to store documents, which will 
ease the investigation of the period, certainly yes. But not as a place that could an official 
version of history and that period that everyone should adhere to, anyone in the country, 
and especially historians who primarily work with this. I would not dare say if they are 
moving in that direction, but they should certainly avoid it (interview with Zagreb teacher). 
 
- 
 
ZG.T.4 – I know what they are doing. But they are only just collecting information and 
material. He is primarily concerned with giving lectures, he has a mission to say 
something about what he has collected. This is some kind of start (interview with Zagreb 
teacher). 
   
Ante Nazor and the Croatian Memorial and Documentation Centre for the Homeland War 
tap into several factors of reliability in the eyes of the Croatian public. It focuses on 
participants of the conflict; a participant runs it; it makes a highly publicised effort at 
collecting source material; and, it collects material from “both sides” of the conflict. The 
centre was established by the government specifically to create official narratives about the 
Homeland War and its statute states that its aims are to investigate the truth and to make 
the public domestically and globally aware of the discovered facts. Ante Nazor also receives 
a high degree of media publicity, especially in contrast with other historians who may not so 
strongly identify with a political current. Despite the Centre still only being in its formative 
stages, it holds the potential to become the most trusted source on the Homeland War and 
one that dictates the official narrative of the conflict. In this sense, it also represents a 
danger, since it gains its credibility from its data collection methods, rather than its lack of 
bias or its objective and systematic interpretations of the data.  
 
 
5.4 Unknown and suppressed 
 
Despite the array of sources on the Homeland War available to the public, there remains a 
general impression that not all information on the conflict is known. Once again, teachers 
stood out to the other two target groups in that they were far more pessimistic. They 
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believed not enough time had passed in order to have all of the information and that 
interpretations of the conflict were now missing: 
 
ZG.T.3 – We need to wait for the archives to open for everything to become accessible. 
Making decisive statements that it was like this has no foundations (interview with 
Zagreb teacher). 
 
- 
 
ZG.T.4 – I struggle to hold a class on the Homeland War. I have read many books, but 
what has been written on the Homeland War is generally boring. For the most part 
reviews of facts and dates. There are no real interpretations, which is interesting in 
history. Cause and consequence connections, meaningful opinions based on scientific 
research, arguments. There is no such literature (interview with Zagreb teacher). 
 
There is also an impression that certain information is suppressed, once again mostly 
shared by teachers. The suppression is seen as predominantly focusing on Croatian war 
crimes, since “the winners write history” (dyad with Zagreb teachers). Teachers who 
mentioned this also mentioned that this was to be expected, since it was not pleasant to 
hear about crimes committed on one’s own side of the conflict: 
 
NU.T.1 – Of course a special theme were situations in which Croats committed crimes. 
This was shown nowhere and it was only discovered later, after interventions from the 
other side – the Serbs, or specific organisations, like the Helsinki Committee, Amnesty 
International, who then published these things. The situation is such that you are at first 
in shock when you hear that such a thing even happened, and then there is the long path 
to the truth. Of course, it was not pleasant to hear that such things happened on the 
Croatian side (interview with non-urban teacher). 
 
- 
 
ZG.T.3 – It is simply not pleasant to discuss crimes on your own side. Even a person 
who is the most conscious of that and tries to look at things in the most objective 
manner, this is not a pleasant realisation, that someone from your narod, city, street, 
building, committed crimes because someone was of a different ethnicity (interview with 
Zagreb teacher). 
 
Both respondents here hint at the shocking effect that information that is opposed to the 
predominant war narrative can have on an individual. They also hint at the fact that the war 
narrative necessitates the suppression of certain information that runs counter to it. Similarly, 
the image of Vukovar (as one of the symbols of Croatian suffering and victimhood) was 
questioned by some teachers, who for example claimed that “we all known that Vukovar was 
sold out. We all know it, but no one is allowed to say it publicly” (dyad with Zagreb teachers). 
Others questioned Croatian involvement in Bosnia and the supposed division of the country 
during the war. It seems teachers are aware that topics that run counter to the predominant 
war narrative were and are being suppressed. This is an example of how top-down efforts 
interact with individual interpretations, albeit in a limited and far from mainstream way. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
The data show that the media in Croatia are distrusted, more so than elsewhere in Europe. 
Specifically, with regard to reporting on the ICTY, they are not seen as objective. Moreover, 
of the different forms of media, the press is the least trusted. The reasons for this distrust is 
that they are seen as corrupt and biased, which has led to them reporting in a selective and 
editorialised fashion. Respondents believed that this corruption was fuelled primarily by 
politics, although also the search for further monetary profit. Television, however, is trusted 
far more than the written press or other forms of media. Often what was seen on television 
was considered to be fact, giving the medium some form of infallibility. Despite all of the 
above, surveys show that the public still uses the media to form political opinions and that 
newspapers still form a great element of this. Moreover, there was a general impression in 
discussions that some information is only available through the media, because courts, 
including the ICTY, are not considered to be sources of information, since this is not their 
job. The media in Croatia, therefore, remain important in the formation of public opinion, 
much like elsewhere in the world, despite the generally poor opinion of them in the country. 
 
The Croatian public seem to trust few sources, which further helps explain the need for the 
media. The government is considered useless and inefficient, which reflects upon its 
reliability as a source of information. Trust in it is lower than in the rest of Europe and 
respondents had similar complaints about the government as they had about the judiciary: 
that it was trying to manipulate people and that it was working in an unfavourable 
environment. The more extreme view, expressed across all of the war veterans’ groups and 
with some pensioners, was that unwanted, anti-Croat agents had infiltrated the government. 
Overall, however, the biggest complaint shared by all respondents was that the government 
was only concerned with itself due to party politics, which are seen as having created a 
broken system. Political parties are, therefore, trusted even less. Paradoxically, war 
veterans’ groups are also highly distrusted, despite participants being the most trusted 
source of information. The groups were seen as overabundant, fragmented and unclear in 
their aims.  
 
The Church generally seemed to be trusted by participants, although the topic was most 
often ignored or laughed off in discussions. Given its central position in Croatian society, it is 
not surprising that it is seen as reliable (as one teacher said, it has been with the Croatian 
people for over 1300 years) or that respondents are unwilling to question its role. Teachers, 
however, frequently also expressed doubts about its political connections and the roles all of 
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the churches played in the wars. Ultimately its role as a source of information remains 
limited, although it is seen as relatively reliable.   
 
Participants were highlighted as the most reliable source across all target segments. So 
much so that they were seen as superior to books and hearsay was considered to be 
trustworthy, if from the right sources. In particular, respondents stressed that it was 
important to listen to participants from both sides. These criteria were also used to judge the 
reliability of historians, who were seen as more reliable if they spoke to participants and 
collected documents or testimonies from both sides. This opens up the space for a project 
like the Croatian Memorial and Documentation Centre for the Homeland War and Ante 
Nazor, which are seeing as being preoccupied with both. This can be dangerous since the 
quality and value of interpretations are not questioned, because such an effort can make a 
publicised effort for data collection. Moreover, Nazor has overtly stated that he finds the 
ICTY to be political and incompetent, both in releasing Serb perpetrators and punishing 
Croat ones, which combined with the high trust in him and the extensive outreach of the 
centre could mean that his interpretation of the ICTY has a powerful impact on perceptions 
of the Tribunal. Only teachers questioned this project on this basis, highlighting that Nazor 
was known for a particularly political representation of the past. 
 
Figure 16. Overview of sources’ reliability. 
 
Source: Own compilation 
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Figure 16 summaries how different sources roughly rank in terms of reliability. This is not a 
quantitative effort at measuring this, but rather a visualisation of how different sources on the 
Homeland War rank in the eyes of the Croatian public. In this picture the media remain 
necessary, although there is a possibility for historians and related efforts (such as Ante 
Nazor and the Memorial Centre) to become more popular, since they are seen as more 
trustworthy. Participants and hearsay remain a far more reliable source and one that the 
public uses extensively to form opinions. In other words, the most “everyday” of all sources, 
participants and a documentation centre that focuses on participants, ranked as the most 
reliable sources, especially compared to top-down efforts such as the government or courts.  
 
A comparison across all target segments and locations shows for the most part agreement 
(Table 9). All groups, bar a few exceptions, agree that participants and television images 
were trusted sources of information on transitional justice and the war narrative, while 
political courts (both international and domestic), political parties and war veterans’ 
associations were distrusted. Non-television media, Ante Nazor, the government and the 
notion of information being suppressed or hidden saw some disagreement between groups.  
For non-television media and the government, this took the form of varying levels of 
disagreement, predominantly because war veterans did not only distrust them, they thought 
they aimed to create splits in the Croatian people (the media), that they required lustration 
(the government) or both. The Church and historians as sources of information featured the 
starkest dividing lines. The Church was for the most part ignored during discussions by 
pensioners, trusted as a source of information by war veterans and distrusted by teachers. 
Teachers stood out on the topic of historians as well, they were the only target segment that 
was neutral or that in one instance trusted them as a source of information.  
 
Teachers stand out from the other two segments since they are the only group to 
consistently question all of the more reliable sources (the Church, participants and Nazor). 
This may be because teachers are younger than the other two target segments, they are the 
only one that contained no participants in the war (although some grew up in areas that were 
on the frontline), they are generally better educated than the rest, socio-economically they 
may be faring better and, as trained historians, they may be more aware of the need to 
question sources. Nevertheless, none of these factors singularly help explain why they stand 
out in their inquisitiveness.  
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Elites and media are distrusted, but by performing and choosing the narrative, they set the 
parameters of it. Everyday interactions and discussions by the public lead to the talking of 
the narrative; this is where the narrative is debated, contested or affirmed. It is at this level 
that the most trusted source of information on transitional justice topics, participants, is to be 
found. Where superimposed elite or media narratives meet constantly evolving everyday 
interaction and talk is where moments of contradiction occur. These narratives, coming from 
above or below, can be in support or against transitional justice, but they are all equally 
subjected to this complex process of interaction. It is here that personal ties prove to be 
more trusted than impositions from above and where attempts by transitional justice 
institutions to change norms and narratives in a society can hit significant obstacles to 
diffusion. 
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CHAPTER 6  
A story of Croatian defence: The narrative of the Homeland War  
 
In Croatia there is a pervasive, nearly universal among ethnic Croats, notion that Croatia 
was a victim of Serbian aggression. According to this narrative, Croatia led a war of self-
defence, with the aim of not only saving the Croatian state, but preventing the destruction of 
the Croatian nation (Pavlaković, 2014: 19). This narrative was also central to the nation-
building process in the state, together with other strategies such as severing all ties with the 
multinational Yugoslav state and providing a history of continuity of the Croatian state into 
history (Pavlaković, 2014: 31). At the same time, a justice narrative is also present in 
Croatia, one based on the norms of transitional justice. Actors who wish to promote one or 
the other have similar expressivist goals, those of building a narrative, authenticating it as 
the truth and passing it on to the society in question (Drumbl, 2007). The official war 
narrative and the justice narrative exist in the same space and interact with each other; at 
times coming into conflict and undermining each other, at other times affirming each other 
and becoming aligned.  
 
The war narrative has previously been extensively outlined by the literature on Croatia and 
transitional justice, especially Banjeglav (2012), Jović (2009), Koren (2011) and Pavlaković 
(2014). This has included detailed breakdowns of its various facets, many of which are also 
reproduced in the Declarations on the Homeland War and Operation Storm. This study uses 
those categorisations and builds on them, details of which are outlined below. The justice 
narrative is, however, less well defined and there is a greater need to be aware of how this 
narrative may be interpreted by other scholars. In this study, the justice narrative is defined 
as the stories that transitional justice institutions in Croatia and in The Hague try to impart on 
the Croatian public. These include specific versions of events as presented by courts 
through, for example, trial transcripts and sentences, as well broader norms concerning the 
primacy of rule of law, regardless of circumstances. Such an approach is inherently 
subjective and can be interpreted differently depending on individual views of these 
institutions (for example, if they are not trusted), but an attempt has been made to always 
connect the justice narrative to a trial or institution that is promoting it. Moreover, the notion 
of a justice narrative is linked to how individuals, as well as the researcher, construct their 
notion of justice. For example, the ICTY may be regarded as just by some, but also as unjust 
by others (for example individuals who are unhappy with its work), thereby making the use of 
“justice” to describe the narrative dependant on opinions about the tribunal itself.  
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The justice narrative comes into conflict with the war narrative over the notion of a defensive 
war. ICTY convictions, such as those of Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, form a large part of 
the justice narrative and show that the Croatian state supported armed forces outside of its 
own territory for purposes other than the defence of the Republic of Croatia. Such 
convictions have the potential to undermine a narrative of defence. The notion of a joint 
criminal enterprise by the Croatian wartime political and military leadership held similar 
potential, while domestic and international trials relating to war crimes by Croatian military 
personnel undermine the notion that crimes could not be committed in a defensive war.  
 
At the same time, the justice narrative at times supports the war narrative or sees judgments 
that are aligned with it. For example, the justice narrative asserts that all war crimes must be 
investigated and processed, which Croatian authorities have been more than happy to do 
with regards Serbian perpetrators. Both narratives stress the importance of fact-finding, 
although one in a more universal sense than the other. Most significantly, ICTY decisions 
can be in conflict with or in line with the war narrative. The final verdicts in the Operation 
Storm case reaffirmed the war narrative (and the creation of the Croatian state): that the 
operation was legitimate and that no joint criminal enterprise was present.50 The dominant 
national narrative is thus constantly contested by both external and internal sources 
(Ashplant et al., 2000: 16). At times this led to fierce rejection of war crimes processes, when 
they ran counter to the official war narrative, at other times the processes fit into or were 
modelled to fit into official narratives about the past (Ristić, 2014: 96). 
 
The war narrative is important since it forms a kind of founding, or refounding, myth in 
Croatia. Much like in other societies, this helps the society explain its origins and define what 
it stands for (Eliade, 1963). Such myths are often marked by “monumental didactics” (Osiel, 
1998: 4), in other words, public recounting of the heroic deeds as a national narrative. A 
myth of refounding marks a clear period of change from the recent past and celebrates the 
achievements of the main protagonists of this separation. Myths of founding and refounding 
frequently centre on legal proceedings or the drafting of legal documents, for example the 
Magna Carta for Great Britain and the Declaration of Independence for the United States of 
America (Osiel, 1998: 5). War narratives, in particular, are composed of emotional symbols 
and images related to struggle, survival and sacrifice, unlike more pacifistically minded 
narratives, such as the justice narrative (Pavlaković, 2014: 22). Wars and ethnic conflict 
provide particularly strong inspiration for the creation of national narratives of the past and 
                                                
50 This concerns only the individuals on trial in this case (Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak and Mladen 
Markač). Other individuals implicated in the joint criminal enterprise died before any potential 
processes were held.  
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many modern nations have built national sentiment on these foundations (Ristić, 2014; 
Zertal, 2005).  
 
The Croatian war narrative is concerned with the notion that the war was defensive; that it 
was an attempt to create a democratic Croatian state, which the Croatian people expressed 
a desire for through a referendum; that a distinction must be made between the Greater 
Serbian aggressor and the victim; that the most recent war memory must be kept alive; and, 
that war heroes must be protected. It is inscribed by parliament in institutionalised form in 
the Declaration on the Homeland War (Deklaracija o Domovinskom Ratu) and the 
Declaration on Operation Storm (Deklaracija o Oluji). Croatia’s first post-Tuđman 
government was initially willing to actively cooperate with the ICTY but, due to a public 
backlash and the threat of certain facets of the war being criminalised, they issued the 
Declaration on the Homeland War in 2000, the same year they came to power. The 
Declaration enshrined, in official writing, several key concepts (Narodne Novine, 2000):  
 
• That the “basic values of the Homeland War are unequivocally accepted by 
the whole Croatian narod and all citizens of the Republic of Croatia”. In other 
words, the declaration is considered to be binding to all citizens. 
• That “the armed aggression against the Republic of Croatia was conducted 
by Serbia, Montenegro and the JNA with an armed rebellion from a part of 
the Serb population in the Republic of Croatia.” 
• That “The Republic of Croatia led a just and legitimate, defensive and 
liberating, not an aggressive and conquering war against anyone in which it 
defended its territories from Greater Serbian aggression within its 
internationally recognised borders.” 
• That “the Croatian judiciary is obliged to process all possible cases of 
individual war crimes, serious transgressions of human rights and all other 
crimes committed in the aggression against the Republic of Croatia.” 
• That the Croatian parliament “calls for all citizens, state and civil institutions, 
trade unions, associations and media, obliges all state officials and all state 
bodies of the Republic of Croatia” to protect these principles and values.  
• Finally, the stated reason for issuing the declaration was “to stop the radical 
politicisation of the Homeland War and the worrying polarisation of Croatian 
society”. 
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The Declaration puts in official state writing a single interpretation of the past, regardless of 
whether or not it is correct, which paints Croatia as exclusively a victim of international 
“Greater Serbian” aggression; it puts the whole blame for the start of the conflict on Serbia 
(and none on the Tuđman regime); it ignores that there were elements of civil war (despite 
this still being an academically debated issue); and, it denies any official Croatian 
involvement in Bosnia, despite ICTY rulings contradicting this (Pavlaković, 2014). Moreover, 
it binds all citizens, media and public bodies to follow these points and elevates them to the 
status of core values of the Croatian state and narod. It also includes contradictions that 
were reflected in focus group discussions. For example, it refers specifically to individual war 
crimes (Narodne Novine, 2000: Article 6), a common manner of describing alleged Croatian 
war crimes, whilst also referring to crimes committed in aggression, which are seen as 
planned and committed by Serbia, Serbs and the JNA as a group. In comparison to the 
memory and narrative surrounding the Second World War, the Homeland War provides a 
much stronger foundation on which to build consensus and, subsequently, a nation-state 
(Pavlaković, 2014: 37). Certain topics on the Homeland War continue to be debated, both 
publicly and academically, however, there exists a general consensus that the Declaration 
and most of the themes outlined represent the truth. For example, the very term “Homeland 
War” is loaded, but is now used across nearly all of Croatian society, media and politics to 
refer to the conflict  (Jović, 2009: 23; Pavlaković, 2014: 39).51 This chapter will outline these 
various themes in greater detail and attempt to show how pervasive they are in Croatian 
society.  
 
Operation Storm had the potential to undermine the notion of Croatian defence since it was 
an aggressive military occupation to retake lands (at times this is also how it is justified as 
being defensive, because its aim was to retake lost lands). The Declaration on Operation 
Storm was issued in 2006 in order to pre-empt an ICTY verdict that might criminalise the 
military operation. Unlike its earlier counterpart, it does not focus on the core values of the 
Croatian state, but instead it attempts to define the nature and events of the operation. It 
cites key facts, actors, dates and goals, much like a historical document, although it is not 
academic in nature since it does not use sources or define terms (Koren, 2011). It was less 
influential than the Declaration on the Homeland War, although it also aimed to create an 
official version of events during the 1990s (Koren, 2011). It does, however, nevertheless 
include large elements of the war narrative: 
 
                                                
51 Exceptions are certain NGOs, members of the ethnic Serb community (although the ones 
interviewed in this study did use it) and certain political parties. 
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• One of the justifications for the operation was that “from the occupied 
territories of the Republic of Croatia, Serb forces organised and conducted 
systematic aggression against the free and liberated parts of our country and 
neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Narodne Novine, 2006: Article 1). 
• Article 2 focuses on the legally legitimate nature of the operation, but also on 
the cooperation with the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Tuđman-Izetbegović agreement specifically (Narodne Novine, 2006: Article 
2).  
• Article 5 states that “Operation Storm was, by all accounts, organised and 
executed in the last moment, because the defeat of the Serb forces 
prevented a repeat ‘scenario’ of Srebrenica in other parts of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, especially in Goražde, Bihać, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Cazinska 
Krajina and Posavina” (Narodne Novine, 2006: Article 5). 
 
This last point of the Declaration is particularly interesting, since it was often reproduced 
(word by word with regards to Bihać) in focus groups. Overall the Declaration presented a 
change of tact from its earlier counterpart, since it no longer focussed so much on defence 
(it is more focused on response to aggression), but instead it focuses on cooperation with 
Bosnia, as well as allies in the West, thereby countering any arguments over Croatian 
aggression in the neighbouring state. Despite being the less influential of the two 
declarations, it still enshrined facets of the war narrative in writing, thereby quasi-legally 
undermining the justice narrative, and elements of it were reflected in focus group 
discussions.  
 
The core components of the dominant war narrative are summarised in the literature, and 
apparent in transcripts, as those of: 
 
Defence: The conflict is seen as an act of self-defence against an aggressor (Jović, 2009). 
As Pavlaković (2014) notes, even the Croatian word for war veterans of the Homeland War 
is branitelji, or “defenders”, reinforcing this image of defence. Respondents consistently 
returned to notions of self-defence in the focus groups, dyads and interviews, when asked 
about the war but also when discussing other topics, such as for example the role of the 
Serb minority in Croatian society. It was often used to justify other views or to excuse actions 
(for example Croat war crimes).  
 
Survival and struggle: As already discussed above, war narratives draw on emotional 
reactions based on symbols of struggle. In Croatia this is presented as the fledgling state 
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being unprepared and unarmed for the coming conflict (Banjeglav, 2012: 26; Peskin and 
Boduszynski, 2003: 1129). In the transcripts this was often referred to in terms of the 
“barefooted” or “bare-armed” Croatian soldiers who, without any preparation (as opposed to 
Serbs, who did prepare), fought off and survived the aggression.  
 
Aggressors: Since Croatia is seen as having acted in self-defence, there must exist 
aggressors. These are frequently referred to as “Serbs/Serbia”, “Greater Serbs/Serbia”, 
“JNA”, “Chetniks”, “communists” or any combination of these words (for example “Serbo-
chetniks”). Yugoslavia is often paired with communism, whereas Serbs are often collectively 
referred to as Chetniks (Banjeglav, 2012: 10-11; Jović, 2009; Pavlaković, 2014). In the group 
discussions aggression was referred to overtly, but it was also often implied by participants 
stressing how Croatia did not attack anyone, how the Croatian army never left the territory of 
the Republic of Croatia and how the situation would have been different had Croatia been 
“gone to someone else’s home”.  
 
Yugoslavia as broken: This part of the narrative, less present than the others, is more central 
to the nation-building narrative than the war narrative. The two, however, often overlap and 
appear together. In the war narrative this is represented as betrayal by Yugoslav institutions, 
especially the JNA. The public is also split on the issue; some see the cause of this as 
Milošević and were not directly opposed to the idea of Yugoslavia. Others, however, see 
Yugoslavia as destructive for Croatia. Moreover, Pavlaković (2014: 32) points out that many 
facets of Yugoslavia’s breakup, including all of the above, as well as the hundreds of 
refugees, the appearance of extremist groups (such as Chetniks) and wartime media 
reporting, are all today associated with the Yugoslav state itself, rather than simply the 
violent dissolution of it. This part of the narrative was also used by participants to highlight 
how the current Croatian state had been infiltrated by unwanted elements or had not 
changed much from Yugoslavia, since they saw a continuity in Yugoslavia not functioning 
and the modern Croatian state not functioning. War veterans, for example, interpreted this 
as a problem of lustration, since they believed the same people to be in power in both 
regimes.   
 
Victimisation: The Croatian victimisation narrative is built around several focal points, such 
as Vukovar and Dubrovnik, whose destruction (in the case of Dubrovnik more symbolic) is 
expressed across all of Croatian society (Banjeglav, 2012: 14; Jović, 2009). Further symbols 
are war crimes committed by the Yugoslav People’s Army (and associated paramilitary 
groups) and destruction in other localities, which are more locally pronounced (for example 
the attacks on Sisak and Zadar, murders in Petrinja, Glina, Škabrnja, and so on). This 
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component was reflected in the importance attributed to the Croatia-Serbia ICJ genocide 
case by Croatian elites. Their unhappiness with the final ruling (the case was dismissed) 
focused on the lack of recognition given to the amount of suffering and the level of 
victimhood experienced by Croatia.52 Participants not only referred to the key focal points, 
but they also created a distinction between “us, Croats, the victims” and “them, Serbs, the 
aggressors”. Much like with the notion of defence, victimisation was often used in passages 
to excuse and relativise certain Croatian actions.  
 
War is not over: Finally, there is a perception (not covered elsewhere in the academic 
literature) among certain groups of society that the Homeland War, or at the very least the 
struggle for Croatian independence, is not over. The war was still central to some 
individuals’ lives and they saw issues from it as unresolved. This is sometimes attributed to 
Greater Serbian forces still being alive and present (inside or outside of Croatia), at other 
times it is seen as an attempt by the international community to take away Croatian 
independence (for example, through international tribunals or the EU). This also includes the 
notion that the Croatian government “works against Croatia” and that it has been infiltrated 
by unwanted elements. This is connected to the notion that the “other” to Croats, namely 
Serbs, have throughout history been oppressors of the Croat people and that history is 
repeating itself, so Croatia has to once again defend itself (MacDonald, 2002). This 
particular facet of the war narrative has not been outlined in the literature before, but it 
became obvious in the transcripts as participants consistently referred to an ongoing or 
constant defence, as if the war or struggle had not ended yet for them. Participants in this 
study, but war veterans in particular, consistently talked of the centrality of the war in their 
lives. It is, however, important to note that it is possible that this narrative is specific to the 
data gathering methods. In other words, that this centrality was brought about by the 
moderator asking questions about the Homeland War, which elicited narratives that may 
have otherwise been marginalised.  
 
This is important to the process of transitional justice because trickle-down effects of human 
rights norms (Lutz and Sikkink, 2001; Osiel, 2009) compete with these narratives. If they are 
to take hold in society, they have to somehow exist alongside these competing narratives or 
overcome them. These narratives evolve as they are reproduced, but this reproduction is 
marked by repetition rather than innovation, which makes them particularly hard to change 
(Bernhard and Kubik, 2014: 286). The broader implications of this for transition is that 
                                                
52 This ruling potentially undermined the Croatian interpretation of events, since it belittled Croatian 
victimhood; on the other hand the dismissal of the Serbian claim to genocide reinforced the 
interpretation that Operation Storm was a legitimate military operation.  
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political actors who try to change such narratives often have a polarising, and therefore 
destabilising, effect on democratic establishments (Bernhard and Kubik, 2014; Linz, 1978; 
Sartori, 1976). By challenging the legitimacy of the narrative they also challenge the 
legitimacy of political elites (Banjeglav, 2012: 26). Consequently, what is contested, 
reinforced and threatened (or not) in the narrative becomes important for analysing the 
trickle-down effect of norms.  
 
 
6.1 The war narrative 
 
6.1.1 Defence 
 
The sheer pervasiveness of the belief that Croatia was a victim of Serbian aggression and 
was, therefore, acting in self-defence is apparent in survey results. For example, Figure 17 
highlights the percentage of the public that believes Serbia needs to admit it committed 
aggression against Croatia for relations to improve (Kolstø, 2011). 
 
Figure 17. Serbia needs to admit that it committed aggression against Croatia in order for relations to 
improve. 
 
Source: Kolstø (2011) 
 
The group discussions and individual interviews reflected this since not a single participant 
expressed a different opinion in either setting. Even groups that did not agree on many 
topics agreed wholly on this one. For example, a pensioner in the Zagreb group, which 
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ended in a walkout, agreed when ZG.P.2 said that “all kinds of things happened, so you 
cannot look at things in black and white. But it is a fact that cannot be negated – that Croatia 
was attacked” (focus group with Zagreb pensioners). That Croatia was attacked was seen 
as fact across all groups: 
 
ZA.T.3 – I think that Croatia led a defensive war and that there was no need to try some 
of our [generals]. Although it is possible to commit a war crime as a country in defence, 
again, I think the guilt should not have been equalised so much. 
 
ZA.T.2 – Given the number of killed Serb and Croat civilians, where we know that many 
more Croat civilians died and much more property was destroyed and cultural 
monuments and everything on the Croat side because this all took place on the territory 
of the Republic of Croatia. I think that, although more Serbs were tried, maybe many 
more should have been. Or at least this ratio should have been different. Maybe they 
should have focused on the worst or those most responsible, and here I mean mainly the 
leadership of the previous state, the leadership of Serbia, the leadership of the RSK, and 
of course then also some of our Croatian generals who were responsible. In this way 
they instead started a great number of cases that created a sense of suspicion in the 
narod that maybe they were trying to equalise the aggressor and the victim. 
 
ZA.T.3 agrees. 
 
ZA.T.1 – Yes. 
 
ZA.T.3 – Especially after the first judgment to Gotovina, of 24 years, because of that and 
because of this joint criminal enterprise and such things. 
 
ZA.T.2 – And let us look the excessive artillery shelling of Knin, which firstly was not 
shelled, it was attacked with rockets, and secondly, it was damaged far less and attacked 
less than any other Croatian city that was close to the front line (focus group with Zadar 
teachers). 
 
-  
 
NU.V.5 – It was not [a civil war], it was a war, an aggression against Croatia and Croatia 
defended itself. If someone is killing me then I will not accept that it was a civil war. No 
one from Croatia went to Serbia. 
 
NU.V.4 – Vučić held fiery speeches with Šešelj about how the Croats should be 
destroyed, and today he is the Prime Minister of the Serbian government.  
 
NU.V.5 – I am too emotional, it is better if I do not speak (focus group with non-urban war 
veterans Banovina). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.1 – For Croatia it was a true defensive war against the neighbouring narod who 
was not allowing us our freedom and who wanted to conquer us militarily, subdue us and 
force us to stay in the failed state of Yugoslavia (interview with non-urban teacher). 
 
These passages highlight the complex narratives interwoven in the theme of self-defence. 
The Zadar teachers begin with the admission that crimes were possible in the context of a 
defensive war, but then throughout the passage go on to compare numbers of victims and 
damage between the Serb and Croat sides (without mentioning actual figures), thereby 
accusing transitional justice authorities of attempting to equalise guilt. They end the 
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sequence by stating that Knin was not attacked by artillery, but by rockets. The cumulative 
effect is that by comparing levels of suffering and citing possible technicalities over how the 
destruction of Knin came to happen, they minise notions of Serb victimhood and suffering, 
which was proven by investigators and trials. The non-urban war veterans group, on the 
other hand, highlights how this narrative of suffering (on both sides) is always followed by 
the caveat of “the Other” as the aggressor or initiator of violence holding a larger share of 
the blame. Moreover, the passage also highlight how this narrative is laced with emotion.  
 
The concept is intrinsically attached to quite obviously related themes, such as Serbian 
aggression, Croatia never attacking Serbia and no one wanting the war. The self-defence 
argument is also related to more abstract topics and worries, such as the fear of an 
equalisation of guilt, to war crimes trials, to the failing Yugoslav state and even to a war of 
the narods. There was, however, no agreement over whether the conflict was seen as ethnic 
or political, since there was no consensus over if the narod or the state was attacked. 
Teachers, who disagreed with other target segments on topics, were equally vociferous in 
their agreement that Croatia was attacked.  
 
Great importance was attributed to the label “defensive” in describing the war. In Zadar war 
veterans lamented that the Homeland War is not a good name for the conflict, “because it 
has to be called defensive” (focus Group with Zadar war veterans). There was also a 
general impression that this label could not and ought not to be questioned: 
 
ZG.T.2 – It is to in any case cherish [the dignity of the Homeland War] and in no way 
question it, to not disparage it. 
 
ZG.T.1 – Absolutely, not to question that it was a defensive war (dyad with Zagreb 
teachers). 
 
Across all groups an equal amount of importance was attached to the conflict not being 
labelled a civil war or an armed conflict. Highly emotional narratives regarding this theme did 
not follow legal logic, but rather a folk theory of law that helped justify the foundation of the 
Croatian state: 
 
NU.T.3 – It was not a civil war but it was the Homeland War, for the defence of the state 
territory, because we were attacked (dyad with non-urban teachers). 
 
- 
 
NU2.V.1 – They are all Balkan tribes and they all want armed conflict. That is what they 
call [the conflicts]. They were not armed conflicts, rather it was an attack by one state on 
another internationally recognised sovereign state, the Republic of Croatia (dyad with 
non-urban war veterans Slavonia). 
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- 
 
NU.P.1 – The known facts are, for example, that the former army, the JNA, attacked the 
state of Croatia and that we defended ourselves (focus group with non-urban 
pensioners). 
 
Croatia is also seen as not wanting a war and therefore having no part in starting it. This is, 
once again, in accordance with the Declaration on the Homeland War. Moreover, this 
sentiment was equally present across all groups: 
 
ZA.T.2 – But I think the main reason the [Serb] population is no longer here is the Serb 
rebellion led by the leaders of the RSK and the leadership in Belgrade. If they did not 
lead to this, then I believe most of this population would still be living in Croatia as normal 
citizens (focus group with Zadar teachers). 
 
- 
 
NU.V.3 – I only have on opinion, that maybe it should not have come to this because no 
one wanted a war. Of the Croats, no one wanted war, we only wanted our own state 
(interview with non-urban war veteran Banovina). 
 
The notion of defence in the eyes of the Croatian public has implications for transitional 
justice since it makes it hard for any narratives, other than the war narrative, to exist in the 
discursive space. The everyday narrative of defence poses a barrier to understandings of 
justice imposed from above and attributes blame wholly to one side of the conflict, further 
endangering any prospects for reconciliation society.  
 
 
6.1.2 Survival and struggle 
 
The fact that Croatia did not start the war is supported by the widely held belief that Croatia 
was unarmed, unprepared and unorganised in the lead-up and early phases of the conflict. 
Imagery of struggle and survival related to these themes creates the backbone of the 
narrative of Croatian defence and victimhood on the one hand, and Greater Serbian 
aggression on the other. Again, this was expressed strongly across all target segments and 
locations. References to being “barehanded” and “barefoot” were common with war 
veterans’ groups in particular. This was often juxtaposed with the Serb or JNA side, which 
was considered far more prepared:  
 
SI.V.1 – The war was forced on us, we met it unprepared, barefoot, without weapons. I 
went to war in sneakers (focus group with Sisak war veterans). 
 
- 
 
ZA.V.1 – We had nothing to defend ourselves with at the beginning.  
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ZA.V.2 – We had to buy our own weapons. I bought myself a pistol and a rifle, all by 
myself.  
 
ZA.V.1 – That is because the Yugo-army took all of the munitions, weapons, down to the 
smallest bullet and to airplanes, with them (focus group with Zadar war veterans). 
 
Serbs here are seen as scheming and conniving, as opposed to the innocent and 
unprepared Croats. The Zadar war veterans also highlighted that this unpreparedness was 
starker in the case of women, who “had not finished regular army training, who did not know 
how to hold a rifle” (follow-up interview with Zadar war veteran). Teachers displayed this 
narrative, but often analysed it through the arms embargo placed on Croatia at the time. For 
example, the Sisak teachers agreed in their belief that it was not possible that Knin was 
destroyed during Operation Storm as much as had been claimed, since “as the professors 
say, no one knows where they could have found so much ammunition and artillery to fire, 
because there was none at [the Croatian army’s] disposal. In order to even begin a counter-
attack, they had to first conquer weapons depots. For the army to even function properly, 
given an embargo was placed on the sale of weapons to the Republic of Croatia” (focus 
group with Sisak teachers). The notion of Croatian unpreparedness and lack of arms exists 
next to the belief that the opposing side, the Serb side, was prepared and well-armed: 
 
NU.T.1 – It has been proven that the whole army stood, with all of its armaments, on [the 
Serb] side. In this war, in which youths who up until yesterday were wearing sneakers, 
leather jackets, had long hair, and listened to rock or urban music, swapped this civilian 
clothing with weapons that were comical compared to a tank – some kind of rifle or 
automatic rifle without enough bullets, for the most part using their own inherent 
intelligence or will for survival, to successfully with great sacrifice and losses, first stop 
and then four years later defeat the enemy that attacked (interview with non-urban 
teacher). 
 
- 
 
NU.V.4 (discussing the retaking of Petrinja and entering the local hospital) – [The Serbs] 
had everything in the hospital. During five years of war we had not seen such high quality 
medical equipment (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
- 
 
SI.V.3 – My neighbour was from Dvor. His and my children went to school together. One 
day my son came home and said ‘Mom, you know, Zoki has taken a pistol and rifle with 
him from home.’ They were all hunters. We were not even allowed to get a hunting 
licence” (focus group with Sisak war veterans). 
 
Unpreparedness was attributed to the unforeseen start of the conflict, which surprised 
Croats but which Serbs were prepared for. This led to an unorganised Croatian defence: 
 
NU.V.4 – In 1991 we lived peacefully in these parts. We could not believe that our 
neighbours would do what they did. I was working at the hospital in [the city], I went to 
work and I could no longer return home. With just a small purse over my shoulder (focus 
group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
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- 
 
ZA.T.2 – We always have to begin from the position that this was an army being created. 
Usually it takes an army eight years to be formed, but in Croatia this all happened very 
quickly. Maybe many people who would not be accepted into the regular army had to be 
accepted because the situation was such. I am not surprised that there were Croatian 
war crimes and people who have been sentenced. This is normal given the situation 
(focus group with Zadar teachers). 
 
This feeling of the unorganised and unprepared defence was frequently brought up as a 
mitigating circumstance in discussions, but it is also present in Croatian society more 
broadly, including court rulings and arguments (for example in the Mirko Norac ruling and in 
the Tihomir Blaškić defence closing arguments). As later chapters will show and as was 
shown in the methodology chapter, in more extreme instances it is used to explain the 
reasoning behind crimes committed against civilians, sometimes even partially excusing 
them. The image of barehanded defence also frequently involved references to how young 
the Croatian soldiers were, creating an image of a young, baby-like Croatian army pitted 
against the well-armed, professional JNA, “You know that we did not really have our own 
army in 1991. These young boys went there naked and barefoot. In sneakers and jeans. We 
had to cloth them, knit gloves for them. I have this information first-hand” (focus group with 
Zagreb pensioners). These points of view also help explain (together with many others) why 
most Croats do not feel there was an organised effort by Croatian authorities to expel Serbs 
from Croatia, since the war was led in such an unorganised fashion. Indicative of this are the 
results of the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights (2011) survey, which found that 63% of the 
Croatian public did not think there was such an effort, as opposed to 26% who think there 
was. This facet of the war narrative is so strong that it is also used to make legal arguments 
made by laypeople and professionals alike.  
 
 
6.1.3 The aggressors 
 
There was consensus across groups that Croatia could not have committed any aggression, 
since Croatia did not go to Serbia, but rather that “they came here”. It was not enough to 
state that Croatia was attacked, but a comparison was made that Croatia did not attack at 
all: 
 
NU.P.1 – Did we destroy their state? We were not there. We did not even burn a house 
there, nor did we kill anyone. But they destroyed everything here.  
 
NU.P.3 – We killed them here when they came. 
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NU.P.1 – They are guilty for everything that was destroyed. The factories and everything 
(focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
- 
 
NU.V.5 – We were defending ourselves. Not a single weapon, not a single rifle, was fired 
at Serbia.  
 
NU.V.3 – Our young boys went. 
 
NU.V.4 – They came here. That one thing is clear and factual. The ones they captured, 
who survived, were taken to Sremska Mitrovica to camps. In Serbia. Everyone knows 
that. The whole world knows it (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.4 – I do know this: that our Croatian armed forces did not go into Serbia (interview 
with Zagreb pensioner). 
 
Notions of betrayal and one’s home being threatened by the aggressor were common in 
more emotional passages, while many individuals also referred to the national symbols of 
defence, such as Vukovar and other cities. Aggression was often seen as a war crime in and 
of itself, although less so with teachers and locations farther from the frontline: 
 
SI.V.1 – A war crime is exactly what she (another participant) said, when another power, 
Serbia, Yugoslavia, commits a war crime against us. The moment they came on to 
Croatian territory to kill the Croatian narod, they committed a war crime. This is a 
massive war crime on everyone who was killed. They killed them on our territory. In our 
house, in our country. This is a war crime. 
 
SI.V.2 agrees (focus group with Sisak war veterans) 
 
- 
 
NU.P.1 – They attacked us. They came here. They chased away and destroyed a whole 
city, Vukovar. Not only Vukovar. Pakrac, Glina, Sisak, Petrinja … if we can compare this 
to Istra and the Italians, or the Hungarians. This is a different matter. If this is a different 
matter, why is it so? Because they did not stab a knife in the Croat heart, or the back. No 
Croats attacked these poor Serbs. They attacked us (dyad with non-urban pensioners). 
 
JNA or Serb aggression was related to the infamous line drawn by SRS leader Šešelj as the 
border of Greater Serbia: Virovitica, Karlovac, Ogulin, Karlobag. This has become an 
enduring image of perceived Greater Serbian ambitions, pronounced by a radical politician, 
but adopted in Croatian eyes as the goal of all Serbian aggression and of Serbian 
imperialism: 
 
ZG.P.1 – Virovitica, Karlobag, this is where the border went. That part of Croatia they 
wanted to conquer. Today people still know about this.  
 
All shake heads in agreement 
 
ZG.P.3 – This was the imperialist politics of Slobodan Milošević!  
 
All agree vocally 
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ZG.P.3 – This we know nearly everything about (focus group with Zagreb pensioners). 
 
- 
 
SI.P.4 – Currently he is in the news again, but I would remember him even if he was not 
– Šešelj. He drew the line in the field. Virovitica, Karlovac, Karlobag. And you live in 
Croatia. So where will you put me? He puts us in Greater Serbia (dyad with Sisak 
pensioners). 
 
For the most part, the JNA or “Serbs” are referred to as the aggressors, meaning a certain 
type of military formation. Across all groups there was, however, also mention of Serb civilian 
involvement in the fighting, which was not considered to be the case for Croats. This built an 
image of honest defence versus conniving aggression: 
 
ZA.V.1 – We had to guard Serbian churches. And when we searched them, do you know 
what we found? Munitions.  
 
ZA.V.2 – There churches were used as storage for munitions. And we still left them 
alone. That is what us Croats were like. 
 
ZA.V.1 – And their houses were full of weapons.  
 
ZA.V.2 agrees 
 
ZA.V.2 – While we had nothing to defend ourselves with (focus group with Zadar war 
veterans). 
 
The image of honest defence was further based on the premise that Croats only attacked 
individuals who had weapons in their hands or posed a direct threat to Croatian soldiers. 
These arguments often excused alleged war crimes: 
 
NU2.V.2 – If the circumstances and facts from the time were realistically evaluated, I 
think there would not have been cause to prosecute Mirko Norac for war crimes. Norac, 
as one of the people in charge of Croatian formations in Lika, where he is also from, did 
not lead any actions against people who did not have weapons in their hands. They had 
weapons in their hands.  
 
NU2.V.1 – That is right. 
 
NU.2.V.2 – He led operations against Serbs who took weapons in their hands and fought 
against their own homeland, against her government and her citizens, Croats (dyad with 
non-urban war veterans Slavonia). 
 
Key to this was the notion, prevalent across all groups interviewed, that Serb civilians 
frequently and historically carried arms, which they used against the Croatian army in the 
Homeland War. In other words, the Serbs as a group are seen as aggressive and armed for 
the purposes of attacking Croats or achieving Greater Serbian goals: 
 
NU.P.3 – In this war they did not all have uniforms on. You could not find a person with a 
military cap all the way to Dvor, but they all had rifles. They all had guns.  
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All agree 
 
NU.P.1 – Civilian defence, they had guns. 
 
NU.P.3 – They were just standing in their gardens. And what do you do then? You 
cannot kill him, but he can kill you (focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.1 – War is a very unfortunate situation. I have never been, but from what I know, it 
is hard to stay sane in such a situation, especially since it has historically been proven 
that among the Serb population it is often hard to tell who is a soldier and who is a 
civilian. Civilians often armed themselves, even women, even older women. If a scout 
passes by, a certain military unit, through a village where there is no fighting, and a 
civilian, even an old lady, there were such stories, takes out a bomb or a pistol and starts 
to act militarily – what can you as a soldier, surrounded by gunpowder, blood and smoke, 
do except to eliminate the threat? But then, when a reporter, some agency or the 
UNPROFOR arrives and sees the situation and sees the dead old lady on the ground, 
not being aware of what happened, of course their conclusion can be that a war crime 
occurred (interview with non-urban teacher). 
 
The above passage employs a particularly common and powerful image of armed Serb 
civilians, often used to justify alleged war crimes during Operation Storm, the baka 
(grandmother) with a rifle: 
 
ZG.T.2 – Of course we know what a war crime is, but as you can imagine yourself, 
maybe you heard some stories, of what actually happened in the field, what kind of 
unbelievable situations.  
 
ZG.T.1 – Yes. You have certainly had the opportunity to hear these.  
 
ZG.T.2 – Yes. On some battlefields you had the case – a baka shoots at you and kills 
your friend, your fellow fighter.  
 
ZG.T.1 – Yes. These are the most common examples. 
 
ZG.T.2 – And now, of course someone shot the baka. Now people come and see – the 
dead baka. This is just a trivial example. 
 
ZG.T.1 – But one of many (dyad with Zagreb teachers). 
 
Given the general belief that Serb civilians bore arms against the Croatian army, it is not 
surprising to see certain (often based on legal verdicts) war crimes being questioned by the 
general public, but especially by more extreme elements, including war veterans. In group 
discussions with all war veterans and some pensioners this led to a questioning of well-
known cases such as those of Norac, Glavaš, Gotovina and Merčep, among others. It 
comes as no surprise then that numerous respondents, and much of the Croatian public, 
see military operations such as Operation Storm (an organised military action) as legitimate 
retaking of Croatian land and that collateral damage (civilian or otherwise) was natural, given 
the nature of the aggressor. Moreover, some individuals even saw the case of the Zec family 
(an incident involving paramilitaries, unrelated to any military goal) as justified or at the very 
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least unexplained. The consequences for transitional justice are profound since the rule of 
law was not given much priority in these situations in relation to the aims of the war. 
 
 
6.1.4 Yugoslavia as broken 
 
The idea that Yugoslavia was broken (borrowing from Pavlaković, 2014) forms a greater part 
of the nation-building narrative in Croatia, than it does of the war narrative. It was 
predominantly evident in the group discussions when speaking about the aggressor in terms 
of the JNA. Here two points were crucial: that the JNA was a Serb or Chetnik army and that 
the JNA attacked Croatia, thereby not making the conflict a civil war. The JNA narrative, 
which fits into a broader narrative of a failed Yugoslav system that was unfair on Croats, also 
neatly fits into the powerful narratives of Croatian self-defence and Serbian aggression: 
 
NU2.V.2 – When it suited the Serbian politics, [the JNA] turned into the Serbian army. It 
acted under the guise of Greater Serbian politics on the side of Serbian politics. That is 
when the aggression by force happened on the territory of the Republic of Croatia (dyad 
with non-urban war veterans Slavonia). 
 
Overall two sides existed in this debate, much like they do in Croatian society more broadly. 
On the one side are individuals who were not or are not dissatisfied with Yugoslavia, but 
who felt that Milošević abused his power to destroy the federal state and Croatia. This does 
not mean these individuals lived through Yugoslavia, although many did, but they may have 
an idealised version of it in their minds (most commonly referred to Yugonostalgia). On the 
other side are individuals who believe that Yugoslavia itself was detrimental to Croatia and 
consequently see any connections to it as threatening. Feelings around this varied across 
groups, war veterans all fell into the latter anti-Yugoslav camp while the other two groups 
were split between the two. This has further implications in the realm of transitional justice 
since it greatly affects how people understand their past. Those that see Milošević as 
criminal and Yugoslavia in a more positive light may see the environment that Milošević was 
operating in (the dissolution of a state) as open to delinquency. It is not a long jump then to 
view other politicians in the post-Yugoslav period as also being criminal, including Croatian 
elites. Those who see Yugoslavia itself as criminal and damaging Croatia may be more 
lenient in their judgment of any Croatian politicians since they saw the need to leave criminal 
Yugoslavia as paramount and, therefore, they associate delinquency with Yugoslavia alone 
and not with the Croatian state at all.  
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6.1.5 Victimisation 
 
Victimisation (Croatia as a victim of aggressive Serbian politics) was primarily centred 
around several national symbols, such as Vukovar and Dubrovnik, as well as a range of 
smaller ones particular to regions. Vukovar, however, is the nationally dominant symbol; 
central to the war narrative and one that has the single greatest capability to raise tensions 
between the states of Croatia and Serbia, between these two ethnicities in Croatia and 
between various political parties and actors.53 Proof of this was the crisis with Cyrillic that 
was on-going at the time and which was frequently used to discuss how and why Vukovar is 
special in Croatia. In many ways, the concept of Croatian victimhood is defined by the image 
of Vukovar as the “heroic, victim city”. It was discussed as such across all of the groups and 
was frequently used as a reference point in related narratives: 
 
NU.T.4 – When you sit every day in the basement while the sirens are wailing, when you 
listen to what is happening in Vukovar, then you have no dilemma. They attacked us, we 
are miserable and who knows what will happen (dyad with non-urban teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.2 – The Serbs from Vukovar who in 1991 did not write in Cyrillic are those who 
took part in that same aggression, against their neighbours (focus group with Zagreb war 
veterans). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.1 – Has anyone from the Serbian side apologised? 
 
ZG.P.2 and ZG.P.4 – Tadić apologised.  
 
ZG.P.1 – Please, this is not an apology. He said “I am sorry” if I remember correctly, he 
said “I am sorry that Vukovar suffered”. He did not say what it suffered from. 
 
ZG.P.4 – No, he apologised.  
 
ZG.P.1 – No! This is not an apology! He said he was sorry for the victims of Vukovar, but 
he did not admit the mistake. He did not say which victims. Vukovar was not hit by an 
earthquake. Or a flood. This is not an apology.  
 
ZG.P.3 – And what was Tadić doing during the war? 
 
ZG.P.1 – I do not know what he was doing. 
 
ZG.P.3 – So how can he apologise for something that he did not do? 
 
ZG.P.2 – He represented Serbia. 
 
ZG.P.1 – He was in Vukovar as the President of Serbia, but he did not admit their fault.  
 
ZG.P.3 – How did he not? 
                                                
53 The study involved several individuals who were from Vukovar and had lost numerous family 
members and friends during the conflict.  
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ZG.P.1 – He did not say “we attacked Croatia, I am sorry, Vukovar suffered due to 
Serbian politics”. Croatian victims today want an apology.  
 
ZG.P.2 – I look at it this way. This is my personal impression. That Tadić is honest and 
that he would like to apologise. But he has Serbian politics he needs to lobby with and 
the electorate there and so on. So he cannot do what we want him to do.  
 
ZG.P.4 – I understood him to have apologised. To have said he was sorry. 
 
ZG.P.1 – Do you know how many people died in Croatia? And it is difficult for him. 
 
ZG.P.2 – Of course. 
 
ZG.P.1 – 20,000 people died in the Homeland War. 
 
ZG.P.2 – It is horrific. And in Vukovar they watch criminals walk down the street.  
 
ZG.P.1 – Could he not have said that it was their mistake and to apologise. He did not 
have to say that it was his fault, but that it was the fault of Milošević’s aggressive politics. 
He could have said that. 
 
ZG.P.3 – Who sent [Milošević] to The Hauge?  
 
ZG.P.2 – That is what I wanted to say, that ultimately the Serbs sent him to The Hague.  
 
ZG.P.1 – Well alright, they sent him. They had to. 
 
ZG.P.3 – What more do you want! 
 
ZG.P.4 – Do not argue, we are just talking. 
 
ZG.P.1 – You are defending Milošević and Serbian aggression (focus group with Zagreb 
pensioners)! 
 
In this long exchange, Vukovar is used as the example of Croatian suffering, but the 
passage highlights many more dynamics at play in the narrative. Serbian politics is seen as 
continuous from the Milošević regime to the current one and ZG.P.1 condemned the others 
for defending this new regime, since they therefore also defended the old one. How they 
viewed politics today was judged based on how they viewed the past. Moreover, as the 
discussion became more heated, ZG.P.1 used Croatian victimhood and suffering, expressed 
using casualty figures, to highlight the legacy of Serb aggression, thereby also preventing 
any further debate, although only momentarily. It briefly stopped the discussion as 
participants individually acknowledged the suffering, highlighting the powerful impact of such 
a symbol in exchanges.  
 
Vukovar is not only central to the war narrative; it is also emblematic of relations between 
ethnic Serbs and Croats in the country (discussed in more detail in Chapter 8). The city is in 
many ways seen as unique, but it is also seen as representing the struggle of the whole 
Croatian nation and people. The most well-known atrocity committed in Vukovar, the 
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murders at Ovčara farm, is also the most well-known war crime in Croatia, the one most-
believed to have actually occurred and the one that is most-considered to constitute a war 
crime (Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, 2011). The fall of Vukovar also provides an 
interesting insight into what is considered to be “truth” or fact in the Homeland War. In this 
case, the date of the fall of Vukovar is considered to be a universal fact (18 November 1991) 
that was not questioned in a single focus group, despite large parts of the ethnic Serb 
community referring to different dates (for example, when Croatian forces re-entered the city 
in 1995). This seemingly small detail is illustrative of how difficult it can be for different 
interpretations to enter the discursive space on this issue: 
 
ZG.P.1 – Šljivančanin took all 200 heavily injured people to Ovčara. There they were 
killed and buried. 
 
All agree vocally. 
 
ZG.P.1 – These are facts. I did not make this up, this is nothing political (focus group with 
Zagreb pensioners). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.3 – What is known is what part of Croatia was occupied, when Vukovar fell, exactly 
what and on what day. Operations Flash and Storm. This is known (dyad with non-urban 
teachers). 
 
This is not to say that events surrounding Vukovar are not questioned at all. Its fall, that it 
was a victim of the war and who attacked it remain unquestioned, but there is debate over 
why Vukovar fell and what role it played in behind-the-scenes politics in Croatia at the time. 
Theories about the city being sold out by the Croatian government (namely President 
Tuđman) or by the international community (fortifying the image of ICTY ineptitude) were 
prevalent and frequently referred to as one of the great unknowns about the war: 
 
NU.T.4 – Now I am reading some things about why Vukovar fell. I did not know that 
1,500 were sent to help Vukovar and that they then, I do not know how many kilometres 
before Vukovar, they were stopped and returned back to where they came from because 
for some reason it did not suit Tuđman, I do now know exactly what happened. I did not 
know this ten years ago. Now this information is slowly… we all know Vukovar was sold 
out (dyad with non-urban teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.1 – But Ovčara was a huge crime. From the hospital they took 200 injured people, 
from the Vukovar hospital, the hospital was in a desperate state, they were keeping 
people in the basement, without medication, without care or doctors.  
 
ZG.P.4 – Yes.  
 
ZG.P.1 – In the presence of the Red Cross, that Major arrived, what is his name, 
Šljivančanin, he told the Red Cross, and there is a video of this. He was sentenced but 
only for a few years, I think he is already out. 
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All agree. 
 
ZG.P.1 – And the representatives of the Red Cross were there, since this is a hospital 
(focus group with Zagreb pensioners). 
  
Survey data supports the notion that Vukovar is considered to have been “sold out” in some 
kind of secret agreement, with 40.1% expressing some degree of belief in it, compared to 
20.5% not and 19.4% having no opinion (Ipsos Puls, 2012). Moreover, survey data shows 
that the Croatian public sees the ICTY as biased against Croats, much like other ethnicities 
see it biased against them (see: Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, 2011; Kolstø, 2011). 
The data also shows that the Croatian public is either unaware of the number of individuals 
sentenced at the ICTY (in 2011, 42% claimed not to be aware) or that they for the most part 
underestimate the total number of individuals sentenced (for the public awareness figures 
see Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, 2011; the actual figures can be accessed on the 
ICTY website).  
 
The group discussions support the general impression that none or few Serb war criminals 
had been sentenced for crimes committed in Vukovar, although strictly speaking this is not 
the case. In the “Vukovar Hospital” case at the ICTY, Mile Mrkšić, a Colonel from the JNA, 
was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for murder, torture and cruel treatment, while 
Major Veselin Šljivančanin of the JNA was initially sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for 
torture, although this sentence was later increased to 17 years, then reduced to a total of ten 
and he was released after serving six (partly explaining the confusion among the public, 
given the initial sentence saw a large amount of reporting by the Croatian media). The on-
going ICTY trials of Vojislav Šešelj and Goran Hadžić also include charges related to 
Vukovar, as did the trial of Slobodan Milošević when he died in 2006. Serbian courts have 
convicted 15 people of crimes committed in and around Vukovar (as of 2015), although this 
has seen little reporting in Croatia, while the ICJ rejection of the Croatian genocide claim 
against Serbia in 2015 received considerable coverage. Vukovar plays a key role in the 
Croatian narrative of victimisation, it is seen as definitive proof of Serb crimes and even as 
the definition of a war crime: 
 
ZG.V.3 – In my opinion a war crime is possible when a territory is occupied or so-called 
liberated. For example in Vukovar or Škabrnja a horrible war crime was committed. 
When the aggressor occupied and the Serbian army arrived, the Chetnik army, and 
when they ran people over with tanks, raped them (focus group with Zagreb war 
veterans). 
 
This quote, although extreme, was also commonplace across most of the other groups, in 
particular with war veterans and teachers. Indicative of this is that many respondents, when 
asked to define ethnic cleansing or what situations came to mind when the term was used, 
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most often referred to Vukovar. For instance, a teacher in Zadar said, “the first picture that 
comes to mind when I think about ethnic cleansing is of course Vukovar” (follow-up interview 
with Zadar teacher). The more dangerous consequence of this is the apologetic attitude 
taken towards war crimes committed by Croatian forces, since their crimes are seen as 
crimes of passion committed under the mitigating circumstance of self-defence against an 
aggressor that committed rampant war crimes. War veterans commonly used the phrase 
“crime in war” to distinguish between a “war crime”, which is seen as different (discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 7): 
 
ZG.V.2 – When someone, for example, loses five to ten family members in Vukovar, they 
were slaughtered, and then he finds himself in some other area, defending different parts 
of Croatia, in a certain moment it can happen that he comes across a person, maybe 
even an unarmed one, who provokes him. Maybe they shout “We will repeat Ovčara”, 
and his family was killed at Ovčara, then he may shoot this person and kill them. That, if 
you ask me, is not a war crime. This is a crime in war (focus group with Zagreb war 
veterans). 
 
Vukovar is also seen as representative of the tensions still present in Croatian society. The 
city is seen as proof of the division between Serbs and Croats, due to the impression that 
known war criminals are walking in front of their victims (and an associated perception that 
amnesties were offered to these criminals) and due to the number of persons still missing: 
 
ZG.T.3 – There are still people there who claim, and I have no reason not to believe 
them, that they are traumatised by the fact that people who literally participated in the 
rapes, murders, whatever inhumane acts, on the other side, are now normally walking 
around. They must have been under the amnesty and nothing can be done to them 
(interview with Zagreb teacher). 
 
So why is Vukovar considered so unique? Participants listed a range of reasons, but three 
main ones were apparent: the degree of missing persons or graves is far larger than 
anywhere else in Croatia (this was particularly emphasised by war veterans’ groups); it is 
considered to be not only a victimised city, but also a heroic one; and, the tensions discussed 
above are particularly strong in Vukovar: 
 
SI.V.2 – And what, in Vukovar there are maybe 10% Serbs, maybe not even that many, 
who have remained. And now these who are returning, whose parents shot at us. The 
youth want to come back, for Croatia to rebuild their houses, to give them jobs, money 
and so on. And now they are returning, asking for their alphabet. How for such a small 
number? Where do they get the right? 
 
SI.V.1 – Where were they, who are not asking for Cyrillic, when Vukovar fell? How did 
none of them die? And now they ask for their alphabet, their place in the sun in Vukovar, 
they want all rights.  
 
SI.V.3 – I respect the Roma, all minorities, they have not done me any evil. But this is 
different, to speak about this minority. Who lived and worked there. 
 
SI.V.2 – And now they want to return. 
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SI.V.1 – They left. No one forced them to leave. If Vukovar fell and there was a massacre 
there, then Croats could not have made them leave, since they were stronger. How 
come they were not massacred? How come only the Croats were massacred? And now 
they want to return. Is this not out of spite? Or defiance? This is not about the minority. I 
respect minorities. I work in a foundation for sick children, where my child is the same as 
a Roma child, sickness is sickness. There is no difference there. You help everyone. But 
this is a provocation. They are waging war in peace. They are raising the blood pressure 
of these people who wear black for their parents. 
 
SI.V.2 – Who do not know where their sons, daughters or fathers are. 
 
SI.V.3 – For one thousand and something they still do not know where they are (focus 
group with Sisak war veterans). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.1 – I cannot now say they should have Cyrillic in Vukovar, when the wounds are 
still fresh. Why should these people? A few hundred women were raped, no one has 
been sentenced for that. For a thousand people from Vukovar no one still knows where 
their graves are. But the family wants to know; everyone wants to know where their son 
or brother is buried, where his bones are (interview with Zagreb pensioner). 
 
- 
 
ZG.T.1 – I think Vukovar should be left out of [the Cyrillic] story. It should have been 
under a glass bell. 
 
ZG.T.2 – It is absurd to me that, not to mention soon, after the end of the war they are 
forcing this in our heroic city (dyad with Zagreb teachers). 
 
The exchange between the Sisak war veterans highlights this notion of how Cyrillic is 
connected to the war in Vukovar and to the victimhood of the city. The participants cite 
numbers, the threat of job losses (to Serbs) and war crimes against Croats in Vukovar. 
Vukovar represents all of this to them: the numerical magnitude of Croatian suffering, the 
poor economy and the greatest symbol of Croatian victimhood. Moreover, as the passage 
continues, they frequently state how they respect minorities, but that Serbs do not deserve 
those rights, since they are criminals. They use notions of Croatian victimhood to deny 
Serbs their legal rights.  
 
For teachers, Vukovar was over and over again used as an example of how difficult it is to 
teach the Homeland War in class, due to the complicated nature of the Homeland War 
narrative and, in particular, Vukovar. The Zagreb teachers quoted above prior to the start of 
the formal discussion lamented how they could not teach about Vukovar since they found it 
hard to be objective, since the subject was too emotional for them, despite students asking 
for more material on it. Another Zagreb teacher claimed it was too politically fraught and that 
she feared how parents would react. Teachers across all groups agreed that ultimately 
children seem to be gaining this knowledge from their close family, more than school, which 
generally focussed more on the Second World War. This shows a highly emotional and 
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personal connection with the war narrative, which can be hard to undermine by competing 
narratives, such as the justice one. 
 
 
6.1.6 The war is not over 
 
The final element of the war narrative is a perception that the Homeland War somehow 
continues. Predictably this was most common among war veterans, but it was expressed in 
different ways among all of the groups. At the most basic level this is the feeling that 
tensions remain present, while on the more extreme end it is the idea that what the Serbs 
“did not manage to do with weapons and the task the JNA did not complete, this will be won 
at the negotiating table” (dyad with non-urban war veterans Slavonia). This involves notions 
that Serbs would still readily kill Croats; that calls for hatred remained prevalent; that Croatia 
is somehow still being disadvantaged economically; that the war had not stopped (especially 
in Vukovar); or, that the war had turned into a phase of attrition:  
 
SI.V.2 – Listen, I am not a historian. I have not completed any great schools, but I tell 
you, what has started in Vukovar will spread to all of Croatia.  
 
SI.V.3 – If they start to rape. 
 
SI.V.2 – Let me ask you, in what state is there another state? And our government has 
allowed the Republic of Serbia. In a state you have another state. In which state? In 
England would they allow another state (focus group with Sisak war veterans)? 
 
- 
 
ZA.T.3 – What is happening now is that Croatia is attacking Serbia over Šešelj, and 
Serbia is attacking Croatia over Cyrillic, because it cannot keep ten signs safe. Tensions 
are being kept high (focus group with Zadar teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.1 – I, as a journalist, call this a permanent ideological civil war. There is no 
shooting, there are no bombs being put in theatres. It is not like Dublin in Ireland, or like 
Belfast or Spain. However, here this kind of war continues for 40 years. And in certain 
phases it becomes very intense. And this is a fact in Croatia. Everyone knows this (focus 
group with Zagreb war veterans). 
 
The Sisak war veterans use graphic terminology, such as “rape”, to liken Cyrillic signs in 
Vukovar to the cities secession from Croatia and to conquest by Serbia. Especially with war 
veterans and pensioners, just like in discussions about Croatian government institutions and 
the media, much of this is attributed to a kind of infiltration of the system by unwanted 
elements (teachers did not express this attitude). The Zadar pensioners below saw the 
Croatian state as failing them to the extent that they saw it as an affront against Croatian 
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indepenendece. This led to an impression among the two older target segments that war will 
come again and could do so at any time: 
 
ZA.V.4 – We have a feeling that [the Serbs] are laughing at us. We have a feeling that 
they can attack us again whenever they want to. Why? Because even our people who 
are in power take part in this. We feel betrayed (focus group with Zadar war veterans). 
 
- 
 
ZA.P.2 – Look at the poor Marić54 who they arrested on the border and are holding. [The 
Serbs] have made themselves the successors of Yugoslavia to have the right to 
prosecute criminals in the whole region of the former Yugoslavia. Who are they? Who 
gives them the right? 
 
ZA.P.3 – In some ways, Croatian independence is not respected.  
 
ZA.P.2 – Not to mention that our government has done nothing to help this poor man 
(focus group with Zadar pensioners). 
 
- 
 
NU.P.5 – It is important for us to say what we think of our neighbours, the Serbs, how we 
now view them. In no way and never will we once again look at each other the same. 
Even if we lived another 100 years. They will come again. They said that even our great-
grandchildren will fall victim to the Serbs.  
 
NU.P.2 – They teach that. But we do not. Our future generations will not hate. They are 
vengeful. If there is a war, they will attack. 
 
NU.P.3 – They are vengeful. If there is a war, they will attack. If they cannot fight with 
anyone, they will fight between themselves.  
 
NU.P.1 – People take this hatred and animosity from generation to generation. From old 
Yugoslavia, to the Second World War to now (focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
The last passage is quite striking, considering the community where the group took place 
was not on the frontline (although it was slightly hit by the war) and was not ethnically mixed. 
It did, however, see Serbs as intrinsically aggressive due to historical intepretations of the 
Second World War. It is possible that homogenous communities have more extreme views 
since they have so little interaction with the other ethnicity, but the strength of the stance is 
nevertheless surprising. The above passages also highlight how these older generations 
and war veterans see interaction with ethnic Serbs and how this interplays with the war 
narrative. The issue of missing persons, which was often highlighted as the greatest 
obstacle to reconciliation in the region, is portrayed here as a mechanism of staying in the 
past and of the war “continuing”.  
 
                                                
54 Veljko Marić is a Croatian war veteran who was arrested by Serbian authorities on the Serbian-
Bulgarian border in 2010 for the killing of a Serb civilian in October 1991. A Serbian court sentenced 
him to 12 years in prison.  
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The fears present amongst these groups are best described by a Zadar war veteran, 
“Greater Serbia is an idea that lives and will continue to live in many Serbs and generations 
after us” (focus group with Zadar war veterans). The idea of “Greater Serbia” is considered a 
key element of Serbian aggression as much as it is seen as proof of future aggression or the 
conflict not being over, but instead continuing in a different sphere. In many Croatian eyes, 
the concept is one of a Serbian state continuously looking to aggressively expand across its 
borders; this perceived continuity in Serbian foreign policy helps explain both previous acts 
of aggression and contemporary actions. Additionally, the distinction made between the 
savage and aggressive Serbs and the victimised Croats helps perpetuate the difference 
between the two states. This is also used to justify the separation of the states, and thereby 
the war, as well as the fact that it was not a civil war. This makes the war narrative 
particularly detrimental to certain aspects of reconciliation since so many events are 
interpreted as attacks on Croatia.  
 
 
6.2 How the war narrative is reproduced   
 
The reproduction of the war narrative involves two distinct features, other than the 
categories described above: the first is a preoccupation with numbers and the second is a 
personal and local manner of speaking about events. This is important for expressivist 
efforts in transitional justice because such efforts need to be able to connect with already 
present narratives. If they fail to do so, they may be ignored or misunderstood completely. 
This means that it is important to consider where to speak to people (everyday narratives 
versus top-down narratives) and how to speak to people (in this case, to use numbers or 
not).  
 
 
6.2.1 Numbers 
 
Various sets of figures or statistics were frequently used in group discussions and interviews 
to prove points to the moderator or to other participants. For instance, during a heated 
discussion about the number of Croatians indicted for war crimes in the Zagreb pensioners 
groups, one participant shouted at the other, “Do not speak off the top of your head! You 
have to use data” (focus group with Zagreb pensioners). The same participant then later 
frequently repeated that 600 branitelji are being tried in Croatia, using it as proof of their 
superior knowledge. Numbers were often seen as important in many of the other groups and 
were used as definitive proof of one point or another. A Zagreb war veteran, for example, 
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claimed, “Up until 1995, 10,000 Croatian soldiers have been convicted in military courts of 
the Croatian Army for minor or major offences. I will not go into the details of whether these 
convictions included war crimes, and how many if so, but they did happen” (focus group with 
Zagreb war veterans). The main numbers cited during discussions were the number of dead 
(Croatian military personnel or civilians) and the number of war veterans, although there was 
no consensus over numbers, which many participants felt was the crux of the problem: 
 
ZA.V.4 – Today in Croatia we do not have, after all this time, the exact number of dead 
Croatian branitelji. We have some partial figures. [The Ministry of War Veterans’ Affairs] 
use some number of 7000 dead branitelji. There is a great epidemic among the branitelji, 
29,000 people have already died. We ask ourselves, we really ask ourselves, I will say it 
out loud, what was this ammunition irradiated with (focus group with Zadar war 
veterans)? 
 
The above passage was typical of the narrative found in the war veterans’ groups since it 
used figures to justify conspiracy theories (over which there was no consensus across 
groups) and it saw a general disagreement with officially provided figures. There is no official 
number of dead that has ever been published or agreed on, which helps feed this narrative, 
but also leads to the general notion that if anything is known, it is that the number of dead is 
unknown. Exchanges such as this one were, therefore, common: 
 
ZA.T.2 – We do not know the exact number of dead and missing, which will be 
researched for some time to come.  
 
ZA.T.3 – It is always being guessed. Even the exact numbers for the First World War are 
not known.  
 
ZA.T.1 – The number of people who took part. 
 
ZA.T.3 – Today they are still playing with these numbers. Especially the number of 
people that died in Jasenovac.  
 
ZA.T.1 – Yes, the statistics are always questionable.  
 
ZA.T.3 – The side that suffered more inflates it a bit. 
 
ZA.T.2 – The same for Bleiburg, one side inflates, the other deflates (focus group with 
Zadar teachers). 
 
Particularly when referring to the number of dead, there was an impression that the 
disagreement over figures represented continuity from the Second World War. This was one 
of the reasons why many felt it was important to discuss numbers, in order to avoid the 
“Jasenovac” scenario, when “a part of historiographers competed over who would put more 
numbers into Jasenovac” (interview with Sisak teacher). This is important for the justice 
narrative since actors attempting to promote it need to be aware of this fear, which runs 
deep in Croatian society. As the above passage also demonstrated, the number of war 
veterans was deemed important, although much like with the number of dead, there is no 
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consensus on the actual figure. For the most part this was connected to pensions (as the 
debate on war veterans often was): 
 
NU.P.1 – I would write a law: anyone who lies, who took a single kuna, who received a 
pension, but who was not in the war, should be shot. Not to jail. I am telling you, we 
would once again end up at 250, 300 thousand of our soldiers. And not 500, how many 
there are now. 526,00055 (focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
Generally there was a worry that numbers were being manipulated, for any range of 
reasons, especially among war veterans. All of the war veterans’ discussions involved a 
large deal of citing numbers and data to support arguments. One of the non-urban war 
veterans’ groups did this extensively when discussing various aspects of the war narrative: 
 
NU.V.5 – In the region of Petrinja 128 Croatian branitelji from Petrinja died, 134 from 
other parts of Croatia. More than 350 civilians were killed, and there are 21 Croatian 
branitelji listed as missing and 74 civilian victims (focus group with non-urban war 
veterans Banovina). 
 
This last passage is a good example of how numbers are often used to compare Croatian 
suffering to Serbian suffering. Despite the disagreement over total figures and the 
acknowledgment that numbers are being manipulated by various sources, figures of Serbian 
casualties were rarely mentioned. Comparisons were, therefore, made between the number 
of Croatian victims and anecdotal stories of Serbian victims. Numbers can be problematic on 
a different level as well, if a more precise figure can be found, it can be used to verify one 
side’s narrative over another, triggering defensive reactions in the counterpart. 
 
 
6.2.2 Local and personal 
 
During the course of the focus group discussions and interviews it became apparent that 
participants across all of the groups discussed the Homeland War in a personal and local 
way. This was particularly common among the war veterans’ groups, which often also 
contained numerous direct victims of the war. Respondents in these groups, therefore, 
frequently jumped to personal stories. Generally, survey data also shows that the public 
seem to identify quite strongly with their city, village and county, slightly more so than they 
do with Croatia (Kolstø, 2011). Schäuble (2014: 167), in her anthropological fieldwork in Sinj, 
found that people there connected more to local traditions, grounded in everyday 
experience, than to nation-state efforts to represenent particular versions of history. 
 
                                                
55 As a point of comparison, in 2014 the number of active US army personnel was 515,888. See: 
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp. 
 169 
A personal and local way of speaking about the war became particularly evident when 
groups discussed their understanding of the war, war crimes trials and the conflict in Bosnia. 
It was common for war veterans to claim they had a good understanding of the war since 
they had “felt the war on their own skin” and had “seen it first-hand”. This sentiment, 
however, was present across most of the other groups as well. One teacher proclaimed that 
they did “live through that time after all” (dyad with Zagreb teachers). The question “Do you 
think you have a good understanding of the Homeland War?” led to similarly personal 
responses with teachers and with pensioners. This was sometimes referred to in terms of 
personal experience, whereas others referred to it in terms of the personal experience of 
others they had spoken to. For example: 
 
ZG.T.2 – I personally think I do. Not only from written sources, but also from my 
conversations with people. When I put all of that together then I think I have a fairly 
complete picture (dyad with Zagreb teachers). 
 
- 
 
SI.P.5 – About its general characteristics, from people who experience it as such. I can 
only say what I saw and what I experienced (dyad with Sisak pensioners). 
 
Interestingly, respondents were often aware that their own understanding could be subjective 
since they were “participants”. Responses were often also accompanied by references to 
local events or locations, especially in locations on or close to the frontline. In Sisak in 
particular such responses were commonplace: 
 
SI.T.2 – It depends on the segment. For example, concerning the beginning of the 
Homeland War in the Sisak area. The constructions, the armament, here I am on my 
stomping ground. With regard to reported facts, I do not know anything (focus group with 
Sisak teachers). 
 
The principal features of the war narrative were often told in a personal and local fashion, 
both close to and far from the frontline:  
 
Moderator – What about that it was a defensive war, is that a fact?  
 
ZG.T.4 – Yes, I do think that is a fact. I did after all live during that time, so I know who 
first started bombing. This I know. I have lived in Zagreb since I was 18, but until then I 
was in Daruvar. And I know what it looked like in the summer of 1991. Your colleagues 
up until yesterday just disappeared over night. A girl who I went to musical school with 
for four years, not a word, she just left. And at night in August, all of a sudden the 
shelling starts. They started falling all over the city. She knew something, I did not know 
it. So then we can ask, what are facts and what did you experience yourself and what 
was passed on in the family? That is something that I will also say to my own children. 
Maybe someone will say that someone provoked it and so on, but I know personally what 
happened in this one place. So I do think it was a defensive war (interview with Zagreb 
teacher). 
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This quote quite poignantly shows the presence of local experience being expressed in 
Zagreb. In fact, respondents in Zagreb discussed the war on a personal level as much as 
those in other locations, despite this being the location that saw the smallest amount of 
violence. The excerpt below is a typical example of this: 
 
[Discussing sources of information on the war] 
 
ZG.T.2 – I think, as I said at the start, that those sources that are available together with 
the experience, since we lived through those days.  
 
ZG.T.1 agrees  
 
ZG.T.2 – I just started high school.  
 
ZG.T.1 – As did I.  
 
ZG.T.2 – So you remember it all. And with later chats with people, participants. So a 
written source is not even necessary (dyad with Zagreb teachers).  
 
In Sisak on the other hand, discussions frequently referred to how INA and the local refinery 
fared during the war. The personal and local understanding of the war is also transposed to 
interpretations of war crimes trials, be they international or domestic, and the view of crimes 
during the conflict in general. Among war veterans and victims, as well as the rest of the 
public, there is a distinct disappointment with the ICTY and war crimes trials in general 
(which has been shown in survey research. See: Pavlaković, 2014), but little is said about 
how such disappointment is always related to local incidents. 
 
Moderator – Have there been enough judicial processes for the breaking of humanitarian 
laws during the war?  
 
SI.V.2 – I don’t know how much you know about Sunja, about these parts here. There 
was also massive artillery fire here, all kinds of stuff happened, every day at least 1000 
artillery shells fell, how many people died. No one has been punished for that. Everyone 
talks about Dubrovnik etc. All these cities experienced the same as us (focus group with 
Sisak war veterans). 
 
Such a local narrative makes the potential educational effects of transitional justice 
questionable. All of the above results, however, do not account for the fact that opinions and 
attitudes could be influenced from a variety sources. More importantly what it does show is 
the difficult and complex environment such efforts have to work in. Overall the consequence 
of this is that narratives (re)produced close to home become more powerful than narratives 
produced further afield and references to everyday life gives them additional credibility. Top-
down narratives, such as the justice one, struggle to compete with such bottom-up 
narratives since the everyday worldview is so strongly associated with what respondents’ 
viewed as the truth.   
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6.3 Bosnia in the war narrative 
 
In some ways it is not surprising that the Croatian Homeland War, which much of the country 
witnessed directly, is referred to in personal and local terms. Such distressing events and 
images will naturally affect individuals profoundly. The case of the Bosnian conflict in the 
eyes of the Croatian public, therefore, provides an interesting contrast for comparison, since 
it was not experienced directly. The Bosnian conflict also has the potential to provide a 
powerful counter-narrative to the Croatian war narrative, since it involved Croatian 
aggression in a foreign state. This, however, does not seem to have happened. Moreover, 
despite the geographical removal, the conflict is still referred to in much the same way as the 
Homeland War: personally and, when possible, locally. As a theme it provides an example of 
the inherent contradictions present in the war narrative. It is important to keep in mind the 
lack of representativeness in this particular instance as these results are only indicative and 
require support from larger, quantitative research, as well as from comparative research with 
Bosnia.  
 
A 2001 parliamentary exchange between Vesna Pusić56 of the Croatian People’s Party 
(HNS) and several members of parliament57 encapsulated a range of these themes. The 
heated exchange began when Pusić proclaimed that she personally, not on behalf of her 
party, believed the Homeland War waged in Croatia was positive, but that it should not have 
been fought outside of the territories of Croatia, namely in Bosnia. This resulted in an 
avalanche of retorts, with one Member of Parliament quoting the Declaration on the 
Homeland War, stressing that it clearly states that Croatia led a defensive and liberating, not 
an aggressive and conquering war. Another Member of Parliament complained that she was 
incorrect on the basis of the Tuđman-Izetbegović agreement, which made Croatian military 
action in Bosnia legitimate. A number of members agreed with this, to which Pusić 
responded that she has the right to her own opinion, including on the Declaration, and that 
she believed the HDZ government waged an aggressive war in Bosnia. The reaction by 
others to this was possibly most telling of all: Vladimir Šeks requested the parliamentary 
session to be paused due to the insults of Pusić, the Speaker of the Parliament asked Pusić 
to apologise to all of parliament for belittling the Declaration on the Homeland War, which 
                                                
56 She has also served as First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs 
(2012-2016) in a centre-left coalition under Prime Minister Zoran Milanović 
57 Vladimir Šeks and Ivo Sanader of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and Zdravko Tomac of the 
Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP). Ivo Sanader later became Prime Minister of Croatia. 
Tomac was always far more nationalistically oriented than most of his party and was aligned closely 
to HDZ policies during the 1990s. He was highly critical of the ICTY and formally left the party in 2003.  
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was agreed upon through a vote. She refused and was given an official warning. The 
incident, despite occurring in 2001, is emblematic of the war narrative’s predominance and 
its commonly used symbols. It also shows the interaction between an emotional narrative 
and legal reasoning.  
 
Given the lack of personal experience of the conflict in Bosnia, most participants simply 
found it hard to comment on or explained that they did not know much. This was usually 
explained in terms of not having been present there or how the only source available was 
the media and the general opinion of the media remains low: 
 
SI.P.2 – About people here we can comment more easily, but over there in Bosnia only 
based on what it said in the newspapers. I cannot say if it is this way or that way (follow-
up dyad with Sisak pensioners). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.1 – I cannot really say since I was not there. I can just say what I heard, that the 
situation is always grey (interview with non-urban teacher). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.2 – I do not know much about it.  
 
ZG.P.1 – That is why I think we should limit ourselves to Croatia. Bosnians can talk 
about Bosnia. We do not know enough about it. War hit us, and Slovenia and Croatia.  
 
ZG.P.2 – But it is closely related. Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
ZG.P.1 – But we in Croatia are not familiar enough with the situation in Bosnia to be able 
to talk about it.  
 
ZG.P.3 – That is what I tried to say, I do not have the right information! 
 
ZG.P.1 – But if you lived in Croatia, then you can talk, since you know what happened in 
Croatia (focus group with Zagreb pensioners). 
 
In the last passage the Zagreb pensioners also provide an example of how many participants 
and groups dealt with this thorny issue of negative Croatian involvement; by claiming to be 
ignorant of it. There was, on the other hand, also an impression that information on Bosnia 
was suppressed, either to help portray Croatian involvement as criminal (when it was not) or 
in order to hide actual illicit Croatian involvement in the conflict: 
 
ZA.V.4 – (discussing the ICTY Kordić trial) I think it was conducted under a veil of 
secrecy, with a lack of information, especially for the public (interview with Zadar war 
veteran). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.2 – The role of Croatia in the war in Bosnia is always suppressed. It is as if we are 
ashamed of this. What happened is a fact, but it is being hidden (interview with non-
urban teacher). 
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The conflict was seen as grotesque and extreme, especially when compared to war in 
Croatia. This is an image that respondents still held for Bosnia today: that it is savage and 
chaotic. Some even held the view that historically this has been Bosnia’s, as opposed to 
Croatia’s, role in the Balkans: 
 
NU.P.3 – It was hard to live in Bosnia, there are three nations there. And these are half-
wild people (focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
- 
 
SI.T.2 – Bosnia has always, from its establishment, not as this republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, but from before the Romans, the area was like this. There were always 
conflicts between different factions (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
 
By painting the Bosnian conflict as extreme, chaotic and unknown, individuals are able to 
more easily distance themselves from the reality of the situation. Bosnians (of any ethnicity) 
are likened to savages, much likes Serbs, distinguishing them from Croats. They, therefore, 
do not belong to the same state or nation, nor is their role one of innocent victims. The fact 
that the Bosnian conflict is considered unknown also helps explain why it has not come into 
a significant conflict with the premise of a wholly defensive war. When participants claimed 
to know something about the war in Bosnia, it was frequently discussed in terms of what the 
individual had heard from someone else. Much like with the conflict in Croatia, knowledge 
and experience was discussed in terms of personal knowledge or hearsay. These 
discussions were particularly common in Sisak, which is also much closer to the Bosnian 
border: 
 
SI.P.4 – My relative was there when Blaškić was there. So I asked him, so who was this 
Blaškić? And he said, Blaškić was no one. That he had nothing to do with what went on 
over there. And he was there, he knows (follow-up dyad with Sisak pensioners). 
 
- 
 
SI.T.1 – So two roles, the first was arming and the second was this one. The third role, a 
certain grey zone, concerns participation, now I did not see this anywhere or read about 
it, I heard from various sources. I heard that Croatian forces participated in some military 
conflicts before signing the agreement Tuđman-Izetbegović (follow-up interview with 
Sisak teacher). 
 
As the teacher from Sisak indicates, similarly to other respondents, there is a general 
impression there was Croatian involvement in the Bosnian conflict, other than the officially 
acknowledged one. Most of the public in Croatia did have direct contact with the war in 
Bosnia through the huge influx of refugees into Croatia from the conflict. Of all of the topics 
concerning the Bosnian conflict, this one was present most consistently across the groups. 
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Moreover, it was often discussed in a positive light, in terms of Croatia taking these refugees 
in:  
 
SI.V.3 – Sisak was full of our refugees, Croats, from Krajina. And Bosnia had already 
started, so the Muslims were also in Sisak. So not only were we fighting someone, but 
we still also had to feed others.  
 
SI.V.1– These people, yes.  
 
SI.V.3 – The hall was full, the railway housing. At mine I had my cousin with her whole 
family, from Petrinja.  
 
SI.V.1– Maybe this is the ethnic cleansing you were interested in (focus group with Sisak 
war veterans). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.1 – Half of Bosnia, maybe not that much, was here. In my house, I have a big one, 
I took a whole family. We helped, seeing as we had good connections abroad, for 
example with women in Vienna, they were collecting for them. I took personally things to 
the refugee camp. Took them to the hospital. We were helping them. You cannot say 
that we wanted this war. But if we had let all of these refugees over the borders, to go, 
then the world would have thought differently. Croatia carried on its own back half of the 
Bosnian war and the armament of itself (focus group with Zagreb pensioners). 
 
Illicit Croatian involvement in the Bosnian conflict was, however, at times ignored or denied. 
In the most extreme instance, the Sisak war veterans group refused to speak about the 
conflict at all or related ICTY trials, further showing the amount of suspicion present, 
especially given this group hinted that they required approval from a local party leader to 
take part in the group discussion. Moreover, the defensive war is itself used as a defence 
mechanism by the group to avoid difficult topics:  
 
Moderator – What do you think of the trial of Dario Kordić? 
 
SI.V.1 and SI.V.2 vocally protest 
 
SI.V.2 – I would not like to answer that question.  
 
Moderator – Could I then ask about the related trial of Tihomir Blaškić?  
 
SI.V.1 – I would rather not speak about individuals at all. 
 
SI.V.2 – You asked us about a defensive war, about individuals no.  
 
Moderator – We can skip it, it is not a problem. 
 
SI.V.1 – They have their lawyers, a whole team working for them, who are familiar with 
their affairs.  
 
SI.V.2 – We are just mere mortals. 
 
SI.V.1 – I would rather not hurt any individuals, I do not want to talk about it (focus group 
with Sisak war veterans). 
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In many other instances, participants readily acknowledged Croatian involvement in the 
Bosnian conflict. Survey results are indicative of this: when asked if Presidents Tuđman and 
Milošević agreed on a division of Bosnia in Karađorđevo, thereby implying some kind of illicit 
Croatian involvement, 34% answered that they did not know, 40% answered that they did 
believe it to some degree, whereas only 17.1% were neutral and 14.7% did not believe there 
was an agreement (Ipsos Puls, 2012). Croatian involvement was presented in two 
perspectives, one negative (Croatia, or the HVO, attacking their neighbours) and one 
positive (the Croatian army coming to save Bosnia). The negative perspective, expressed by 
a minority of participants among teachers and pensioners, focused on backroom deals or 
covert Croatian military operations in Bosnia: 
 
ZG.P.2 – It is a fact that [Tuđman] made a deal with Milošević to leave Posavina to 
Serbia, and for us to create Herceg-Bosnia. When you looked at meteorological maps on 
television, Croatia and Herceg-Bosnia were nearly the same colour. They already agreed 
that this would be a part of Croatia. You can see that was an agreement. And the 
Bosniaks are somewhere in the middle of it. This was ultimately a deal at the expense of 
the Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina (focus group with Zagreb pensioners). 
 
The positive perspective, of Croatia saving Bosnia in some way, was particularly common 
with war veterans’ groups and was tied to the idea that, following Operation Storm, the 
Croatian Army continued into Bosnia to free the area around Bihać. In numerous instances 
the siege of Bihać was referred to as “the next Srebrenica” and Croatia was viewed as 
preventing it from occurring (thereby further solidifying the narrative of self-defence, even 
outside of national borders): 
 
NU2.V.2 – Military Operation Storm was a nice gesture for the international community. 
We returned our territories, but by returning our territories into the constitutional and legal 
framework of the Republic of Croatia, we also did something good for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. We reached the defensive lines of Bihać, which was surrounded by 
Serbian forces. Then we chased them away, came to the defenders of Bihać, our and 
their generals shook hands and Croatia returned its army and branitelji to the territory of 
its state, and they stayed in their state. And then Bosnia became unburdened from a 
situation where Bihać could have maybe been in the same situation as Srebrenica.  
 
NU2.V.1 – Not maybe, definitely (dyad with non-urban war veterans Slavonia)! 
 
The two perspectives outlined above are not mutually exclusive. The interviewed war 
veterans’ groups exclusively spoke of the positive one (if they spoke about it at all), while 
teachers (in particular) and pensioners (less so) often also highlighted the negative one. 
Teachers and pensioners often acknowledged viewed the two as separate phases of 
Croatian involvement in the Bosnian conflict: 
 
ZG.T.3 – Croatia was definitely present there, even before the Tuđman-Izetbegović 
agreement. We were definitely on the cusp of international sanctions and there was 
pressure from the international public. Clearly the judgement by higher powers was that 
this involvement was not completely positive and friendly (interview with Zagreb teacher). 
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- 
 
ZG.P.3 – When the agreement was signed between Tuđman and Izetbegović, that when 
Operation Storm happened they also went towards a solution, that was clean. But there 
was also something before that (focus group with Zagreb pensioners). 
 
The conflict in Bosnia is seen as a chaotic, unknown and barbaric conflict, where the 
Croatian state may have had some kind of illicit involvement, but where it also helped the 
neighbouring state in its defence against a common Serbian aggressor. Croatia’s role in 
taking refugees from Bosnia is seen in a highly positive light, further solidifying the narrative 
of victimhood (the refugees being seen as a burden on Croatia). Both, however, are narrated 
in a personal and local manner, especially when considering that more people had personal 
contact or saw Bosnian refugees first-hand, whereas far fewer had a personal connection to 
the actual conflict. The nature of Croatian involvement in Bosnia, as shown by ICTY verdicts, 
has the potential to contradict a purely defensive war narrative in the country. This has not 
occurred since most Croats remain unaware of the nature of Croatian involvement in the 
conflict and, when it is discussed, the focus is more often on positive elements that fit into 
the defensive war narrative, rather than on potentially incriminating ones that would not. 
 
The role of Croatia in the conflict in Bosnia shows the contradictions created by the 
interaction of the war and justice narratives. Individuals’ narratives on the topic often 
reached obstacles where they struggle to explain events or where they contradict 
themselves, especially when emotional and judicial narratives do not overlap. This was also 
evident in the 2001 parliamentary setting, where the Tuđman-Izetbegović agreement 
(agreed after Croatian involvement in Bosnia had already started) was used to justify 
Croatian forces operating outside of Croatia, much like it was used in focus groups. The 
importance of this lies not only in how the two narratives interact, but also how much debate 
there is surrounding the issue. The theme of Bosnia provides an opportunity to question the 
dominant war narrative in Croatia and, both on the level of elites and the everyday, there is 
evidence of this happening, of some form of debate occurring, but also of the war narrative 
for the most part making it difficult for the debate to intensify. 
 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
The conflict is seen as one of self-defence against an aggressor. This opinion is nearly 
universally accepted (85% agree to a lesser or greater extent, while only 4% disagree; 
Kolstø, 2011). No single participant disagreed with this notion in group discussions and 
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interviews. Moreover, the idea of defence was expressed in every other mention of the war 
and was constantly brought up in discussions. This part of the narrative was built on 
personal and local experiences (for example, participants frequently referred to local, rather 
than national events, as proof) and consequently Croatia is seen by nearly all of the public 
as not having any part in starting the war and, therefore, bearing no guilt. This theme 
provides a basis for all other parts of the war narrative. 
 
Survival and struggle form another cornerstone of the war narrative, as Croatia is seen as 
being unarmed, unprepared and unorganised for the required defence. Each target segment 
highlighted this in their own manner, for example teachers discussed the arms embargo 
placed on Croatia, pensioners discussed their own experiences of having no weapons, and 
women’s war veterans’ groups discussed the lack of training women had for war. Again, this 
was discussed in personal and local terms. The surprising nature of the conflict for Croatia 
was also seen as explaining why Croatia could not have planned any crimes, since they did 
not have the time or the means to do so. This is further supported by (and may help explain) 
survey evidence that Croats do not feel there was an organised effort to expel Serbs from 
the country. Unpreparedness was used as a mitigating circumstance in many discussions of 
potential war crimes, which has direct implications on how verdicts in trials are accepted in 
the country.  
 
It was common to hear, across all groups, that Croatia did not go to Serbia; rather that “they” 
(Serbia, JNA, the Serbs, the Chetniks, and so on) came “here”. Aggression was, in some 
cases, seen as a war crime in and of itself. This can be dangerous (and relevant to 
transitional justice) because aggressors are seen as composing a whole, or a large part, of 
the Serb minority in Croatia. In the groups this involved the powerful image of the baka with 
a rifle, representing the notion of armed Serb civilians attacking Croatian soldiers, thereby 
justifying potential Croatian crimes against Serb civilians. This was especially common when 
discussing Operation Storm and the trial of Mirko Norac.   
 
This apologetic attitude towards war crimes is also present in the narrative of victimisation, 
another central part of the war narrative. Croatian victimhood is built around several focal 
points, chief among which is Vukovar. It is seen as representing the whole Croatian struggle, 
both during the war and today (in terms of ethnic tensions and political manipulation). 
Vukovar was discussed across all groups as what could have happened anywhere in 
Croatia, had the aggressor won. It was also seen as exemplifying ICTY ineptness and was 
frequently cited as the biggest war crime in Croatia. Teachers cited Vukovar as an example 
of how difficult it was to teach the Homeland War to students and all target segments saw 
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this notion of victimhood as a further mitigating circumstance in committed crimes, since 
they were often committed as revenge by victims of Serbian aggression.  
 
Finally, there was a feeling among many participants that the war is not over, that it is 
continuing and that the Greater Serbian plan still exists. This notion was present in different 
ways with different groups, but it was always somehow highlighted. War veterans saw a 
continuation of the war “on the negotiating table”; pensioners (and war veterans) saw an 
infiltration of the system and a generally aggressive standing by Serbs and Serbia; and 
teachers highlighted general tensions present between neighbouring ethnicities and states 
(they did not, however, see this as an overt continuation of the war). More generally, there 
are unresolved issues that all participants attached an immense amount of importance to: 
missing persons, criminals walking freely close to victims, leftover mines and so on. There is 
also a clear generational difference here, since the two older segments (pensioners and war 
veterans) held more extreme views in this regard compared to teachers. This has the 
potential to continue perpetuating the war narrative by calling for a continuous defence 
against aggression, be it overt or covert. 
 
All aspects of the war narrative are reproduced through the frequent use of numbers, as well 
as personal and local experiences. This means that any efforts to influence the overall 
narrative would have to engage with these. In other words, this could involve producing 
some kind of generally accepted figures (for example, the number of dead) and dealing with 
narratives on a local, not just a national, level. Naturally such attempts are not only highly 
complex but also hampered by local resistance to change. 
 
One of the most striking aspects of the war narrative during focus group discussions was its 
sheer universality (Table 10). All groups and respondents wholly agreed on its 
interpretations of defence and Croatian struggle for survival. All groups discussed the 
conflict in exactly the same manner. War veterans, in particular, expressed total unanimity of 
opinions across all interviewed groups. They all followed a script that argued, in addition to 
the above, that Serbian aggression could not be questioned, that Yugoslavia was criminal, 
that Vukovar was the symbol of Croatian suffering, that the war was not over and that 
Croatian involvement in Bosnia was positive. Teachers and pensioners generally agreed 
with war veterans on most of these points, but the groups did, however, at times feature 
debate on these topics. Teachers questioned continued tensions (and generally felt these 
were not a continuation of aggression) and debated Croatia’s role in Bosnia. Pensioners 
also debated certain aspects, but what becomes clear from a comparison is how much the 
Zagreb pensioners and the Sisak teachers stand out from their counterparts in the rest of 
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Croatia. The Sisak teachers, a small city that was on the frontline during the war, expressed 
the war narrative in similar terms to the war veterans. This may be because the strength of 
everyday narratives, such as the war narrative, is particularly strong in smaller localities. 
This may also explain why the Zagreb pensioners show such different opinions, since the 
influence of everyday narratives is weaker in a larger city, although it is not possible to 
generalise with such data. 
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The justice narrative competes and interact with the war narrative, but the war narrative’s 
strength makes it difficult for the justice narrative to take hold in Croatia and, consequently, 
for the trickle-down effects of human rights norms to occur. Emotional notions of defence 
and victimhood, as well as the local and personal discussion of the conflict, make it difficult 
for other narratives to undermine the predominant understanding of the conflict. Perceptions 
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of Serbian aggression and the subsequent struggle for Croatian survival affect 
interpretations of the rule of law, thereby preventing the spread of rule of law norms 
(discussed in the following chapter). The feeling that the war is not over means that present 
day events are seen as a continuation of the aggression. Moreover, for some this is seen as 
an attempt to return to Yugoslavia, which is seen as a criminal entity. In other words, current 
and past events are being interpreted through the prism of the Homeland War. The issue of 
Bosnia encapsulates much of this debate, since even this conflict outside of the territory of 
the Republic of Croatia is being interpreted based on the understanding of the conflict in 
Croatia.  
 
Even a small degree of debate, especially among the youngest of the target segments, 
points to how the justice narrative and the war narrative are interacting. They also point to 
some degree of success of the justice narrative to at least initiate debate within society. 
Nevertheless, respondents construct a context for understanding the past from a variety of 
perspectives and the war narrative has an advantage over others being propagated from 
outsides sources due to its everyday nature, which makes it much more trusted. In 
comparison, the justice narrative is far removed from the everyday since it is seen as coming 
from institutions based in The Hague or Zagreb. The effect is that transitional justice 
contestation of the war narrative can potentially discredit the process, rather than change 
narratives, because it can be interpreted as a continued attack on Croatia. Moreover, the 
war narrative’s dominance in the discursive space means that the Croatian public interpret a 
range of phenomena through the perspective of the Homeland War, the most significant of 
which are discussed in the subsequent chapters.  
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CHAPTER 7  
The law is the law: Understandings of law in the war 
 
The UN Secretary General’s report on transitional justice in 2004 reflected its intrinsic 
connection to the rule of law by stating, “Justice, peace and democracy are not mutually 
exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives.” The UN Security Council, 
when setting up the ICTY, was “Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take 
effective measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them,” and was 
“convinced that in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the establishment 
as an ad hoc measure by the Council of an international tribunal and the prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law would enable 
this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace” 
(UNSC Report 827, 1993). Broader aims of dispensing justice and achieving reconciliation in 
the region were secondary. Some of the recent scholarship also assumes that transitional 
justice is a necessary requirement for the establishment of the rule of law and that they 
reinforce each other (McAuliffe, 2010; Teitel, 2005), although the reality of the dynamic is far 
more complex. If post-Second World War justice is considered to be transitional justice (it 
did deal with transition), then it did successfully consolidate regimes and democracy, but it 
did not necessarily establish the rule of law or implement it. Karsai (2000) has argued that in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, when Hungarian leaders were faced with the 
inherent conflict between legal security and injustice, which forms the rule of law, they chose 
unjust and inexpedient law, unless its conflict with justice was intolerably great (Karsai, 
2000a: 1). Drawing on the works of Gustav Radbruch (1946), they viewed the fundamental 
purpose of law as the creation of order and justice (Karsai, 2000a: 2).  
 
Crimes against humanity, such as those witnessed in Croatia and the region during the 
1991-1995 conflict, can express the core rule of law norm that there is no escaping law’s 
protective force (Teitel, 2005: 853). Because such offences may be committed anywhere 
and under any circumstances, whether during war or in peacetime, they may be subject to 
international adjudications and prosecution by any state as a matter of universal concern 
(Luban, 2004). This concept, however, is not without its ambiguities. Controversies 
surrounding Article 98 of the ICC and Belgium’s efforts at testing universal jurisdiction are 
both representative of this. Article 98 of the ICC has been challenged by the United States 
entering a number of bilateral agreements with the purpose of bypassing ICC jurisdiction 
over US nationals (for an example see Harmen, 2005). It has also been challenged by 
Malawi and Chad in the arrest and surrender of Sudan’s President Omar Al Bashir (see 
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Tladi, 2012). Belgium passed a universal jurisdiction law in 1993 (expanded in 1999) that 
allowed it to hear cases concerning violations of humanitarian law, including genocide and 
other crimes against humanity, which happened anywhere, without any connection to 
Belgium. Again, this was challenged by the United States and Belgium had to give in to 
political pressure, which ended in the relinquishment of all elements of universality in the law 
(see Leonard, 2015; Panakova, 2011). 
 
The main overlap between transitional justice and the rule of law is that the former aims to 
move society from instability towards stability, which includes adherence to human rights 
and general democratic principles, and this move involves the establishment of the rule of 
law (Sarkin 2015, 127). Both aim to achieve peace and stability in the long-term and share 
similar short-term goals, consequently both deal with the establishment and strengthening of 
institutions (Sarkin, 2015). This does, however, apply more to domestic initiatives than the 
ICTY, which has generally avoided claims that it is doing anything more than providing trials. 
Despite the numerous synergies between the two, the transitional justice process in many 
countries has often impeded what many would classify as the establishment of the rule of 
law (McAuliffe 2010, 129). It remains different to legal justice (especially when taking the 
form of show trials or political justice) because, as McAuliffe notes, “transitional justice is 
understood as non-ideal, but symbolic. Indeed, it is even welcomed as such” (McAuliffe 
2010, 135). Legal justice, on the other hand, has four distinct characteristics: the law applied 
must be clear and unambiguous; the independent judiciary must not be influenced by 
government; judges should be consistently unbiased in their interpretation of the law; and, 
due process must be adhered to strictly (Elster, 2004: 86; McAuliffe, 2010: 129; Shklar, 
1964). Not adhering to one or more of these facets does not turn legal justice in political 
justice, but these facets are often ignored due to the necessities of transition (Elster, 2004: 
91). For example, adversarial trials can limit pedagogical effects and the potential for 
reconciliation (Stover, 2005: 23). Such trials can also constrain domestic understandings of 
legality and lower credibility in judicial institutions (McAuliffe 2010, 154). 
This dynamic has led to two effects in the former Yugoslavia, both of which have been 
researched in Serbia. First, the rule of law developed via ICTY conditionality has led to 
stymied development of a culture of law in the country (Brodersen, 2014). Second, the 
negative perception of the ICTY and domestic judiciaries, which are seen as lacking 
independence, has hampered diffuse support for these institutions (Hagan and Ivković, 
2006).58 Using conditionality to establish the rule of law is problematic since, other than 
                                                
58 Diffuse support is defined as conferring legitimacy on an institution and it is considered rationally 
calculated (Caldeira 1986).  
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domestic and EU factors, it also depends on the performance of the ICTY (Brodersen, 
2014). Moreover, this process of subordinating justice to political institutions also empties 
law of its meaning, thereby eroding potential for reconciliation and stability (Subotić, 2009). 
Unfortunately, the difficulties the institution experienced with victim interaction, lenient 
sentences, ambiguous decisions and contact with the region’s publics meant that it struggled 
to spread a culture of law (Brodersen, 2014: 27). Conditionality, among a range of factors, 
meant that it was seen as a tool of the international community to control the region and the 
ICTY never came to represent justice, limiting its potential to establish a rule of law norm 
(Brodersen, 2014; Spoerri and Freyberg-Inan, 2008). Despite administering fair trials, the 
ICTY therefore never managed to develop a significant culture of law, at least in Serbia 
(Brodersen, 2014: 248). 
 
The lack of diffuse support is based on the institution’s poor image and inconsistencies 
interacting with processes of localisation, where norms are contested (Hagan and Ivković, 
2006: 131). This is based on the notion that in situations where individuals feel they have an 
inability to influence structures of power around them, there is a greater risk of legal cynicism 
arising (Sampson and Bartusch, 1998: 783). The great pessimism and distrust associated 
with the image of the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia meant that it was always going to 
struggle with its broader goals of democratisation and the establishment of the rule of law, 
as long as confidence in judicial independence was lacking (Hagan and Ivković, 2006: 135). 
More broadly, legal prosecutions also came into conflict with particular political goals of the 
former Yugoslav states. Croatian leaders felt compelled to comply with EU conditionality, 
partly due to their own vision of Croatian identity as a Western and democratic state 
(Zambelli, 2010: 1673). Its identity as a law-governed state depended on ICTY cooperation 
and the ability to try criminals domestically (Zambelli, 2010).  
 
The justice narrative in Croatia contained this inherent dynamic between the rule of law and 
transitional justice. As previously discussed, it also simultaneously interacts with everyday 
narratives and understandings of the war and the rule of law. The local dimensions of 
international justice, therefore, cannot be ignored (Slaughter, 2004). The amount of atrocities 
committed in the former Yugoslavia and the relatively short mandate of the ICTY (although it 
can be argued this is no longer so short) also required it to collaborate with local judicial 
institutions to properly address the crimes committed (Hagan and Ivković, 2006: 51). The 
ICTY has to be aware of local norms, understandings and attitudes, since its legitimacy is 
dependant on working in synchronisation with them and thereby creating a balance between 
local, national and international preferences (Arendt, 2006; Hagan and Ivković, 2006: 81). 
Respondents in focus groups reflected this as they constructed a context for their 
 185 
understanding of crimes and trials out of a variety of perspectives. The result was that 
feelings of powerlessness, folk theories of law and general factual inaccuracies played large 
roles in shaping attitudes on law. Firstly, respondents felt powerless in a system that was 
unresponsive to their demands. Notions of corruption, inefficiency and dissatisfaction with 
government led to a general distrust of institutions, of which legal institutions, both domestic 
and international, were just one example. Secondly folk theories of law played a large 
element in legal reasoning, since respondents would often claim “not to be lawyers”, only to 
use that statement as a premise for developing an opinion that would be consistent with it. 
This enabled them to say statements that were not consistent with the law, which partly 
reflects that they are not lawyers, but it also illustrates a more important notion: that politics, 
law and emotion work in tandem to create a general understanding of the situation. In others 
words, individuals use several narratives to build a picture of their personal world. Finally, 
factual inaccuracies were common among respondents. These are quite common in the 
interview and focus group setting, but some of these idiosyncratic images, such as for 
example the baka with the rifle, have a broader implication because they also justify 
narratives. The image of the baka helps make the point that civilians were not innocent and 
consequently crimes against them are permitted.  
 
A period of transition offers an opportunity for an actor’s identity to be defined or redefined, 
thereby creating the space for new norms to be incorporated with the new identity (Zambelli, 
2010). It is, however, possible that the everyday reproduction of the war narrative makes it 
difficult for the justice narrative to take hold and for associated norms to spread. Attitudes 
and perceptions towards the rule of law, as well as general understandings of the law, 
remain warped in Croatian society. The result is that some people think that certain crimes 
are acceptable in specific situations. By drawing on interview, focus group and survey data, 
the analysis seeks to answer questions, such as, if convicted war criminals (at domestic or 
international trials) are considered heroes or criminals, if war crimes can be committed in a 
defensive war, and how important principles such as the rule of law, human rights, 
cooperation with the ICTY and punishment of war crimes, among others, are to the Croatian 
public. These norms were, for the most part, discussed as a part of broader discussions on 
the topics of war crimes in general, Croatian war crimes (and associated topics, such as 
ethnic cleansing and command responsibility), and trials at the ICTY or domestic tribunals. 
Discussions surrounding mechanisms of transitional justice, such as tribunals, make it 
possible to also draw tentative conclusion on the effects of such mechanisms on attitudes, 
perceptions and norms. 
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7.1 War crimes  
 
Table 11 presents the results of three separate surveys that asked respondents to what 
extent should governments focus on achieving a list of specified aims ranging from the 
economy to various facets of transitional justice. The table presents the aims respondents 
marked as “very important” out of five options. “Punishing war crimes” and “cooperating with 
the ICTY” rank relatively low compared to a range of other aims, although it should be kept 
in mind that the two nationally representative surveys (Ilišin, 2011; Ipsos Puls, 2012) group 
the two aims together under one, which may lead to a more negative score for “punishing 
war crimes” due to the ICTY’s generally poor image. For example, in the survey handed out 
to participants prior to focus groups, punishment of war crimes received a considerably 
higher score than the separate category of ICTY cooperation. It is also possible that this is a 
frequent finding in surveys, since people tend to rank economic issues first and symbolic 
issues last, but their political behaviour (for example voting patterns) is not always reflective 
of this.   
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Table 11. To what extent should future governments focus on achieving the following goals? 
Focus group 
participants  
Ipsos Puls 2012 
 
Ilišin 2011 
 
Fight against corruption 90% 
Increasing the living 
standards of citizens 
95% Lowering unemployment 94% 
Ensuring human rights 
and freedom 
85% 
Fight against corruption 
and organised crime 
95% 
Fight against corruption 
and organised crime 
92% 
Finding out the truth about 
what happened during the 
Homeland War 
83% Lowering unemployment 95% 
Economic growth and 
development 
88% 
Protecting the dignity of 
the Homeland War 
75% 
Improving the position of 
young people 
91% 
Guaranteeing social 
justice and safety for all 
84% 
Punishing war crimes 75% 
Guaranteeing human 
rights and freedom 
90% 
Guaranteeing human 
rights and freedom 
79% 
Harmony among ethnic 
minorities and Croats 
62% 
Guaranteeing social 
justice and safety for all 
88% 
Improving the position of 
young people 
73% 
Cooperating with the 
ICTY 
42% 
Improving the position of 
women 
82% Caring for the environment 77% 
  
Caring for the environment 77% 
Improving the position of 
women 
55% 
  
Combating addiction 74% 
Improving relations with 
neighbouring countries 
59% 
  
Encouraging population 
growth 
71% 
Developing private 
enterprise 
63% 
  
Protecting the dignity of 
the Homeland War 
70% 
Encouraging population 
growth 
52% 
  
Developing private 
enterprise 
68% 
Protecting the dignity of 
the Homeland War 
52% 
  
Developing the regions 
and decentralisation of 
Croatia 
64% 
Harmony among ethnic 
minorities and Croats 
52% 
  
Harmony among ethnic 
minorities and Croats 
52% 
Entry into the European 
Union 
54% 
  
Entry into the European 
Union 
37% 
Developing the regions 
and decentralisation of 
Croatia 
53% 
  
Strengthening military 
power and the security of 
the state 
32% 
Punishing war crimes 
and cooperating with 
The Hague 
38% 
  
Punishing war crimes 
and cooperating with 
The Hague 
29% 
  
Source: Own compilation; Ipsos Puls (2012); Ilišin (2011) 
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Attempts at discussing the general definition of war crimes often led to discussions of war 
crimes committed by Croatian forces. Consequently, most of the discussions on war crimes 
focused on what war crimes are not rather than what they are. Throughout the focus groups, 
in particular, crimes during the war (real or hypothesized) were discussed in different 
categories: those that were war crimes; those that were war crimes but were understandable 
or forgivable; and those that were not war crimes at all (if they were crimes at all, then they 
were “ordinary” crimes).  
 
The most common narrative, especially with war veterans and pensioners, fit into the latter 
two categories: forgivable war crimes and “ordinary” crimes. This was based on the premise 
that crimes of passion or revenge were not war crimes. It was present in nearly identical 
format across all of the war veterans’ and pensioner groups, but not at all with the teachers. 
Moreover, they were usually highly emotionally loaded and in one instance a participant had 
to remove himself from the group whilst discussing the concept. The two excerpts below are 
particularly representative:  
 
NU.P.1 – A colleague once told me that he saw them kill his whole family. He should not 
have gone there. And later he did that. When they later returned, he also killed them all. 
As a kind of revenge. 
 
All agree 
 
NU.P.1 – He experienced a breakdown. He had no purpose in his life, he had nothing. 
 
NU.P.4 – His only real goal was revenge (focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.2 – In war someone can commit a crime of passion. This a crime in war. Or in the 
situation, when someone for example in Vukovar lost five or ten family members, who 
were massacred. And he finds himself, as a man, in a different region, defending a 
different part of Croatia, and in a certain moment it can happen that a person he comes 
across there, and maybe this person is not even armed, but they provoke him. In that 
moment he is not conscious, he is controlled by emotions. If someone at a certain 
moment says ‘We will repeat Ovčara!’, and his family were all killed at Ovčara, he may 
shoot and kill the person. According to me, this is not a war crime. This is a crime in war.  
 
ZG.V.3 agrees 
 
ZG.V.2 – What was targeted, consciously, be it rape, murder, massacres, liquidation, 
destruction of culture, that is a war crime. 
 
ZG.V.1 agrees (focus group with Zagreb war veterans). 
 
These passages suggest a distinction between individual acts and acts carried out in 
response to policy or orders, thereby distinguishing crimes by individual soldiers that do not 
implicate the army, since the army did not order them. They also show an apologetic attitude 
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towards crimes committed as crimes of revenge or passion and a broader tolerance of 
deviance. Since war crimes were discussed in relation to Croatian forces, they were 
consequently broadly discussed in the context of a defensive war. Again, a categorisation 
was present: on the one hand war crimes were considered possible in a defensive war (but 
that these crimes were sporadic) and on the other hand war crimes were not considered 
possible in the context (but individuals did commit “crimes in war”). Teachers, in particular, 
thought it was obvious that they were possible: 
 
Moderator – Is it possible to commit war crimes in a defensive war? 
 
All – It is (focus groups with Sisak teachers). 
 
- 
 
Moderator – Is it possible to commit war crimes in a defensive war? 
 
ZA.T.2 – Of course. 
 
ZA.T.1 – Of course they can. 
 
ZA.T.3 – They can (focus group with Zadar teachers). 
 
- 
 
Moderator – Is it possible to commit war crimes in a defensive war? 
 
NU.T.3 – Of course, it is possible. 
 
NU.T.4 – This is what happened to the civilian population and so on (dyad with non-
urban teachers). 
 
These passages with teachers also highlight how at times questions in focus groups can 
struggle to produce sequences for analysis, when participants may not want to discuss 
difficult concepts or see no reason to. As other sections have shown, teachers did feel this 
was possible, but that this was not done by the Croatian side in any systematic fashion. 
Pensioners were willing to elaborate on this topic and in doing so revealed interesting 
narratives. These involved the sporadic nature of Croatian crimes, as well as the influence of 
the former Yugoslav system of military training and education, which at times contradicted 
their understandings of international law59 (many of these individuals also participated in the 
Homeland War). The non-urban pensioners also compared this to the US military, thereby 
relativizing Croatian crimes and removing any responsibility from the Croatian state:  
 
Moderator – Is it possible to commit war crimes in a defensive war? 
 
                                                
59 For example, a respondent (cited below) claimed that the Yugoslav army code stated that war 
crimes were not possible in a defensive war and that recruits in the JNA had to answer exam 
questions to that effect, but he then goes on to say that the written code of conduct was based on the 
Geneva Conventions. No proof of the veracity of this claim could be found.  
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NU.P.1 – It is. Surely. 
 
NU.P.4 – That is also possible. But I do not think there was much of that. 
 
NU.P.1 – But this could have only happened sporadically. For example, individuals.  
 
NU.P.4 agrees  
 
NU.P.1 – In every army. If we compare it to America, they recently admitted abusing 
prisoners. Our ones also exist, but in a different way (focus groups with non-urban 
pensioners). 
 
- 
 
SI.P.4 – During the socialist administration in Yugoslavia we were taught that in a 
defensive war it is not possible to commit a war crime. In a defensive war. That is how 
we were taught. Not just us, all generations that sat that test until the 1990s. When we 
sat it we would even often ask, when you are defending yourself, if someone attacks our 
country and you defended yourself, can you commit a war crime? We were always told, 
no! However, war crimes are prescribed by international law. Before, in that old 
Yugoslavia, there was Article 120, and war crimes against the civilian population, against 
prisoners, against the injured and so on, were dealt with. So that they were not 
committed. A crime is a crime. That is how I see it. These criminal acts are prescribed. 
There is no debate about what kind of war they were committed in (focus group Sisak 
pensioners). 
 
These results have been replicated in numerous longitudinal studies over the years. A 2001 
survey found that a large majority of the public did not consider the Croatian army (74%) or 
volunteers (69%) responsible for war crimes (Caritas Croatia and the Franciscan Institute for 
the Culture, 2001). A 2011 study found that 44.9% of respondents did not believe it was 
possible for Croatian forces to commit a war crime in a defensive war, versus 29.8% who did 
(Kolstø, 2011). Focus group participants reflected this survey result: 48% did not think it was 
possible and 38% did.  
 
In addition to self-defence and emotion, the unpreparedness of the Croatian armed forces 
also presented a mitigating circumstance in the eyes of participants. All of these were most 
strongly expressed by all of the war veterans’ groups who held a clearly different opinion 
compared to the other target segments, that war crimes are not possible in a defensive war. 
Comments such as this were common among those groups: 
 
NU2.V.2 – During those times I do not think it was possible to commit a war crime 
against anyone because there was no war being conducted or directed at the territory of 
another state, where we could have led a war in which we could have killed Serbs on 
their territories. We waged a war only on our territories and this was a purely defensive 
war where Croats fought a war for the defence of their homeland inside their own 
borders (dyad with non-urban war veterans Slavonia). 
 
More specifically, war veterans’ groups and pensioners who took part in the war 
acknowledged that crimes of some kind were possible on the battlefield. Again this was 
qualified in the case of Croatian crimes as either extremely rare or as a result of emotion: 
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NU.P.3 – When someone is running away and you shoot him, like a rabbit, this is a 
crime. You do not even want to take something from him, you just kill him. You do not 
know him, he is innocent. This is a war crime. But when there are battles, this is different. 
Look. People go crazy. This is easy to talk about to you who were not in the war.  
 
(The participant struggles to continue, pauses and removes himself from the group; 
focus group with non-urban pensioners) 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.1 – A war crime can be committed on the frontline. Even in direct fights it is 
possible. But I cannot remember a single case, I mean in terms of alleged Croatian 
crimes, that would fit into that category. In principle it is possible, but I do not know of a 
single case (focus group with Zagreb war veterans).  
 
The pause in the non-urban pensioners group also highlights the PTSD, trauma and emotion 
that can be triggered by questioning these narratives. The pause, or what is missing in this 
sequence of dialogue, shows the traumatic nature of the war narrative and how hard it is for 
top-down narratives to change everyday narratives. Further discussions on this topic led to a 
variety of elaborations of what war crimes were, but often with qualifications that the 
participants were not trained in law, which seemed to be viewed as a necessity in 
understanding the trials. This may be indicative of a failure of the ICTY Outreach 
Programme to make the institution more approachable to the publics in the target region. 
Equally, however, it may be a method for the publics to avoid dealing with ICTY rulings. 
Evidence for both was present in discussions: 
 
SI.V.1 – They have their own lawyers, legal experts, a whole team working for them, with 
an insight into their business. 
 
SI.V.2 – We are just mere mortals (focus group with Sisak war veterans). 
 
- 
 
ZA.T.3 – I would, however, add, that I and ZA.T.2 do not understand legal things much, 
we are not lawyers (focus group with Zadar teachers).  
 
There was consensus across all groups, in one form or another, that international law or the 
Geneva Conventions defined war crimes. Among a long list of examples was the knowledge 
that medical personnel are protected under the Geneva Conventions (focus group with non-
urban war veterans Banovina); that prisoners of war have special rights (focus group with 
non-urban pensioners); that these conventions were taught to officers in Yugoslavia (focus 
group with Sisak pensioners); that international human rights constituted a universal 
standard of some kind (focus group with Zadar teachers and dyad with Zagreb teachers); at 
the very least that some kind of broader international conventions existed (dyad with non-
urban teachers); and in a minor example of dissent, that the Geneva Conventions were still 
valid although The Hague’s interpretation of them was incorrect (focus group with Zagreb 
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war veterans). These often led to folk theories of law creating contradictions in respondents’ 
understanding: respondents were aware of generally implicit norms of behaviour and even 
law but they still showed a tolerance for transgression.  
 
On a more basic level, some participants and groups felt that war crimes were obvious and 
known to all before the war or the existence of the ICTY. For example, some expressed a 
feeling that war crimes were “that which could happen in any war, to come to something 
inhuman” (interview with Zagreb pensioner). A non-urban teacher believed it to be “any act 
in war, on any side, that is not in line with moral, human laws. Any actions outside of what 
we consider to be civilised behaviour” (interview with non-urban teacher). Again, this points 
to folk theories of law or even a type of lex non scripta; transgressions of human rights were 
intrinsically understood but their transgression was still tolerated. More detailed explanations 
of war crimes did not have a consistently identifiable pattern across all groups. For example, 
war veterans and some pensioners’ groups defined war crimes as aggression or conquest of 
one state by another, while teachers did not at all. This meant that, as discussed above, war 
crimes were considered to only be possible in another states’ territory. War crimes were 
defined in relation to what the Serbs did “to us”, to what Serbs inherently do: 
 
NU.P.4 – A war crime is what the Serbs did to us. This is a complete war crime. 
 
NU.P.1 – Yes. All of Serbia and the former JNA attacked Croatia (focus group with non-
urban pensioners). 
 
- 
 
ZA.P.4 – I think it is a war crime when someone kills innocent people whilst trying to 
conquer what is not theirs.  
 
ZA.P.2 – Exactly, that is it. That is a good definition (focus group with Zadar pensioners). 
 
In addition to aggression, war veterans’ groups defined war crimes as the destruction of a 
culture and cultural heritage. The Zadar group focused on this in particular and all agreed 
when ZA.V.4 said, “[a war crime] is the way in which one attempts to destroy a different 
narod or different nation, with the aim of not only conquering their territory, but also to kill the 
members of that narod and everything that belongs to the cultural heritage of the narod” 
(focus group with Zadar war veterans). Likewise, the notion that war crimes were by 
definition “planned” or “conscious” acts was present for the most part only with war veterans. 
This is further supports the notion that crimes of passion are, therefore, not war crimes.  
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Finally, pensioners across all locations expressed that a war crime was the targeting of 
civilians, specifically unarmed civilians. Croatian war crimes were, however, quickly 
defended or excused in some manner, as ZG.P.1 does below: 
 
ZG.P.2 – A war crime is what happens outside of battle. 
 
ZG.P.4 – Killing civilians. 
 
ZG.P.3 agrees 
 
ZG.P.1 – Unarmed people, you come and you shoot them. 
 
ZG.P.4 – And prisoners of war. 
 
ZG.P.2 – Yes, this happened for sure. 
 
ZG.P.3 – To kill unarmed people. 
 
ZG.P.4 – To kill someone’s daughter on their doorstep (referring to the Zec murders), 
this is also a war crime. These are examples.  
 
ZG.P.2 agrees  
 
ZG.P.1 – Croatia has sentenced its war criminals. It is known that the murderer of the 
Zec family is in jail (focus group with Zagreb pensioners). 
 
This is significant because, as was already shown in the previous chapter, a key part of the 
Croatian war narrative is that Serb civilians were armed. By definition, therefore, war crimes 
against Serbian civilians can be seen as a lesser crime, if they are seen as a crime at all.  
 
 
7.2  Croatian war crimes 
 
Croatian war crimes, or alleged war crimes, were most often discussed in relation to Serbian 
war crimes. This relativity was brought up in numerous scenarios, so while Croatian crimes 
were considered to be sporadic, individual and unplanned, Serbian crimes were considered 
to have been premeditated, planned and committed by the whole group. This comparison 
was often expressed directly: 
 
Moderator – What is your opinion about the claim that the Croatian state was responsible 
for ethnic cleansing during the war? 
 
ZA.T.1 – I think to a far lesser degree than on the Serbian side. That is undeniable. 
 
ZA.T.2 agrees – I am aware that the concept of ethnic cleansing was created as a 
euphemism for the genocide that the Serb side did at the beginning. However, it is 
difficult to accuse Croatia of ethnic cleansing because realistically, in many parts of 
Croatia that were far away from the conflict zones, there was a similar number of Serbs 
and it did not change much. In areas where conflict did occur, as a rule the flight of the 
population was prepared by the authorities of the para-state.  
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ZA.T.1 – Yes. 
 
ZA.T.2 – They would often say themselves that they would either be in Serbia or that 
they would not stay here. 
 
ZA.T.3 – Many left willingly. 
 
ZA.T.1 – Willingly (focus groups with Zadar teachers). 
 
In other words, the agency was on the side of the Serbs, who left willingly. Again, Croatian 
suffering was always compared to Serb suffering, using the logic that Croatia cannot be 
guilty since Serbia is much more guilty. This type of rhetoric could be found, sometimes less 
overtly, in nearly all discussions of Croatian war crimes across groups. As was already partly 
discussed in the previous chapter, there was a pervasive notion across all groups that 
crimes on the Croatian side were committed by individuals. This was expressed 
unequivocally across all groups and had several implications. Given individuals had 
committed crimes, the Croatian army was not seen as responsible: 
 
NU.V.4 – I do not want to categorically say that maybe even the Croatian side committed 
crimes. If they did, then they should be punished. But these were not committed by 
Croats and the Croatian Army, but by individuals.  
 
NU.V.5 – Individuals (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
Individuals were seen as not being able to taint the war, the way Generals or state policy 
could: 
 
ZA.P.4 – On the Croatian side, if there were crimes, then they were committed outside 
the system of organised defence. They were committed by the horrible impulses of an 
individual. Like we have crimes today. A husband kills his wife. This involved these types 
of people. These types of people killed. And I cannot transfer this to the guilt of the entire 
Homeland War. This is the guilt of an individual and he should be harshly punished 
(focus group with Zadar war veterans).  
 
- 
 
NU2.V.2 – There is only one truth, Croats cannot be put on trial for command 
responsibility at The Hague Tribunal. There was no command ‘kill Serbs.’ In fact all of the 
commanders told their units not to commit crimes and to be very considerate when 
entering into villages where they are, to be careful that nothing happens and that there 
are no excesses. What an individual could do, that is something different. He could have 
done whatever he wanted, but he cannot be tried for command responsibility (dyad with 
non-urban war veterans Slavonia). 
 
The non-urban pensioners group even discussed alleged murders of children by Croatian 
forces as accidental. War veterans, on the other hand, used the distinction between 
individual and organised crimes to further discern between individual “crimes in war” and 
organised war crimes. Moreover, these individuals were seen across all groups as being 
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committed by non-professional soldiers. The Zagreb group of war veterans supported this by 
arguing, at length, that the ICTY did not sentence a single member of the Croatian army.60  
 
Key elements of the war narrative, such as the unprepared and unorganised (even clumsy) 
defence were expressed throughout. This further reinforced the notion that Croats did not 
commit crimes, especially compared to the organised Serbian ones. This view was held by 
all groups, but was particularly strongly expressed by teachers: 
 
SI.T.1 – Unfortunately I do not think we were capable enough to organise something 
(laughs).  
 
SI.T.3 – Yes. 
 
SI.T.1 – They are giving us powers we do not have. 
 
All laugh and agree (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZA.T.1 – No one is innocent in war.  
 
ZA.T.2 – No one is innocent. In war people fight, not robots. If one of our generals 
unfortunately committed war crimes, then he has to be punished. I do not think the 
Croatian courts would willingly punish anyone who was completely innocent.  
 
ZA.T.3 – I have not been to war, but in war sometimes innocent people get hurt. I think it 
is important that there were no planned actions, which they wanted to accuse them of, 
that there was no planned ethnic cleansing or genocide.  
 
ZA.T.2 – This is why wars should be avoided at all costs. Normal people become 
dangerous. As my colleague said, we are convinced, all three of us, that on the Croatian 
side there were no ideas about a planned expulsion or destruction of the Serb 
community. These isolated cases… Croatia is a relatively small state and in the army 
there were several thousand people, which is a bigger army than some large NATO 
states currently. There was no total control. We always have to be aware that this was an 
army in the making. As a rule, it takes an army eight years to form, and in Croatia this 
was done very fast. Maybe many people were allowed into the regular army who would 
not have been allowed if the situation were different. I am not surprised that Croatian war 
crimes happened and that people were found guilty. This is normal, given the situation. It 
is unfortunate, but that is how it is (focus group with Zadar teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZG.T.4 – I think this was more inexperience and clumsiness. That is what I think today. I 
would not go as far as to say there was purposeful political cleansing. But some 
clumsiness, yes (interview with Zagreb teacher).  
 
The Zadar teachers highlight the constant relativization of crime, which portray Croatian 
crimes as unexceptional. They further this notion of unexceptional crimes by comparing the 
                                                
60 This is factually correct regarding crimes committed in Croatia, although Croatian army personnel 
have been sentenced at domestic war crimes trials, some following transfer from the ICTY. 
Additionally, it does depend on whether former HVO officers who later became Croatian army officers 
afterward are included or not.  
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Croatian army to NATO and by referring to the exceptional situation at the time. Groups with 
war veterans were, however, silent on the topic of whether Croatian war crimes were 
planned or not. Much of their discussions instead focused on how there was no time to 
commit war crimes, due to the urgency of the defence. This was a sentiment only expressed 
in those groups, although some of the other target segments did refer to the lack of weapons 
as the reason for no Croatian war crimes. The most striking juxtaposition with Serbian 
crimes was, however, the narrative of the baka with the rifle and other similar narratives of 
armed civilians. In discussions about war crimes this basic notion was present in many more 
formats. It was used to relativize Croatian actions in the war and featured many of the most 
common elements of the Croatian war narrative. For example, the Zadar pensioners below 
first relativize using figures, then portray Serbs as universally and inherently armed (from 
children to old people) and finally contrast this with the image of Christ, a victim, speaking 
the truth, as Croats now must do. It was a particularly powerful symbol when expressing any 
kind of tolerance of deviance: 
 
ZA.P.3 – Here they mobilised, I think about 50,000-100,000 of them. There was not a 
peasant that did not have a weapon. And today we talk about this and that. This is why 
Tuđman pardoned them, because he would otherwise have to punish even the simplest 
of peasants because the JNA armed them all. 
 
ZA.P.2 – From children to old people. 
 
ZA.P.3 – That is right. Today we avoid this in discussion and in politics and so on. But 
this is a tragedy. As Christ said, the truth will set you free. And we have to speak the 
truth and only the truth (focus group with Zadar pensioners).  
 
- 
 
NU2.V.2 – There is this mystery around the Zec family. If these people were really killed 
as civilians, then this was a war crime and we cannot run away from that. However, a lot 
is not known about what happened in the background. If someone from the Zec family 
picked up a weapon (dyad with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
This last quote is particularly interesting, since the participant used this to directly question a 
war crime case that has featured heavily in the Croatian press, but with no mention of any 
members of the family being armed. Such factual inaccuracies were quite common and not 
all too surprising with the lesser known cases, but their broader significance is that they help 
justify certain parts of the dominant war narrative. In this case this helps justify the notion 
(much like the baka with the rifle does) that Serb civilians were armed and that their murder 
did not constitute a war crime. In fact, some groups across all target segments felt that 
Croatia had tried all of their war criminals and investigated all committed crimes, so it was 
common for participants in these groups to see no reason for further inquiries. A minority 
view expressed across all groups was that Croatian war crimes were a fabrication by the 
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Serbian or former Yugoslav secret services in order to start the Serb rebellion or to equalise 
guilt. 
 
The mention of ethnic cleansing inevitably led to a discussion of Operation Storm. This can 
be seen as representative of the Croatian public’s view of war crimes since it contains the 
narrative of revenge and of sporadic crimes rather than organised ones. In numerous groups 
the questions “can war crimes be committed in a defensive war?” and “what do you think 
about the claim that the Croatian state was responsible for ethnic cleansing during the war?” 
led to an immediate response about Operation Storm. This is not surprising given how the 
trial of Gotovina captured the attention of the public for so many years and the emotion 
attachment much of the public has to it, since it was seen as holding the potential to 
delegitimise the Croatian state. The degree to which Croatian war crimes are connected to 
Operation Storm is best captured by the response of a Sisak war veteran, who threatened to 
remove herself from the group if the moderator did not stop focusing solely on Operation 
Storm, despite the fact that the moderator had not mentioned the theme at all and the 
conversation at the time was about the crimes and trials in Bosnia: 
 
SI.V.3 – You have once again focused on one detail from this complex war. The war did 
not start with Operation Storm. The war started far earlier. Theoretically it started long 
before 1991 (focus group with Sisak war veterans). 
 
All groups agreed that crimes did happen on the Croatian side and that this happened 
especially during the period of this military operation. Again, however, there was a 
perception across all groups that these were not war crimes but “crimes in war” motivated by 
individual revenge or emotion: 
 
SI.T.1 – 90% of the crimes happened in 1991, by the Serb side, and a smaller number 
happened in 1995 after Operation Storm. I would connect these crimes more with some 
kind of criminals and, not to say it, cowards, who stole the belongings of these Serbs, 
who of their own volition, if you ask me, left the territory of the Republic of Croatia (follow-
up interview with Sisak teacher). 
 
- 
 
NU2.V.1 – Yes, during Operation Storm certain criminal offences were probably 
committed by the larger ethnicity and the Croatian Army, who by doing so showed their 
thirst for their homes. Let us call this uncontrolled revenge. These types of crimes, which 
are absolutely crimes and which I condemn as a man, were committed as crimes in war, 
not as war crimes (dyad with non-urban war veterans Slavonia).  
 
This view seems to be influenced by the connected, equally widespread, belief that Serb 
populations across all of Croatia and in particular in the region to be captured by the military 
action knew that it was about to occur and had time to leave. Participants often referred to 
personal stories or hearsay to bring up examples of how the Serb populations knew the 
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attack was about to happen or how they were forced out by retreating Serb forces. This was 
a common pattern in sequences when Gotovina or Operation Storm were mentioned, as 
participants then often stressed that Serbs left willingly. This led to an impression that 
Croats were disadvantaged compared to Serbs, that judging them on an equal basis was 
unjust and that crimes were not possible or as severe: 
 
NU.P.4 – Everyone in Croatia knows that there was no ethnic cleansing because just 
before Operation Storm the Serbs went around chasing their own away. They prepared 
buses and chased them away. 
 
NU.P.3 – They ran them over. 
 
NU.P.4 – They chased them away since they knew a military operation was being 
prepared. Someone told us, a Slovenian, but his wife was Serbian. He was in the 
military… Ordinary people knew that this was a show and was staged, and that the 
Serbs expelled their own people before our soldiers arrived. Gotovina could not then 
have even committed war crimes in Operation Storm, since there were no people. 
 
All agree 
 
NU.P.3 – The buses took them all (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.3 – When in Okučani Operation Flash happened, the Serbs fled en masse. There 
are even documentaries about it. And then these, who you might call real Serbs, 
volunteers, Chetniks, were swearing at their own Serbs and were playing Thompson 
(follow-up interview with Zagreb war veteran).61 
 
- 
 
SI.V.2 – People of the Orthodox faith, in other words Serbs, were always notified when to 
go, that there was about to be shelling. They would leave en masse. But to their 
neighbours the Croats they would not say anything. I will tell you that, you can freely 
write it down, I will even sign it. I am not scared of saying it and will always do so. They 
were notified and were ordered to move from the villages and the cities (focus group with 
Sisak war veterans).  
 
Across the board there was, therefore, a feeling that Croatia did not commit any organised 
war crimes during the war generally and Operation Storm specifically. Numerous 
respondents felt that the Croatian state gave enough guarantees to local populations for 
them not to have to leave. Overall the juxtaposition between the situation of the Croats and 
the Serbs leaves an impression that legal understanding is being defined by the difference in 
playing fields for the two ethnicities and on emotional grounds. This is probably best 
exemplified in the recurring use of the concept of war crimes versus “crimes in war”. Further 
support for this notion is present in survey results. Whereas the public does not believe it 
                                                
61 Thompson is a Croatian singer who is known for his nationalistic, often anti-Serb and provocative 
songs. Moreover he is known for using symbols associated with the Second World War Ustasha 
regime.  
 199 
was possible for the Croatian side to commit war crimes in a defensive war (see above; 
Kolstø, 2011), the Belgrade Human Rights Centre (2011) survey found that 66% of the 
public did believe it was possible to commit crimes in a defensive war, versus 29% who did 
not.   
 
Participants regarded the doctrine of command responsibility, also a key feature of the 
Gotovina trial, with a mixture of disbelief and confusion. Numerous individuals admitted they 
were confused about the concept, although there was a view across all groups that the 
unorganised nature of the Croatian defence mixed with the inherent difficulty in controlling 
vengeful individuals meant that it was not correct to try commanders, since it was impossible 
to control all individuals in such a situation. This is another example of folk theories of law 
playing a large role in legal reasoning: respondents first admitted not understanding the 
concept, then outlined the premise for their definition of the concept, before arguing for why 
they believed Croatian generals were not guilty of command responsibility. They constructed 
their understanding of the situation through a mixture of law, politics and emotion: 
 
NU.T.2 – It is difficult to talk about command responsibility in 1995 in the Croatian Army, 
when a man after five years liberates his house and kills someone he found inside it. Of 
course he is guilty for that war crime and for the murder of a civilian, but it is hard to 
control him (interview with non-urban teacher).  
 
- 
 
NU.P.1 – [Norac] was a young boy thrown into huge responsibility, to lead those people 
there. He could not, so young, command those types of people in the army. Those were 
mainly people from that region, from that place. What we just discussed, revanchism. 
Here the Medak Pocket and all of that happened. He was tried mainly for that and 
sentenced. What did they call it? A massacre. Compared to Čavoglave, what they did 
there, this is not normal, it is not even comparable (follow-up dyad with non-urban 
pensioners).  
 
Many of these attitudes are also present in narratives on the ICTY and domestic war crimes 
tribunals. As the following section will show in more detail, there is a sense that too few 
Serbs were put on trial compared to the number of Croats. Overall all types of trials were 
considered too slow and there was a general feeling that many perpetrators of crimes are 
known but nevertheless free. Unsurprisingly there is, therefore, an impression that no one 
has been held accountable for the crimes committed and that justice has not been done: 
 
Moderator – Do you think there have been enough trials for the breaking of human 
rights? 
 
All – No! 
 
NU.V.5 – If you follow the news on our state television, when they commemorate the 
anniversaries of the atrocities – Pakrac, Borovo Selo, Petrinja, Škabrnja, Ćelija, any 
place where people died en masse and where there are mass graves – this mantra 
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always comes to me: the number of dead, the number of exhumed, how many civilians 
and how many branitelji, and then all of a sudden ‘and up until now no one has been held 
responsible. 
 
NU.V.3 agrees 
 
NU.V.5 – I repeat, as a mantra, no one has been held responsible up until now. 
 
NU.V.3 – And no one does anything. 
 
NU.V.5 – I will say something openly. I do not blame Serbia now for this. My own state, 
authority and system, in my state, do not work (focus group with non-urban war veterans 
Banovina). 
 
Victims, such as these, felt unrepresented by all types of courts. The Croatian state in its 
current form was blamed for crimes committed against the victims. They connected the lack 
of trials to the state and to its perceived infiltration. The resulting universal view of courts is 
of inefficient and often biased institutions that were for the most part not fit for purpose. Most 
groups, however, concluded that it would have been difficult to come up with a better 
mechanism to achieve justice. 
 
 
7.3 The ICTY: Slow, inefficient, unjust and biased  
 
The ICTY is and has been the primary, or at least the most visible, instrument of transitional 
justice in Croatia, as well as the region more broadly, since starting its work in 1993. It, 
therefore, had the potential to guide the whole process and to set the tone for the work of 
future institutions. It has, however, never been particularly popular in Croatia (in 2011, 65% 
of the public had a negative opinion of it and 24% a positive one, although this may have 
changed with the release of Gotovina in 2012; Belgrade Human Rights Centre, 2011) and 
most focus group discussions reflected this.62 The institution was generally seen as 
inefficient, political and biased against Croats and Croatia. Figure 18 outlines the main 
reasons that survey research has shown for negative views (Belgrade Human Rights 
Centre, 2011). This highlights how general distrust of institutions play a role in shaping 
attitudes about law.  
  
                                                
62 This has depended on who was being tried at any one time, so the initial Gotovina verdict and the 
appeals verdict may have influenced popularity. Similarly, more popularity may have come about from 
the Ovčara perpetrators trial, while less from the temporary release of Šešelj. 
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Figure 18. Reasons for negative opinion of ICTY (multiple spontaneous answers allowed). 
 
Source: Belgrade Human Rights Centre (2011) 
 
There was, however, a feeling that it was necessary and verdicts at the Tribunal, both in 
“favour” of Croats and against, seemed to influence the opinions of participants. This points 
to some level of credibility given to the institution, despite the poor public opinion.  
 
 
7.3.1 The inefficient ICTY 
 
The ICTY was above all considered inefficient and all groups spent some time discussing 
this topic. Survey research has reflected this in that 69% of respondents in the Belgrade 
Human Rights Centre (2011) study felt trials were needlessly long, as opposed to 25% who 
felt that trial complexity justified this. Given the crimes it was dealing with and the emotional 
nature of the memories involved, it is debatable if it could have ever been seen as efficient 
since justice may never seem swift enough. It is, therefore, also important to note that it is 
possible that this categorisation is something the researcher was looking out for before the 
fieldwork started.  
 
The most recurring theme was that the trials took far too long, which meant that sentences 
could not be carried out and that following the processes became boring: 
 
ZA.T.2 – Maybe like after the Second World War, when they tried the military leadership 
of Germany and Japan, maybe that approach, to punish less people, but more 
3% 
4% 
4% 
4% 
4% 
5% 
9% 
11% 
27% 
30% 
I do not trust them, they lie, it is a farse 
Did not process all criminals or the real criminals 
Incapable, slow, poor work 
Inadequate judgments or punishments 
They are lenient towards Serbs, they give short 
sentences or free them 
The real criminals are lightly punished or released 
Work so far, shortcomings, disappointment with their 
work 
It is a political court, it is influenced by the West 
Unjustly attribute blame, they judge Croats, they are 
anti-Croat  
Unjust, biased, unobjective, unfair 
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responsible ones, would be more efficient than many small processes in which some big 
fish avoided justice in the end.  
 
ZA.T.1 – Or did not live long enough to see the trial end. 
 
ZA.T.2 – Either they did not live long enough or they died before making it there. This 
took too long and there were too many small ones, instead of those big ones (focus 
group with Zadar teachers). 
 
Many reasons were given for this inefficiency, for example that the institution lacked qualified 
professionals. War veterans considered it inefficient since it did not try the “aggressor” 
sufficiently, which it was in their eyes meant to do. All groups, but teachers in particular, felt 
the Tribunal was poorly implemented from its original design, which led to inefficiency: 
 
ZA.V.4 – This Tribunal is not even a shadow of what it was meant to be.  
 
ZA.V.3 – The idea was good (focus group with Zadar war veterans). 
 
- 
 
Moderator – Do you think it was a mistake to establish the Hague Tribunal?  
 
SI.T.2 – No. 
 
SI.T.3 – No, it was established with a different intention.  
 
SI.T.1 – As an idea it was good.  
 
SI.T.2 – As an international court of justice. 
 
SI.T.1 – However, what kind of court of justice is it if the Americans do not recognise it? 
 
SI.T.3 – That they do not respect. 
 
SI.T.1 – This is an international criminal court for the second division. For those clubs 
who play county level matches. This is not a court for the top division, for the Security 
Council. Who would they prosecute on the Security Council, when they have the right to 
veto. No one. This is for us small ones. To give us some sense of justice and truth.  
 
SI.T.2 – Of international justice. 
 
SI.T.1 – International justice, because we are fooled by terminology. International.  
 
SI.T.3 – To show that we are not forgotten, that they are thinking of us (focus group with 
Sisak teachers). 
 
This last passage highlights another problematic aspect of the ICTY’s work, that it is 
frequently confused with the ICC. Given respondents were not particularly well acquainted 
with these legal institutions, this is not surprising, but once again factual inaccuracies in this 
instance served the purpose of reinforcing established narratives. This is significant since 
the institution is seen as highly political and influenced by larger, more powerful, states, 
which are seen as not being governed by the same rules as smaller states. The Sisak 
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teachers, above, discussed the notion of “international justice” as an injustice towards 
Croatia and other small nations. Several facts were seen as exemplifying ICTY inefficiency, 
chief among which was the release of Vojislav Šešelj. He was seen as proof of inefficiency 
and of ethnic bias (his temporary release was seen as a poor one, as opposed to Gotovina's 
good one): 
 
SI.P.3 – [Šešelj] was there 11 years. And for 11 years you have been unable to sentence 
him. We who are not trained in the field would have been able to do it.  
 
All agree and laugh 
 
SI.P.1 – We would have brought papers and documents in order to sentence him. 
 
SI.P.5 – And he insulted them. 
 
SI.P.3 – In those 11 years you did not manage to come to a verdict (focus group with 
Sisak pensioners). 
 
More broadly there was dissatisfaction that the leadership of the JNA was never indicted for 
war crimes in Croatia. This feeds into the notion of betrayal by Yugoslavia, which forms a 
key element of the Croatian war narrative. The JNA was seen as the aggressor, or at least a 
large component of what constituted the aggressor, and it also represented the Yugoslav or 
Serbian state. Because of this respondents saw JNA involvement as proof that the conflict 
was more than a civil war and more than just an ethnic Serb rebellion in Croatia, thereby 
giving such indictments more significance:  
 
NU.V.5 – Radić, Perišić, Jokić. 
 
NU.V.3 – So many. 
 
NU.V.5 – I do not know the names. Why is Mladić currently there? They are not trying 
him for crimes in Croatia at all. Only Bosnia and Herzegovina. No one from the JNA. 
That is politics. Not even Kadijević (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.2 – Why was no one from the JNA tried? The JNA was formed to defend 
Yugoslavia, not to lead a national war.  
 
ZG.P.1 – Because of international politics that was like that at the time, so that 
Yugoslavia would not fall apart. But the JNA was meant to protect Yugoslavia. Croatia 
and Slovenia left this so they let the JNA do what they want. 
 
ZG.P.2 – The biggest crime of the JNA was that it turned into the de facto Serbian army 
(focus group with Zagreb pensioners). 
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Vukovar was seen as an example of ICTY inefficiency and unjustness. The view that no one 
has been sentenced sufficiently, if at all, for war crimes in the city was expressed in varying 
degrees across all groups.63 This was exacerbated due to the symbolic nature of the city:  
 
ZA.V.3 – Has anyone been sentenced for Srebrenica and Vukovar?  
 
ZA.V.4 – No one. 
 
ZA.V.3 – What are we talking about here? This was a war crime, genocide was 
committed there.  
 
ZA.V.2 – A hard to believe genocide in the 21st century.  
 
ZA.V.3 – And no one has been indicted for that. 
 
ZA.V.2 – If you tell your children, they cannot believe you. My grandchildren cry when 
they hear about the genocide against the Jews, not to mention if I speak about the 
Homeland War. Too horrific.  
 
ZA.V.5 – That city was levelled to the ground. It is too horrific (focus group with Zadar 
war veterans). 
 
Much of the above passage is factually incorrect (a number of individuals have been 
sentenced for crimes in both Srebrenica and Vukovar), but it does show how powerful this 
symbol of Vukovar is and how emotional it is. Other than a further example of factual 
inaccuracy being employed for the purpose of supporting the war narrative, this dichotomy 
points to a lack of Outreach or press coverage, since trials did take place (although it is 
debatable how happy the Croatian public is with their outcomes). The ICTY has in reality 
itself only sentenced Serbs for crimes committed in Croatia, whereas no Croats have been 
sentenced for such crimes (only for crimes in Bosnia). Efficiency was, however, often judged 
through the ratio of Serbs and Croats on trial. This undertone was always present in groups, 
sometimes through literal complaints about not enough Serbs being put on trial, at others 
more discretely by simply comparing the numbers without further comments. Other than the 
above views, respondents provided a vast range of other reasons for ICTY inefficacy, these 
included but are not limited to the institution being too complex, having no clear aims or 
being too opaque. Some felt this had the effect of raising tensions and digging wounds in the 
region, as well as portraying the institution as unjust.  
 
 
  
                                                
63 As was already discussed in Chapter 6, a number of trials dealing with these crimes have taken 
place and individuals have been sentenced.  
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7.3.2 The biased and political ICTY 
 
Another recurring complaint about the ICTY was that it was biased against Croats and 
Croatia because it was attempting to equalise guilt between the warring factions, but 
especially between Croats and Serbs. Again, this has been shown in longitudinal research 
where it was found that 47.5% agreed and 11.8% disagreed that this was the aim of the 
Tribunal (Ipsos Puls, 2012). Much like with the category discussed in the previous section, it 
is possible that due to this commonly held belief and these survey results, the researcher 
may have been searching for this category in the fieldwork and, therefore, unduly aiding in 
its construction. The concept of equalisation of guilt has the potential to undermine the 
Croatian war narrative because respondents saw it as portraying the Homeland War as a 
civil war with no exclusively Serbian aggression, no exclusively Croatian defence and no 
unique Croatian victimhood. Participants felt this belittled victims and some consequently did 
not take the ICTY seriously since in their view it had a misconstrued notion of recent 
Croatian history. For example, a Zadar teacher claimed, “as soon as the stories started that 
Croatia committed some kind of crime and was being equalised with the aggressor, I 
immediately stopped following [the ICTY]” (focus group with Zadar teachers). This also 
highlights a connection between expressivist aspects of courts and their legal performance: 
as much as legal decisions can be perceived as unjust, thereby delegitimising expressivist 
messages, so can disagreement with the expressivist message (often based on emotion) 
delegitimise legal rulings.  
 
War veterans saw “equalisation” as an attempt to equalise the aggressor and victims, as 
well as war crimes and crimes in war. This was not only attributed to the ICTY, but also to 
the Croatian government, civil society groups and the international community, further 
spreading a feeling of distrust of nearly all institutions, especially ones with a top-down 
approach to their work. There was a further notion that this attempt was a small element in a 
broader strategy of falsifying Croatian history: 
 
NU.2.V.1 – This criminal enterprise, which the Prosecution wanted to use to sentence 
the generals, which would have solidified this idea of equalising guilt, this is the 
elementary concept with which they wanted to falsify Croatian history (dyad with non-
urban war veterans Slavonia). 
 
Once again, discussions on this topic frequently compared the number of Croats and Serbs 
on trial to prove that the Tribunal was biased against Croats (in the sense that the ratio of 
trials was not reflective of the number of crimes committed). In one extreme instance, a 
participant claimed that Croats were the most punished ethnicity and this has also shown up 
in survey research over a num
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Overall, however, there was an impression that this element of the ICTY trials damaged 
Croatia extensively. Participants also felt that the Tribunal, and the international community 
as a whole, thought of Croatia as an actor in a region that it wanted to portray as barbaric.64 
Some participants complained that this was demeaning since it equalised Croatia and 
Serbia, while others complained more about being portrayed as savage: 
 
Moderator – Why do you think the ICTY had this approach [to equalise guilt]? 
 
SI.T.1 – So that they could prove that we are all some kind of Indians, savages, and that 
we every once in a while, every 30 or 40 years, slaughter each other. That it is nearly a 
part of our folklore and that we act like that (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZA.P.3 – This is the plan of the European Union, because even in the European Union 
all countries will not be the same. Of course on the one side we will have England, 
Germany and France. But this here will be the region South-Eastern Europe (focus group 
with Zadar pensioners). 
 
Much of this was related to the generally accepted notion that the ICTY was politically 
motivated and controlled by big power politics. This is partly the result of political bargaining 
between Croatian governments and the EU, NATO and ICTY over accession conditionality. 
For example, Lamont (2010) identified Tuđman’s bargaining with the ICTY as the major 
reason why the transfer of individuals to the ICTY was viewed as a political process rather 
than a judicial one. This not only blemished the ICTY, but also the Croatian government, 
which was seen as only transferring individuals who did not possess necessary political 
connections with the government. Moreover, since so much reporting on trials has occurred 
around the transfer of individuals, these events held more potential than others to influence 
public opinion. Conversely, so did judgments, such as the appeals decision in the Gotovina 
trial, which can make the ICTY look fairer in Croatian eyes. Trials, indictments and verdicts 
were across the board seen as politically motivated and the institution was subsequently not 
considered to be independent: 
 
NU.V.5 – Everything was decided by politics. And spheres of interest. Here the UN, that 
established the ICTY, failed. Completely. They allowed for certain interests to assert 
themselves. What are those interests? I mentioned a few countries. 
 
NU.V.2 – It is sad that Croatia, specifically the parliament or government, did not create a 
law to allow civilian victims of war not to have to pay for legal fees in trials they 
commence (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
                                                
64 Croatian institutions have also reflected this feeling and fear of being grouped in a region 
considered to be inferior. For example, the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts (Hrvatska 
akademija znanosti i umjetnosti or HAZU) sent complaints to the ICTY, EU and Western European 
universities over reports intended for Croatia being in Serbian. This is discussed further in the 
following chapter.  
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- 
 
ZA.P.4 – This is a political court and there not much to say here. It was directed in 
exactly how it had to judge. 
 
ZA.P.1 – I just think that we did… 
 
ZA.P.4 (interrupts) – We did help it. We did help.  
 
ZA.P.1 – They looked through their fingers a bit.  
 
ZA.P.3 – Mesić helped them. 
 
ZA.P.4 – Mesić helped them a lot (focus group with Zadar pensioners). 
 
- 
 
ZA.T.2 – I had this feeling as if Croatia was rewarded for admission to NATO and the EU 
by releasing the Generals. If that is true, then this is truly an embarrassment for the court 
and for international law.  
 
ZA.T.1 – It looks like politicisation and no one can deny that. 
 
All agree  
 
ZA.T.3 – I want to add that there was a connection between the state and that court. The 
very extradition of the generals was a consequence of the fact that Croatia wanted to join 
the EU so they had to appease them, even though most of the narod was not in fabour of 
extraditing the generals.  
 
ZA.T.1 – Yes.  
 
ZA.T.3 – In my opinion this is an embarrassment for Croatia. 
 
ZA.T.2 – Especially because the majority of politicians said one thing in opposition, and 
something different in power (focus group with Zadar teachers). 
 
The above sequences are all interesting. The non-urban war veterans connected the 
perceived politicisation of the ICTY to internal politics, meaning that international criminal law 
and proceedings were defined by perceptions of internal politics. The Zadar pensioners 
equally felt that Croatian politics (already infiltrated by unwanted elements) delegitimised the 
legal work of the court. Finally, the Zadar teachers connected the lack of continuinity in 
Tribunal verdicts to internal and international politics, wholly disregarding the legal dynamics 
behind them.  
 
The former ICTY Chief Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, was seen as the embodiment of ICTY 
equalisation of guilt, institutional inefficiency, misunderstanding, political manipulation and 
anti-Croatian bias. Notions of institutional distrust were expressed most strongly when 
discussing Carla del Ponte, more than any other facet of the ICTY. Individuals were 
frequently visibly irritated or angry when discussing her and her name was cited as an 
example of all of the above arguments. These also at times alluded to a variety of 
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conspiracy theories, which have plagued the work of the Tribunal since its inception. Overall 
the ICTY was seen as closely related to the highly distrusted international community, 
another topic that features plenty of conspiracy theories. For example, 54% of respondents 
in the Ipsos Puls (2012) survey felt that some great powers tried to undermine the Croatian 
independence attempt in order to keep Yugoslavia intact, versus 5.5% who did not. This 
leaves the impression that the ICTY is seen as an institution created by big powers to dictate 
politics in the inferior Balkan region. This factor, possibly more than any other, contributes to 
the general distrust of the ICTY. Together with all of the other factors in this process, it helps 
create a widespread feeling of powerlessness, which respondents frequently expressed.  
 
 
7.3.3 The necessary ICTY 
 
Despite a range of critiques against it, the ICTY did attract a certain level of praise, although 
it is worth bearing in mind that such a construction may have been the outcome of the 
researcher hoping to see a positive perspective of the institution. The praise was not as 
universal as the criticism, for example war veterans had next to none. The only positive 
sentiment they expressed (other than that it did sentence some Serb war criminals) was that 
the institution initially had good intentions, which other groups agreed with: 
 
SI.V.2 – The worst part is that the late President Tuđman, as far as I remember, 
supported The Hague and was a founder of it. He supported the trying of war criminals 
more than anyone.  
 
SI.V.1 – Of course (focus group with Sisak war veterans). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.1 – The ICTY certainly had good intentions, at least at the start when it was 
established. Their attempt to bring justice and to punish criminals who were proven 
guilty, to solve all dilemmas and unknowns, and if it actually managed to show the truth 
about what happened not to allow such an atrocity to ever happen again. I assume this is 
primarily based on the experiences of the 20th century. Where crimes were never 
punished, there was almost always once again trouble in the period that followed 
because of the unsolved crimes from the past. So as I said, the ICTY certainly had good 
intentions, but later over those 15 or so years we saw that there were certain situations 
where justice was not reached in the end (interview with non-urban teacher).  
 
Pensioners and teachers, even in groups strongly opposed to the ICTY, also believed that in 
retrospect it was not a mistake. They believed that it did help Croatia, if not the region as a 
whole, and that it did punish crimes that ought to have been punished: 
 
Moderator – Do you think it was a mistake to establish the ICTY? 
 
ZA.P.1 – Maybe not. Because who knows when the war would have ended or how. The 
Americans got involved, and then the court came, so that it somehow ended up like this. 
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ZA.P.3 agrees – I have personally changed my opinion. 
 
ZA.P.4 – The war happened and Tuđman was also an initiator of the idea… 
 
ZA.P.3 (interrupts) – That is right. 
 
ZA.P.4 - And I saw what this should be, that criminals would be punished, that they 
would be stopped. However, later I saw that this had nothing to do with this. Nothing to 
do with this. 
 
ZA.P.3 – Well yes, in the end I was so disappointed. In the beginning I believed in the 
creation of the ICTY, that we would get the truth. To truly get the truth. Unfortuntely, we 
all know how it played out and what happened.  
 
ZA.P.1 – Stipe Mesić went there instead of Tuđman. 
 
ZA.P.3 – What was done there. Now instead, this sentence is what it is, and ultimately in 
the eyes of the international community there is a written trail. And the position of the 
international community. At least it will not be like it is with Ante Pavelić and the Second 
World War, when that history and those laws were only written by the communists. And 
what do we know about the NDH? We know that the world has accepted that as soon as 
someone mentions “Za dom spremni”65, imagine the absurdity of it, who on planet earth 
is not ready for their home. Even if Pavelić said it a million times, so what? Pavelić said 
“Za dom spremni”. Imagine how UEFA, FIFA and so on react. This is an embarrassment. 
And that is why I think that the ICTY, if there were such a court back then, then Ante 
Pavelić would have had a very different status. I am sure he would have. Now we are still 
waiting for any kind of debate over what really happened during the Second World War 
(focus group with Zadar pensioners). 
 
- 
 
Moderator – Do you think it was a mistake to establish the ICTY? 
 
ZG.T.1 – No. 
 
ZG.T.2 – Perhaps it was not, I do not know, a mistake.  
 
ZG.T.1 – A war crime has to be punished.  
 
ZG.T.2 – Yes, in that light it definitely was not a mistake (dyad with Zagreb teachers). 
 
ZA.P.3 compares the ICTY directly to the legacy of the Second World War, stressing its 
potential to document and the factual legacy it leaves behind. The ICTY did in his eyes 
change the debate on the Homeland War, since it has produced documentation that is not 
disputed in the way the Second World War still is today. Teachers stood out as the group 
that felt particularly positive about the ICTY. Other than the above opinions, teachers 
frequently expressed that it was better than no court at all and often it was compared to the 
domestic judiciary, which was seen as inferior. Some teachers also felt that the Tribunal was 
cathartic, or at least had the potential to be. The Belgrade Human Rights Centre (2011) 
                                                
65 “Za dom, spremni” was the official salute of the NDH (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska or Independent 
State of Croatia), the Croatian fascist puppet state during the Second World War. It was led by the 
Ustasha movement and was responsible for the mass killings of a high percentage of Croatian Serbs, 
Jews, Roma and political opponents (most notably Partisan fighters). 
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survey found that the Croatian public was roughly divided on this issue: 44% felt it was the 
right decision to establish it compared to 45% who felt it was not.  
 
The image of the ICTY is maybe best exemplified in how its verdicts are interpreted by the 
Croatian public. The discussions focused on three cases, those of Gotovina, Kordić and 
Blaškić. As the previous chapter have shown, however, the trial of Gotovina was the only 
one that was discussed at any length and the only one that the public seems to be informed 
about. Much like media reports on the Gotovina trial disproportionately outnumbered 
reporting on other trials, it was mentioned more often in focus groups, dyads and interviews 
compared to other trials (Table 12).   
 
Table 12. Number of mentions per trial in focus group and interview transcripts. 
Trial of: Gotovina Norac Glavaš Kordić Merčep Blaškić Lora 
ICTY/Domestic 
court: 
ICTY 
Domestic 
court 
Domestic 
court 
ICTY 
Domestic 
court 
ICTY 
Domestic 
court 
Number of mentions 
in transcripts: 
102 66 45 44 28 21 19 
Total number of 
thematic articles: 
1931 283 381 159 268 334 119 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Participants often admitted that they felt there were so many trials that Gotovina was just the 
easiest to notice or remember, which is not surprising given the predominance of reporting 
on the trial. All participants considered Gotovina to be innocent and believed the ICTY 
appeals chamber verdict to be correct. He was seen as standing out from other criminals 
because he was a professional soldier and was in the French Foreign Legion. Many shared 
the view of the Sisak teacher that you “never have crimes committed by the French Foreign 
Legion” (focus group with Sisak teachers). A recording of a speech Gotovina gave to his 
soldiers prior to Operation Storm, in which he warned them against committing crimes, was 
often cited as further proof of his innocence and military correctness. Finally, given crimes 
were considered to have been crimes of passion, Gotovina was not seen as responsible for 
these or as being capable of preventing them. 
 
The Gotovina trial taps into many of the problems about the ICTY discussed above. A guilty 
verdict is seen as having the potential to undermine the Croatian war narrative by falsely 
criminalising the Croatian state, people and history, worries which were explicitly expressed 
across all groups: 
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ZA.V.4 – If Croatia, in other words if Gotovina, is sentenced for anything, that means that 
we are all criminals and that Croatia was created through crime. 
 
All agree 
 
ZA.V.4 – That is our justified fear. That means that the person who killed her brothers 
(points at ZA.V.1) was right, who killed her husband. Is that what it means? 
 
All agree vocally 
 
ZA.V.4 – That is what we are scared of. It means that the person who killed her brothers 
was right. That is how it ends, right? 
 
All agree. 
 
ZA.V.4 – This is why we are scared. The objectiveness of the ICTY is such a fabrication.  
 
ZA.V.2 – A huge one. 
 
ZA.V.4 – We, as a narod, swallowed that bait. Politicians sold Croatia for 30 pieces of 
silver. 
 
ZA.V.3 – Our poet. 30 pieces of silver. We all know how Judas sold Jesus for that bag of 
coins (focus group with Zadar war veterans). 
 
Moreover, the Zadar war veterans considered the Croatian government to be at fault, by 
selling the Croatian people out. They use biblical imagery to fortify the image of the Croatian 
narod’s victimhood (as Jesus), betrayed by its government (as Judas). War veterans and 
victims, therefore, feel unrepresented by the government. The ultimate verdict in the 
Gotovina case was seen as “correct” and as absolving the Croatian state of any guilt. The 
trial of Gotovina has come to represent ICTY bias in that it indicted Gotovina, inefficiency in 
that it had two wholly different verdicts, but also correctness since it did find him, and 
seemingly the foundation of the Croatian state, to be innocent. Prior to his release survey 
evidence showed that, although 65% of the public thought crimes against Serbs did happen 
during Operation Storm (varying from a lesser to a greater degree), only 43% of those 
individuals thought the Generals on trial were responsible for them in some way (again, from 
a lesser to a greater degree; Belgrade Human Rights Center, 2011).  
 
ICTY verdicts in general did seem to leave some kind of impression on participants. 
Whereas the final Gotovina verdict can reinforce the war narrative, the guilty verdict for 
Kordić has the potential to undermine the war narrative and, therefore, erode trust in the 
ICTY. Teachers, but at times also pensioners, expressed the belief that ICTY verdicts were 
ultimately correct and viewed Kordić as guilty due to the ruling. These sequences also show 
there is acknowledgment of guilt, but that the political implications are seen as more 
important than the legal ones. Once again, the theme is ignored and participants tried not to 
discuss it at length: 
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ZA.T.2 – Given he was sentenced, I suppose he was guilty. I do not think it is such a big 
problem not to agree with the verdict, maybe he is innocent but I do not know, but what 
was problematic was his reception when he returned as a positive individual, despite that 
he was sentenced. This can be compared to the reception of Gotovina, who was found 
innocent. It is not fair to Gotovina, or to the victims. 
 
ZA.T.1 – I agree. 
 
ZA.T.3 – Bosnia is quite a complex theme. I would not like to add much (focus group with 
Zadar teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.4 – I do not think it was fair that the Church went to welcome him and kiss him. He 
has served his sentence, so it was proven through a court decision. There is nothing else 
to consider. He should not have been welcomed like that (follow-up interview with Zagreb 
pensioner).  
 
The last quote shows how an ICTY verdict can be seen as significant to individuals and that 
war criminals ought not be accepted back into society as they previously were. At the very 
least, the guilty verdict seems to have generated some kind of debate over how convicted 
war criminals should participate in society. Whereas verdicts did seem to make a difference, 
the number of years of imprisonment given in a verdict did not seem to be known or 
significant to participants. Despite the ICTY’s huge unpopularity, this evidence shows that it 
may have some level of legitimacy in the eyes of the public and that, despite numerous 
criticisms, the verdicts it passed held some form of meaning with respondents.  
 
 
7.4 Domestic war crimes trials: Just as slow, inefficient, unjust and biased 
 
Trials in domestic courts are not as well known as those at the ICTY. Survey results have 
shown this and the interviews, individual or group, reflected this (see Belgrade Human 
Rights Centre, 2011). Overall there was once again a lack of diffuse support and trust, 
leading to cynicism with the institution. This provides yet another source of institutional 
distrust to the public, which together with a range of others, leads to scepticism regarding 
the whole process of transitional justice. Much like with the ICTY, domestic courts were also 
seen as lacking qualified personnel and as being slow. This was connected to a generally 
poor Croatian judiciary: 
 
NU.P.1 – Our courts are worthless. Look at the statistics of unresolved cases. Last year 
they lowered them a bit. But until now they have been lagging. And now they have 
abolished county courts, they do not work well. They do not process people.  
 
NU.P.5 – Our paupers are not in prison, our rich people are. And they will bribe the 
judges. Corruption is like that in Croatia, that he who has money does not have to fear 
anything (focus group with non-urban pensioners).  
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- 
 
NU.V.5 – The institutions have failed because they have not dealt with all the crimes. 
The system has failed. From the police, to the public prosecutor. 
 
NU.V.3 (interrupts) – To the judiciary. 
 
NU.V.5 – The judiciary (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
- 
 
ZA.P.1 – Here corruption and clientilism have taken over, so that our courts have 
stooped very low (focus group with Zadar pensioners).  
 
This inefficiency of the Croatian judiciary was seen as emerging from several sources, such 
as corruption, broader institutional inefficiency and the legacy of communism. Some 
individuals also felt that it was not possible to question verdicts, since this could mark you as 
a communist sympathiser or as anti-Croat, depending on which verdict you question. In 
general, there was a feeling that the judiciary did not stand out from other state institutions, 
which were all developed in a poor climate. Similar as to the ICTY, a pervasive feeling was 
expressed that domestic courts were biased against Croats. War veterans felt that courts 
only processed Croats and that they would sentence a Croat quickly. The case of the Zec 
family was used across a number of groups, not only war veterans, as an example of bias 
against Croats and towards Serb victims. It was normal for the case to be directly contrasted 
with local crimes or with numbers of Croat victims, thereby discriminating against the Serb 
(or Orthodox) minority: 
 
NU.V.5 – NU.V.3’s parents were killed in Petrinja. Mother and father. When she went to 
the Republic of Croatia, she ended up having to pay court fees. 
 
NU.V.3 – And Aleksandra Zec is the inspiration for plays and I do not know what else 
Frljić has done with her.  
 
NU.V.5 – And in Croatia 400 children were killed.  
 
NU.V.3 – She is given rights simply because she is Orthodox.  
 
NU.V.1 – And in our region we have a 16 year old girl who was raped and killed. Her, her 
parents, her grandmother and her grandfather (focus group with non-urban war veterans 
Banovina). 
 
War veterans and some pensioners attributed this bias to the lack of lustration in the 
Croatian judiciary, which allowed judges from the Yugoslav system to remain in place in the 
Croatian one. This remains significant in modern day Croatian politics since lustration laws 
continue to be discussed by political parties. It demonstrates how much sway that part of 
history holds over politics in Croatia today. Less common among these groups, but present, 
was the view that the judiciary was infiltrated by the UDBA or a communist mentality. The 
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theme of infiltration was present more broadly across all groups in the sense that Croatian 
courts were seen as influenced strongly by the ICTY, Europe or big power politics. This was 
seen as an attempt by the international community (especially Britain and France) to keep 
Yugoslavia intact and an attempt to equalise crimes. War veterans, in particular, saw it as a 
literal extension of the ICTY: 
 
ZG.V.4 – They want to equalise it numerically. To realise the goal that it was an equal 
war, including in the number of crimes. Everyone is guilty. In that environment it is 
questionable how credible any case put before the Croatian public is (focus group with 
Zagreb war veterans).  
 
Despite the range of criticisms levelled at domestic war crimes trials, positive views were 
present in a number of the groups. Teachers and pensioners often expressed the view that 
these courts provided difficult, given the environment, yet correct verdicts. There was a view 
that they did as much they could have done: 
 
SI.T.1 – As much as they could, they did.  
 
All agree (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.1 – They did their job as much as they could and those cases they received they 
completed successfully. And even in those situations when the majority resented verdicts 
they still did their job, as far as I can comment on the legal side, satisfactorily (interview 
with non-urban teacher). 
 
 - 
 
SI.P.4 – In the last years, the last four years, the situation regarding war crimes here has 
changed drastically. It is unrecognisable now. People who have been sentenced in the 
last four years, it would not have been possible to even get them to a court four years 
before that (interview with Sisak pensioners).  
 
As this last quote shows, there was a sense that domestic courts were improving. War 
veterans, however, did not share this notion as they felt the courts were biased against 
Croats. Much like with the ICTY, there was a pervasive view across all groups that not 
enough Serbs and too many Croats were processed (at least in relation to Serbs). All groups 
felt that most, if not all, Croat perpetrators had been dealt with at domestic trials. In reality, 
domestic courts have processed 3,553 individuals and sentenced 589, predominantly 
Serbs.66  
 
It is, however, questionable how well-known domestic war crimes trials are at all. The Norac 
trial was the best-known domestic trial across all groups (Table 12) while most other cases 
were generally unknown. Domestic cases were frequently discussed in relation to the ICTY, 
                                                
66 See: www.dorh.hr/fgs.axd?id=1841 
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sometimes because the two were confused and at other times because the ICTY seemed to 
embody the transitional justice process as a whole. Narratives about the ICTY and domestic 
courts were, therefore, at many junctures used interchangeably and it was common for 
individuals to jump from court to court when making examples. For instance, a war veteran 
stated, “when the ICTY prosecution interprets things, I return again to the Zec family, to the 
ICTY it is all a war crime” (dyad with non-urban war veterans Slavonia). Another participant 
on the other hand felt that “domestic courts viewed things through the prism of the ICTY” 
(focus group with Zadar war veterans). Distrust of one institution, therefore, affected the 
other. It is questionable if a particularly negative view of one drags the other down with it, but 
pessimism regarding both reinforced the more general cynicism regarding transitional 
justice.   
 
Despite the overall pessimistic view of domestic war crimes trials, verdicts discussed in 
groups seemed to have some effect on participants. Verdicts were viewed as valid, although 
the institution’s credibility was often questioned. Some saw them as defining what 
constituted a war crime, others as a warning to future perpetrators. Teachers expressed this 
most consistently, although not exclusively, and when circumstances of trials were 
questioned, actual verdicts were nevertheless not (despite the usual relavitization of crimes):  
 
ZA.T.2 – I do not think a Croatian court would have sentenced [Norac] if he were 
completely innocent. In war both sides commit crimes. Everyone knows what the 
Americans did in Vietnam, but that does not mean that the Vietnamese side did not 
commit crimes (focus group with Zadar teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.4 – To kill his daughter on the doorstep. That is also a war crime. This is an 
example.67  
 
ZG.P.2 agrees (focus group with Zagreb pensioners). 
 
- 
 
SI.T.3 – Mirko Norac was tried and sentenced. As far as I heard not too much of this was 
invented.  
 
All agree 
 
SI.T.1 – Yes.  
 
SI.T.3 – If he has sinned and committed a war crime, then that is that. 
 
SI.T.1 – If he had not done anything, then he would not be in jail. 
 
SI.T.3 – Yes (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
 
                                                
67 Referring to the murder of Aleksandra Zec and related trials. 
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Most striking was that war veterans also rarely questioned the validity of verdicts, despite 
numerous objections about the judiciary itself. For example, the Zagreb war veterans group 
admitted that war crimes did happen on the Croatian side and that these have been dealt 
with. They continued to state that when people say “hero, not war criminal”, they do not 
mean people like Norac, who were actually sentenced for war crimes.68 This highlights the 
complexity of perceptions of transitional justice, since they are certainly not exclusively 
negative. Consequently, even by parts of society who have been traditionally opposed to 
trials of Croats, these institutions are seen as partially legitimate.  
 
The case of Norac was, as previously discussed, also by far the best-known domestic war 
crimes trial. The case was mentioned frequently as proof of the quality of Croatian courts. 
Generally, he was considered guilty of the crimes committed, although participants across all 
groups felt the circumstances were unfair on the former general, due to the unprepared and 
unarmed nature of the Croatian defence in which revenge killings were a common problem. 
It would be interesting to see if such results would be equally reproduced outside of the 
group or follow-up interview setting. It is possible that a guilty verdict by a Croatian court 
means that individuals feel the need to show their respect for that in front of others, whereas 
individually they may doubt it more openly.  
 
The case of Glavaš seemed to be the best known of the other domestic war crimes trials 
(and saw the second highest number of thematic reports as well; Table 7), although it most 
often came up in follow-up interviews and dyads, in other words, it rarely came up naturally 
during group discussions. Nevertheless, it was common for respondents to say they were 
not familiar with the trial. The Ipsos Puls (2012) survey reflected this: when asked about the 
murder of Josip Reihl-Kir, which has frequently been connected to Glavaš in the media, 45% 
of respondents claimed to not know what it was. When he was discussed, then he was 
across the board seen as necessary for the successful defence of Osijek. The recurring 
theme in these discussions was the question “what if Osijek had fallen?” This was equated 
to a “new” Vukovar: 
 
NU.P.1 – If there were no Glavaš then Osijek would have also been occupied. 
 
NU.P.2 – Just like Vukovar (follow-up dyad with non-urban pensioners). 
 
- 
                                                
68 The “hero, not war criminal” (and derivations thereof) slogan was first used at public demonstrations 
in Zagreb and Split in 2001, in protest against the Croatian indictment of Mirko Norac for war crimes. 
It has since then been used mostly for Gotovina, but it has featured in many other protests in support 
of the generals as well.   
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NU.T.2 – During the war there remained around 10,000 inhabitants in the city. 
Everyone else left out of fear of what was about to happen. Vukovar had fallen. 
And there was not a single person who could defend Osijek other than Glavaš 
(interview with non-urban teacher). 
 
Teachers for the most part believed that reports of war crimes committed by Glavaš were 
true, while war veterans and pensioners did not share this conviction. All groups, however, 
agreed that his trial was somehow political. To war veterans and pensioners this made him a 
greater symbol of defiance (first against Serb aggression, then against corrupt party politics), 
while teachers felt that the motivations behind the trial were politically motivated: 
 
NU.P.5 – Glavaš is guilty only because he stood up to the HDZ. 
 
All agree 
 
NU.P.2 – That is why he want to jail. 
 
NU.P.5 – It is political. 
 
NU.P.1 – It is a game of party politics. 
 
NU.P.3 – If you remember he was the first to stand out against the HDZ. He is a national 
hero to me. The HDZ destroyed him (focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
- 
 
ZA.T.2 – Is he guilty? I do not know. But unfortunately it is a fact that the indictment 
began when he was politically excluded from a large political party (follow-up interview 
with Zadar teacher).  
 
The implication of this is that legal proceedings do not have the desired expressivist effect, 
since they are seen as political decisions. The trial of Merčep featured even less in 
discussions, although again some saw him as necessary, while others saw him as a war 
criminal (despite that the trial was still on-going at the time). When it was discussed, it was 
brought up spontaneously in focus groups and discussed almost exclusively in relation to the 
Zec murders (discussed in the previous chapter). Finally, the Lora trials were only known to 
any significant degree by war veterans in Zadar. This location is physically closest to where 
the crimes and trial have taken place. Moreover, members of the interviewed war veterans’ 
group were personally connected to some of the accused. The trial was otherwise an 
unknown to the participants.  
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7.5 Conclusion 
 
Respondents discussed and defined war crimes in relation to Croatian defence. They were 
across the board considered to be conscious, often planned, acts. This allowed for an 
apologetic attitude towards crimes committed in revenge, which were seen as crimes, but 
not quite war crimes and, therefore, viewed more leniently. Moreover, respondents 
frequently asserted that the killing of civilians was a war crime, but their definitions of ethnic 
Croat and Serb civilians differed. This justified the killing of Serb civilians by Croatian forces 
through folk theories of law and factual inaccuracies. For example, the image of the baka 
with a rifle was frequently used as a mitigating circumstance and led to a certain acceptance 
or understanding of Croatian crimes. The lack of preparation by Croatian forces meant that 
war crimes, defined as planned, were not seen as possible on the Croatian side of the 
conflict.  
 
Overall, respondents in the study revealed a tolerance for deviance in the context of war 
crimes committed by Croats. Various factors of the dominant war narrative, such as the 
unorganised and unprepared defence, were seen as a mitigating circumstance to such war 
crimes. These crimes were often defined in relation to Serbian crimes, which were seen as a 
part of a planned aggression. War crimes in defence were seen as possible by teachers and 
some pensioners, but this did not happen with Croats or it happened sporadically. The “but” 
in these statements is crucial since respondents frequently used these contradictions, in 
tandem with a range of mitigating circumstances, to show that they were aware of what 
constituted a war crime but that tolerance for deviance in certain situations was acceptable.  
 
Much like with the war narrative, there was a stark contrast between how teachers and war 
veterans perceived the law, while pensioners had mixed opinions (Table 13). The key 
difference was that, although there was consensus across all groups that the ICTY was 
inefficient, teachers nevertheless thought the ICTY was necessary and attributed 
significance to their and domestic courts’ judgments, whereas war veterans generally did 
not. Moreover, teachers had different understandings of what constituted a war crime and 
debated if Croatian war crimes were possible, while war veterans did not.  
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Transitional justice institutions, be they international or domestic, had to operate in the 
context of localised complexities and normative expectations in attempting to instil a rule of 
law norm in the public. Respondents across the board regarded all domestic and 
international institutions, including legal ones, as corrupt and inefficient and were 
consequently dissatisfied with and distrustful of them. On the whole they, therefore, felt 
powerless in an unresponsive system where justice was imposed from above. In this sense 
all legal institutions were painted with the same brush.  
 
Localised folk theories of law also played a large role in the legal reasoning of respondents. 
This allowed for an apologetic attitude towards certain crimes, based on an understanding of 
the law that was not legally consistent but was consistent with emotional and political 
narratives. This means that in Croatian society the dominant war narrative plays a large role 
in shaping attitudes towards law. Finally, factual inaccuracies often served the purpose of 
justifying respondents’ narratives. This involved several characteristic symbols, including 
core components of the war narrative, such as the baka with the rifle that vindicated 
Croatian crimes or at least lowered them to the level of common crimes, rather than war 
crimes. Croatian war crimes were seen as unexceptional crimes in war (to be punished more 
leniently), while Serb crimes are seen as exceptional war crimes (to be punished more 
harshly). 
 
These factors led to an attitude in individuals that crimes are acceptable in certain situations 
or that they are, at least, not war crimes. Law is most effective when it takes into account the 
social norms that govern behaviour, including norms against disorder that may give rise to 
crimes (Meares and Kahan, 1998). In this instance institutional distrust coupled with the 
strength of the war narrative in society has led to a great deal of cynicism with the 
transitional justice process. Despite the ICTY and, especially recently, domestic courts 
providing legally sound judgments and strongly adhering to legal justice over political justice, 
this has not led to concurrent understandings of law. Localised narratives and normative 
processes have proven effective in undermining the potential trickle-down effects of rule of 
law norms.  
 
This expectation may have been too high on legal institutions, but it does highlight the need 
for transitional justice efforts to take into account localised normative processes in their work 
and in their attempts at producing pedagogical effects. Arguably, it will simply take more time 
for these institutions, especially domestic ones, to achieve this effect and results from the 
focus groups are not exclusively pessimistic, far from it. Responses were different across 
target segments and the youngest segment, history teachers, had a far more optimistic view 
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of the ICTY and domestic courts than pensioners and war veterans’ groups. Nevertheless, 
teachers also often displayed a tolerance for deviance, which may be a warning for the 
future if left unchanged. This is particularly important in relation to reconciliation, given that 
notions of legality are defined differently in relation to Croats and Serbs.  
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CHAPTER 8 
My Neighbour, the criminal: Serbs in the eyes of Croats 
 
The strength of the war narrative and Croatian interpretations of the rule of law have become 
an intrinsic part of how Croats view the Serb minority in Croatia. The situation with Cyrillic 
signs in Vukovar exemplifies this since it has come to be seen by Croats as an aggression 
against them, rather than an issue of minority rights. Much like previous chapters have 
shown, however, narratives on the topic are marked by contradictions and emotional 
narratives. This chapter will investigate how Croats view Serbs in Croatia and how the war 
narrative features in this attitude. How have notions about the rule of law affected this? And, 
how have different types of institutions, such as the Church or the government, affected 
this? Answers to these questions in great part define how Serbs make up the “other” in 
Croat identity.    
 
Identity, ethnic or national, involves both belonging and otherness, “there is no self without 
an other; no identity without alterity; no nation without rival foreigners” (Spiering, 1999: 153). 
According to Social Identity Theory, individuals are conscious of belonging to an “ingroup” as 
opposed to another “outgroup” and their behaviour is often biased towards the ingroup and 
against the outgroup (Langston and Peti-Stantić, 2014; Oakes, 2001; Tajfel, 1978). 
Moreover, the theory considers stereotypes about the ingroup and outgroups as constituent 
parts of identity (Joseph, 2004: 76). Serbs have composed the “other” to Croatian identity 
and Tuđman argued that this otherness was based on cultural, historical and geographical 
differences, which he used in his attempt to unify the Croatian people (Bellamy, 2003: 68). 
Political elites since then have furthered this image of Serbs as Croatia’s “radical other” and 
presented them as uncivilised, non-Western and savage (Zambelli, 2010: 1664). 
Unsurprisingly, there is a high degree of xenophobia towards Serbs in Croatia, especially 
returnees, who are seen as embodying this otherness and the collective guilt of Serbian 
aggression (Ramet et al., 2008: 24). Moreover, by showing how the “other” has throughout 
history oppressed Croatia and Croats, it was also possible to argue that history was 
repeating itself (frequently through historical revisionism) and that Croatia must once again 
defend itself (MacDonald, 2002). 
 
The picture, however, is not so clear cut: in a study focused on Slavonia, Croat respondents 
were for the most part prepared to reconcile with Serb returnees, other than those who had 
committed war crimes (Babić, 2008: 221). Eastern Slavonia did feature higher tensions than 
Western Slavonia, due to the severity of the war there, associated war memories and 
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exacerbated present-day ethnic divisions, but primary social connections in local 
communities were being rebuilt gradually (Babić, 2008: 222). The intensity and speed at 
which this was happening differed to Western Slavonia, but coexistence has once again 
become a part of local social fabric.  
 
Participants in this study differentiated with Serbs predominantly in terms of religion and 
language. National identity in Croatia is strongly based on religion (Babić, 2010; Smith, 
1991). Throughout the fieldwork the notion of Croat Catholicism was commonly juxtaposed 
with Serb Orthodox Christianity. As much as Croats identified themselves as Catholics, they 
equally strongly identified Serbs as Orthodox. The importance of Catholicism to Croatian 
identity has been observed among elites and Prcela (2009: 211) has even argued that it has 
been overlooked as a factor in Croatian identity.69 This identification stems from the 1945-
1990 period, when Croatian Catholicism and Croatian national identity merged, as the 
Church presented itself as the only defender of the Croatian people’s collective identity 
(Jakelić, 2010: 118). In Croatia, as well as in Bosnia, Catholicism became an identity marker 
for Croats (Sells, 2003). It became collectivistic and public; emphasised tradition and 
ascription; and, defined group boundaries towards the Other (Casanova, 1994: 217; Jakelić, 
2010: 197).70 During the Homeland War, many volunteers in the Croatian Army saw military 
deployment as more than just their national duty, but as a religious calling to defend Croatia 
and in some rural areas facets of Catholicism continue to provide a basis for resistance to 
centralisation and economic change (Schäuble, 2014). This union is probably best 
exemplified in the expression “bog i hrvati” (God and the Croats) that is built on a shared 
Croat feeling of suffering (Schäuble, 2014: 262). Today, these elements are recurring 
features in political speeches, religious sermons and in public discourse more broadly.  
 
Identity has been argued to be predominantly linguistic in nature and language is seen as 
another large differentiator between Serbs and Croats (Joseph, 2004: 12). How people 
identify themselves is in many ways language and culture specific, so identity can be viewed 
as a key function of language, equal to those of representation and communication (Joseph, 
2004). Language is seen as fundamentally linked with the history of the Croatian people 
(Fishman, 2006). In order to legitimise modern Croatian language (especially as a language 
planning project) and a distinct Croatian national identity, Croatian linguistic identity has 
                                                
69 Matica Hrvatska, the institution behind the cited publication, is a non-governmental organisation 
devoted to Croatian literature and culture. Its aims also include the promotion of Croatian national and 
cultural identity, and it has played an important role in the history of the standard Croatian language.  
70 It is important to note that this is not universal among the Croatian public or political elites. In 2009 
President Stjepan Mesić had a highly public dispute with the Croatian Catholic Church over the place 
of Catholic symbols in public institutions.  
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been presented as reaching far into the past (Langston and Peti-Stantić, 2014: 45). The 
aims of language planning in Croatia since the 1990s have been exclusively symbolic in 
order to enhance this identity, in large part because ethnic foundations and identities in the 
region have been so hotly contested over time (Langston and Peti-Stantić, 2014: 57). 
Language policy was used exclusively in the service of national projects and purity of the 
language was argued to be essential for the survival of the narod (Kordić, 2010: 9).71 In the 
1990s, the HDZ became an active agent of language change since they saw language as 
the main point of differentiation with other Balkan nations, especially Serbs (Bellamy, 2003: 
146). In an effort to legitimise the Croatian nation, an attempt was made to erase anything 
from the language that could associate or remind Croats of their shared past with Serbs 
(Richter Malabotta, 2004: 80). Croatian and Serbian were now different languages and if this 
difference was not visible, then it had to become so (Kordić, 2010: 47).  
 
Langston and Peti-Stantić (2014), however, argue that in Croatia the government itself has 
not been the primary vehicle of language change, instead this was achieved through non-
governmental institutions with similar goals, but greater ambitions. The government rarely 
seemed eager or willing to introduce legislation or regulations to control language policies, 
even when conservative parties were in power (Langston and Peti-Stantić, 2014: 145).72 
Laws that did and do exist were rarely enforced and allowed for exceptions, while even less 
was done regarding the norms of the language (Langston and Peti-Stantić, 2014: 145). 
Institutions that have been actively involved in this process and that propagated language 
planning most successfully functioned in a similar way to language academies in other 
states, both before and after independence (Langston and Peti-Stantić, 2014: 171). These 
primarily included but are not limited to the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts 
(Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti or HAZU), the Council for the Norms of the 
Croatian Standard Language (Vijeće za normu hrvatskog standardnog jezika), the Institute 
for the Croatian Language and Linguistics (Institut za hrvatski jezik i jezikoslovlje or IHJJ) 
and Matica Hrvatska. These are not strictly government institutions, but they do all have 
significant connections (institutional or financial) to the state, so they do not form a part of 
civil society either. The government thereby did influence language change through 
sponsorship of practice rather than by law. The paradox here is that the reason that the 
issue of a “minority language” has arisen in Vukovar at all is because Croatian as the official 
                                                
71 This was not only the case in Croatia, but in the region as a whole. Elites in the region believed it to 
be important for each nation to have its own language in order to differentiate it from other nations 
(Kordić, 2010: 167). Language purism was the consequence of nationalist understandings of 
language.  
72 Langston and Peti-Stantić base this analysis on a model that divides level of language planning into 
macro (government) and micro (academic institutions; scholarly literature; and, communication with 
society) levels. 
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state language has been defined by law and, therefore, defined Serbian as a different 
language in need of protection. This would not be the case if the law regarded the two as 
different variants of the same language, since there would be no argument for the 
representation of multiple languages.  
 
In the 1990s the above-mentioned institutions started to encourage an exclusive view of the 
Croatian standard language that actively looked to eliminate anything related to the “East” 
(Langston and Peti-Stantić, 2014: 277). This exclusivity defined Croatian identity based on 
religion (Western Christian and Catholic), language (Croatian and not Serbian) and alphabet 
(strictly not Serbian Cyrillic). Croatian alphabets were defined as Latin, Glagolitic and 
Croatian Cyrillic (Horvat, 2009: 18). HAZU even complained in 2007 to the ICTY about their 
reports intended for Croatia being written in Serbian, along a range of other complaints to 
the EU and Western European universities (HAZU, 2007). The HAZU called on the 
government to take more action in order to prevent Europe from introducing a single regional 
language for Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. This can be interpreted as reflecting either the 
Croatian public’s or elite’s fear, discussed in previous chapters, that Europe and the West 
were treating Croatia as a part of an inferior region together with its neighbours. Whose fear 
it represents is debatable and indicative of the strange position of HAZU, since they and 
other similar institutions occupy a grey area between government institutions and civil 
society.   
 
These notions of identity sit alongside the war narrative, which presents the relationship as 
one of aggressor and victim. In this sense, the Serbian Orthodox Church is seen as 
inherently aggressive, as opposed to the forgiving and compassionate Roman Catholic 
Church in Croatia. The Serb community is seen as taking advantage of their unique status in 
Croatia, granted to them by an open multi-ethnic state. These attitudes, however, feature a 
range of contradictions. The situation with Cyrillic in Vukovar, discussed at the end of this 
chapter, exemplifies this best. The Serb community feels the effect of these narratives, since 
they are seen as undeserving of some of the rights granted to them by the Croatian state. 
The implications of this can be exacerbated during turbulent times, such as war, where 
ingroup and outgroup relations are potentially dangerous and even a matter of life and death 
(Dugandžija, 2006). They become a matter of self-defence and, especially because of this 
notion, in Croatia they can be related to the feeling that the war is not over.  
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8.1 Contradictory attitudes towards minorities  
 
Survey results on attitudes towards minorities are ambiguous and point to a generally 
positive view of them, whereas the focus group and interview data point to a far more 
pessimistic view of the Serb minority specifically. Three general trends are apparent in 
surveys: that the Croatian public claims to view ethnic minorities in Croatia favourably, that 
they rank harmony between ethnic minorities as a low political priority and that they do not 
believe localities with significant Serb populations should have signs in Cyrillic. The low 
priority given to ethnic relations can be seen on Table 11, where it ranked only slightly higher 
than “Cooperating with the ICTY and punishing war crimes” on three separate surveys. 
Participants in this study further reflected this, when asked to rate the importance of three 
principles of the Croatian constitution, ethnic equality scored lowest, although only 
marginally so (Figure 9). Surveys by Ilišin (2011) conducted in 1999 and 2004 support these 
findings (Table 14). 
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Table 14. How important do you believe the following principles of the Croatian constitution to be? 
Constitutional Values 1999 2004 
Young people Young people Elderly 
Freedom (1) 91 (1) 94 (1) 95 
Respecting human rights (2) 88 (2) 92 (2) 94 
Equality (4) 74 (3) 86 (4) 87 
Social justice (3) 76 (4) 82 (3) 89 
Maintenance of the environment (5) 73 (5) 79 (6) 83 
Gender equality – (6) 79 (7) 80 
Peace building (6) 67 (7) 76 (8) 80 
Integrity of ownership rights (7) 65 (8) 73 (5) 86 
Ethnic equality (9) 58 (9) 71 (10) 75 
Rule of law (10) 55 (10) 64 (9) 79 
Democratic and multi-party system (8) 61 (11) 58 (11) 72 
Source: Ilišin (2011) 
 
The Ipsos Puls (2012) survey found that the Croatian public generally looked favourably on 
different ethnicities living in Croatia (Figure 19) but less favourably on coming into familiar 
contact with members of those ethnicities (Figure 20).  
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Figure 19. Members of different ethnicities frequently come into close interpersonal contact. What 
form of interpersonal contact would you find acceptable with the following groups? To live in Croatia. 
 
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Members of different ethnicities frequently come into close interpersonal contact. What 
form of interpersonal contact would you find acceptable with the following groups? To be a member of 
your family. 
 
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
 
What is striking here is not only the negative opinion of Serbs, but of all ethnicities listed. 
This calls into question the centrality of Serbs, they appear to be liked and disliked as much 
as other groups. Participants in this study also displayed ambiguous opinions in the survey 
element. A survey question regarding Serb minority involvement in the development of 
museums dealing with 20th century Croatian history received a generally positive response, 
but as the below passages will show, strong negative opinions of the minority were also 
present (Figure 6). This presents another instance of contradiction where norms of 
inclusivity, expressed by the public, meet a relatively strong war narrative by which issues of 
minority rights are instead interpreted as an attack on the Croatian people. Moreover, this 
highlights the conflicting nature of quantitative and qualitative research methods. 
Quantitative methods can miss narratives that influence behaviour and individuals may be 
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aware of the social expectations to express openness towards Serbs, although they may not 
act consistently with this opinion in specific situations (such as Cyrillic in Vukovar).   
 
 
8.2 Serbs  
 
Throughout all of the group discussions related to Serbs in Croatia, war veterans and 
pensioners were exceptionally vocal, while teachers were quiet. The two target segments 
spent much time discussing the Orthodox Church and the current position of Serbs in 
Croatia, in particular. Across all groups, however, much discussion centred on the war and 
the role of the Croatian Serbs in it. Much of this focused on the notion that there was no 
expulsion of Serbs from Croatia (that they left willingly), that they committed more crimes 
than Croats and that they knew the war was coming and were, therefore, prepared for it.  
 
All groups felt that Serbs and Serbia had not punished their own criminals the way that 
Croatia had. Various reasons were given for this, from the strength of nationalism in Serbia 
to conspiracy theories concerning political elites in the region as a whole: 
 
ZA.T.2 – The problem in Serbia is that it has not come to terms with the role she has 
played [in the war] and now the current government is quite radically nationalistic… 
(pauses) They allow them to be Greater Serbs, chetniks, nationalists, this and that 
(follow-up interview with Zadar teacher). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.4 – Courts in Serbia have not convicted a single officer. They have sentenced a 
few regular soldiers, volunteers. Courts in Croatia have convicted highly ranked officers 
from colonels to generals in the Croatian Army. Like Norac, the commander of the 
Gospić defence (focus group with Zagreb war veterans).  
 
There was, however, disagreement over exactly what was necessary by the Serb side to be 
seen as trying their own. In the below passage, one participant felt that Serbia was doing 
enough by cooperating with the ICTY, which another participant saw as a defence of 
Serbian aggression. Accusations such as this can limit the potential for constructive debate 
about interethnic relations or even the past more generally: 
 
ZG.P.3 – Who sent [Milošević] to The Hague?  
 
ZG.P.2 – That is what I wanted to say, in the end the Serbs sent him. 
 
ZG.P.1 – Well yes, they sent him, they had to.  
 
ZG.P.3 – What more do you want?  
 
ZG.P.2 – Do not argue. 
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ZG.P.1 – You are defending Milošević and the Serbian aggression. 
 
ZG.P.3 – No! 
 
ZG.P.1 – If I need to discuss this with you. 
 
ZG.P.3 (interrupts) – This is our Croatian politics.  
 
ZG.P.1 – Do not teach me about Croatian politics, I have seen it all up close. 
 
ZG.P.3 – Do not teach me, I am older and I took part in the Second World War! I can 
read between the lines quite well (focus group with Zagreb pensioners).  
 
This passage (also previously quoted) shows how such heated debates quickly lead to the 
topic of the Second World War. Pensioners and war veterans felt that Serbs, as an ethnicity, 
were inherently aggressive and hateful. Again, this was closely connected to the 
predominant war narrative and the feeling that the war is not over. In extreme cases, Serbs 
were seen as teaching their children to hate. This was compared to the peaceful nature of 
the Croat people: 
 
NU.P.4 – Us Croats are that kind of narod. Even though the wounds are deep and it is 
difficult for someone who has lost someone, but reconciliation will come from our side 
before it comes from theirs. Although they maybe say it is not so. They are simply that 
kind of narod.  
 
NU.P.1 – They would wage war now.  
 
NU.P.4 – Yes, they are like that. It is in their blood.  
 
NU.P.2 – Since they teach them to hate (focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
- 
 
NU.V.3 – Šešelj said that he is not giving up on the Greater Serbian plan. 
 
NU.V.5 – Šešelj will always say that. 
 
NU.V.3 – In Serbia there were 4000 people [at the rally]. It means they are thinking about 
it. 
 
NU.V.5 – Tadić is no better than him. What can you do? 73 
 
NU.V.3 – They are full of hatred. They gathered in Belgrade, young people. I saw no old 
people. These were young people (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
- 
 
ZA.P.3 – The Croatian narod has never attacked anyone, since King Branimir. We may 
have to defend ourselves again. So we have use politics to somehow maintain peace 
here and to keep good neighbourly relations. I think this is elementary.  
 
ZA.P.2 – It is just that [the Serbs] do not want this (focus group with Zadar pensioners). 
 
                                                
73 President of the Republic of Serbia from 2004 until 2012. 
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These exchanges all highlight how these Croat participants view Serbs. Non-urban 
pensioners saw Serbs as inherently aggressive and, through their discussion, created an “us 
versus them” division. Non-urban war veterans highlighted this inherent aggression by 
highlighting how young people, in great numbers, were attending nationalist rallies in Serbia. 
Finally, the Zadar pensioners used the symbol of King Branimir to portray how ancient and 
hereditary the trait of Croatian peacefulness is, as opposed to Serbian aggression.  
 
This is closely related to how respondents viewed the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, the 
former as peaceful and the latter as aggressive (discussed below). It is also linked to the 
general view of the Greater Serbian plan, discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Respondents believed that “Greater Serbia is an idea that lives on and will live on in many 
Serbs and generations to come” (focus group with Zadar war veterans) and attempts to 
introduce Cyrillic signs in in Vukovar were at times seen as an attempt to implement this 
plan.  
 
Not all comments directed at the ethnic Serb community were negative. Since discussions 
predominantly focussed on the Homeland War, there were admissions across all groups that 
Serbs, although only a minority, did fight on the Croatian side in the war. Croatia was by 
some also seen as the homeland of the Serbs. Teachers generally felt that it was hard for 
Serbs during the war, while war veterans considered “good” Serbs to be the ones that fought 
on the Croatian side: 
 
ZA.T.2 – There were those that even joined the Croatian Army and had some important 
tasks. 
 
ZA.T.1 – Yes. 
 
ZA.T.2 – For example around Šibenik, the island of Žirje where the military commander 
was Serb and who significantly helped with the defence of Šibenik. Little is said about the 
number of Croatian Serbs who voluntarily joined the Croatian Army and participated in 
the defence together with their countrymen, which is very difficult and should be praised 
(focus group with Zadar teachers). 
 
- 
 
NU2.V.2 – I can say one thing from my personal experience, and my wife here can testify 
to this, that at the time, and it was a hard time, 1991 after the fall of Vukovar, I came 
home from the battlefield one day to find a colleague here, a Serb. I worked with him, 
before the war, and I was his friend at the time, we are friends today and we were friends 
during the war. That man came to me in tears to tell me he had to run away. He knew I 
was in the army. As soon as I realised that he was looking to me for help, as a friend, 
because it was not his fault he was Serb. He came to me out of dire necessity, since he 
was planning to run away. I told him that I know that it is not easy for him, people are 
doing things they will regret, it is a time when you have to look out for your own head, 
and that he is a friend and I know that he is not a Greater Serb, but his two cousins 
immediately joined the other side. One of them died in Bosnia. They were at a certain 
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moment taken by this Greater Serbian idea and they fought on the territory of the 
Republic of Croatia, Eastern Slavonia and later Bosnia and Herzegovina. And then, as 
much as now, I do not believe that it is his fault who his parents were or what his cousins 
did. He stayed in Croatia, he spent the whole Homeland War in Croatia. I told him that I 
would do everything in my power so that he would no longer be persecuted. I told others 
to stop and to this day he is grateful to me for that. And I made sure to find out if 
someone did that. Second, I told him that if he left now, then as far as I am concerned, 
he is no longer welcome in the Republic of Croatia and in this city. A time has come for 
us to pick sides and your ethnicity is not your fault. You are not guilty for the crimes of 
the Greater Serbs, but you can prove your loyalty to the Croatian state by remaining 
here. There were not few of these Serbs, there were also such Serbs who also fought 
with me, who defended their families, their homes, their homeland and I do not know 
what else. But that the great majority of these Serbs were seduced, they say seduced, I 
am not so sure, since I could not be seduced like that by anyone (dyad with non-urban 
war veterans Slavonia). 
 
This last quote is indicative of the strength of social ties in the local community and the 
results have been replicated in the survey setting (Babić, 2008). Both quotes show how 
these memories are drawn from local knowledge or experience. Nevertheless, their logic 
states that Serbs did not help, although participants knew specific instances of Serbs who 
did help. Despite so many communities being destroyed, neighbours did protect each other 
and such memories have survived through the war narrative. This provides hope for the 
rebuilding of local communities, especially in war hit areas, where inter-ethnic tensions are 
particularly high.   
 
All target segments believed that Serbs overall were manipulated by Greater Serbian 
politics. This creates yet another contradiction with the war narrative’s notion of exclusively 
Croat victimhood and Serb aggression. Instead it reformulates it into Serbian state 
aggression and manipulation of all ethnicities in Croatia, painting them all as victims: 
 
SI.T.1 – The Serb minority currently has a very interesting situation. I think they were 
manipulated in this whole story. They were a tool of Greater Serbian politics and 
Milošević used them for his own interests. They will never celebrate this beause for them 
this is a national tragedy. If they will ever be proud or not, you will have to ask them. 
 
SI.T.2 – This does not concern us (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
 
The Sisak teachers laugh off, and thereby ignore, this difficult issue of what happened to the 
Serb community in Croatia. This reaction is similar to that of the group, and other groups, to 
mentions of the Church’s in the war or to Croatian involvement in Bosnia. On the other hand, 
the Zadar teachers, for example, thought that Serbs considered themselves to be eternal 
victims and that they were only affected by the war on the frontline. Serb returnees were, 
however, only brought up and discussed by war veterans, who debated the topic at length. 
They universally saw them as accomplices to war criminals, although they also connected 
this in sequences to the failure of the Croatian state and of Croatian institutions: 
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NU.V.5 – So I told [a Serb returnee], this war criminal, I told him “in you, in every person 
who return from Serbia, I see the potential killer of my husband.” He responded “please 
madam do not be like that.” So I responded, “until you tell me who killed my husband, I 
have the right to think so. I can walk through the town with my head raised high. I have 
the right to say this. You are the killer of my husband until you reveal who actually is.” I 
explicity told him, “Free me of this because it is not easy for me to look at each person 
who has returned as a potential murderer of my husband.” 
 
NU.V.3 – And the institutions are not doing their job. 
 
NU.V.5 agrees (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina).  
 
To many in Croatia, Serbs are seen as the embodiment of collective Serbian guilt and 
collective Croatian suffering (Ramet et al., 2008: 24). Individuals have all too frequently 
employed notions of collective guilt, especially since guilt has not been individualised to any 
significant extent. Moreover, a 2004 survey found that a majority of the public was only 
prepared to forgive Serbs who were not criminals (Babić, 2010: 137). The combined 
implication of this is that, if many Serbs are seen as criminals due to their ethnicity 
(especially returnees), then readiness for forgiveness can be interpreted as low in Croatia.  
 
 
 
8.3 The forgiving Catholics and the aggressive Orthodox  
 
National and ethnic identity in Croatia is closely linked to religion (Babić, 2010; Smith, 1991). 
The Catholic and Orthodox churches featured in all group discussions. They were discussed 
as a source of information on the war and the Catholic Church specifically was seen as 
educational and reliable. For example, a non-urban teacher felt that since the Church had 
been with the Croatian narod for 13 centuries and that it was more consistent than any state. 
In many instances, however, the topic was laughed off.  
 
The two churches came up in other parts of discussions as well. These can be divided into 
four separate categories: opinions about both overall; the Church as a key component of 
identity; the Catholic church specifically as forgiving; and, the Orthodox church specifically 
as aggressive. Overall teachers saw all Churches as politically biased (towards the right), 
political or corrupt, although this did feature some disagreement within groups. Pensioners 
also discussed the Church, although they were not as critical, while war veterans generally 
avoided the topic: 
 
ZA.T.2 – The Islamic community, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church, 
they all strictly adhere to. 
 
ZA.T.1 (interrupts) – Their Church.  
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ZA.T.2 – Their flock (laughs). And the innocence of their own narod (focus group with 
Zadar teachers). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.2 – They are politically right leaning, which is what Churches on these territories 
have traditionally been, since the time of the Turks (interview with non-urban teacher).  
 
- 
 
ZG.P.4 – The Church is all right but it cannot contradict what the constitution tells it. It 
has a religious function and that function it has to do. It cannot run politics. 
 
ZG.P.1 – And it does not run politics. The parliament runs politics, the President.  
 
ZG.P.4 – I am just saying my opinion, you can have yours. 
 
ZG.P.2 – I sometimes talk to some people who are quite religious, I for one am not, but 
people are unhappy about how much the church is meddling in politics, in things that are 
not really its business, its job. As I said earlier, before you (ZG.P.1) arrived, this Latin-
American Catholic Church is actually on the side of the poor, but ours was in an alliance 
with the HDZ. It never condemned the theft, the cheating, nothing. They only talk like you 
(ZG.P.1), about how communists or criminals are in power. I do not think this is the role 
of the church. It should deal with religious questions. That is my opinion. 
 
ZG.P.1 – Do you know who defends the poor here? Who feeds the poor in soup 
kitchens?  
 
ZG.P.2 – I know it is the Church, but they also receive donations from the state. 
 
ZG.P.1 – Many do, even civil society organisations.  
 
ZG.P.3 – Have you (ZG.P.1) looked at the treaty between the Vatican and our Church? 
Do you know how many billions are tied into it?  
 
ZG.P.1 – I do not.  
 
ZG.P.3 – Do you know how many churches have been built? How much they were shot 
at? 
 
Moderator interrupts to calm participants down (focus group with Zagreb pensioners). 
 
The last passage highlights the political associations that are at times made with the 
Catholic Church in Croatia, as well as the potential for disagreement associated with it. It 
also highlights the emotional nature of the topic and, much like in the narrative of Croatian 
defence and victimhood, the strategy of deferring to how much the Church suffered during 
the war (for example, when ZG.P.3 refers to churches being shot at), thereby avoiding the 
difficult discussion regarding its role in society. The common dissenting view to the above 
was that the Church has a role, but not a political one. Groups that on the whole disagreed 
with the above views thought that the role of the Church was purely spiritual: 
 
SI.T.1 – The Church is concerned with spiritual work and not political. 
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SI.T.2 – And charity. 
 
All laugh (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
 
- 
 
SI.V.2 – The Church talks about the Lord. And to have faith in the Lord. Not in Milanović. 
In him I have no faith. But in Him above I believe. That is what the Church says. 
 
SI.V.1 – Most of us wore rosaries around our necks during the war. That tells you that 
few people would put a rosary around their neck and consciously commit a war crime. 
We wore rosaries around our necks to pray for our dead so that they could give us 
courage and strength.  
 
SI.V.3 – To put up with it all. 
 
SI.V.1 – I experienced a huge fear in war. I was a small woman of about 45 kilos, I had to 
carry a large rifle and then had to go to unfamiliar terrain where there was shooting. I 
was more scared of the luminescent bullets than the airplanes. I do not know why. Here I 
panicked. I prayed to God to give me strength. But why? To defend my home. When I 
saw the people from Vukovar, when I saw that evil, I saw my own children cry, I just 
could not allow this. I did not go to war because I hated someone. I went because I loved 
someone. I loved my children and my narod. I did not want to see them fleeing like that. I 
asked myself, what if everywhere was like Vukovar, what if these Croats here 
experienced the same? A man came to our company at night, where I worked. And the 
boss came. They let him live so that he could tell us what was coming. So I went to war 
because I loved my family, not because I hated someone. But now, war is war. When 
you see the injured, the dead, you start to hate the other side a bit. But as I said, I wore 
the rosary. And the priest would sometimes come to the battlefield. He never told us to 
kill. As far as the Church is concerned, not even in one mass. He would pray to God to 
also enlighten them. But he prayed for our bravery, our patience, to wage a war. And 
who is waging this war? But as I said, we came back to nothing. It is different when you 
are waging war in a different country against someone else. You come back from war to 
your home and your family. Many came back and had no house. They had nothing. They 
came back to despair. Who was there to welcome you? This is the difference. This is a 
defensive war (focus group with Sisak war veterans).   
 
This last passage shows the connection between the Catholic Church and the notion of 
Croatian defence and victimhood. The rosary is first seen as proof that it was not possible to 
consciously commit a war crime. By referring to “conscious” crimes, the participant further 
supports the notion of crimes of passion, which are not considered fully conscious. Then, in 
the sequence the participant moves the conversation back to Croatian victimhood (Vukovar), 
suffering and a defensive war. By portraying the Catholic Church as purely spiritual and 
concerned with humanity, Serb or Croat, the participant vilifies the Serbs in comparison to 
the forgiving and compassionate Catholic Croats. Again, by moving the topic to Croatian 
suffering and defence, this also enables the conversation to move off the difficult topic of 
Church involvement in the war.  
 
The Church was seen as identifying ethnicity in a number of ways. War veterans especially, 
but not exclusively, did not consider only Croatia and the Croat narod to have been attacked, 
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but also the Catholic Church. On the other hand they used the term Serbs (Srbi) and 
Orthodox Christian (pravoslavci) interchangeably to refer to ethnic Serbs:  
 
NU.V.3 – For [the murder of] my parents Tarbuk gave the order. The Serb, Orthodox, 
leader (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
- 
 
SI.V.2 – People of the Orthodox faith, Serbs, were informed when to leave before the 
artillery fire started (focus group with Sisak war veterans). 
 
- 
 
NU.P.3 – The Church protected its Catholic narod. It knew who attacked the Catholics 
(focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.1 – [The Serbs] do not see themselves as members of the Serb ethnic minority, but 
as political Croats of Serb ethnic origin. Or some only as Orthodox Christians. Political 
Croats of the Orthodox faith. […] And who in the last census did not identify themselves 
as Serbs.  
 
ZG.V.2 – As Orthodox Christians yes, as Serbs no (focus group with Zagreb war 
veterans). 
 
- 
 
NU2.V.2 – Today they talk about Serb village, but these are not Serb villages, but 
Croatian villages with Orthodox inhabitants (dyad with non-urban war veterans Slavonia).  
 
Teachers and other pensioners agreed with these notions in a general sense, although they 
seemed to see it more objectively: 
 
ZA.T.2 – The Croatian Catholic church acts more as a Croatian church instead of as a 
universal Catholic or Christian Church. The same goes for the Orthodox Church or for 
Islam. They act more under this notion of ethnic identity than under their notions of 
universality, as it should be (follow-up interview with Zadar teacher). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.4 – In 1981 and 1982, before anything started, they were Catholics of the Orthodox 
faith. Actually Croats of the Orthodox faith. That is what they called themselves, without 
me asking. Later this heated up, took on a different shape and colour, and the hatred 
began (follow-up interview with Zagreb pensioner). 
 
There is an attitude among the Croatian public that Croatia would be better off if all citizens 
followed Christian moral values (Figure 21). This may be indicative of a strong connection to 
the Church, but only inasmuch as there is a belief that the Church embodies those values. 
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Figure 21. Croatia would be better off if all citizens followed Christian moral values. 
 
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
War veterans and pensioners saw the Catholic Church as forgiving and, therefore, Croats as 
a forgiving narod. This notion came up exclusively in a spontaneous fashion in those groups 
and never came up with teachers. Forgiveness was discussed through the use of Catholic 
symbols and language. Moreover, the topic was frequently associated with reconciliation in 
the region: 
 
ZA.V.4 – In our Catholic country they say that, in order to forgive someone, that 
someone has to ask for forgiveness. They have to be aware that they sinned. If I hurt 
someone, who will forgive me anything if I am not first aware that I have hurt them. Only 
then can I ask them for forgiveness. I also need to repent and be aware that I have truly 
hurt them and I never want to do that again. […] If someone truly apologised to me, 
maybe I would have that feeling. They have repented and I will forgive them.  
 
ZA.V.3 – You would, because you are Catholic (focus group with Zadar war veterans). 
 
- 
 
NU.P.3 – I am a believer. How can I forgive a criminal who does not seek forgiveness? 
This is a question of faith (focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
This has the implication that forgiveness, in the eyes of these individuals, is interpreted as 
religious and specifically Catholic. The would-be sinner must, therefore, ask for it. Given 
there is a slight preponderance of citizens who believe that the Catholic Church is the 
predominant moral authority in Croatia (41% agree versus 33% who disagree), this can have 
far reaching consequences (Figure 22).  
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Figure 22. The Catholic Church is the moral authority whose opinions should be adhered to by all 
citizens. 
 
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
Whereas some target segments saw forgiveness as exclusively Catholic or Croat, there was 
much wider agreement across groups that the Orthodox Church was inherently aggressive. 
Consequently, there was consensus that the Orthodox Church was involved in the war, 
directly or indirectly. For example, the Zadar war veterans described coming across 
Orthodox Churches being used as ammunition storage and a non-urban teacher noted, “I 
know the role of the Orthodox Church in the war, it is well known” (interview with non-urban 
teacher). It is, however, important to highlight that the researcher is not tied to either religion, 
which may offer a more objective view, but it may also lead to undue bias in portraying the 
position of religion in Croatian society as problematic.  
 
 
8.4 Serb minority rights 
 
The special place that the Serb minority holds in Croatia, due to the legacy of the war and 
the large size of it, was reflected in discussions. Respondents felt that the minority was 
unique and that it received more rights than other minorities, as well as more rights than 
Croats in Serbia. The Serb minority was considered unique for a range of reasons: for 
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getting special treatment as victims; for their perceived self-imposed segregation; for having 
to suffer for others’ crimes; due to the Law of General Pardon;74 and so on: 
 
NU.T.1 – I think that today, some 15 years since Operation Oluja, they are given such 
rights and benefits that barely any other minority gets in Croatia (interview with non-
urban teacher). 
 
- 
 
SI.T.2 – We cannot talk about any kind of reconciliation because [the Serbs] are equal 
citizens of the Republic of Croatia. No one belittles them. Just read an issue of the Serb 
Novosti,75 by the Serb National Council, and you will see what kind of articles are put in 
there. Can you in any other country write those types of articles about the country you 
live in, to smear it, and to still receive funds from the government? As far as the Croats 
are concerned, there is no problem. I think we need to, as my colleague said, ask the 
Serb side how they view the process of reconciliation. Because we have no problems. 
 
SI.T.1 – No one has gotten into a fight with anyone here since 1995. 
 
SI.T.2 – Yes. 
 
SI.T.3 – I do not see who still has to make peace, how this would even happen. 
 
SI.T.2 – Yes (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.1 – Auto-segregation and auto-ghettoization, through which [the Serbs] for their 
own reasons dissociate themselves from the complete national Croatian political corpus. 
So Hungarians go to Croatian schools, Russians go to Croatian schools, the Czechs and 
Germans go to Croatian schools, everyone. Only Serbs go to Serbian schools. This is 
not a question of their ethnic identity. This is a method of their auto-ghettoization and 
auto-segregation, which then of course leads to a separation (focus group with Zagreb 
war veterans).  
 
Passages such as these were common. The exchange between the Sisak teachers also 
highlights that, despite referring to a process, the manner in which the participants discussed 
reconciliation implied that they felt there was no process. Instead, they transfer the problem 
and the blame for it to the Serb minority. Veterans complained a great deal about the Law of 
General Pardon, which they felt gave Serbs special rights, while on the other hand teachers 
felt that the general Serb population was unique in that a few “bad apples” had made it 
difficult for the whole ethnicity to live in Croatia. Generally, however, as in the above 
passages the ethnic group was often compared to others, especially Italians in Istria: 
 
NU.P.5 – Because they did not stab the Croatian man in the heart or the back. No Croats 
attacked these poor Serbs, but they attacked us. But with the Italians it was different. 
When I was in the army, I was told not to sing the songs about our conquest of Trieste. 
And we gave Trieste back. There is no more war. In Istria there are many Italians. But 
                                                
74 The Law of General Pardon (Zakon o općem oprostu) was passed in 1996, following the end of the 
war. It protected former members of Serb forces from prosecution, other than for serious human rights 
violations (Narodne Novine, 1996). 
75 Novosti is a weekly magazine published by the Serb National Council (SNV).  
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they have not hurt Croatia in any way, but the Serbs wanted to put all of Croatia under 
the boot (focus group with non-urban pensioners).  
 
At times the position of the Serb minority in Croatia was compared to the Croat minority in 
Serbia. Again, there was a feeling that Croats were worse off than their Serb counterparts: 
 
NU.P.1 – They have Pupovac. But ours do not exist in Serbia. 
 
NU.P.2 – Well they would slaughter them.   
 
NU.P.1 – Stjepan Radić.76 They killed him and injured his brother. They would do the 
same with us. Can you not see that there are none of us there (focus group with non-
urban pensioners)? 
 
These comparisons between the Serb minority and other minorities led to a feeling that the 
Serb minority should not, but does, receive more rights than other minorities. The reasons 
for this can be divided into four broad categories, each of which features many examples. 
First, because of what they have done and the legacy of that, so they do not deserve more 
rights until the country is de-mined or the missing persons are found. Second, because of 
what they do today, such as voting based on ethnicity. Third, because of what they may do 
in the future, for example to attack once again (this is connected to the notion that the war is 
not over). Finally, they should not receive more rights because Croats do not. Examples of 
all of these included: 
 
ZA.V.4 – We need to continue living. Without coexistence it is not possible. Tell us where 
the bones of the dead are, where the left over mines are. Let us build a future together 
(follow-up interview with Zadar war veteran). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.4 – This is no assimilation. One ethnic Hungarian Croatian votes right, the other 
left. One for the HDZ, the other for the SDP. But they do not vote based on their 
ethnicities (focus group with Zagreb war veterans). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.1 – With the Serbs, with who we waged war. We need to keep a civilised level of 
relations, respect, dialogue, but to never forget that inside of them there is a hidden seed 
of conquest, a call, which if it is watered slightly, can sprout out. To always be alert and 
to keep a certain distance (interview with non-urban teacher).  
 
War veterans suggested using the issue of missing persons as leverage for the Serb 
community to gain more rights, while others claimed that special rights prevented 
                                                
76 Stjepan Radić was a Croatian political leader in the early 20th century. He founded and organised 
the Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka), had a large degree of support in Croatia and 
advocated for Croatian autonomy within a federalised Yugoslavia. In 1928 he was assassinated in the 
Yugoslav parliament. 
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reconciliation. Some felt it was too soon for the Serb community to be given special rights, 
which is where Cyrillic was often used as an example. 
 
 
8.5 Cyrillic  
 
The issue of Cyrillic signs in Vukovar illustrates the inherent contradictions present in how 
Croatia and Croats deal with the Serb minority in the country. While nearly all respondents 
felt that Serbs should have the right to Cyrillic signs, they also felt that it was too soon to put 
them up in Vukovar. No date was, however, given for when the right time might be. While 
the Serb minority was for a variety of reasons seen as undeserving of this right, all segments 
agreed that the government created the issue in the first place. Survey results point to 
similarly contradictory outlooks.  
 
Across a range of longitudinal measures, attitudes towards ethnic minorities can be 
interpreted as open and positive. The Kolstø (2011) survey asked a range of questions 
related to this topic and found that:  
 
• Ethnic and civic identity were of nearly equal importance, although civic identity 
ranked higher than ethnic. 
• Respondents felt they had the most in common with inhabitants of Croatia, 
regardless of ethnicity, rather than members of their ethnicity living abroad.  
• There was some disagreement over whether ethnicities in Croatia were treated 
equally (44.3% felt they were, 45.7% felt they were not), although this does not 
indicate if respondents were unhappy with how Serbs, Croats or any other 
ethnicity were treated. Results from focus groups and interviews in this study 
indicate that it may be the case that Croats are being seen as treated unfairly. 
On the other hand, the regions that felt strongest that treatment was unequal 
(and therefore answered “no”) were Zagreb, Hrvatsko Primorje, Gorski Kotar, 
Rijeka and Istria, regions that also displayed the most openness towards ethnic 
Serbs in the rest of the survey. Slavonia, which on the other hand did not display 
this, featured the most respondents who felt that treatment was equal. Babić’s 
(2010) longitudinal results further support this difference between the regions.   
• Both majority and minority groups were strongly (79.8%) seen as deserving 
equal rights. In other words, that no one deserved special rights.  
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• For the most part interethnic relations were regarded as positive or at the very 
least rarely negative (Figure 23). 
 
Figure 23. How do you evaluate interethnic relations in Croatia. Do you think they are… 
 
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
• Interethnic relations were also seen as having improved in the last ten years 
(Figure 24) 
 
Figure 24. How do you compare current interethnic relations in Croatia compared to ten years ago? 
Are they now… 
 
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
• The Ipsos Puls (2012) survey also found that respondents overwhelmingly 
felt that ethnicities should not live alone in their own states.  
 
The above stand in stark contrast to the strong objection to Cyrillic signs in Croatia. The 
same Kolstø (2011) survey found that respondents were predominantly opposed to the 
introduction of such signs in villages and towns with significant Serb populations (Figure 25). 
Participants in this study reflected this nearly universally.  
 
10.0%	
36.9%	
49.3%	
Sum	-	 Neither	good	nor	bad	 Sum	+	
10.2%	
22.7%	
61.9%	
Sum	-	 The	same	 Sum	+	
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Figure 25. Do you think that the names of villages and towns with significant Serb populations should 
be also written in Cyrillic? 
 
Source: Kolstø (2011) 
 
That is not to say there was consensus among participants or groups on the issue as a 
whole, but all participants agreed that this policy ought not to be implemented at the time. 
Respondents universally argued that introducing Cyrillic signs in Vukovar and in Croatia 
more broadly was not the same. Vukovar as the “hero city” was frequently raised as the 
reason for why it was too soon to do so: 
 
NU.T.3 – But we all forget that Cyrillic is also a Croatian alphabet.  
 
NU.T.4 – Yes. And formally as well, but this means something different to them. 
 
NU.T.3 – Something different, that is right.  
 
NU.T.4 – Those wounds are still too fresh. I do not know, if I were from there, to have 
lived through it, I do not know how I would react. Currently I have no dilemmas about 
Cyrillic in Vukovar, just like Istrians have no problems with Italian. And they should have 
because the Italians occupied them, they depopulated them and everything. But they do 
not have a problem, 40 years have passed, and then do not have a problem.  
 
NU.T.3 – Yes, yes. 
 
NU.T.4 – Maybe in 50 years in Cyrillic in Vukovar will also not be a problem (dyad with 
non-urban teachers).  
 
 
The teachers appropriated, integrated and welcomed Cyrillic into Croatian culture and 
society, but they do not see Cyrillic as representative of Serbs any more than of Croats. 
They, thereby, do not welcome Serbs into society in the same manner. At times Cyrillic in 
Vukovar specifically was seen as a continuation of the war and an act of aggression. It fit 
Yes 
16% 
No 
78% 
DK-Ref 
6% 
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into the dominant war narrative and featured similar characteristics: such as the direct 
connection between Serb aggression and the Croatian state’s failure to protect its people; 
the notion that all Serb returnees are criminals, therefore, marginalising them in society; and, 
a folk theory of minority law, which misunderstands the actual law but makes sense in 
participants’ internal logic:  
 
ZA.T.1 – They are pouring salt on people’s wounds. I do not know how someone even 
came up with the idea to put [the signs] right there.  
 
ZA.T.2 – Someone wrote that law and they knew that is could be used in Vukovar. 
Obviously whoever was making this law was not aware of the geography and population, 
or it is simply a case of negligence.  
 
ZA.T.1 – Yes.  
 
ZA.T.2 – The state is at fault (focus group with Zadar war veterans).  
 
- 
 
SI.V.1 – This is a provocation! They are even waging war in peacetime (focus group with 
Sisak war veterans).  
 
- 
 
NU.P.3 – If I were in power, I would put this Cyrillic on two signs, one at the front of the 
column, one at the back. And then over the Danube. Who knows how to swim, who does 
not… (pause) This is just digging. Our children will have to once again wage war 
because of these types of things. 
 
NU.P.1 – You are a minority narod. Surely the majority narod is the ruler in their own 
state. What are we talking about? This is what it is like all over the world.  
 
NU.P.3 agrees. 
 
NU.P.5 – Cyrillic slaughtered Croats!  
 
NU.P.1 – Do you know how many ethnicities live in Vukovar? Hungarians, Russians… 
What if they all want their own signs and schools?  
 
NU.P.4 – Especially in Vukovar (focus group with non-urban pensioners).  
 
The language employed in many of these passages is highly symbolic (“hero city”), 
accusatory (“this is a provocation”), emotional (“blood from the war has not dried yet”) and at 
times even aggressive (“and then over the Danube”). This highlights the significance of the 
issue and of the potential for Vukovar and Cyrillic to stir up emotions. As already noted in 
some of the above passages, the introduction of Cyrillic signs in Vukovar was across all 
groups seen as the fault of the government and as a political game of some kind. In extreme 
instances it was seen as a provocation or even an attack from Zagreb: 
 
ZA.V.6 – Cyrillic in Vukovar and Cyrillic in Croatia is not the same thing. Cyrillic in 
Vukovar is a grenade from Zagreb directed at Vukovar. Zagreb is attacking Vukovar. 
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ZA.V.2 - Once again (focus group with Zadar war veterans). 
 
- 
 
ZA.P.1 – Cyrillic in Croatia? It would be normal to have it, like Bulgarian Cyrillic, 
Macedonian, like… 
 
ZA.P.3 (interrupts) – Like English.  
 
ZA.P.1 – This is our alphabet, not only theirs. Cyril and Methodius were also apostles to 
our ancestors. 
 
ZA.P.4 – Cyrillic is not the problem. 
 
ZA.P.1 – However, they are misusing Cyrillic. Just imagine this in Vukovar, it is such a 
clear example. The blood from the war has not dried yet, from the killing of the people in 
Vukovar and they are bringing, the Prime Minister is bringing signs with Cyrillic to put 
on… Even a blind man can see that this is a first class provocation. A provocation (focus 
group with Zadar pensioners). 
 
Cyrillic in the above sequence is not discussed as a legal issue, it is politicised and turned 
into an issue of internal politics and, by referring to the blood that is yet to dry, connected to 
Croatian victimhood. All target segments connected the issue of Cyrillic in Vukovar primarily 
with the Croatian government, at least as the initiator of this effort, and not necessarily with 
the Serb minority. Overall it was seen as proof of special treatment of the ethnic Serb 
community. At times they were seen as a victim to party politics and at other times as an ally 
of the “infiltrated” government. Some saw it as a method for politicians to hide real problems, 
such as the economy, while other saw it deeply mired in party politics and blamed either the 
SDP or the HDZ: 
 
SI.T.2 – This is political. 
 
SI.T.1 – Against the current government.  
 
SI.T.2 – Yes, the current government is using Cyrillic to annul greater problems than 
Cyrillic. 
 
All agree. 
 
SI.T.1 – It is cheaper to put up 100 signs than to remove loss making companies and to 
revitalise economic life. 
 
SI.T.3 – You need to know that here, as soon as big problem arises. 
 
SI.T.2 – A smaller one appears. 
 
SI.T.3 – A media war starts. A new Cyrillic! A new Milošević! 
 
SI.T.1 – Pure politicisation.  
 
All agree 
 
SI.T.3 – Always (focus group with Sisak teachers). 
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Discussions often moved from Cyrillic onto politics and corruption. One group of war 
veterans even saw it as a method for preventing Croats from getting jobs: 
 
ZG.V.1 – (to the moderator) Do you know Serbian? My son was born in 1991 and he 
does not. In Croatia, not even in Zagreb, you do not spend a single hour learning Cyrillic. 
Do you realise that with a doctorate from the USA you cannot get a job in Vukovar if they 
introduce bilingualism? My son, a future doctor of mathematics, cannot work there.  
 
ZG.V.2 – Bingo! 
 
ZG.V.1 – At any moment, you cannot teach Serb children in a Serbian language you do 
not know. In English you can. Maybe in Swedish you can. But in Serbian you cannot! 
And where have we arrived? That in their auto-segregation and auto-ghettoization they 
are reaching the administration, and the judiciary, the educational system and staffing. 
 
ZG.V.2 agrees 
 
ZG.V.1 – It is about a crucial, incremental takeover of positions and power. And we are 
playing stupid. We are always pretending it is about two signs. No. It is a process, which 
Croatian veterans and victims of the Homeland War are trying to stop (focus group with 
Zagreb war veterans).  
 
In this narrative Cyrillic in Vukovar is interpreted as much more than an issue of minority 
rights, but instead it is seen as a threat to Croatian jobs and as a continuation of the 
Croatian struggle for independence. This can be a powerful strategy by any political party or 
government to divert economic or minority rights concerns onto the war memory and, 
therefore, not having to deal with the real issue at stake. Despite that all groups 
acknowledged Cyrillic was also a Croatian alphabet and formed a part of the Croatian 
cultural heritage, many nevertheless felt it had been misappropriated and had become 
dangerous, since it could and was separating people. Given that both the SDP and HDZ 
were at times blamed for language problems, it is possible that what started as a 1990s HDZ 
policy of language change has come to be accepted by the majority of the mainstream 
political spectrum.77 The Croatian language and associated alphabets may have become 
one of the primary sources of national and ethnic identification across the majority of 
Croatian society.  
 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
Participants in the study reflected the notion that Croatian identity is largely defined by 
religion and language. These elements are contrasted with the “other” to Croatian identity, 
Serbs. Whereas Croats see themselves as Catholic, speaking Croatian and writing in Latin, 
Serbs and Serbia are seen as Orthodox Christian, Serbian speaking and writing in Cyrillic. 
                                                
77 It is important to stress again that it was the HDZ that originally introduced bilingualism into the 
Vukovar City Statute in 2009, before using the issue to incite demonstrations in 2013.  
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This “other” is also greatly defined by the war narrative, so the Orthodox Church is seen as 
aggressive, as opposed to the forgiving Catholic Church. Not only were Croats attacked 
during the war, but also so was the Catholic Church, and general notions of reconciliation 
are seen as highly based on religion.  
 
An overall comparison of the groups (Table 15) shows universal agreement on two issues: 
that Serbs fought on the Croatian side (and do not, therefore, all constitute the enemy) and 
that Cyrillic signs should not be put up in Vukovar. This exemplifies the core contradiction in 
the Croat view of Serbs. On all other issues, the same pattern as before was present, 
teachers and war veterans generally disagreed, while pensioners showed mixed opinions. It 
is, however, worth noting that teachers stood out in their lack of debate on this topic, 
whereas war veterans and pensioners discussed it at length.  
 248 
 
The general impression was that Serbs were not seen as deserving more rights, despite 
respondents expressing openness towards minorities in general. Much of this dynamic was 
embodied in discussions about Cyrillic signs in Vukovar. A range of survey results and 
participants’ comments across all groups indicated that ethnic minorities had a right to their 
own language, but that Serbs could not receive this right in Vukovar at the present time. This 
created a stark contradiction between general openness towards minorities, but no 
openness towards Serbs right now, with no indication of when the time might be right. 
Participants across many groups, in a narrative that featured numerous facets of the war 
narrative, interpreted Cyrillic in Vukovar as an aggression against Croatia, instead of as an 
issue of minority rights.  
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The ingroup versus outgroup dynamic in this instance has an implication on the ethnic Serb 
minority in the country, which in the eyes of the majority Croat public continues to be defined 
by the war narrative. The introduction of Cyrillic signs in Vukovar seems to have had the 
effect of simultaneously reducing trust in government institutions and making Croats feel 
threatened by a perceived Serb threat. The implications of this become more dangerous and 
pronounced in any instance of higher tensions, violence or war, when outgroup membership 
can become life threatening.    
 
 
  
 250 
CHAPTER 9 
The defenders’ truth 
 
Under Tuđman war veterans’ associations had a privileged position in society and their 
associations enjoyed special benefits, as well as extensive financial backing by the 
government (Fisher, 2003). The rest of Croatian civil society has, since 1991, been plagued 
by personality conflicts and fragmentation (Fisher, 2003). Support for the war veterans 
proved useful to the HDZ’s discourse of defence and victimisation, while human rights 
focussed NGOs were called “anti-Croatian” by the HDZ and were generally perceived in a 
negative light (Fisher, 2003: 79). Veterans’ associations have and continue enjoy prominent 
media coverage, since the media have used these issues to boost sales (Fisher, 2003: 76). 
The cumulative effect of the close connection between the HDZ and war veterans’ 
associations is that they are not wholly independent from political institutions and that their 
actions are, therefore, tied to the performance of the HDZ and similar parties. They still form 
a part of Croatian civil society, but they also remain distinct from many other parts of it due 
to this close connection to state institutions. This is reflected in how war veterans’ 
associations act and how they are perceived by the public.  
 
War veterans from the Homeland War have undergone four distinct phases of reporting in 
the Croatian media, all of which were reflected in the focus groups and interviews by all 
target segments. The first phase was one of war veteran self-sacrifice and willingness to 
give their lives for the freedom of Croatia; the second was of war veterans as victims in a 
society that did not know what to do with them; the third was one of war veterans as frauds, 
stealing money from the state; and, finally, the last one was that of enemies of the state and 
threats to society (Car, 2008). War veterans’ associations are believed to have prevented 
the transmission of international human rights norms to the public by fortifying non-
compliance preferences in transitional justice (Lamont, 2010: 42). Civil society, more 
specifically war veterans’ associations, provided a space where the mobilisation against 
transitional justice was allowed to flourish (Lamont, 2010: 42). The overall picture is, 
however, far more ambivalent since human rights NGOs played a certain role in catalysing 
the growth of human rights norms. War veterans’ associations remained dependant on state 
funding, thereby tying their fate to the HDZ whether they were in power or not, which 
translated into how they acted as a grouping (Rangelov, 2013). Civil society actors have, 
therefore, often exerted pulls in opposing directions and the outcomes of their efforts have 
been equally ambiguous. Public protests over the indictments and trials of General Norac 
and Generals Gotovina, Čermak and Markač exemplify this. 
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The scale of the 2001 public demonstration against the trial of Genenal Norac took the 
Croatian media and government by surprise. This showed the potential for civil society 
actors to challenge the state. In 2004, however, war veterans’ associations struggled to 
reach the same level of mobilisation to protest the indictments of Generals Gotovina, 
Čermak and Markač without government support. Ivo Sanader, who in 2001 had helped 
organise the Norac protests as leader of the opposition, had become prime minister and 
become more committed to cooperation with the EU and the ICTY to further Croatian EU 
integration (Rangelov, 2013: 81). Without his support only 50,000 people attended the 
largest event in Split, with only minor crowds elsewhere (Rangelov, 2013).  
 
War veterans’ associations and nationalistically oriented political parties, especially the HDZ, 
have since Croatian independence been able to use the memory of the Homeland War in 
order to legitimise their efforts (Peskin and Boduszynski, 2003: 1123). War veterans’ 
associations have had nearly exclusive access to state funding and have since then 
continued to enjoy relatively positive views in the eyes’ of most media outlets, while human 
rights NGOs remain dependent on international funding and are often branded as 
“communist”, even after 2000 (Lamont, 2013: 45-46). Because the war narrative has proven 
to be so enduringly influential in society, war veterans’ associations have been able to 
exploit related symbols to more effectively further their political aims, at times ideological 
ones not specifically related to war veterans’ direct interests.  
 
This has two implications. Firstly, it allows the HDZ (or any other political party) to easily 
appropriate such groups for their own means, by strongly opposing any supposed attacks on 
the legitimacy of the Homeland War and calling them to arms when needed. This does not, 
however, mean that war veterans did not also use the HDZ to assure their own continued 
influence. Second, it means that political aims of war veterans’ associations come to 
overshadow the humanitarian and therapeutic aims of such groups.  
 
Given the prominent role of war veterans’ associations in Croatia and in the sphere of civil 
society, it is important to understand how others in society see them, how they see 
themselves and how they interact with civil society more broadly. Moreover, in Croatia war 
veterans’ protests receive much press coverage and public interest, potentially diverting 
attention from larger problems in the country. While the bond between the HDZ and war 
veterans’ associations has certainly grown weaker since 2000, recent protests have once 
again shown how symbols of the Homeland War can be appropriated in order to mobilise 
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protests around political causes and parties. What briefly stopped in 2000 seems to have 
now returned to Croatia and protests in Vukovar and Savska seem to exemplify that.  
 
 
9.1 The problem of the branitelji 
 
War veterans were discussed at length in all focus groups. Generally, there was an 
impression across all groups that the actual number of war veterans was unknown and that 
they were hard hit by unemployment and poor pensions, in other words, that they returned to 
a dire situation. A large part of these discussions focused on the problems with war 
veterans. This construction of war veterans as a “problem”, by both participants and the 
researcher, is itself problematic, since this makes their situation in society difficult by 
portraying them in a negative light and, therefore, making them unwelcome (which they feel 
they are). Instead of highlighting that they may have out of the ordinary but manageable 
needs (as any former combatants do), they are branded as the sick child of Croatian society:  
 
SI.P.2 – I have first-hand experience. My sister in law’s son was in the war. From his 
unit, half later committed suicide, only a couple landed on their feet and now have decent 
assets. He never wanted to deal with any of it. He was a bit messed up and he did not 
want to go around to all of those offices, to write those applications and so on. And he 
now lives in poverty and no one cares (focus group with Sisak pensioners). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.2 – My opinion of branitelji is that it is a catastrophe because firstly they have no 
place to work, their jobs are gone. Then young people, 35 or 40, who had jobs, had to 
get sent into retirement. These people now have nowhere to go so they gather, not all of 
them, in cafes, in bars, and that is all they do. And what can they do when they meet? 
They all have the same opinion; they are upset with everything and everyone. I think it 
would have been healthy for society if it upheld production, that people were given jobs, 
and not to have to live off the war, which has passed. It has contributed a lot to Croatia, it 
freed Croatia, but now they need normal jobs. It is catastrophic to retire a boy of 35 or 
40. He will remain unemployed until the end of his life. That is horrible.  
 
All agree (focus group with Zagreb pensioners). 
 
War veterans expressed this notion in the broader context of coming back to nothing and of 
currently having nothing. They linked this problem to their lack of unification and 
misrepresentation.  
 
ZA.V.6. – Currently there are 37 branitelji in parliament, and they have never had a 
shared idea, despite their party allegiances, to solve something for the Croatian branitelji. 
This has not happened a single time. Not in a single session of parliament. This means 
that there is not even a reason to talk about the war. Why should we talk about the war? 
This is something ugly, dark. 
 
ZA.V.4 – It is the past.  
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ZA.V.2 – It is not the past to me. To me it was yesterday. My husband is gone. I am 
putting on a uniform, I am carrying a rifle, I am firing. 
 
ZA.V.6 – This is all done by people who do not have a single wound from the Homeland 
War. They live comfortably on the cross of these branitelji. They cannot see the cross 
from some cosy office, who would see the cross? But we carry it every day. We live with 
these people, especially those who also took part. Now this happens on Savska and it is 
some kind of world wonder. Maybe someone has really had enough.  
 
ZA.V.4 – I do not like to compare, but it really bothers me that the dignity towards the 
Second and First World Wars has to be sown into younger generations as something 
that needs to stay with the narod. And the feeling that you need to respect that (focus 
group with Zadar war veterans). 
 
- 
 
SI.V.1 – As I said, we came back to nothing. It is different if you return, if you wage a war 
in another country against someone else, and then you return to your family, your home. 
Many came back here and no longer had a home. Had nothing. They came back to 
poverty (focus group with Sisak war veterans). 
 
The above passages illustrate the preoccupation with the memory of the war, or in other 
words, the preoccupation with not letting it be forgotten since this would mean that the war 
veterans would be forgotten. In their eyes they are, therefore, not only defending the 
existence of Croatia, but also themselves and their status in society. The Zadar war veterans 
again highlight the use of Christian symbology to discuss their victimhood, but also how real 
the war remains to these individuals. To them it is still a party of everyday life, which creates 
a distinction between them and the non-veteran population. It also creates a distinction 
between them and veterans of the Second World War, who they see as revered, rather than 
forgotten, in society. The war veterans interviewed in the study all felt that they were not 
unified and that they wanted to have more of a say in Croatian society and politics. They felt 
manipulated (a common theme) and excluded. Within these discussions, a distinction was 
often made, explicitly or implicitly, between the “veteran” (braniteljska) population and the 
rest of the “civilian” population. The Zagreb war veterans below attributed different values to 
these populations, thereby creating a stratification in society. Again, many respondents felt 
that the “veteran” population should unify in order to gain a stronger voice and to influence 
societal values:  
 
ZA.V.4 – We allowed ourselves to become disconnected, for politics to play us as it saw 
fit, to eat up and spit out the braniteljska population because they no longer needed 
them. It is should not be possible to create laws that are very harmful for the Croatian 
branitelji (follow-up interview with Zadar war veteran). 
 
- 
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ZG.V.2 – They say there 500,000 branitelji in the register, minus the 80 or 90,000 who 
are buried, but add to that their families, their friends, a range of citizens.78 When in this 
country they will have the right, when they will have the right, although they are a 
minority. When they will have the right to participate, not to decide, but to participate in 
the defining of what are positive and negative values in this society, then we open the 
path towards reconciliation. Dialogue is required for reconciliation.  
 
All agree 
 
ZG.V.4 – Absolutely.  
 
ZG.V.2 – There has to be reconciliation between a civil sector, which has power and 
money, and it decides. 
 
ZG.V.1 – And arbitrates. 
 
ZG.V.2 – What are negative and positive values. And it completely ignores a large part, 
multiply 500,000, every person has three or four dependants in his family or wherever. 
 
ZG.V.1 – Half of Croatia really. 
 
ZG.V.2 – So two million people have a system of values that are based on the values of 
the people who created this state (focus group with Zagreb war veterans).  
 
The other groups agreed that war veterans suffered from a lack of pensions and that they 
wanted to be listened to; they wanted the rest of the public to hear their “truth”. The other 
groups also, however, felt that it was difficult to comment on the war veterans since they did 
hold a special status in society, for better or for worse. They were seen as possibly holding 
too much power, preventing anyone from speaking out against them: 
 
NU.T.2 – The veteran scene is very strong, and rightfully so, they sacrificed a lot for the 
state, they created it, but this does not mean that they do not serve it. This does not 
mean that they can dictate the political picture of Croatia and if someone who was a war 
criminal on our side has to be tried, they do not have the right to organise protests and I 
do not know what. When in 2000 the politics of the current government, as they call it in 
Croatia the Yugonostalgics, the SDP, did not suit them, they then organised a 
demonstration of 200,000 people with the right wing parties in order to topple the 
government. Of course it is legitimate to protest and demonstrate, however, we know the 
underlying reasons. When someone today supports the current government, then he is a 
Yugonostalgic. If I wanted to prosecute a branitelj, then I would be a Serb lover (interview 
with non-urban teacher). 
 
- 
 
SI.P.2 – Now a small joke. Ante Tomić wrote in Jutarnji List, about the branitelji. Imagine 
a situation where a branitelj wants the service of a woman for sex. And he calls and says 
“I want this and that”. She asks what he wants, oral or what. He asks for the price and 
she says 500 kunas. He says this is a bit steep. And Tomić started a story that branitelji 
who are branitelji, in this society with its unemployment and so one, ask for a bit too 
much in relation to those who have practically nothing. So the branitelj asks for a 
discount and she says no. So he says, what if someone from the other side now called 
                                                
78 The number of dead remains unknown, but these are far off current estimates. The Croatian 
Memorial and Documentation Centre for the Homeland War (2006) and Ivo Goldstein (1999) put the 
current estimate at 13,583 deaths, including military and civilian deaths, as well as all missing 
persons. Živić (2003) has a slightly higher estimate, at 15,970.  
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you. She says the price would stay the same. So the branitelj accuses her of equalising 
the victim and the aggressor (focus group with Sisak pensioners).  
 
Teachers and pensioners felt that a range of sources was manipulating war veterans, 
including all governments to date. War veterans expressed this more strongly. They believed 
that because of this manipulation they were repressed and that their “truth” was not heard. 
This highlights the notion that war veterans, the state and the war narrative represented as 
“the truth” are all interconnected, not only in academic analyses, but also in the eyes of the 
public: 
 
SI.V.2 – Those who were participants of the partisan (narodno oslobodilačka) fight, or 
war. They had memorials. They were praised. Today you cannot even say that you have 
a medal or that you were a branitelj, they all spit on you. That is what the Homeland War 
is to us. 
 
SI.V.1– Politics made it so.  
 
SI.V.2 – Yes. 
 
SI.V.1- Now who is behind the politics? Maybe we are at fault. I especially blame us 
branitelji. This is what I have always been saying. 
 
SI.V.3 – I agree. I agree that we should have been louder (focus group with Sisak war 
veterans).  
 
All of the interviewed veterans’ groups agreed with the Sisak veterans, that it was their own 
fault for this state of affairs since “they did not fight enough”. This leads to a permanent call 
to arms by the veterans, who feel they have to not only continue to defend Croatia, but also 
Croatian values and their own rights within the Croatian state. Much like with the war 
narrative or Cyrillic signs in Vukovar, war veterans more so than any other group, interpret 
their position in the state as under attack.79 This is made starker in the context of their 
perceived diminished rights in post-Tuđman Croatia and it does offer a higher potential for 
manipulation. Moreover, they felt that the media misrepresented them and contributed to this 
state of affairs: 
 
ZA.V.3 – And how much does the media contribute to this insulting of the branitelji? Jure 
Jurić has killed Pero Perić. It will say that a Croatian branitelj killed Pero Perić. 
 
All agree 
 
ZA.V.3 – Or a Croatian branitelj beat his wife. But recently we had an incident here, 
where a drug addict attacked his girlfriend with a knife. And a Croatian branitelj was 
passing by and he jumped to the girl’s rescue. He got stabbed and I am not even sure if 
he survived. 
 
ZA.V.4 – He did survive. 
                                                
79 In reality, however, war veterans receive a large number of benefits and vast quantity of 
monuments have been built and continue to be built across the country. These pay tribute to their 
sacrifices and reflect their role in society. 
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ZA.V.3 – It did not say anywhere that a Croatian branitelj saved a woman from a drug 
addict, it said that Jure Jurić saved a girl. If it is anything negative then, poof, Croatian 
branitelj.  
 
ZA.V.6 – This is called, in the former UDBA or KOS, linguistic terror. Linguistic terror. 
Constantly someone is bombarding you with certain words and this goes into the 
consciousness of people. This has come into the consciousness of people. And it now 
causes fear (focus group with Zadar war veterans). 
 
Josip Klemm was seen as a further example of manipulation.80 The few times he was 
mentioned in the groups (he was vocal during the Savska protests and had appeared on 
television several times during the fieldwork), war veterans felt that he was dirtying the name 
of all veterans and that he was using the issue of veterans as a marketing platform for his 
own business. Some did, however, concede that at the very least Klemm was providing jobs 
for war veterans. The topic highlights two of the great preoccupations that both war veterans 
and the other groups seem to have regarding the veteran population: dishonest or fake war 
veterans and war veterans’ pensions. All target segments agreed that this was a key issue 
at the time and war veterans complained of the fake stories (once again highlighting the 
issue of “truth” in their eyes) being invented by false war veterans: 
 
SI.P.3 – You must have heard, there are also many of these false ones. These false 
ones maybe talk about the dignity [of the Homeland War] more than those that should be 
talking about it. Especially these days, it is popular to talk about it (focus group with Sisak 
pensioners). 
 
- 
 
ZA.T.1 – There are many arguments here about the branitelji – who is one, who is not. 
Maybe this is the problem (focus group with Zadar teachers). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.3 – I know many people and I know that many watched the war on television. So 
that many people like to talk about it, who according to me were not there. They do more 
damage than anything else. I have listened to people, for example a boy came to me and 
said some rubbish about how people were slaughtering those or those. He does not 
know who I am or what I am. I tell him fantastic, tell me who did this and I will report him. 
And you will be a witness to testify that he told you that he did this and that, over there. 
Then he changes his mind. So I told him not to lie then, since that is how you spread 
disinformation. Now I should accuse him of lying, saying rubbish about things that did not 
happen. You were not there; you heard something from someone, who heard from 
someone else. That is how these stories are created. And that is how this happened in 
various veterans’ associations, where various stories were created. Because everyone 
wants to be a hero. It is not quite that simple. Most heroes are either dead or heavily 
disabled (follow-up interview with Zagreb war veteran). 
 
As previous chapters have shown, PTSD was present among participants. All groups 
considered PTSD to be prevalent, hard to diagnose and permanent among the war veteran 
                                                
80 Josip Klemm is a vocal war veteran who is the President of the Association of the Republic of 
Croatia Special Police and he is also the owner of the company Klemm Security, a private security 
company. He is frequently on television and in media speaking in support of war veterans’ rights.  
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population. These individuals continue to face great psychological pains, but this also further 
reinforces the notion of perpetual victimhood in which events are often interpreted as further 
attacks on the war veteran population. War veterans admitted they suffered from it openly, 
talked about it at length and alluded to PTSD being a further manner in which their struggle 
or war was not yet over: 
 
SI.V.1 – The world powers, you, Europe, you are playing with us. You are forgetting that 
we lived through this and that we are still here.  
 
SI.V.2 – And we are still experiencing it. 
 
SI.V.3 – It is still not over. 
 
SI.V.1 – We are all on pills (focus group with Sisak war veterans). 
 
Such exchanges were common, together with admissions of diagnoses. Moreover, they 
have the effect of making the notion of conflict or war current and ongoing, since the 
suffering has not stopped. Children and future generations were also mentioned as the 
individuals who will continue to suffer from the effects of their (war veteran) parents’ 
suffering from PTSD. The other two target segments predominantly shared these opinions 
as well. 
 
Unfortunately, despite the high number of female war veterans and war veterans’ groups 
involved in this study, the analysis did not have the opportunity to investigate these groups 
to the extent that they deserve, which will hopefully be left to future studies. Generally these 
groups (war veterans in Sisak, Zadar and non-urban Banovina) did not immediately or 
openly complain of being treated differently to their male counterparts. Their roles in the 
conflict seemed to be “mothering”81 and at times lonely, since they were not numerous. 
Further probing did reveal stories of how they were treated differently during the war and 
how this has continued after the war. Both as soldiers and as associations they had to prove 
themselves to their peers, as well as to society as a whole: 
 
SI.V.2 – When you are at your post, on the front, with people who are carrying rifles. 
When you arrive as a woman, you do not only have to prove yourself to them, so that 
they respect you and value you and look at you as an equal, but you have to do this to 
everyone, as if you fell from Mars. No one sees you as equal to them. You understand? 
That was an additional battle for women at the front with themselves and with people, 
with their friends. 
 
SI.V.3 – Certainly, as in life (focus group with Sisak war veterans).  
 
- 
 
                                                
81 Bourke (1999) has, for example, found evidence of maternal instincts playing a key role in the 
motivation of female fighters in the two world wars and the Vietnam War.  
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ZA.V.4 – Society, the local community, they thought why another association? Why are 
women even important? Maybe they were just prostitutes in the war? This is nonsense 
that people even said this or thought like this. It was simply thought of as too much at the 
time. On the other hand, they thought we were bored so we established it. That we had 
no purpose, no aim. So it was hard at the beginning. So we had to work harder to show 
that we can do this, that we want to do this, that this is truly for the aim of promoting 
peace, promoting the truth, something we lived through and experienced, we want to 
keep, we want to write, to save the photos, and to have more material (follow-up 
interview with Zadar war veteran). 
 
The other war veterans’ associations involved in this study seemed supportive of the female 
associations and the Zagreb and the Sisak groups attempted to equalise the gender balance 
in the focus groups of their own volition. They seemed aware that women and men may 
have different opinions and did not want to present themselves as biased. Moreover, the 
Zadar women’s association was referred to the researcher by a male member of the Zagreb 
war veterans’ focus group, further pointing to a certain openness, at least amongst these 
smaller associations.  
 
 
9.2 The udruge 
 
The war veterans’ associations, also known as udruge, were seen as predominantly 
untrustworthy and a blight on war veterans, especially by the interviewed war veterans 
groups. A Zagreb war veteran’s view was that “the associations are numerous, but there are 
few associations that I take seriously. They are very rare. The others were formed in order to 
socialise” (follow-up interview with Zagreb war veteran). Other than showing a general 
dislike of war veterans’ groups, this individual believed their aim should not be socialisation. 
Given how often group discussions focussed on a persistent defence, it is possible this is 
seen as a more appropriate aim of associations. The defence is centered around pervasive 
political and societal complaints. Overall, how all of the interviewed war veterans’ groups 
viewed other groups was best described in a long passage by the Zadar war veterans. They 
were seen as fragmented, too numerous, politically motivated and manipulated. Additionally, 
these sequences (such as below) often moved from discussions of veterans’ issues to 
politics and how corrupt the world around them is:82  
 
ZA.V.2 – I was in a war veterans’ association in Sveti Filip Jakov, but it fell apart. These 
people had PTSD, they did not like to talk about war, they had receded into themselves 
and they are easily manipulated. For example, when the presidential elections were on, 
the head of our group wanted Bandić for President. And we said that we should not 
discuss politics in the group. He was handing out t-shirts and so on. We did not like that 
so we parted and have not met since. Only when we need flowers or so on. 
                                                
82 As stated in Chapter 5, the official number of war veterans’ associations according to the Croatian 
Ministry of War Veterans’ Affairs is roughly 6,300. See: https://registri.uprava.hr/#!udruge 
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[…] 
 
ZA.V.3 – There is no umbrella organisation that keeps them all organised. 
 
ZA.V.4 agrees 
 
ZA.V.3 – They are all over the place. As they say, divide and rule. Well that is what they 
did with the war veterans associations.  
 
All agree 
 
ZA.V.2 – I think all of the presidents of these associations just fight for their seat and 
nothing else. I was a member of a group for PTSD sufferers and I did not get any care, 
any attention or anything that would help branitelji know their rights or get help. I left the 
group and I joined this one. 
 
ZA.V.4 – I just wanted to add that a real cancer has started, a disease, when they 
allowed 200 umbrella associations to be established. This is the folly of the century. It is 
as if you are saying that you are building a house that will have 200 roofs. If the Croatian 
branitelji exist, if their families exist, who were hit directly or indirectly by war, there exist 
civilian victims, then I do not see a fourth option. What is this fourth option? It does not 
exist! But it is allowed, in the name of politics. This is done on purpose. 200 umbrella 
organisations, and I do not know how many small ones. A million small ones. Why? 
Because that is how you can manipulate (focus group with Zadar war veterans).  
 
War veterans are seemingly aware of the political manipulation they are subject to. Others 
for the most part agreed with this view of war veterans’ associations. They also found them 
too numerous, politically motivated and fragmented. This led to the view that while war 
veterans were respected a great deal, their associations were not. The number of 
associations alone is seen as proof of their unreliability: 
 
NU.T.1 – We have seen an inflation of war veterans’ associations and no one can 
convince me that from a few associations in the beginning, probably honest and reliable, 
this has not turned into personal interests. The law concerning associations has allowed 
a hyperinflation of associations. You then realise that every other association and their 
leadership must have some interests, you cannot ascertain who is reliable, who is 
honest, and who is saying something for certain reasons. Unfortunately, as much as I 
respect the branitelji, no one is questioning that, but associations as an organisation I 
rank very low in terms of reliability (interview with non-urban teacher). 
 
- 
 
NU.T.2 – There are more war veterans’ associations than war veterans (interview with 
non-urban teacher). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.4 – I think [the associations] are not united. They should be stronger in every 
aspect and united. 
 
ZG.P.3 – They are fragmented (focus group with Zagreb pensioners).  
 
In the eyes’ of all participants in this study, the war veterans’ associations were not 
representative of war veterans as a whole and were linked with ulterior motives. They were 
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seen as giving war veterans a bad name and were not even considered serious by war 
veterans’ associations themselves. Furthermore, the protests at Savska were not wholly 
supported. While all groups agreed that war veterans had problems they had to tackle, the 
protesters and groups at Savska were generally seen as attempting to divide Croatia for 
political or corrupt purposes. In some ways, therefore, the perceived connection between 
war veterans’ associations and the government has damaged their image in the eyes of the 
public. Even honest plights for better treatment may, therefore, be seen as merely political 
posturing on behalf of party politics.   
 
 
9.3 Victims 
 
A recurring topic in discussions was that of victims of the war. A “victim” was not only 
someone who was physically or mentally injured during the war, instead it was the whole 
Croatian population in varying degrees since the war narrative victimises all Croatians. The 
narrative, therefore, featured a type of stratification, where some victims were seen as more 
typical of the category than others. In this sense, war veterans were at the top of the 
hierarchy due to their sacrifices for Croatian independence. Below this were victims on the 
frontline or in occupied territories and victims who were directly hit by the fighting. Below this 
was the rest of Croatia, for example residents of Zagreb who were victims, but not as much 
as residents of Sisak. Finally there were Croats who fled Croatia to go abroad, who were 
victims but only to a minor degree.  
 
This stratification is not simple to write about in the context of this study, since the 
researcher in some ways falls into the latter, and lowest, category, having spent a part of the 
war abroad and another part in less hit areas of Croatia, such as Zagreb and the Primorje 
region. This potentially provides a less biased view of such a construct, but it is also possible 
that a sense of stratification is only present because the researcher would fall into the 
“lowest” category and, therefore, view one category as lower thn another. There is, however, 
evidence of similar stratification from Kosovo, which helps compensate for this potential 
bias.    
 
In Kosovo a similar hierarchy of victims is semi-legally enshrined and allows for higher 
benefits and lower eligibility criteria for military victims (Ströhle, 2013: 252). The effect of this 
is that military victims hold higher social value and their calls to arms are legitimised 
(Ströhle, 2013). Competition over the “purest” commitment to the nation has also been 
contested among politicians and war veterans (Ströhle, 2010: 501). In that case, the heroic 
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self-representation of these groups allowed them to make claims for power and to establish 
clientilistic networks around them (Ströhle, 2010: 501). Hints of this are apparent in Croatia, 
for example with the HDZ presenting themselves as the war veterans’ party or Josip Klemm 
using his status as a war veteran to further business interests. These types of formal and 
informal practices can segment social citizenship, as they have done in Kosovo, thereby 
creating social divisions (Cocozzelli, 2009: 119; Ströhle, 2013: 259). 
 
During the fieldwork, war veterans’ groups frequently made two specific distinctions: 
between war veterans and other members of society (“civilians”), and between war veterans 
who fought on the frontline and those who did not. War veterans in the non-urban and Sisak 
pensioner groups also admitted that those working behind the scenes during the war were 
equally responsible for Croatian independence, although this notion never came up with the 
war veterans’ groups. The below are only some examples of this stratification: 
 
SI.V.1 – I know what the Homeland War was, I know why I went to war, and I know how 
we conducted the Homeland War. And everyone who conducted the war, who was in the 
war, who took part, especially on the battlefields know what the Homeland War is. It is a 
different question for those who were here, but who were not on the battlefield. This 
means they were not directly involved in the action (focus group with Sisak war 
veterans). 
 
- 
 
SI.P.5 – The defence of this Homeland War is attributed to one side, to one group. It is 
not attributed to all citizens. But my opinion is that all citizens who lived here, who 
produced oil, who produced iron, who produced other things, but I mention only these 
two strategic aspects, they are all participants of the Homeland War. Because they 
worked under artillery fire, which was worse than being in a shelter. Even on the frontline 
it was easier, since you had some shelter. They had bunkers there. In the workshops, in 
INA, you had nothing but work. Production had to continue (follow-up dyad with Sisak 
pensioners). 
 
All participants, and especially those who were direct victims of the war (the non-urban war 
veterans’ group in Banovina stood out in this regard), felt abandoned by authorities, such as 
the government, ICTY, judiciary, international community, etc. Victims levelled complaints at 
the ICTY because none of them had been called to participate in any trials, despite feeling 
that they had valuable information to present to authorities. Similar complaints were made 
regarding Croatian authorities. Moreover, war veterans’ groups complained of a monopoly 
on victimhood by certain victims, especially Serb ones, which prevented others from being 
heard. The other groups also directed similar complaints at war veterans, since they saw 
that this segment of society was louder than civilian victims. This collective feeling of 
underrepresentation seems to have led to a degree of finger pointing between the various 
stratifications. 
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9.4 Civil society 
 
Civil society as a subject did not receive the same amount of attention as war veterans and 
their associations. When it did, this mainly came from the war veterans’ groups. The general 
public does not seem to hold a strong opinion on the issue, for example most seem to have 
a neutral opinion of NGOs in general (Figure 26).83  
 
Figure 26. Please rate on a scale from 1 to 5 the level of trust in the following political and social 
institutions: non-governmental organisations. 
 
 Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
War veterans’ groups, in particular, felt that civil society in Croatia, meaning human rights 
NGOs, was dysfunctional and looked to divide Croatian society. This is a common notion in 
Croatia and also in Serbia, especially with the right wing press. Despite the proportionately 
small size of human rights NGOs in both countries, they have often been seen in a negative 
light, particularly due to their relative success in attracting Western funding, which war 
veterans’ associations have not been able to do. The constant theme in this narrative was 
that someone or some kind of entity, working in the background, was attempting to divide 
civil society and war veterans’ associations, as well as to equalise guilt or portray the war as 
a civil war. Some attributed this to an unknown entity, others to infiltration of associations by 
unwanted elements and others to influence by the international community that was 
attempting to equalise crimes: 
 
NU.V.4 – It obviously suits someone that they are all separated and act alone. Because if 
they were united then they would be too strong. I think that if Documenta and the war 
veterans’ associations and the civilian associations, and other associations that exist, 
                                                
83 War veterans’ associations technically fall under this, but many in Croatia may see them as a 
separate entity. War veterans’ associations were not included in the survey as a separate category or 
question.  
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were to unite and to start working on collective questions, then everything would be 
solved quickly. But obviously this does not suit someone. There is a constant need to 
interfere and to instill some kind of hatred. There was a war. It is a fact that that the JNA 
and the Serbs wanted to occupy Croatia, but the Croats rose up and did not allow it. 
 
NU.V.3 agrees 
 
NU.V.4 – It was not a civil war, it was a war, there was aggression. Aggression by one 
state on another. 
 
All agree (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.3 – You will most likely speak to various non-governmental organisation, maybe 
you already have. I wanted to say what I think would be good. When you are speaking to 
me or to them. You should consider who comes from where. In terms of family. Not 
ethnicity. You can then get a complete picture of the truthfulness of my or their dialogue 
(focus group with Zagreb war veterans). 
 
- 
 
NU2.V.1 – The international community protects certain so called non-governmental 
organisations, world famous ones. The proof of this is Documenta, which as an 
international institution conducts certain investigations and their aim is the absolute, so-
called, equalisation of guilt (dyad with non-urban war veterans Slavonia). 
 
Members of war veterans’ associations felt that they and NGOs such as Documenta, the 
Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights, the Civic Committee for Human Rights 
and the Centre for Peace Studies had a basic disagreement over the war narrative and the 
notion of a defensive war. This meant that NGOs were seen as trying to criminalise the 
Homeland War: 
 
ZG.V.1 – With their story and their relativization of the beginning of the war, and 
everything that leads on from there, they are trying to relativize things that cannot be 
relativized because we then have to relativize our complete history. Not the Croatian 
one, not the Serbian one, but the global one. We need to change our understanding of 
what war is. According to their theory every war is illegal. Defensive and otherwise. 
According to their theory Croatia is at fault because it accepted war. Croatia did not have 
to accept war. Serbia and Yugoslavia gave us an ultimatum: forget your sovereign wish 
of the narod expressed in a referendum, replace the leadership you chose, install a new 
set of political laws and abide by our demands. And if we really did this, there would not 
have been war (focus group with Zagreb war veterans). 
 
The Zagreb group, in particular, also felt that these human rights NGOs actively prevented 
other groups, specifically war veterans’ associations, from participating in the activities they 
undertook, thereby creating a monopoly in the space. There is not much support for this in 
the survey research. The public is relatively divided over the issue, but many respondents 
did not have an opinion at all (Figure 27).  
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Figure 27. Do you agree with the following statement: the most dangerous enemy of Croatia are so-
called fighters for human rights, who come from the ranks of Yugonostalgics and members of foreign 
agencies. 
 
Source: Ipsos Puls (2012) 
 
Other target segments generally did not comment on this topic. Only the Zadar pensioners 
strongly agreed with the war veterans. They shared their opinion that civil society had been 
infiltrated (specifically by UDBA) and that they were aiming to write a false history. War 
veterans expressed a range of other opinions about civil society more broadly. Some 
believed that at the very least some human rights NGOs and especially Documenta had a 
similar aim to war veterans’ associations in attempting to record an oral history of events. 
Others believed that the fight for monopoly in the sector was due to funding and that human 
rights NGOs were much better at attracting the significant international funding available, 
giving them an advantage. The non-urban war veterans in Banovina, for example, felt that 
although they disagreed with Documenta and other local organisations (most notably a local 
human rights NGO), they agreed that they also had the right to participate in the debate and 
provide their own view. Finally, and specifically with regard to transitional justice, some felt 
that only human rights NGOs had access to justice, since they had the necessary funding to 
engage with courts.  
 
Other target segments did not comment on civil society nearly as much, nor were they asked 
as many questions on the topic. The one general thread that was common is that they 
believed that civil society groups, both war veterans’ associations and human rights NGOs, 
do not communicate effectively despite having the same aims:  
 
ZA.T.2 – I think both sides do a good job, but that the problem is more in communication 
rather than in the actual work. Both are trying to help people who have been suffered and 
are trying to get to the truth about the war (focus group with Zadar teachers). 
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This teacher went on to say that lack of communication was also the problem with 
RECOM.84 In a follow-up interview he elaborated that he felt RECOM suffered from horrible 
leadership, despite being an initially sound idea. He felt that the far right in Croatia had, 
therefore, managed to convince the public that RECOM is an attempt to falsify the truth. This 
does highlight the two-sided nature of the project, which identifies with and involves many 
human rights groups that war veterans are highly critical of, such as Documenta, while also 
including war veterans’ associations in the coalition. This novelty makes it both remarkable 
and confusing to outsiders. Overall, however, this was the only mention of RECOM 
throughout the fieldwork.  
 
 
9.5 Twin transitions 
 
During and since the Homeland War, Croatia experienced two simultaneous transitions, that 
of transitional justice and of a shift to the neoliberal economic model. Croatia’s economic 
transition was marked by widespread corruption led by an elite class of businessmen and 
politicians. As a consequence Croatians do not make a semantic distinction between the two 
transitions, “capitalism” is linked to “democracy”, which is linked to the “European Union”, 
which is linked to the “ICTY”, and so on. The dynamic between the twin transitions has 
broad societal implications. It shows the inconsistency between how a period of change is 
greeted and how it is experienced. It shows how war veterans, as a disproportionately 
influential part of civil society, do not only remove space for action from human rights NGOs, 
but also from more economically focused groups, such as unions. Finally, core parts of the 
war narrative, such as the notion that the aggression has continued, can be used in order to 
divert attention from economic problems in the state. The cumulative effect of this is that the 
transitional justice process could be suffering from an image problem associated with an 
economic transition marked by corruption, since they are seen as linked. 
 
The two older target segments, pensioners and member of war veterans’ associations, 
discussed at length the period during the war as one of hope, unity and harmony, which they 
juxtaposed with the post-war (and current) period where this hope was lost. The new 
situation was characterised by a loss of employment opportunities and a rise in corruption. 
                                                
84 The initiative for RECOM is a regional attempt to establish a commission for the establishment of 
facts about human rights violations committed in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 2001. It is a 
regional coalition formed of various human rights NGOs, war veterans’ associations and victims’ 
associations.  
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For some the memory of the war was characterised by this loss. The examples were 
numerous: 
 
Moderator – Has your opinion of the Homeland War changed since the end of the war? 
 
NU.P.2 – Yes, for the worse. 
 
NU.P.1 agrees 
 
NU.P.3 – It all started so well. Together. The narod, the people, there were Serbs there 
as well, people were coming from abroad. And in the end the representatives of the state 
trick you. This one starts to steal. From the President to whomever has an opportunity.  
 
NU.P.1 – The difference [since the war ended] is huge. A lot of people expected to have 
a job, but they stayed on the street (focus group with non-urban pensioners).  
 
- 
 
SI.P.2 – Many people were previously successful in the industry here, which was large 
here. Unfortunately today it is gone (focus group with Sisak pensioners). 
 
- 
 
SI.V.1 – Our companies have all disappeared. Or in our place there are now Serbs who 
conveniently stayed behind, who were not allowed to go to war.  
 
SI.V.3 – They had work duties. 
 
SI.V.1 – While we had rifles on our shoulders, they got work duty through their 
connections, so they were not allowed to go to the battlefield, instead they were in the 
companies. So you come back and you do not even have the company. You are killed by 
the poverty and misery. By the time you realised what they are doing to your state, you 
are old and sick. Young people came, like you new historians, who are now telling us 
what we should do. INA is failing. We remember 1995 when we had to work hard for INA. 
Do I remember? And what about those people who were left here with these work duties, 
who remained behind to care for the city, for my companies. Where have the companies 
gone? I defended my state. And now I should cower. They should call me up again, 
because jobs are disappearing. By the time we realised that it is not good to let someone 
else run your state… If you knew how to create it, then you also know how to run it.  
 
SI.V.2 agrees 
 
SI.V.1 – If you know how to guard your house, then you know how to run the family in 
that house. By the time we realised this, they had already ruined it for us (focus group 
with Sisak war veterans). 
 
To the Sisak war veterans, Serbs and those who did not fight in the war represented two 
groups of people who were less deserving and less able to run the state, in comparison to 
those who literally fought for the country. They connect the disappearance of jobs to the 
Serb minority, specifically those who did not fight, and even feature a type of call to arms 
(“they should call me up again”). They not only ignore the economic reasons for 
unemployment, but also place blame on the Serb minority in the state. The closing down of 
the INA oil refinery was a relevant topic at the time and discussions in the predominantly 
industrial city of Sisak, where the refinery is based, saw much discussion about jobs as a 
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consequence of this. This feeling was, however, expressed across all geographic locations 
to a certain extent. Corruption was seen as the embodiment of this loss of hope and 
harmony. The concept of a job was even seen as one of the aims of the war, in other words, 
people fought and died for jobs: 
 
NU.P.3 – In the beginning there was faith and hope. 
 
NU.P.1 – That people got what they fought for. Their jobs. For no one to prevent that. If 
they had received that, that would be dignity, gratefulness for this Homeland War.  
s 
NU.P.3 – That war would have at least brought you what you fought for. To have a job, 
for your child to get an education and to know that you will have work (focus group with 
non-urban pensioners).  
 
As far as pensioners and war veterans were concerned, the legacy of the conflict and the 
transition to neoliberalism were inextricably linked. The Croatian government was seen as 
selling out the Croatian soldiers by not giving them a job to return to. Unemployment and 
economic struggle were discussed through the use of symbols of the Homeland War and, 
thereby, connected to the continuing need for defence. Additionally, all target segments saw 
reconciliation and the economy as connected. They regarded a strong economy as the key 
to reconciliation and saw some transitional justice issues as means to divert attention from 
the economy (such as, for example, the issue of Vukovar discussed in the previous chapter): 
 
ZA.T.3 – And now it is getting to Croatia and Serbia throwing insults at each other. One 
complains about Šešelj and the others retort about ten Cyrillic signs. So this is being kept 
up. 
 
ZA.T.2 – I think it is much more important for Croatia and Serbia to find ways to 
cooperate better economically, Vojvodina and Slavonia, so then people who would have 
work to do would be less burdened by these problem. It is the worst when a person is 
disempowered, humiliated and unemployed. 
 
ZA.T.1 – It is toughest economically. They would be much happier in their situation 
without that (focus group with Zadar teachers).  
 
- 
 
SI.P.1 – Ordinary people. Now ordinary people do not need to reconcile, since they 
never fought. Just like someone mentioned, the economy. The airport in Osijek was 
approached by the Serbian side, they want to use the services of the Osijek Airport for 
their purposes. The economy will reconcile this, it has to. 
 
SI.P.4 and SI.P.5 agree.  
 
SI.P.1 – Common interests will be found in the economy, in investment (focus group with 
Sisak pensioners). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.4 – People [in Vukovar] are under heavy tensions and frustrations. If they were not 
frustrated, then none of this would be happening. But many are frustrated. Frustrated 
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because someone is fuelling the fire. And this is causing the bigger problem. If it were 
not so then everything would be fine. Instead of opening factories, instead of focusing on 
employment, they are doing this (follow-up interview with Zagreb pensioner).  
 
Evidence that economic concerns are related to the legacy of conflict and socialism by 
certain parts of the public was found in the focus group discussions. War veterans and some 
pensioners’ groups connected economic failures to the lack of lustration in Croatia following 
the war and the long-term effects of Yugoslav socialism. These two elements are merely two 
examples of a variety of reasons given by these target segments, as the reasons for 
Croatia’s poor economic performance: 
 
NU2.V.2 – The Great Serbs, Yugonostalgics, people who persecuted Croatia and Croats 
throughout history. Today they have infiltrated all parts of the Croatian administration and 
politics, all parts of life. That great idea of reconciliation, and thank God for Dr. Tuđman’s 
great idea, since it is a major reason for today’s freedom of the Croatian narod. However, 
after the war ended, I am absolutely for it, I was then and I am now, to undertake some 
kind of lustration. Why? What is happening in Croatia today, it is coming exactly from 
those cadres, those people, those currents of Croatian political life. They just have to 
work a bit for people to forget about the serious topics, like why is our economy like this, 
why is our economy in recession for 12 quarters, why despite joining the European Union 
Croatia has the worst European economy, why we do not see economic improvement in 
the near future. Those same currents, today and before, their aim is to remain in power 
and to destroy the pan-Croatian national spirit. The pan-Croatian national spirit was 
present in the war, in the defence and so on. And today it would be unique in the 
economic recovery, if it were not for these people (dyad with non-urban war veterans 
Slavonia). 
 
- 
 
ZG.P.1 – I think [the other focus group participants] are people from an old environment 
of fear of communism. You cannot freely say that they wanted a Croatian state, you saw 
how they always kept on finding negative things. It really struck me when I told them we 
were craftsmen, for two generations now, my parents and now me. We truly could not 
wait for private capital to finally come, for entrepreneurship to start moving forward. But 
yesterday they started spitting on this “what are you business owners? You stole! You 
bought a yacht by cheating on taxes!” I do not have a yacht, my daughter lives 
downstairs. At the end of the day, if we have two generations, and we had many 
workers, we worked hard, and we were big. But I am not an enemy of the state. That 
communist mentality has remained in some people, with the older generation. That all 
those who have something robbed the state (follow-up interview with Zagreb pensioner). 
 
- 
 
ZG.V.4 – In Croatia the situation with the economy, finances, the administration of 
resources – Croatian waters, the floods – is poor. Poor administration of the sea. Of 
sources of oil, gas and energy. These are consequences of a catastrophic approach and 
running of the economy during the 50 years of socialism (follow-up interview with Zagreb 
war veteran).  
 
It is easy to see how the above war veterans’ passages can easily be interpreted as forming 
a part of their desire and attempt to return the HDZ to power, by using economic concerns 
as the reason. The intertwined narratives on what can broadly be described as transitional 
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justice issues85 and economic concerns can mean that transitional justice efforts suffer from 
being seen as related to economic grievances. Moreover, self-conceptions of defence and 
victimisation in Croatia against larger, foreign powers may now be set against neoliberal 
globalisation instead (Schäuble, 2014). The disparity between how the period of change was 
greeted and how it was experienced is, therefore, also associated with any actors involved in 
transitional processes. Arguably this stems from the failure of transitional justice institutions 
to make it clear who they were designed to deal with and how, leaving other plights for 
justice to different actors. The cumulative effect is that some segments of society see 
economic failures as caused by issues in the realm of transitional justice, while others see 
transitional justice as a means to divert attention from economic failures.  
 
 
9.6 Conclusion 
 
War veterans and their associations, staunchly opposed to the transitional justice process, 
continue to be the most influential part of Croatian civil society. War veterans remain 
preoccupied with the war narrative and continue to see a need to defend Croatia, the values 
of the Homeland War and their own rights in society. They feel like “the radical losers in the 
war” (Schäuble, 2014: 201). This makes it easy for political actors to manipulate them, 
especially right wing parties, like the HDZ, who have in the past given war veterans special 
benefits due to their shared priorities regarding the Homeland War. Veterans might 
associate the HDZ with protection of the war, but they might also see it as a means to once 
again gain more funds and powers. This creates tensions between how war veterans are 
seen as individuals and how their associations are seen.  
 
While war veterans remain respected by the Croatian public, war veterans’ associations are 
on the whole distrusted and viewed as fragmented, politically manipulated and too 
numerous. War veterans share this belief about their own associations. Given the 
preoccupation of war veterans with political and social issues, it is not surprising that 
socialising and humanitarian services of war veterans’ associations are ignored and seen as 
inferior. It is also then easy to imagine why others see them as politically manipulated. It is 
possible that what started as a means for the large associations to keep or get the HDZ in 
power, with the aim of maintaining or returning to a Tuđmanist state of affairs, has had a 
spill-over effect on the smaller associations that took part in this study. Only one group 
seemed to have an overt connection to the HDZ, while the others seemed dissatisfied with 
                                                
85 Lustration, the legacies of socialism and the Homeland War, perceived infiltration of Croatian 
institutions by unwanted elements, the need for a continued defence, and so on. 
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the political system as a whole, including the HDZ. Despite this and possibly inadvertently, 
their narratives featured symbols from the Homeland War, calls to arms, nostalgia over the 
Tuđman regime and so on; all mannerisms associated with war veterans’ associations of the 
1990s.  
 
A comparison of views across groups (Table 16) shows a high degree of unanimity on this 
topic, especially in comparison to others. All groups agreed that war veterans were being 
manipulated, that the war veterans’ associations were not to be trusted and that the key to 
reconciliation was in the economy. Transitional justice and neoliberal transition were 
semantically linked by war veterans and pensioners, while teachers generally did distinguish 
between the two. War veterans did express a worry that they and their sacrifices were being 
forgotten. This feeling was also shared by the other two target segments, but they discussed 
this more in terms of jobs and pensions, while war veterans had more emotional 
preoccupations about their position in society. Finally, the greatest difference in opinion was 
over what the role of human rights NGOs was, who war veterans and a group of pensioners 
saw as looking to divide Croatian society, while other groups were neutral on the topic.  
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What does this high degree of unanimity over war veterans mean? The narrative 
surrounding war veterans, their sacrifice and the problems they face seems to be unifying. 
They embody the spirit of the war narrative since they are seen as the truest victims of the 
Homeland War, the ones who made the greatest sacrifices. Alternatively, it could also be 
that, because of their place in the war narrative, it is considered socially unacceptable to 
critique their position and actions (something that would be reflected in the focus group 
setting in particular). Others may have a fear of speaking out at all, which was reflected in 
some interviews with teachers, who alluded to negative aspects of the special status war 
veterans have in Croatian society. The position of war veterans also highlights the need for 
social justice, alongside restorative and transitional justice, in the aftermath of conflict 
(Cocozzelli, 2009). This often takes the form of a comprehensive social welfare system, 
which if neglected, can create social divisions, as it has in Kosovo (Ströhle, 2013: 247). This 
means that transitional authorities, be they internal or external, need to pay careful attention 
to the social divisions and structural inequalities that are the result of different war narratives 
and memories (Ströhle, 2013: 264).   
 
At the time of the fieldwork the HDZ was not in power, but with an election on the horizon, it 
had started to frequently employ nationalist symbols to raise their popularity among voters. 
War veterans’ associations proved to be a useful ally since they fervently rally behind such 
causes. The relationship between Croatian economic transition and transitional justice 
highlights this, since the two are semantically identical in much of the public’s eyes and this 
allows issues between the two to be used interchangeably, easily diverting attention from 
one area by emphasising issues in the other. For example, calls for jobs for war veterans 
can be used to divert attention from broader issues of unemployment. This also shows the 
inconsistency between how a period of change can be greeted and how it can be 
experienced, with a stark contrast between hope and despair. The cumulative effect is that 
whilst war veterans’ associations hold an influential position in society, they have been 
opposed to transitional justice and, given their preoccupation with the Homeland War, they 
can be manipulated by political actors. This allows political actors to divert attention from, for 
example, economic issues to issues related to the war narrative, which are seen as much 
more imminent in an atmosphere of perpetual defence.  
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CHAPTER 10  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis: Comparing the results 
 
The interaction between different narratives and memories, produced and reproduced at 
different levels of society, is complicated and confusing. The preceding chapters have 
shown the structure of narratives associated with the transitional justice process in Croatia 
and how they interact with each other in some detail. It is, however, difficult to distinguish 
patterns across all of the investigated themes and target segments. This chapter will 
highlight some of these patterns by using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).  
 
The main purpose of QCA is to take in-depth analyses of single cases and systematically 
compare them across a larger number of cases, often to ascertain causal factors (discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 3). In this study, however, the purpose of QCA was to illustrate and 
to validate. QCA helped illustrate patterns that occurred across the interviewed target 
segments and to help ascertain why they occurred. For example, how did teachers express 
different attitudes towards transitional justice and specifically where did their views differ 
from other target segments? Moreover, the method can more clearly illustrate where the war 
narrative is particularly strong and where there is some debate. QCA can also help validate 
results, by systematically showing how certain discussions recurred across groups and how 
debate over certain topics may have led to a different understanding of transitional justice. 
The purpose of the QCA was, therefore, not to ascertain causality or causal paths, but to 
look for patterns.  
 
The analysis used crisp set QCA for the sake of simplicity, both in terms of analysis and 
visualisation. This means that the various factors were, for the most part, dichotomised. The 
analysis of the whole set of factors showed no patterns, so the factors were divided along 
thematic lines (as they were discussed in the chapters). Themes that saw total agreement 
were removed from the QCA, but are discussed below. Logical remainders, such as 
parsimonious and intermediate solutions, which form a crucial part of QCA were ignored 
since the aim was not to ascertain causality. Both of these types of solutions are 
configurations of conditions that are populated by few cases, if any at all. Each of these 
allows a researcher to come up with counterfactual conclusions about causal roots, 
however, these are not pertinent to a search for patterns, such as in this thesis. QCA also 
uses the terminology of necessary and sufficient conditions. A sufficient condition is one 
that, if satisfied, guarantees a certain outcome. A necessary condition, on other hand, is one 
that must be satisfied in order to achieve the outcome. For example: it is sufficient to skip a 
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final exam to fail a course, but it is not the only way to fail a course; it is necessary to be 
female to be pregnant (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012: 21). These are important in QCA to 
draw conclusions about causality, but in this study necessary conditions were particularly 
illustrative of patterns, while sufficient conditions for the most part highlighted the complexity 
of the narratives. They are included below only if they had high coverage of cases. 
 
The analysis aimed to explain whether the transitional justice process in Croatia was 
successful in achieving some of its stated goals (discussed below in more detail). This is 
based on the theory of deliberative justice, which argues that transitional justice is 
successful if it leads to a debate on topics relevant to the process. The analysis, therefore, 
looked for areas where debate or questioning over themes in the dominant war narrative 
occurred. The chosen “outcome” for the QCA was whether deliberation happened on the key 
topics that transitional justice deals with.  
 
Other than the general limitations of QCA (discussed in Chapter 3), this application of the 
method has a range of further limitations. Primarily, this approach does not ascertain 
causality, although it does hint at what pre-conditions (necessary or sufficient) could lead to 
deliberation of transitional justice issues. Using crisp set QCA also means that many 
nuances associated with narratives were missed, but again the aim was to better illustrate 
results from preceding chapters. Because it dichotomises outcomes regarding transitional 
justice, the analysis loses much of the colour associated with attitudes and responses, not 
just from participant to participant, but also from group to group. Overall, although the QCA 
does not make an independent contribution to the finding, the results presented are a useful 
schematic summary of the previous chapters’ observations.  
 
The following sections will outline the results of the QCA theme by theme. Each section will 
provide the relevant data used, the necessary conditions and the sufficient conditions, if any. 
Only conditions with significant coverage were included, meaning that a set of conditions 
had to cover more than one case (group) to be included. A presentation of the outcomes and 
the areas of universal agreement (those that featured no debate whatsoever) across groups 
precede these analyses. Together these also highlight potential future areas for study.  
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10.1 Outcomes 
 
It is debatable if it is at all possible to talk about “success” of transitional justice, since such a 
high degree of ambiguity is attached to the goals of the process. For the purposes of the 
QCA analysis, the outcome of transitional justice was assumed to be the presence, or not, of 
a debate on transitional justice issues. This outcome was drawn from six topics taken from 
the focus group discussions that were defined as “aims” of transitional justice, for the most 
part relating to understandings of the rule of law. They are both factual questions (such as 
the first two, based on belief in ICTY rulings) and value questions (the remaining four). 
These highlight how transitional justice is concerned with both the transmission of facts and 
with normative change:      
 
• Did only Serbia commit aggression during the war? This is contradicted by ICTY 
rulings on Croatian involvement in Bosnia. 
• Was there Croatian involvement in Bosnia? Again, ICTY rulings relate to this. 
• Are crimes of passion war crimes? 
• Are war crimes possible in a defensive war? 
• Did Croatian forces commit war crimes? Domestic war crimes trials proved this 
to be the case. 
• Did trials at the ICTY or domestic courts have any significance in the eyes of 
participants? 
 
The outcome was reduced to a binary 0 (if three or less of the topics saw debate) or 1 (if four 
or more topics saw debate). In other words, transitional justice was adjudged to have been 
“successful” in initiating a debate if four or more areas of the six saw debate (Table 17).  
 276 
 
 277 
It is possible that on the topics that featured debate, individuals already disagreed due to 
their existing orientations, which was reflected in results. In other words, that debate was not 
a result of transitional justice, but of existing social divisions. Given the difficulty in 
ascertaining causality, it is hard to decisively dispute such an explanation, other than to 
highlight that the survey results (discussed below) showed no clear distinctions between 
groups that would point to inherent social divisions. For example, university education 
seemed to only make a small difference in attitudes, but not independently of other factors. 
Moreover, the lack representativeness means it is not possible to generalise with this data.   
 
Across groups the difference between the war veterans and teachers becomes obvious, 
whereas pensioners show mixed opinions (Table 18). 
 
Table 18. Comparison of group outcomes. 
Deliberation Present Deliberation Not Present 
Zagreb teachers Zagreb war veterans 
Zadar teachers Zadar war veterans 
Sisak teachers Sisak war veterans 
Non-urban teachers Non-urban Banovina war veterans 
Zagreb pensioners Non-urban Slavonia war veterans 
Sisak pensioners Zadar pensioners 
 Non-urban pensioners 
 
This simplification is useful for illustration, but it does miss nuances. For example, the 
groups of pensioners displayed mixed opinions compared to the overall less ambiguous 
teachers and war veterans; the Sisak teachers stood out compared to teachers in other 
locations; and, the Zagreb war veterans did feature some discussion, at least compared to 
other war veterans’ groups. Finally, the theme of the ICTY being seen as necessary or not 
has been excluded in this part of analysis since it correlates exactly with the outcome of 
debate over transitional justice. In other words, groups that felt the ICTY was necessary also 
featured debate on transitional justice. This most likely indicates that both outcomes are the 
result of a third factor, but ultimately this study cannot ascertain the exact significance of 
this. It is possible that individuals who see a purpose to the ICTY may also see a reason to 
question recent history and dominant narratives. 
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10.2 Agreement 
 
Before outlining the key differences between and among target segments, it is important to 
note the high degree of agreement across groups. In many ways, the most striking feature of 
this analysis is how much agreement is present across target segments and locations on 
key parts of various narratives (Table 19). This highlights that some narratives are too 
strongly ingrained in society to be easily undermined or even debated. 
 
Table 19. Topics of agreement across all groups and target segments. 
Theme   
Sources of information 
Participants and television 
highly trusted. 
The ICTY, domestic courts, 
political parties and udruge 
highly distrusted. 
The war narrative 
Agree that the war was in 
self-defence and a struggle 
for survival. 
The war narrative is 
discussed in a local and 
personal manner. 
The rule of law 
The ICTY is regarded as 
inefficient.  
Serbs in the eyes of Croats 
Agree that there should not 
be Cyrillic signs in Vukovar. 
Acknowledge that Serbs 
fought on Croatian side. 
War veterans 
Agree that war veterans are 
being manipulated, that war 
veterans’ associations are 
corrupt and untrustworthy 
and that the economy is the 
key to reconciliation. 
 
 
Within the predominant war narrative, the key notion of Croatian self-defence is not 
questioned at all, although all other elements are at least debated somewhat. Likewise, all 
participants discussed this in a local and personal manner, which hints at the everyday 
nature of this particular narrative. The ICTY is regarded as inefficient, although as 
subsequent sections will show, this does not mean their verdicts do not hold any 
significance. The view of the Serb minority, however, highlights the contradictions present 
among the Croatian public. Whereas there is widespread acknowledgment that they did fight 
on the Croatian side, there is also total agreement that there should not be Cyrillic signs in 
Vukovar. Given Vukovar’s unique position in the Croatian war narrative, it is possible that 
views on Cyrillic in Vukovar are not necessarily also views on the Serb minority in Croatia. It 
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is also possible that views on the Serb minority vary according to where people live, more so 
than this study has been able to highlight. Survey data supports this notion (Figure 28).  
 
Figure 28. Respondents who think that names of villages and towns with significant Serb populations 
should also be written in Cyrillic. 
 
Source: Kolstø (2011) 
 
 
10.3 Survey results 
 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the survey results found no significant patterns and no 
patterns whatsoever across the whole set of questions. It was, therefore, necessary to 
significantly simplify the raw data (Table 20) to obtain a more manageable set data table 
(Table 21). In order to achieve this, the factors and conditions were dealt with as follows: 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 
2. Age: it was removed since no pattern at all was found and age correlated exactly 
with the target segments (teachers were youngest, war veterans older, 
pensioners oldest). This could have proven more useful if the study had used 
fuzzy set QCA, but in this instance splitting age along three categories did not 
prove to be effective. 
3. Place of birth: this was also excluded since it correlated closely with where 
participants were during the conflict, which also seemed the more relevant 
factor. 
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4. Highest qualification achieved (UN): did most of the group hold a university 
degree of some kind (1), or not (0)? If the group was evenly split then it was 
marked as 0, since most of the group was not university educated. 
5. Residence during 1991 – 1995 period (WR): frontline (1), or not (0). Frontline 
was defined as either occupied or attacked frequently. For example, Zadar and 
Sisak were on the frontline during the war, Zagreb was not. 
6. Current residence (CR): same as above.  
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
7. Interest in national history and the fate of the nation (FN): 1 indicated high 
interest (above 2.5), 0 indicated low (below 2.5). 
8. Croatian officials and soldiers convicted at the ICTY and in domestic courts are 
heroes, not war criminals (HC): 1 indicated strong agreement (below 3.0), 0 
indicated neutral views (3.0 and above). 
9. The Croatian side could not commit war crimes in a defensive war (DW): 1 
indicated agreement (below 2.5), 0 disagreement or neutrality (above 2.5). 
10. School books about Croatian history in the 1990s present the history of Croatia 
correctly: this was excluded since the answers were far too nuanced to fit into 
crisp set QCA. An attempt was made to analyse the results using multi-value 
QCA, but this also proved inconclusive.  
11. Representatives of the Serb minority in Croatia should be involved in the 
development of museums about 20th century Croatian history: as above. 
12. Importance of demonstrating national belonging and being true to national 
tradition (NB): 1 indicated a high degree of importance (3.6 and higher), 0 little or 
neutral (3.5 and less). 
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Table 21. Survey set data table. 
Condition UN WR CR FN HC DW NB TJ 
ZGT 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
ZAT 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
SIT 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
NUT 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
ZGV 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
ZAV 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
SIV 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
NUVB 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
NUVS 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
ZGP 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
ZAP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
SIP 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
NUP 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
 
As already mentioned, there were no discernible patterns across the whole set. The QCA 
analysis showed that the necessary conditions for deliberation of transitional justice with the 
highest coverage were:86 
 
Neutral view of: Croatian officials and soldiers convicted at the ICTY and in domestic 
courts are heroes, not war criminals  
OR  
Little or neutral importance of demonstrating national belonging and being true to 
national tradition (hc+nb) 
 
Low interest in national history and the fate of the nation  
OR  
Neutral view of: Croatian officials and soldiers convicted at the ICTY and in domestic 
courts are heroes, not war criminals (fn+hc) 
 
Most of group held a university degree  
OR  
Little or neutral importance of demonstrating national belonging and being true to 
national tradition (UN+nb) 
 
Most of group held a university degree  
OR  
Low interest in national history and the fate of the nation (UN+fn) 
                                                
86 Lower case lettering indicates the lack of presence of a condition, whereas upper case indicates its 
presence. “+” stands for the logical OR, while “*” stands for the logical AND. 
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These results are not conclusive, but they do hint at some patterns. Many groups where 
debate took place did not place a lot of emphasis on the fate of their nation or did not take 
an interest at all; did not consider Croatian individuals indicted by courts to be heroes; did 
not consider it important to demonstrate their national belonging; and, did have university 
degrees. Overall, however, there is no hard and fast rule present and sufficiency tests were 
even more ambiguous and confusing.  
 
 
10.4 Sources of information 
 
Sources of information were dichotomised from the raw data table (Table 9) to provide a set 
data table (Table 22) along the following lines: 
 
• Croatian Memorial and Documentation Centre for the Homeland War (AN): 
trust in the source (1) or mixed levels of trust (0). 
• Non-television media (NT): distrusted and perceived as aiming to create a 
split in the Croatian public (1) or only distrusted (0). 
• Government (GO): distrusted and in need of lustration (1) or only distrusted 
(0). 
• Is anything being suppressed or hidden (SU): yes (1) or no (0). 
• The Church (CH): trusted (1) or distrusted/ignored (0) 
• Historians (HI): distrusted (1) or trusted/neutral (0).  
 
Table 22. Sources of information set data table. 
Condition AN NT GO SU CH HI TJ 
ZGT 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
ZAT 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
SIT 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
NUT 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
ZGV 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
ZAV 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
SIV 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
NUVB 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
NUVS 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
ZGP 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
ZAP 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
SIP 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
NUP 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
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The calculation for necessary conditions shows three results that highlight two factors: 
 
Government distrusted, but NOT in need of lustration (go) 
 
Non-television media distrusted, but NOT aiming to split the Croatian public (nt) 
 
Non-television media distrusted, but NOT aiming to split the Croatian public  
AND  
Government distrusted, but NOT in need of lustration (nt*go) 
 
Participants who felt that segments of the media did not aim to cause a split in the Croatian 
public and those who did not see a need for lustration of the government (as opposed to 
hard line anti-communists who felt institutions had been infiltrated by unwanted elements) 
were generally more open to deliberation on transitional justice. In this sense conspiracy 
theories were associated with individuals who also did not question issues related to 
transitional justice. All of the war veterans’ groups and the Zadar pensioners strongly felt that 
some kind of infiltration had occurred and that someone was trying to split up the Croatian 
public. Analysis of the sufficient conditions was inconclusive, but it does somewhat highlight 
the special position of the Sisak teachers:87 
 
AN*nt*go*ch*hi Sisak teachers; Zadar teachers 
nt*go*SU*ch*hi 
Zagreb teachers; Non-urban teachers; 
Zadar teachers 
an*nt*go*SU*CH*HI Sisak pensioners 
 
Overall these results point a general distrust of institutions that accompanies a lack of 
deliberation on transitional justice issues. As the necessary conditions point out, the distrust 
is spread across all groups and the nuances here lie in the extent to which sources are 
distrusted, rather than if they are distrusted at all. 
 
 
  
                                                
87 These solutions have not been expanded for the sake of brevity and clearer illustration.  
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10.5 The war narrative 
 
The raw data regarding the war narrative (Table 13) was dichotomised as follows: 
 
• Vukovar (VU): elements over the Vukovar narrative were questioned (1) or 
they were not (0). 
• Yugoslavia (YC), Milošević (MC) or both (BC) as criminal: this condition was 
not dichotomised, but was split into three possible options: that Yugoslavia 
was criminal, that Milošević was or that both were. In the table this is 
presented as binary, where 1 stands for the belief being present and 0 not. 
This was done because this view was expressed in such distinct ways and 
the criminalisation of one system or the other implies an important 
contrasting view of the past. 
• The war is not over (WO): a belief in this notion (1) or not (0).   
• Other conditions are present in the raw data table, but these make up a part 
of the outcome (TJ).  
 
Table 23. War narrative set data table. 
 VU YC MC BC WO TJ 
ZGT 1 0 0 1 0 1 
ZAT 0 0 1 0 0 1 
SIT 0 1 0 0 0 1 
NUT 1 0 0 1 0 1 
ZGV 0 1 0 0 1 0 
ZAV 0 1 0 0 1 0 
SIV 0 1 0 0 1 0 
NUVB 0 1 0 0 1 0 
NUVS 0 1 0 0 1 0 
ZGP 1 0 0 1 0 1 
ZAP 0 1 0 0 1 0 
SIP 0 0 1 0 0 1 
NUP 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 
 
The analysis of necessity shows that only one condition was necessary (wo), so all groups 
that believed the war not to be over also did not deliberate on transitional justice issues, and 
vice versa. In other words, “wo” was the only necessary condition with 100% coverage that 
led to a deliberation on transitional justice. The sufficiency analysis highlights the importance 
of which system is considered to be criminal: 
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VU*yc*mc*BC*wo 
Zagreb teachers; non-urban teachers; 
Zagreb pensioners 
vu*yc*MC*bc*wo Zadar teachers; Sisak pensioners 
vu*YC*mc*bc*wo Sisak teachers 
 
Again, the Sisak teachers stand out since they were the only group to deliberate on 
transitional justice and believe Yugoslavia to be criminal. All other groups either considered 
Milošević to be criminal or both Yugoslavia and Milošević. Overall, however, the key 
difference regarding the war narrative is related to how relevant the war remains in 
individuals’ lives. While it is factually inaccurate to claim the war is not over, what these 
individuals are most likely trying to say is that issues emerging from the war remain 
unresolved and that the war continues to pay a significant role in their personal lives.  
 
 
10.6 Serbs in the eyes of Croats 
 
The conditions for how Croats viewed the Serb minority were dichotomised from the raw 
data table (Table 15) as follows: 
 
• Debate on ethnic issues (MD): much debate (1) or little (0). 
• Cyrillic is a provocation or an attack (CP): agreement with the statement (1) 
or disagreement (0).  
• The role of the Church (RQ): the role was questioned or seen as political (1), 
or it was ignored (0).  
• Serbs are inherently aggressive (SA): agreement with the statement (1) or 
disagreement (0). 
• Serb returnees are accomplices (RA): agreement with the statement (1) or 
disagreement (0). 
  
 287 
Table 24. Serbs in the eyes of Croats set data table. 
 MD CP RQ SA RA TJ 
ZGT 0 0 1 0 0 1 
ZAT 0 1 1 0 0 1 
SIT 0 0 0 0 0 1 
NUT 0 0 1 0 0 1 
ZGV 1 1 0 1 1 0 
ZAV 1 1 0 1 1 0 
SIV 1 1 0 1 1 0 
NUVB 1 1 0 1 1 0 
NUVS 1 1 0 1 1 0 
ZGP 1 0 1 0 0 1 
ZAP 1 1 0 1 1 0 
SIP 1 1 0 0 0 1 
NUP 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 
 
A calculation of necessary conditions highlights two factors with 100% coverage together 
and independently of each other: 
 
Serb returnees are NOT accomplices (ra) 
 
Serbs are NOT inherently aggressive (sa) 
 
Serbs are NOT inherently aggressive  
AND  
Serb returnees are NOT accomplices (sa*ra) 
 
In other words, groups that deliberated on transitional justice did not believe Serbs to be 
inherently aggressive and did not see Serb returnees as accomplices. Analysis of sufficiency 
did not reveal any significant patterns. Overall these results highlight the unanimity of 
opinions across groups and that what sets war veterans and the Zadar group of pensioners 
out from the rest is a higher degree of distrust and suspicion of returnees. The higher level of 
distrust is, however, also present in many of their other views and seems to define a large 
part of their worldview.  
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10.7 War veterans 
 
The topic of war veterans in Croatian society saw a high degree of unanimity across the 
various topics. The raw data table (Table 16) was, therefore, reduced to only three 
conditions (Table 25): 
 
• Transitional justice and neoliberalism seen as linked (TN): the group did not 
make a semantic distinction between the two processes and saw them as 
linked (1) or they did make a distinction between them and did not see them 
as linked (0). It is included in this section since most groups, but especially 
pensioners and war veterans, saw the legacy of the conflict and the transition 
to neoliberalism as inextricably linked. Their discussions of the position of 
war veterans in Croatian society frequently referred to neoliberal transition.  
• Main issue facing war veterans (MV): the main issue facing war veterans is 
being forgotten (1) or the main issue facing war veterans are a lack of jobs 
and pensions (0). 
• View of NGOs (VN): belief that NGOs look to divide the Croatian public (1) or 
a neutral opinion of them (0).  
 
Table 25. War veterans set data table. 
 TN MV VN TJ 
ZGT 0 0 0 1 
ZAT 0 0 0 1 
SIT 0 0 0 1 
NUT 0 0 0 1 
ZGV 1 1 1 0 
ZAV 1 1 1 0 
SIV 1 1 1 0 
NUVB 1 1 1 0 
NUVS 1 1 1 0 
ZGP 1 0 0 1 
ZAP 1 0 1 0 
SIP 1 0 0 1 
NUP 1 0 0 0 
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The analysis of necessary conditions once again highlights distrust as the main differentiator 
between outcomes: 
 
Main issues facing war veterans are a lack of jobs and pensions (mv) 
 
Neutral view of NGOs (vn) 
 
Main issues facing war veterans are a lack of jobs and pensions AND neutral view of 
NGOs (mv*vn) 
 
It is not surprising to see that war veterans worry about being forgotten, but these groups 
that do not deliberate on transitional justice (except the Zadar war veterans) also believe that 
the NGO community in Croatia is looking to divide Croatian society. In the case of teachers, 
a sufficiency analysis also shows that they all make a semantic distinction between 
transitional justice and neoliberal transition (tn*mv*vn). In other words, they deliberate on 
transitional justice issues and see a difference between the two processes. Overall, although 
the topic predominantly featured agreement, the differences between outcomes are focused 
on general pessimism and distrust on the one hand and a generally better understanding of 
what transitional justice is, on the other.  
 
 
10.8 Overall comparison 
 
Is a general sense of distrust within society the key factor to deliberative justice succeeding 
or occurring? These analyses cannot ascertain that, but they do highlight a certain 
correlation. A comparison of all of the above-mentioned areas also provides an interesting 
result. This analysis reduced each separate theme into a binary outcome. It included the 
areas of agreement and the area of disagreement to get an overall picture of each area. This 
method captured further nuances missed in the theme-by-theme analyses. The conditions in 
this analysis were: 
 
• Sources of information (SI): given the general level of distrust, this was 
divided into higher levels (1) and comparatively lower levels (0). 
• The war narrative (WN): whether there was any debate at all on issues (1) or 
not (0).    
• Serbs in the eyes of Croats (SE): if four of more of the 7 factors were 
predominantly debated (1) or not (0).  
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• War veterans (CY): was there a high degree of pessimism (1) or a lower 
degree (0). Pessimism is defined as groups who believed the main issue 
facing war veterans is being forgotten (MV) and that NGOs look to divide the 
Croatian public (VN). 
• Transitional justice and neoliberalism seen as linked (TN): this was included 
to check if it holds any significance. Again, either the group did not make a 
semantic distinction between the two processes and saw them as linked (1) 
or they did make a distinction between them and did not see them as linked 
(0). 
• Outcome (TJ): the outcome was kept the same. 
 
Table 26. Comparison set data table. 
Condition SI WN SE CY TN TJ 
ZGT 0 1 1 0 0 1 
ZAT 0 1 1 0 0 1 
SIT 0 0 1 0 0 1 
NUT 0 1 1 0 0 1 
ZGV 1 0 0 1 1 0 
ZAV 1 0 0 1 1 0 
SIV 1 0 0 1 1 0 
NUVB 1 0 0 1 1 0 
NUVS 1 0 0 1 1 0 
ZGP 0 1 1 0 1 1 
ZAP 1 0 0 1 1 0 
SIP 0 0 0 0 1 1 
NUP 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
 
The analysis of necessary conditions highlights two areas that receive good coverage 
across groups: 
 
Low degree of pessimism regarding war veterans (cy) 
 
Comparatively lower levels of distrust of sources of information (si) 
 
Comparatively lower levels of distrust of sources of information  
AND  
A low degree of pessimism regarding war veterans (si*cy) 
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Groups with lowers levels of distrust regarding sources of information and war veterans also 
tended to deliberate on transitional justice issues, whereas those with particularly high levels 
did not. An analysis of sufficiency highlighted similar areas, in addition to the importance of 
debate over Serbs in Croatia: 
 
si*SE*cy*tn 
Zagreb teachers; Zadar teachers; non-
urban teachers; Sisak teachers 
si*SE*cy*WN 
Zagreb teachers; Zadar teachers; non-
urban teachers; Zagreb pensioners 
  
 
10.9 Amalgamating the results  
 
The focus groups, dyads, individual interviews, QCA and survey data point to a number of 
attitudes and perceptions among participants that may also be reflective of the wider public.  
Despite concerns about the representativeness of the sample, the combination of the 
various interviews with QCA adds more depth to how transitional justice issues are being 
deliberated in Croatian society. Most striking was the agreement across target segments on 
certain topics, which were rarely questioned, if they were questioned at all. For example, the 
notion of Croatian and Croat self-defence, as a part of the predominant war narrative, was 
universally accepted. Nearly all participants expressed it in a similar manner to NU.T.1, “For 
Croatia it was a true defensive war against the neighbouring narod who was not allowing us 
our freedom and who wanted to conquer us militarily, subdue us and force us to stay in the 
failed state of Yugoslavia” (interview with non-urban teacher). There was, however, no 
unanimity over whether it was the Croat narod that was attacked or the Croatian state, 
meaning there was no consensus over if the conflict was seen as ethnic or political.  
 
The war narrative is very much an “everyday” narrative and all participants discussed it in a 
local and personal way. Individuals on the frontline felt they knew it first hand, “About [the 
war’s] general characteristics, from people who experienced it as such. I can only say what I 
saw and what I experienced” (dyad with Sisak pensioners). Individuals who were not on the 
frontline spoke of it in a similar fashion, “I personally think I do [have an understanding of the 
Homeland War]. Not only from written sources, but also from my conversations with people. 
When I put all of that together then I think I have a fairly complete picture” (dyad with Zagreb 
teachers). Despite discrepancies in attitudes about the ICTY, there was agreement (strongly 
supported by survey data) that the ICTY was at they very least inefficient: 
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ZA.T.2 – Some big fish avoided justice in the end.  
 
ZA.T.1 – Or did not live long enough to see the trial end. 
 
ZA.T.2 – Either they did not live long enough or they died before making it there (focus 
group with Zadar teachers). 
 
Many areas, however, were marked by differences in opinion. At times these were relatively 
nuanced. For example, all target segments trusted participants and television pictures as a 
source of information and distrusted other sources. What set apart those who did deliberate 
on transitional justice issues and those who did not, however, were the levels of distrust. 
Those that deliberated simply distrusted the non-television media, “I have the impression 
that unfortunately we do not have any newspapers that are serious, where you can with 
certainty read something smart” (focus groups with Zadar teachers). Those that did not, saw 
them as attempting to divide the Croatian public and especially war veterans from the rest: 
 
NU.V.4 – The demonstration on Savska has lasted for 60 days. In the news it gets a 
minute or not even a minute.  
 
NU.V.5 – What minute? 
 
NU.V.3 – This is already old news, it does not exist anymore. 
 
NU.V.4 – They are once again trying to create a barrier between the civilian victims and 
the branitelji (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
Likewise, all groups distrusted the government. Some exhibited merely distrust of an 
incompetent and selfish set of institutions and individuals that are no different to other 
governments through time:  
 
SI.T.1 – No government will say everything it knows. Only what suits them. 
 
SI.T.2 – Yes. And this is normal for every government. In the future they will not release 
any more information.  
 
SI.T.3 – Throughout history it has always been like that. It has never changed, from 
Rome until now (focus group with Sisak teachers).  
 
Those who did not deliberate on transitional justice saw a government that was infiltrated by 
“Greater Serbs, Yugonostalgics, persecutors of the Croatian national spirit throughout 
history, UDBA members. Today they have completely infiltrated all the pores of Croatian 
economic, political and daily life” (dyad with non-urban war veterans Slavonia). Likewise, the 
war narrative, despite universal agreement on certain facets, exhibited a key differentiator in 
groups of whether participants felt the war was over or not. The war remained a central 
theme to some participants’ lives and they saw issues from the war as unresolved: 
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NU.P.5 – It is important for us to say what we think of our neighbours, the Serbs, how we 
now view them. In no way and never will we once again look at each other the same. 
Even if we lived another 100 years. They will come again. They said that even our great-
grandchildren will fall victim to the Serbs.  
 
NU.P.2 – They learn that. But we do not. Our future generations will not hate. They are 
vengeful. If there is a war, they will attack (focus group with non-urban pensioners). 
 
The war did not hold the same central position in the lives of those who did deliberate on 
transitional justice. Whereas the above pensioners saw insecurity, a Zadar teacher merely 
saw tensions, “What is happening now is that Croatia is attacking Serbia over Šešelj, and 
Serbia is attacking Croatia over Cyrillic, because it cannot keep ten signs safe. Tensions are 
being kept high” (focus group with Zadar teachers). Many of those individuals believed 
tensions related to the war were still present in Croatian society, they adjudged much of 
politics and society around them based on the war, but this did not define their lives in the 
same manner.  
 
Groups that deliberated on transitional justice also saw the ICTY as necessary or not as a 
mistake, despite its many flaws: 
 
Moderator – Do you think it was a mistake to establish the ICTY? 
 
ZG.T.1 – No. 
 
ZG.T.2 – Perhaps it was not, I do not know, a mistake.  
 
ZG.T.1 – A war crime has to be punished.  
 
ZG.T.2 – Yes, in that light it definitely was not a mistake (dyad with Zagreb teachers). 
 
Those who did not deliberate, on the other hand, saw the ICTY as a mistake. They also 
exhibited far more distrust of Serbs. Here the key differentiators between those who 
deliberated and not were whether Serbs are seen as inherently aggressive or not. These 
types of exchanges were common with groups that saw Serbs as inherently aggressive: 
 
NU.P.4 – They are simply that kind of narod.  
 
NU.P.1 – They would wage war now.  
 
NU.P.4 – Yes, they are like that. It is in their blood (focus group with non-urban 
pensioners). 
 
These groups also viewed Serb returnees as accomplices to crimes committed by Serb 
forces during the war. One participant recounted a story of how she told a Serb returnee “in 
you, in every person who returns from Serbia, I see the potential killer of my husband” (focus 
 294 
group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). Finally, the QCA and discussions showed 
how groups differed in their view of war veterans. While those that deliberated on transitional 
justice considered the main problem facing the population of war veterans to be a lack of 
jobs, those who did not deliberate (including all five of the war veterans’ groups) were more 
preoccupied with the war veterans being forgotten or misrepresented in society: 
 
ZA.V.6. – Currently there are 37 branitelji in parliament, and they have never had a 
shared idea, despite their party allegiances, to solve something for the Croatian branitelji. 
This has not happened a single time. Not in a single session of parliament. This means 
that there is not even a reason to talk about the war (focus group with Zadar war 
veterans). 
  
Again, the differentiator is associated with different levels of distrust. Pessimism that certain 
individuals experience when interpreting the world around them seems to also be linked to a 
lack of deliberation on topics related to transition justice. 
 
 
10.10 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of QCA in this study was to illustrate and to validate results. The purpose was 
not to ascertain causality or causal paths, rather it was used to highlight patterns. By 
dichotomising factors or conditions, nuances of narratives were lost but certain aspects of 
them were better exposed. Necessary conditions identified key patterns, while sufficient 
conditions at times proved useful in emphasising the complexity of narratives across groups.  
 
A key differentiator between whether groups deliberated on transitional justice issues or not 
was the perception of whether the ICTY was necessary or not. Those who felt it was 
necessary also questioned or debated over recent history and dominant narratives. Other 
themes also stood out, as Table 27 outlines. 
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Table 27. Overview of key conditions that lead to deliberation on transitional justice issues. 
Theme Necessary Conditions Sufficient Conditions 
Survey 
responses 
Individuals and officials convicted at the ICTY and 
domestic courts to be considered criminals, not 
heroes. 
 
Little importance attached to demonstrating national 
belonging. 
 
Little interest in national history and the fate of the 
nation. 
 
University education. 
N/A 
Sources of 
information 
Government distrusted, but no need for lustration. 
 
Non-television media distrusted, but not considered 
to be aiming to cause splits in the public. 
N/A 
War 
narrative 
War considered to be over. 
Milošević or both 
Milošević and Yugoslavia 
considered to be 
criminal. 
Serbs in 
eyes of 
Croats 
Returnees not seen as accomplices. 
 
Serbs not seen as inherently aggressive. 
N/A 
Veterans 
Main issue with war veterans are a lack of pensions 
and jobs, not that they are being forgotten. 
 
Neutral view of NGOs, not seeing them as aiming to 
divide Croatian society. 
Only teachers: semantic 
distinction between 
transitional justice and 
neoliberal transition. 
Overall 
comparison 
Role of Serbs in Croatia debated. 
 
Lower levels of distrust. 
N/A 
 Source: Own composition 
 
Issues of distrust are present under all of the different themes as the key factor that 
differentiates between where deliberation over transitional justice issues took place and 
where it did not. It is on this level that war veterans, in particular, stand out. For example, all 
target segments distrust most sources of information, but war veterans and the Zadar 
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pensioners also felt that some parts of the media and government had been infiltrated by 
unwanted elements. Equally, these segments felt that the war was not over. These highly 
suspicios groups also happened to not deliberate on transitional justice issues and see no 
need for the ICTY, whereas the other groups at least featured some debate.  
 
The QCA confirms a number of points made in the prior chapters. Mainly, it shows the 
general agreement across all target segments in several areas, such as high distrust of 
media; perceptions of ICTY inefficiency; that Cyrillic signs should not be put up in Vukovar 
despite Serbs deserving equal rights; that war veterans are being manipulated but that their 
associations are corrupt; and, that the economy is the key to reconciliation. As in most 
chapters, teachers stood out from the other target segments. The QCA also raised a number 
of further points. Statistical indicators, at least in this study, were not particularly indicative of 
patterns. War veterans’ views and attitudes were nearly completely uniform, while teachers 
and especially pensioners showed variation. A key differentiator between whether groups 
deliberated on transitional justice issues or not was the perception of whether the ICTY was 
necessary or not. Those who felt it was necessary also questioned or debated over recent 
history and dominant narratives. Levels of distrust, however, proved to be the most common 
differentiator across the groups in this study. For example, is the Croatian government 
simply distrusted or is it also infiltrated and looking to split the public? Are Serbs inherently 
aggressive? Are all returnees accomplices to war crimes? This list also includes views on 
NGOs, non-television media and feelings of the war not being over. All in all, the QCA 
highlighted that those with lower degrees of distrust and pessimism with these institutions 
also deliberated on transitional justice issues.  
 
While the analysis hints at a certain atmosphere of pessimism that is impacting the 
transitional justice process across all groups, it is also important to keep in mind that 
transitional justice is a process and that maybe the fact that issues related to it are being 
deliberated at all means that transitional justice institutions have succeeded in their work. 
The following, concluding, chapter attempts to draw conclusions on how successful the 
transitional justice process in Croatia has been in fostering deliberation on the past and if 
this analytical framework is helpful or not.  
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CHAPTER 11  
Conclusion  
 
The thesis analysed what effect the transitional justice process in Croatia has had on norms 
and narratives related to the 1991-1995 conflict. The results point to ambiguous effects. The 
process took place in an atmosphere of cynicism and distrust of institutions, which greatly 
affected how participants regarded transitional justice authorities and narratives presented 
from top-down. Discussions on most topics across all target segments consistently shifted to 
how the environment in Croatia is corrupt and how politics in the state has ruined 
“everything”. To some participants, the Croatian state was at fault, as much as Serbian 
aggression, for the dire situation that today’s society is in. Justice narratives, as well as the 
hoped for trickle-down effects of human rights norms, struggled to compete with personal 
and local everyday narratives, unless were in line with everyday expectations. This greatly 
affected how participants came to understand the world around them. A thorough and 
society-wide reckoning with past wrongdoings committed by Croatian forces or state 
authorities has not occurred, despite rulings at the ICTY and in domestic war crimes trials 
showing that they did happen. A significant normative and cultural change did not occur in 
society and it seems that, as Drumbl (2007) asserted, war crimes trials preoccupied with 
retribution and deterrence (the primary aims of these courts) lack the capability to instigate 
such change in society.  
 
The Croatian media did not discuss transitional justice issues in a thematic fashion, instead 
they predominantly used the episodic news frame and focused on incidents over analyses. 
They did not draw connections between various interrelated issues. When the media did 
report thematically on transitional justice, they for the most part reported on the trial of 
Gotovina, which has come to define much of the Croatian state’s and society’s relationship 
with the ICTY and the transitional justice process more broadly. The proliferation of 
horizontal media, such as Internet portals, has changed this dynamic somewhat since they 
have questioned many of the mainstream issues that received only episodic coverage by 
vertical media, such as the predominant daily newspapers. Media frames influence how the 
public view the world, but they are also influenced by the environment that journalists work 
in. This analysis did not ascertain if the media is reflecting societal values and narratives, or 
if it is influencing them. It did, however, describe this environment, regardless of how it came 
to be.   
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Everyday narratives held particular sway over individuals in this study, since their most 
trusted source of information on the Homeland War were participants. They were highlighted 
as such across all target segments and were seen as superior sources of information in 
comparison to the media, historians, courts and governments. Despite being distrusted, 
elites and the media do at the very least set the parameters of narratives by performing and 
choosing what is available in the discursive space. Everyday interactions and discussions, 
on the other hand, are where narratives come to be debated, contested and affirmed. It is 
here that top-down and bottom-up narratives interact. This is also where transitional justice 
efforts to change norms and narratives can hit significant obstacles, since individuals trusted 
personal connections and participants far more than the narratives presented to them by 
authorities from above. The personal and local, or everyday, nature of the war narrative is, 
therefore, relatively more easily reproduced.  
 
In the eyes of participants, the nearly universal, predominant war narrative of self-defence 
and victimhood provided justification for certain actions, including some that have been 
interpreted as war crimes by legal authorities. This narrative can be dangerous, since it 
creates a notion of “us, the victims” versus “them, the aggressors”. Participants constructed 
a context for understanding the past from a variety of perspectives, but the war narrative 
was particularly influential due to its everyday nature and emotional appeal. In comparison, 
justice narratives are far removed from the everyday, they are seen as coming from 
institutions in The Hague or Zagreb. These institutions are often perceived as illegitimate, 
which can prevent trickle-down effects of transitional justice to occur. In extreme instances, 
the transitional justice process was interpreted as a continued aggression against Croatia. 
Some deliberation of the war narrative is, however, present and groups that deliberated on 
transitional justice issues did not see this enduring aggression. All groups, however, 
continued to interpret a range of events through the perspective of the Homeland War.  
 
The war narrative is central to many other topics within the realm of transitional justice. 
Participants defined war crimes in relation to their understanding of Croatian defence. 
Consequently, they exhibited a certain tolerance for deviance in the context of crimes 
committed by Croats. Notions of an unorganised and unprepared Croatian defence were 
seen as mitigating circumstances to war crimes, which were often defined in relation to 
Serbian crimes committed as a part of planned aggression. Again, the elite and far-removed 
clashed with the local and everyday; transitional justice institutions in Croatia and the 
Netherlands struggled to instil a rule of law norm in the context of localised complexities and 
already present normative expectations. Respondents felt powerless in a system they felt 
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was unresponsive, untrustworthy, corrupt and inefficient, which imposed justice on them 
from above and, often, afar.  
 
Participants also based their legal reasoning on localised folk theories of law, which again 
allowed for an apologetic attitude towards certain crimes. This understanding of law was not 
legally consistent, but was instead consistent with the political and emotional narratives 
prevalent in respondents’ views of the world. The effect of this is that the highly emotional 
war narrative plays a large role in shaping attitudes towards law. Moreover, factual 
inaccuracies often helped justify these narratives. This involved typical symbols of the war 
narrative, such as the baka with the rifle, which lowered Croatian war crimes to the level of 
ordinary crimes, if they were seen as crimes at all. These were seen as unexceptional 
crimes in war, as side effects of a horrible state of affairs, to be punished more leniently in 
comparison to exceptional Serb crimes, to be punished more harshly. The ICTY’s and local 
courts’ generally sound legal judgments and strict adherence to legal justice over political 
justice has not helped significantly develop understandings of law, but it has helped foster 
deliberation on these topics with certain groups of individuals.88 Localised narratives and 
normative processes may have undermined the trickle-down effects of rule of law norms, but 
that does not mean this will not change in the future, since the norms are at the very least 
being discussed.  
 
The war narrative also defined how participants viewed Serbs, the “other” to Croat identity. 
The war narrative contributed greatly to the Orthodox Church being seen as aggressive and 
an obstacle to reconciliation, as opposed to the forgiving Catholic Church. Although a range 
of survey results and participants’ comments pointed to openness towards the Serb minority 
and minorities in general, there was also consensus among participants and the wider public 
that Serbs should not be given equal language rights in Vukovar at the time. The issue of 
Cyrillic signs in Vukovar had two effects on participants, it reduced their trust in government 
institutions and made Croats feel threatened by a perceived Serb threat, to a lesser or 
greater extent. Moreover, individuals frequently use notions of collective guilt based on 
ethnicity to decide who is culpable for committed crimes. This can have serious implications 
during periods of higher tensions, when members of outgroups can become targets of 
violence.  
 
                                                
88 It is possible that there is a difference where judgments are not sound (for example, it can be 
objectively argued that the Šešelj trial was not legally sound) or where there is a big gulf between the 
reasoning of the trial and appeal chambers.  
 300 
Finally, all participants agreed that war veterans faced significant problems in Croatian 
society, but the exact nature and degree of these differed among participants. All target 
segments, however, agreed that war veterans’ associations were politicised and often 
corrupt. Despite this, associations remain a useful ally to political parties that can use 
nationalist symbols to gain their allegiance and those of voters who agree with their plight 
(such as all groups in this study that did not deliberate on transitional justice). The link 
between Croatian economic transition and transitional justice highlights this potential. To 
many respondents, the two transitions were semantically linked and were referred to 
interchangeably. This allows political elites to divert attention from one by emphasising 
issues in the other, in other words by covering economic woes up (such as for example high 
unemployment or stinted economic growth) by portraying them as attacks on war veterans 
(lack of jobs for war veterans specifically) or on all of Croatia (Cyrillic signs in Vukovar). This 
highlights how a period of change can be welcomed and how it can be remembered.  
 
In so many facets, the war narrative enjoyed universal agreement among study participants 
and nearly universal agreement with the Croatian public, meaning the trickle-down effects of 
norms and justice cascades do not occur, as the justice narrative is wholly rejected. In other 
instances, with some groups and target segments, the complex interaction between two, or 
more, narratives produced a deliberation on topics relevant to transitional justice. This does 
not mean that norms associated with the process will take hold in society, but it does at the 
very least lead to a discursive space marked by numerous narrative options, rather than a 
monopoly. In the case of Croatia, as with many other case studies around the world, norm 
advocates were present and influential in society. These norm advocates, however, did not 
promote human rights but instead primarily promoted the war narrative and, often, the more 
extreme elements of it.  
 
This analysis provides a further case study for how pressure for norm change comes from a 
variety of sources and that this pressure can be for or against human rights norms. The 
spiral model of norm change (Risse et al., 1999), which assumes that pressure on human 
rights norm violating governments will come from below, through domestic norm believers 
and transnational human rights networks, is correct in the case of Croatia, since these actors 
did exist and exerted pressure. It is, however, debatable how much influence they ever had 
and if they could ever have hoped to achieve significant results in the face of a grouping like 
the war veterans, who laid the foundation of their arguments in the powerful war narrative. 
The central role of emotion in periods of drastic change, or entrenched transition as in 
Croatia, has been overlooked in research on post-socialist societies (Schäuble, 2014: 15). 
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The case of Croatia shows how pressure from below can hamper the spread of human 
rights norms, especially when combined with dominant and emotional everyday narratives.  
 
 
11.1 Was transitional justice successful?   
 
It is highly debatable if the process of transitional justice can be reduced to a binary result of 
success or failure. It is equally debatable if causality can ever be ascertained in such a 
complex process, when even its beginning and end often remain hard to pinpoint and its 
realms of influence remain unknown. Despite the numerous instances of transitional justice 
across the globe, few cases are of any comparative use due to their intrinsic uniqueness. 
Even the countries of the former Yugoslavia provide little in the sense of parallels to be 
drawn. One comparison that may be of more comparative use with regards to a deliberative 
interpretation of transitional justice is Croatia’s first such process, dealing with crimes 
committed during the Second World War and during the Yugoslav regime.  
 
The legacy of both the Ustasha and the Yugoslav regimes remain in many ways 
misunderstood. The communist past, for example, was almost wholly ignored and not 
systematically addressed, as opposed to many other Eastern European countries which did 
tackle this period of their histories to varying degrees (Subotić, 2015b: 204). Such a process 
was difficult under the Yugoslav circumstances of the 1990s, which were marked by violent 
conflict and nationalism. The consequence of this was that human rights abuses from the 
communist period were presented as attacks by one ethnicity against another, depending on 
who was asked (Subotić, 2015b: 190). Communist crimes were never analysed in a political 
vacuum and were used for the purposes of nationalistic mobilisation (Subotić, 2015b: 190). 
In other words, transitional justice was politicised from the outset and serious examination of 
this period is yet to happen (Subotić, 2015b: 205). As Subotić (2015b: 205) warns, “if there is 
one lesson to be learned from the Yugoslav experience, it is for the transitional justice 
scholars and practitioners not to give up this historical ground so easily to others, but to 
insist on a careful and systematic evaluation of the communist past.”  
 
Similarly, a lack of systematic studies of Second World War, Ustasha and Partisan crimes 
has led to highly diverging understandings of this period of Croatian history. These different 
memories and associated commemorations have polarised Croatian society and instigated 
political, media and cultural debates (Pavlaković, 2008). More recent events, such as the 
debate surrounding the shouting of “Za dom, spremni” at football matches, exemplifies how 
a lack of understanding of the past can lead to dangerous present-day interpretations. Chief 
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among these incidents was the shouting of the salute by a Croatian national team football 
player, Josip Šimunić, to a crowd of 25,000 spectators in Zagreb in November 2013.89 The 
Australian-born player highlighted his lack of understanding of the past himself in numerous 
subsequent interviews. In a post-match interview he said he “associates home with love, 
warmth and positive struggle – everything that we showed on the pitch to win our place in 
the World Cup… Some people have to learn history” (Bieber, 2013). Later, at his Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) trial, he continued to defend his views and claimed that he 
considered the salute to be patriotic and that he did not understand whom he actually 
insulted (Novi List, 2014).  
 
More importantly, as Brentin (2016: 9) points out, while much media attention was directed 
at the incident, it focused on Šimunić himself and few outlets discussed the significance of 
the player “performing” in front of a “receptive” audience that had already been chanting the 
salute throughout the game. Accounts were centred on his individual stupidity, rather than 
the societal problem, much like in reporting on transitional justice issues that generally 
orientated towards reporting on incidents rather than broader analysis.90 While most media 
outlets condemned the incident, social media reactions were far more ambiguous. 
Comments to many articles and on Facebook pages of newspapers often contradicted the 
outlets criticisms of the event based on different interpretations of the “true” meaning of the 
salute (Brentin, 2016: 9). These incidents have alarmed commentators and have highlighted 
how intense the interaction between different interpretations of the past within Croatian 
society can be (Brentin, 2016: 11).91 Most worryingly, they have highlighted how Ustasha 
symbols, which connote a specific interpretation of the past, have become normal in 
mainstream Croatian sport, culture and politics (Brentin, 2016: 11). 
 
These examples show how easily memory can be used for nationalist mobilisation, 
especially when the discursive space is dominated or monopolised by nationalist elements. 
In this sense, deliberation of issues leads to a discussion about the past and does not allow 
it to be easily hijacked for other purposes. This also gives a good reason for establishing a 
tribunal outside of the former Yugoslavia, since it forces at least some part of the process of 
reckoning to be undertaken, although this does not mean that the target society will 
mechanically deliberate on it. Respondents in the Zadar pensioners group, overtly 
sympathetic to Pavelić and potentially the NDH regime, directly addressed this issue. They 
                                                
89 For an overview of the incident and all of the extensive reactions to it (including by media, elites, 
sports governing bodies and so on) see Brentin (2016).  
90 This was not, however, universal. Boris Dežulović of Novi List stressed that this was a societal 
problem and that the salute had become normal among Croatian football fans.  
91 For a selection of reactions see Horvat (2013), Milekić (2016) and Simon Wiesenthal Center (2016).  
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felt that an institution such as the ICTY would have left a better legacy of that period through 
its ability to produce documentation, although this does not mean they would have 
necessarily been happy with such an institution’s ultimate verdict (the participants seemed to 
think they would absolve Pavelić). The ICTY provided a set of “reference points” that 
focused public debate on the interpretation of facts, rather than the establishment of them 
(Rangelov, 2014: 48). The inherent uncertainty lies in who will engage with the trial and how, 
but this is also the significance of the process, since “indeterminacy is seen here as 
pregnant with opportunity” (Rangelov, 2014: 48).  
 
Moreover, for a nation to thrive without significant internal conflict or inconsistency, it must 
accept its own existence through time and, thereby, acknowledge acts committed in its past 
that still burden the contemporary community (Maier, 1988: 14). Because many Croatians 
(adopting Maier’s and Habermas’ argument regarding Germans) had grown up in a 
psychological and institutional framework that had once descended into violence, it is 
possible that all Croatians are still potential perpetrators and the situation could happen 
again. Although this is quite an abstract concept, it does highlight the need to interpret and 
debate the past, but to also achieve a balance so as not to become obsessed and burdened 
by it.  
  
It remains difficult to compare progress in any instance of transitional justice to another. In 
the case of Croatia, two violent periods of history have previously been ignored or hijacked 
for the purposes of nationalist mobilisation. If the most recently instance of transitional 
justice, from the 1991-1995 conflict, is compared to the previous two, then there may be 
reason to be optimistic. Although the Croatian public continue to interpret events in the past 
through the prism of the Homeland War, this most recent conflict also features deliberation 
in certain segments of society. By removing a part of the transitional justice process from the 
region, the ICTY at a minimum attempted to ascertain what occurred in the region, giving 
publics the chance to focus on interpretation. Although this did not guarantee a debate about 
the past in the region, it did at least provide some basis for it. It also helped develop local 
judiciary capacity, which may have held more potential to initiate deliberation. A plurality of 
views is present on facets of the Homeland War and, among participants in this study, these 
views were not polarising. The one group that ended in an argument ultimately disagreed 
over issues pertaining to the Second World War and the Yugoslav regime, rather than the 
most recent conflict, which highlights the unresolved nature of the former two compared to 
the latter. While it may not be possible to adjudge transitional justice an outright success, it 
can be said that it has achieved much more than has previously occurred in Croatian society 
and possibly more than many may have expected at the outset. 
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11.2 Deliberative justice: A useful framework for analysis? 
 
Rangelov (2014) effectively uses the deliberative character of legal processes to create a 
framework for analysis for three former Yugoslav countries: Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia. 
This thesis further supports his case study of Croatia by providing a broader picture of where 
deliberation occurred within the realm of transitional justice. Is this a comparatively useful 
framework for future studies? The outcome of these two studies would say that it is, but only 
in combination with other forms of analysis that can help overcome the framework’s 
limitations.  
 
What this approach to transitional justice does show is that something is occurring in society, 
whereas so many other studies have shown little to no effect (Hafner-Burton and Ron, 2007; 
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007; Horne, 2015; Lynch and Marchesi, 2015; Thoms et al., 
2010). This may be exactly because what the process can help incite is a discussion about 
the past. The approach used in this thesis shows that this is happening in Croatian society 
by highlighting the nature and extent of the nuanced interaction between various narratives. 
This also shows how such processes are not mechanical, but fluid and highly complex. 
Unlike in previous instances of potential transitional justice in Croatia, which could have 
dealt with the legacies of Second World War or communist crimes but did not, the legacy of 
the Homeland War is deliberated upon by certain segments of society and has, for the most 
part, not been appropriated for the purposes of political goals. This is based on the 
assumption that deliberation on these issues will make it harder for nationalism and ethnic 
conflict to grow. A return to conflict is, however, still possible and unresolved issues from the 
past, for example the legacy of Ustasha and Partisan crimes in Croatia, can still come to 
define modern day politics.  
 
This particular framework has limited comparative use due to its qualitative nature and due 
to the uniqueness of the environment. While a qualitative approach provides more depth to a 
study, which seems necessary when analysing such complex interactions within politics, law 
and culture, it does not lend itself to generalisation and comparison between cases. 
Furthermore, more could have been done to produce sequences to analyse rather than 
instances. The semi-structured approach to focus groups employed in this study allowed for 
comparison between groups, but it did occasionally prevent the free flow of conversation and 
particularly quiet groups, such as teachers, may have been more talkative in a less 
structured group and environment (for example, in a more informal focus group held in a 
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café), although this may have resulted in limited comparative data. In order to become more 
useful in ascertaining the success of transitional justice processes more widely, it would be 
necessary to develop a more systematic model. Instances of transitional justice around the 
globe are inherently complex and rarely suited to large-N studies, since the overall number 
of cases is not particularly high (as far as quantitative analysis goes) and the different cases 
are so unique. In-depth case studies are necessary and QCA, therefore, holds a great deal 
of potential for comparative studies since it combines deep qualitative analysis with medium-
N case comparisons. 
 
Finally, a reasonable timeframe for analysis of transitional justice remains debatable. 20 
years have passed since the conflict ended, meaning we are no longer only witnessing 
short-term effects. It is, however, unclear when the “transition” part of “transitional justice” 
ends and when we can stop considering Croatian society as undergoing the process of 
transitional justice. Given that Croatian society is currently still struggling to interpret crimes 
committed in the 1940s, it is not unreasonable to assume that the legacy of the Homeland 
War will be long-lasting. Frameworks for analysis need to take into account that the effects 
of transitional justice can only become apparent in the long-term (Stover and Weinsten, 
2004). Arguably, however, the real litmus test for transitional justice is whether a return to 
violence eventually happens. 
 
 
11.3 Lessons for the future 
 
So what could have been done differently in Croatia? This is a dangerously open-ended 
question that points more towards numerous incremental changes in the realm of 
practicality, rather than legal process. At the very least, the Croatian case provides a number 
of lessons for transitional justice.  
 
 
11.3.1 Victims 
 
Participants in the study highlighted the plight of victims of the conflict. For many, not only in 
the veterans’ and victims’ groups, these were highly emotional and personal matters. The 
emotional nature of these topics makes them easy to appropriate for political purposes and 
resolving them could limit the space that such opportunists act in. Specifically, focus groups 
and interviews highlighted three areas in which the status of victims could be improved. First 
and foremost is the issue of missing persons. This was raised in all groups, those that were 
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still searching for relatives and those who were relatively far removed from the conflict. This 
remains an issue in Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia as much as, if not more, than in Croatia. It is 
conceivable to conduct a more systematic search for graves and it is possible that records of 
graves exist with the respective militaries. At the very least, such a practical move would 
remove much emotion from these debates. Related to this is the notion that the exact 
number of deceased could be ascertained, thereby lessening the amount of dispute over 
numbers.  
 
Secondly, victims who survived the conflict but continue to suffer from the effects of it could 
be given more rights, assistance and support. For example, laws addressing sexual violence 
during the conflict have been slow to develop. The Croatian parliament only adopted the 
Law on the Rights of Victim of Sexual Violence during the Armed Aggression against the 
Republic of Croatia in the Homeland War in 2015 (Narodne Novine, 2015). This law provides 
extensive rights, assistance and support for victims of wartime sexual violence (Clarke, 
2016). Moreover, the government is building four Veterans’ Centres in Daruvar, Petrinja, Sinj 
and Šibenik as a part of a 20-year project to help war veterans and victims better integrate 
into society (Clarke, 2016: 143). The mere presence of the law and the centres is, however, 
not enough to help victims receive appropriate assistance and support. Moreover, 
psychological assistance in rural areas, in particular, remains limited (Schäuble, 2014: 201). 
At this early stage it is also imperative and practically possible to publicise these 
developments and new rights widely (Clarke, 2016: 143). This highly pragmatic process also 
opens up an opportunity for public deliberation on the issue of wartime sexual violence, 
which can help address the social norms that made it socially acceptable to ignore for this 
long (Clarke, 2016; Duggan et al., 2008).  
 
Thirdly, a large number of individuals remain displaced regionally and globally. The 
implementation and enforcement of laws facilitating their return are lax, especially given the 
still present tensions in the region’s societies. Nevertheless, more supervision from 
authorities could help ensure that the laws are being properly prescribed.  
 
 
11.3.2 Perpetrators and their legacy 
 
Despite the imperfect record of both international and domestic legal efforts at finding and 
trying perpetrators at all levels across the region, certain parts of society do want to find out 
who the perpetrators of the violence were, what their current whereabouts are and what their 
motivations were. Following the acquittals of Gotovina and Markač (and hence the legal 
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clearing of their names), Croatian President at the time, Ivo Josipović, stressed the need to 
find the real perpetrators of the crimes that the former generals were accused of (Jović and 
Romić, 2012). Although some may disagree with such efforts, they do so with limited 
legitimacy. Even those who only wish to see perpetrators from the opposing side tried can 
offer few legitimate arguments as to why all perpetrators should not be tried, although as the 
analysis has shown, who constitutes a perpetrator differs greatly between one’s own and the 
opposing side. All participants expressed the more general desire, likely also present in the 
general public, to identify the key causes of the violence and to try and punish individuals 
responsible for it. One of the enduring questions that hangs over everyone’s heads is “how 
did it come to this?” 
 
For some the violence from the conflict has not stopped. Much of Croatia, as well as Bosnia 
and Kosovo, remains mined. Croatian demining efforts are extensive but left-over devices 
continue to claim lives and hamper efforts at rebuilding infrastructure. More could be done 
regionally to deal with this problem and to clamp down on what is in parts a highly corrupt 
industry (UNDP, 2015).92  
 
 
 
11.3.3 What other options existed? 
 
Since attitudes and decisions on topics of transitional justice are so personal and emotional, 
it is debatable if trials could have ever provided an effective remedy. It is possible that 
Fletcher (2005), Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003), Christie (2001) and many others are correct 
in concluding that, although under some uncommon and particular circumstances trials can 
help with this process, these are so rare that it is difficult to draw any effective parallels 
between trials and reconciliation. Again, Bass’ (2000: 304) pessimistic view of international 
criminal tribunals as the “least awful alternative” sounds plausible. The elements of justice 
and fact-finding discussed above hold some pragmatic, although possibly still idealistic, 
alternatives. What the results of this thesis show is that if the transitional justice process is to 
successfully engage with personal and emotional problems, then the “everyday” elements of 
the process also need to be taken into account. Such, more ambitious ventures, may be 
better suited to projects outside of the courtroom.  
 
                                                
92 For more up to date information see: http://www.mineactionreview.org/country/bosnia-and-
herzegovina/anti-personnel-mines. 
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Truth commissions and fact-finding efforts are one such possibility. The archives they build 
can be understood not as propagators of certain versions of the truth (although they often 
are in poorly run efforts), but as spaces where the past can be debated, interpreted and 
reinterpreted by various actors (Jones and Oliveira, 2016). This facet of archives aids 
deliberation on the past and the entrenchment of democracy (Jones and Oliveira, 2016). 
Civil society may be better positioned to cater to these types of projects than any court ever 
could. 
 
The ICTY does have elements of this in its work, since the ICTY Court Records, or archives, 
will be one of its key legacies. They provide a repository of all of its investigative work, but 
the question remains what to do with them upon completion of the Tribunal’s mandate. As 
much as there may have been a benefit to holding the Tribunal outside of the region, 
likewise there may be a benefit to keeping the archive at a distance. This may, however, 
lead to the archives suffering from the same lack of legitimacy as the ICTY. If the archives 
were to be moved to the region, then would they be kept in multiple locations? What is the 
symbolism of this? Is it at all practical? What location and form of archive will lead to 
deliberation of the past and a more thorough understanding of it, so as to avoid a return to 
violent nationalism in the region? These are the difficult questions that the transitional justice 
process in the former Yugoslavia will face in the near future and which may define how the 
work of the ICTY will be remembered. Arguably, this will be its greatest legacy. 
 
Going forward it may also be beneficial for institutions involved in the transitional justice 
process to focus less on merely providing more information to publics in the region, but to 
also better understand why they are making the choices they are making and under what 
circumstances. Inundating publics with information and blaming them for not accessing the 
readily available data or pointing out inherent condradictions in attitudes may not help 
resolve any of the key obstacles that the legacy of conflict has created. Instead, it may be 
more important to better understand what feels “right” for individuals, in that circumstance 
and at that time, when they make decisions that may be discriminatory towards others. The 
focus is, therefore, not on information but on resolving psychological blockages. 
 
 
11.4 Memories of war 
 
What this study truly showed was how a small number of individuals constructed their 
memory and understanding of the Homeland War, as well as how this affects their lives 
today. The study would not have been possible without their honesty and willingness to 
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relive, often painful and traumatic, memories. The issues discussed were in the realms of 
politics, law and culture, but to all participants they were highly emotional. Many experienced 
the war at close range in a shockingly personal way. A Zadar war veteran openly spoke 
about how she lost four brothers and her husband. A woman in Banovina had to hide in her 
basement as a child, before her parents were found and killed by Serb paramilitaries. Some 
had to flee their homes, never to return. Others were fortunate enough not to have 
experienced extreme personal loss, but fought on the various front lines of the war. They 
were the rudimentary defence that has come to define the Croatian war narrative.  A Sisak 
war veteran went to war “in sneakers with a kinder egg [hand grenade] on me, for protection. 
While they shot at us with tanks and planes” (focus group with Sisak war veterans).  
 
Teachers in this study were, for the most part, too young to have experienced the war as 
directly as the war veterans and many of the pensioners. Instead, they witnessed it from 
bomb shelters or heard about it on television and radio, as well as from friends and relatives 
involved in the fighting. This target segment still shared the trauma of the other target 
segments; they still saw the same threat to their existence: 
 
ZG.T.4 – I know what it looked like in the summer of 1991. Your colleagues up until 
yesterday just disappeared over night. A girl who I went to musical school with for four 
years, not a word, she just left. And at night in August, all of a sudden the shelling starts. 
They started falling all over the city. She knew something, I did not know it. So then we 
can ask, what are facts and what did you experience yourself and what was passed on in 
the family? That is something that I will also say to my own children (interview with 
Zagreb teacher). 
 
All of the participants shared a common trauma, although at different levels. They spoke 
about it in a similar, local and personal, fashion. As the above teacher highlighted, this 
trauma and the strength of the narratives participants used to explain it to themselves, 
continues to affect the way in which participants view the world around them. Some are still 
reliving the war on a daily basis; others only see it in relatively specific topics. After all, I was 
asking these individuals questions about the war, be it directly or indirectly, so it is not 
surprising they frequently brought it up. What was more obvious was how in certain ways the 
communities where participants lived remained plagued by the legacy of the war.  
  
War veterans’ and victims’ groups in all locations were still searching for the bodies of their 
loved ones. More than once they said they would give anything to be able to find a grave to 
light a candle at. Groups felt this was the worst fate of all, to not know where your loved 
ones were buried: 
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NU.V.4 – My brother died in the war as a soldier, but my aunt used to tell my mother “Be 
quiet, you are lucky because you have somewhere to light a candle”. 
 
NU.V.2 agrees 
 
NU.V.4 – I wander around everywhere and nowhere can I find such peace. 
 
NU.V.2 and NU.V.3 agree 
 
NU.V.3 – It is very ugly to say this, but I was happy when I found my parents’ grave. 
 
NU.V.2 – A person finds some kind of peace. Now their birthdays come and go, 
Christmas, Easter, and I have no cross to light a candle at.  
 
NU.V.3 – This eternal unrest.  
 
NU.V.5 – I will just add that when I moved my husband’s bones to the family grave, a 
relative of mine said I looked joyful.  
 
NU.V.3 – Yes, because you found peace.  
 
NU.V.5 – And I replied, “You cannot understand the relief I feel that my husband now 
rests in his home” (focus group with non-urban war veterans Banovina). 
 
This same group also felt their old neighbours, now back, were all potential perpetrators at 
worst and witnesses at best. Those who fought in the war relived the war in a different way, 
through PTSD. Many individuals sought treatment for this, war veterans’ groups acted as a 
therapeutic outlet for individuals, but some were not aware of how much the war still haunted 
them. One individual broke down in tears in the middle of a discussion; another had to return 
to a rehabilitation centre following their participation. For many participants, the war was still 
a heavy burden on their lives. To others it was so to a lesser degree, but they continued to 
view the world around them with suspicion and continued to see a divided society. War 
veterans in Slavonia asked the researcher if he held a Croatian passport before they could 
hold the agreed dyad, pensioners in Zagreb stormed out of the group following an argument 
over interpretations of what Yugoslavia was. 
 
All participants also shared, to varying degrees, a notion that hope had turned to despair. 
That Croatia suffered and fought to the death for its independence, only for that to later be 
corrupted. They distrusted institutions meant to protect them, their Serb neighbours, the 
Serbian state, the Serbian Orthodox Church, and most sources of information available to 
them. Their memories were not only laced with emotion, they were defined by it. So much so 
that they reflected on the worlds of politics, law and culture through emotion. To these 
individuals, the lasting legacy of the Homeland War was distrust and disappointment with the 
world around them; within which they felt abandoned by the very state they fought to create.  
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This data paints a relatively depressing picture of stereotypes in Croatia and the prevalence 
of a certain version of the war narrative. It also highlights how difficult it is to promote 
alternative narratives when mechanisms to achieve this are limited in a society plagued by 
institutional distrust. The ingrained attitudes about “communists”, people who hate Croatia 
and the pervasiveness of conspiracy theories is alarming, especially with specific segments 
of society. Moreover, domestic politics is run by a relatively liberal elite that seems to be out 
of touch with the majority of citizens. There is, nevertheless, some hope. It lies partly in the 
notion that the Homeland War is at least being deliberated on more than prior periods of 
conflict and transition in Croatian history. In particular, however, it lies with younger 
generations and more educated segments of society, who have shown much more positive 
attitudes about issues pertaining to transitional justice in focus groups and in survey data 
(Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, 2011). 
 
 
  
 312 
Bibliography 
 
Acharya, A. (2004) How ideas spread: Whose norms matter? Norm localization and 
institutional change in Asian regionalism. International Organization, 58: 239-275. 
Acharya, A. (2009) Whose ideas matter? Agency and power in Asian regionalism. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Albrecht, T.L., Johnson, G.M. and Walther, J.B. (1993) Understanding communication 
processes in focus groups. In Morgan, D.L. (ed) Successful focus groups: Advancing 
the state of the art. Newbury Park: Sage, 51-64. 
Allcock, J.B. (2009) The international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. In: Ingrao, 
C. and Emmert, T.A. (eds) Confronting the Yugoslav controversies: A scholars’ 
initiative. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 346-389. 
Almond, G.A. and Verba, S. (1989) The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in 
five nations. Newbury Park: Sage. 
Anderson, E. and Pildes, R.H. (2000) Expressive theories of law: A general restatement. 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 148: 1503-1575. 
Arendt, H. (2006) Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil. London: Penguin. 
Arvind, T. and Stirton, L. (2010) Explaining the reception of the code napoleon in Germany: 
A fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis. Legal Studies, 30: 1-29. 
Ashplant, T.G., Dawson, G.L. and Roper, M. (2000) The politics of war memory and 
commemoration. London: Routledge.  
Atkinson, P. (1992) Understanding ethnographic texts. Newbury Park: Sage.  
Avdagić, S. (2010) When are concerted reforms feasible? Explaining the emergence of 
social pacts in Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 43: 628-657. 
Babić, D. (2010) Etnonacionalizam i rat u Hrvatskoj: Teorijski aspekti i istraživanje 
međunacionalnih odnosa u lokalnim zajednicama (Ethnonationalism and war in 
Croatia: Theoretical aspects and investigation of interethnic relations in local 
communities). Zagreb: Plejada. 
Baines, E.K. (2007) The haunting of Alice: Local approaches to justice and reconciliation in 
northern Uganda. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1: 91-114. 
Bajomi-Lázár, P. (2013) From political propaganda to political marketing. Changing patterns 
of political communication in Central and Eastern Europe. In Gross, P. and 
Jakubowicz, K. (eds) Media transformations in the post-communist world: Eastern 
Europe's tortured path to change. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 49-66. 
Baker, C. (2010) Sounds of the borderland: Popular music, war and nationalism in Croatia 
since 1991. Farnham: Ashgate. 
 313 
Banjeglav, T. (2012) Conflicting memories, competing narratives and contested histories in 
Croatia’s post-war commemorative practices. Politička Misao, 49: 7-31. 
Bantimaroudis, P., Zyglidopoulos, S. and Symeou, P. (2010) Greek museum media visibility 
and museum visitation: An exploration of cultural agenda setting. Journal of 
Communication, 60: 743-757. 
Barilar, S. (2012) Pupovac ostao sam: Od Josipovićeva napada nisu ga branili ni kolege iz 
SDSS-a (Pupovac has been left alone: From Josipović attack even his colleagues 
from the SDSS did not defend him). Jutarnji List, 17 August 2012. Available at: http:// 
jutarnji.hr/pupovac-ostao-sam--od-josipoviceva-napada-nisu-ga-branili-ni-kolege-iz-
sdss-a/1048320/. Accessed: 23 April 2013. 
Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. (2005) Power in international politics. International Organization, 
59: 39-75. 
Bass, G.J. (2000) Stay the hand of vengeance: The politics of war crimes tribunals. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bellamy, A.J. (2003) The formation of Croatian national identity: A centuries-old dream? 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Bennett, W.L. (1990) Toward a theory of press–state relations in the United States. Journal 
of Communication, 40: 103-125. 
Bernhard, M.H. and Kubik, J. (2014) Twenty years after communism: The politics of memory 
and commemoration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Bertrand, J.T., Brown, J.E. and Ward, V.M. (1992) Techniques for analyzing focus group 
data. Evaluation Review, 16: 198-209. 
Bieber, F. (2013). Ready for the Homeland? Simunic and a bit of normal fascism. Balkan 
Insight, 21 November 2013. Available at: 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/blog/ready-for-the-homeland-simunic-and-a-bit-of-
normal-fascism. Accessed: 03 May 2016. 
Bilić, B. (2012) We were gasping for air: [post-]Yugoslav anti-war activism and its legacy. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Billig, M. (1995) Banal nationalism. London: Sage. 
Blanuša, N. (2002) Sociopolitička očekivanja mladih u hrvatskoj u modelu povijesne svijesti 
(Sociopolitical expectations of young people in Croatia in the model of historical 
consciousness). Politička Misao, 39: 88-108. 
Bourke, J. (1999) An intimate history of killing: Face-to-face killing in twentieth-century 
warfare. London: Granta. 
Bratić, V. (2006) Media effects during violent conflict: Evaluating media contributions to 
peace building. Conflict and Communication Online, 5: 1-11. Accessed: 03 
December 2015. 
 314 
Brentin, D. (2013) ‘A lofty battle for the nation’: The social roles of sport in Tudjman's 
Croatia. Sports in Society, 16: 993-1008. 
Brentin, D. (2016) Ready for the homeland? Ritual, remembrance, and political extremism in 
Croatian football. Nationalities Papers (web). Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2015.1136996.  
Brodersen, K.H. (2014) The ICTY's conditionality dilemma. European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 22: 219-248. 
Brooks, P. and Gewirtz, P. (1996) Law's stories: Narrative and rhetoric in the law. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Browning, C. S. (2008) Constructivism, narrative and foreign policy analysis: A case study of 
Finland. Oxford: Peter Lang.  
Brubaker, R. (2006) Nationalist politics and everyday ethnicity in a Transylvanian town. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bryman, A. (2016) Social research methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Burić, N. (2016) Media landscapes. Available at: http://ejc.net/media_landscapes/croatia - 
link_1231. Accessed: 01 March 2016. 
Butković, D. (2004) Sudovi i politika (Courts and politics). Jutarnji List, 02 October 2004. 
Available at: http://www.jutarnji.hr/sudovi-i-politika/7277/. Accessed: 26 April 2014. 
Butković, D. (2005) Sanader, Mesić i Gotovina (Sanader, Mesić and Gotovina). Jutarnji List, 
22 January 2005. Available at: http://www.jutarnji.hr/sanader--mesic-i-gotovina/7256/. 
Accessed: 26 April 2014. 
Butković, D. (2013) Hoćemo li znati pobijediti konzervativnu revoluciju (Will we know how to 
beat the conservative revolution). Jutarnji List, 06 November 2013. Available at: 
http://www.jutarnji.hr/komentar-davora-butkovica-postaje-li-hrvatska-izrazito-
konzervativno-drustvo-/1137832/. Accessed: 02 May 2014. 
Camaj, L. (2010) Media framing through stages of a political discourse: International news 
agencies’ coverage of Kosovo’s status negotiations. The International 
Communication Gazette, 72: 635-653. 
Canki, K. (2004) Treba li nestati samostalna Hrvatska (Should independent Croatia 
disappear). Večernji List, 24 April 2004. Available at: 
http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/treba-li-nestati-samostalna-hrvatska-753184. 
Accessed: 29 April 2014. 
Cappella, J.N. and Jamieson, K.H. (1997) Spiral of cynicism: The press and the public good. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Car, V. (2008) Myths in media texts: How media in Croatia treats veterans and tycoons. 
Medianali, 2: 145-163.  
 315 
Carey, M.A. and Smith, M.W. (1994) Capturing the group effect in focus groups: A special 
concern in analysis. Quantitative Health Research, 4: 123-127. 
Caritas Croatia and the Franciscan Institute for the Culture. (2001) Peace in Croatia: Results 
of research. Zagreb: CROPAX. 
Carlsnaes, W., Simmons, B. A. and Risse, T. (2012) Handbook of International Relations. 
London: Sage.  
Casanova, J. (1994) Public religions in the modern world. London: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Chan, S. (2003) Explaining war termination: A boolean analysis of causes. Journal of Peace 
Research, 40: 49-66. 
Chernov, G., Valenzuela, S. and McCombs, M. (2011) An experimental comparison of two 
perspectives on the concept of need for orientation in agenda-setting theory. 
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 88: 142-155. 
Christensen, M. and Utas, M. (2008) Mercenaries of democracy: The 'politricks' of 
remobilized combatants in the 2007 general elections, Sierra Leone. African Affairs, 
107: 515-539. 
Christie, N. (2001) Answers to atrocities: Restorative justice as an answer to extreme 
situations. In: Fattah, E.A. and Parmentier, S. (eds) Victim policies and criminal 
justice on the road to restorative justice. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 379-387. 
Clark, J.N. (2012) The ICTY and reconciliation in Croatia: A case study of Vukovar. Journal 
of International Criminal Justice, 10: 397-417. 
Clarke, J.N. (2016) In from the margins: Survivors of wartime sexual violence in Croatia and 
an early analysis of the new law. Journal of Human Rights Practice, 8: 128-147. 
Clausen, L. (2003) Global news communication strategies – 9.11.2002 around the world. 
Nordicom Review, 24: 105-116. 
Cobban, H. (2006) International courts. Foreign Policy, 153: 22-28. 
Cocozzelli, F.P. (2009) War and social welfare: Reconstruction after conflict. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cohen, B.C. (1963) The press and foreign policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Council of Europe, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (2016) Fourth Opinion on Croatia adopted on 18 November 2015. 
30 May 2016.  
Croatian Bureau of Statistics. (2011). Census 2011. Available at: 
http://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm. 
Cruvellier, T. and Valinas, M. (2006) Croatia: Selected developments in transitional justice. 
New York: International Center for Transitional Justice. 
 316 
Ćuk, J. (2013) Borba za hrvatsku državnu nezavisnost još traje (The fight for Croatian state 
independence it still going on). Dnevno.hr, 11 April 2013. Available at: 
http://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/info/borba-za-hrvatsku-drzavnu-nezavisnost-jos-traje-
84060. Accessed: 09 June 2014.  
D'Amato, A. (1994) Peace vs. accountability in Bosnia. American Journal of International 
Law, 88: 500-506. 
Das, V. (2001) Remaking a world: Violence, social suffering, and recovery. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
del Ponte, C. and Sudetić, C. (2008) La caccia: Io e i criminali di guerra (The hunt: The war 
criminals and I). Milan: Feltrinelli. 
Dembour, M.B. and Kelly, T. (2007) Paths to international justice: Social and legal 
perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Dimitrova, D.V., Kaid, L.L., Williams, A.P. and Trammell, K.D. (2005) War on the web: The 
immediate news framing of Gulf War II. The Harvard International Journal of 
Press/Politics, 10: 22-44. 
Dragović-Soso, J. (2014) The parting of ways: Public reckoning with the recent past in post-
Milošević Serbia. In Waters, T. (ed) The Milošević trial - an autopsy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 389-408. 
Dragović-Soso, J. and Gordy, E. (2010) Coming to terms with the past: Transitional justice 
and reconciliation in the post-Yugoslav lands. In Djokić, D. and Ker-Lindsay, J. (eds) 
New perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key issues and controversies. London: Routledge, 
193-212. 
Drumbl, M.A. (2007) Atrocity, punishment and international law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Dugandžija, N. (2006) Od nacije do reakcije: Nacionalne manjine i nacionalni agnostici 
(From nation to reaction: Ethnic minorities and ethnic agnostics). Zagreb: Srpsko 
kulturno društvo "Prosvjeta". 
Duggan, C, Bailey, C. and Guillerot, J. (2008) Reparations for sexual and reproductive 
violence: Prospects for achieving gender justice in Guatemala and Peru. The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2: 192-213.  
Dusa, A. and Thiem, A. (2012) QCA: Qualitative comparative analysis. R package version 
3.2.2. 
Dvornik, S. (2009) Akteri bez društva (Actors without society). Zaprešić: Fraktura. 
Eliade, M. (1963) Myth and reality. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Elster, J. (2004) Closing the books : Transitional justice in historical perspective. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 317 
Entman, R.M. (2004) Projections of power: Framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign 
policy. London: University of Chicago Press. 
European Commission. (2014) Standard Eurobarometer 82: Media use in the European 
Union. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_en.htm.  
European Commission. (2004 – 2014) Eurobarometer: Trust in government 2004 – 2014. 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.  
Fagan, A. and Ostojić, M. (2008) The ue and civil society in serbia: Governance rather than 
politics. Balkanologie 11: 1-15. 
Feinberg, J. (1970) Doing and deserving: Essays in the theory of responsibility. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Fenton, S. (2007) The under-statement of national identity: What young adults think about 
being English and British. Nations and Nationalism, 13: 641-660. 
Finch, H. and Lewis, J. (2003) Focus groups. In Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (eds) Qualitative 
research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers. London: 
Sage, 170-198. 
Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) International norm dynamics and political change. 
International Organization, 52: 887-917. 
Fisher, S. (2003) Contentious politics in croatia: The war veterans' movement. In Kopecký, 
P. and Mudde, C. (eds) Uncivil society? Contentious politics in post-communist 
Europe. London: Routledge, 74-92. 
Fishman, J.A. (2006) Do not leave your language alone: The hidden status agendas within 
corpus planning in language policy. Mahway: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Fleisher, M.S. (1995) Beggars and thieves : Lives of urban street criminals. London: 
University of Wisconsin Press. 
Fox, J.E. (2004) Missing the mark: Nationalist politics and student apathy. East European 
Politics and Societies, 18: 363-393. 
Fox, J.E. and Miller-Idriss, C. (2008) Everyday nationhood. Ethnicities, 8: 536-563. 
Funkhouser, R. (1973) The issues of the sixties: An exploratory study in the dynamics of 
public opinion. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 37: 62-75. 
Gamson, W. and Modigliani, A. (1989) Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear 
power. American Journal of Sociology, 95: 1-37. 
Gamson, W. and Lasch, K.E. (1983) The political culture of social welfare policy. In Spirose, 
S.E. and Yuchtman-Yaar, E. (eds) Evaluating the welfare state: Social and political 
perspectives. New York: Academic Press, 397-415. 
Geddes, B. (2003) Paradigms and sand castles: Theory building and research design in 
comparative politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
 318 
Gerbner, G. (1973) Cultural indicators: The third voice. In Gerbner, G., Gross, L. and 
Melody, W. (eds) Communications technology and social policy. New York: Wiley, 
553-573. 
George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case studies and theory development in the social 
sciences. London: MIT Press. 
Gibbs, A. (1997) Focus groups. Social Research Update, 19. Available at: 
http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU19.html. Accessed 17 June 2013.  
Gibson, J.L. (2006) Can truth reconcile divided nations? In Meernik, J.D. and David Mason, 
T. (eds) Conflict prevention and peacebuilding in post-war societies: Sustaining the 
peace. Abingdon: Routledge, 176-195. 
Gillham, B. (2000) The research interview. London: Continuum. 
Gitlin, T. (1980) The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking of 
the new left. London: University of California Press. 
Goertz, G. and Mahoney, J. (2012) A tale of two cultures: Qualitative and quantitative 
research in the social sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Goldstein, I. (1999) Croatia: A history. London: Hurst & Co. 
Gordy, E. (2014) Guilt, responsibility, and denial: The past at stake in post-Milošević Serbia. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Gross, P. and Jakubowicz, K. (2013) Media transformations in the post-communist world: 
Eastern Europe's tortured path to change. Plymouth: Lexington Books. 
Hafner-Burton, E. and Ron, J. (2007) Human rights institutions: Rhetoric and efficacy. 
Journal of Peace Research, 44: 379-384. 
Hafner-Burton, E. and Tsutsui, K. (2007) Justice lost! The failure of international human 
rights law to matter where needed most. Journal of Peace Research, 44: 407-425. 
Hagan, J. and Ivković, S.K. (2006) War crimes, democracy, and the rule of law in Belgrade, 
the former Yugoslavia, and beyond. The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 605: 130-151. 
Halperin, S. and Heath, O. (2012) Political research: Methods and practical skills. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Hampton, J. (1984) Moral education theory of punishment. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
13: 208-238. 
Hartmann, F. (2007) Paix et chatiment: Les guerres secretes de la politique et de la justice 
internationales (Peace and punishment: The secret wars of international politics and 
justice). Flammarion: Paris. 
Haslam, E. (2007) Law, civil society and contested justice at the international criminal 
tribunal for Rwanda. In Dembour, M.B. and Kelly, T. (eds) Paths to international 
 319 
justice: Social and legal perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 57-
82. 
Hayden, R.M. (1996) Imagined communities and real victims: Self-determination and ethnic 
cleansing in Yugoslavia. American Ethnologist, 23: 783-801. 
HAZU. (2007) HAZU o hrvatskom jeziku u europskim integracijama (HAZU on Croatian in 
European integration). Available at: http://www.hkv.hr/kultura/jezik/962-hazu-o-
hrvatskom-jeziku-u-europskim-integracijama.html. Accessed: 11 April 2016. 
Hedl, D. (2000) Tabloid of life and death. Feral Tribune, 27 May 2000. 
Hollander, J.A. (2004) The social contexts of focus groups. Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography, 33: 602-637. 
Homan, R. (2004) The principle of assumed consent: The ethics of gatekeeping. In 
McNamee, M. and Bridges, D. (eds) The ethics of educational research. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Horne, C.M. (2015) The timing of transitional justice measures. In Nedelsky, N. and Stan, L. 
(eds) Post-communist transitional justice: Lessons from twenty-five years of 
experience. New York: Cambridge University Press, 123-147. 
Horvat, R. (2009) Hrvatski identitet (Croatian identity). Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska. 
Horvat, S. (2013) Croatia's vote forbidding gay marriage: a sign of the rotten heart of 
Europe. The Guardian, 4 December 2013. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/04/croatia-gay-marriage-vote-
europe-rotten-heart. Accessed: 01 May 2016.  
Hrvatski memorijalno dokumentacijski centar domovinskog rata. (2006) Kronologija 
Domovinskog rata: 1995 (Chronology of the Homeland War: 1995). Available at: 
http://www.centardomovinskograta.hr/1995.html. Accessed: 03 March 2016. 
Hug, S. (2013) Qualitative comparative analysis: How inductive use and measurement error 
lead to problematic inference. Political Analysis, 21: 252-265. 
ICTY Appeals Chamber. (2004) Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, IT-95-14/2-A. 
Ilić, D. (2004) The Yugoslav truth and reconciliation commission: Overcoming cognitive 
blocks. Eurozine. Available at: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-04-23-ilic-
en.html. Accessed: 05 August 2015. 
Ilišin, I. (2011) Vrijednosti mladih u Hrvatskoj (Values of young people in Croatia). Politička 
Misao, 48: 82-122. 
Ipsos Puls. (2012) Izbori 2011 (Elections 2011). January 2012.  
Ivkošić, M. (2011) Sudbina hrvatskih generala u haagu briga cijele hrvatske. Večernji List. 
Iyengar, S. (1991) Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues. London: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 320 
Iyengar, S. and Kinder, D.R. (1987) News that matters: Television and american opinion. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Jakelić, S. (2010) Collectivistic religions: Religion, choice, and identity in late modernity. 
Farnham: Ashgate. 
Jakovčić, E. and Kunac, S. (2011) Preliminarni rezultati istraživanja sadržaja središnje 
informativne emisije javne televizije – „Dnevnika“ nakon presude generalima 
Gotovini, Markaču i Čermaku od 15. do 30. Travnja 2011 (Preliminary results of the 
analysis of the contect of the main informative program on public television -  
"Dnevnik" after the judgments of generals Gotovina, Markač and Čermak from the 
15th of April until the 30th of April). Zagreb: Documenta.  
Jones, B. and Oliveira, I. (2016) Truth Commission Archives as ‘New Democratic Spaces'. 
Journal of Human Rights Practice, 8: 6-24. 
Joseph, J.E. (2004) Language and politics: National, ethnic, religious. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Jović, D. (2009) Croatia after Tudjman: The ICTY and issues of transitional justice. Chaillot 
Paper, 116: 13-27. 
Jović, J. (2012) Josip Jović: Kako je Pupovac promašio cili balun (Josip Jović: How Pupovac 
missed the entire ball). Slobodna Dalmacija, 27 August 2012. Available at: 
http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/misljenja/ad-hoc/clanak/id/177429/josip-jovic-kako-
je-pupovac-promasio-cili-balun. Accessed: 23 June 2014. 
Karsai, L. (2000a) Crime and punishment: People's courts, revolutionary legality, and the 
Hungarian holocaust. InterMarium, 4: 1-13. 
Karsai, L. (2000b) The people’s courts and revolutionary justice in Hungary, 1945–46. In 
Deák, I., Gross, J.T. and Judt, T. (eds) The politics of retribution in Europe: World 
War II and its aftermath. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 233-251. 
Katzenstein, P.J. (1996) The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Kempny, M. (2012) Rethinking native anthropology: Migration and auto-ethnography in the 
post-accession Europe. International Review of Social Research, 2: 39-52. 
Kent, L. (2011) Local memory practices in East Timor: Disrupting transitional justice 
narratives. The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 5: 434-455. 
Kerr, R. (2004) The international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: An exercise in 
law, politics and diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kitzinger, J. (1994) The methodology of focus groups: The importance of interaction 
between research participants. Sociology of Health and Illness, 16: 103-121. 
Klarin, M. (2009) The impact of the ICTY trials on public opinion in the former Yugoslavia. 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 7: 89-96. 
 321 
Klauški, T. (2008) Tolerancija sustava prema ratnom heroju proizvela je monstruma (The 
tolerance of the system towards the war hero has created a monster). Index.hr, 03 
April 2008. Available at: http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/tolerancija-sustava-prema-
ratnom-heroju-proizvela-je-monstruma/381199.aspx. Accessed: 23 June 2014.  
Klauški, T. (2012) Svađaju se tko je izdao Tuđmana. A tko je izdao Gotovinu (They are 
fighting over who betrayed Tuđman. But who betrayed Gotovina)? Index.hr, 15 May 
2012. Available at: http://www.index.hr/mobile/clanak.aspx?id=615148. Accessed: 23 
June 2014. 
Klauški, T. (2013) Vukovarska riva (The Vukovar seafront). Index.hr, 04 February 2013. 
Available at: http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/vukovarska-riva/660733.aspx. 
Accessed: 23 June 2014. 
Kliger-Vilenchik, N. (2011) Memory setting: Applying agenda-setting theory to the study of 
collective memory. In Neiger, M., Mayers, O., Zandbarg, E. (eds) On media memory: 
Collective memory in a new media age. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 226–237. 
Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2004) Explaining government preferences for institutional change in 
EU foreign and security policy. International Organization, 58: 137-174. 
Kolarić, A. (2013) Od kada je to domoljublje postalo privatna prćija ekstremne desnice 
(Since when has this patriotism become a private pout of the extreme right)? 
Index.hr, 06 August 2013. Available at: http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/od-kada-je-
to-domoljublje-postalo-privatna-prcija-ekstremne-desnice/693192.aspx. Accessed: 
13 June 2014. 
Kolstø, P.l. (2006) National symbols as signs of unity and division. Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 29: 676-701. 
Kolstø, P.l. (2011) Strategies of symbolic nation-building in west Balkan states: Intents and 
results. University of Oslo. Available at: 
http://www.hf.uio.no/ilos/english/research/projects/nation-w-balkan/.  
Kordić, S. (2010) Jezik i nacionalizam (Language and nationalism). Zagreb: Durieux. 
Koren, S. (2011) “Korisna prošlost”? Ratovi devetesetih u deklaracijama hrvatskog sabora 
(Useful past? The wars of the ninites in the declarations of the Croatian Sabor). In 
Cipek, T. (ed) Kultura sjećanja: 1991. Povijesni lomovi i svladanje prošlosti (Culture 
of memory: 1991. Historical breaks and overcoming the past). Zagreb: Disput, 123-
156. 
Kritz, N.J. (1995) Transitional justice: How emerging democracies reckon with former 
regimes. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press  
Krook, M.L. (2010) Women's representation in parliament: A qualitative comparative 
analysis. Political Studies 58: 886-908. 
 322 
Lamont, C.K. (2004) A new Croatian right: Nationalist political parties and contemporary 
Croatian politics. Balkanistica, 17: 45-66. 
Lamont, C.K. (2010) International criminal justice and the politics of compliance. Farnham: 
Ashgate. 
Landman, T. (2008) Issues and methods in comparative politics. London: Routledge.  
Langston, K. and Peti-Stantić, A. (2014) Language planning and national identity in Croatia. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lellio, A.D. and McCurn, C. (2013) Engineering grassroots transitional justice in the Balkans: 
the case of Kosovo. East European Politics & Societies, 27: 129-148. 
Levitsky, S. and Way, L. (2002) The rise of competitive authoritarianism. Journal of 
Democracy, 13: 51-65. 
Lewis, J. (2003) Design issues. In Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (eds) Qualitative research 
practice: A guide for social science students and researchers. London: Sage, 47-76. 
Linz, J.J. (1978) Crisis, breakdown, and reequalibration. In: Linz, J.J and Stepan, A.C. (eds) 
The breakdown of democratic regimes. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1-97. 
Lombardi, G. (2003) Legitimacy and the expanding power of the ICTY. New England Law 
Review, 37: 887-901. 
London, A. (2003) Croatia. In Brett, D. (ed) Europe review 2003/04: The economic and 
business report. Saffron Walden: Walden Publishing Ltd, 70-78. 
Luban, D. (2004) A theory of crimes against humanity. Yale Journal of International Law, 29: 
124-131. 
Lutz, E. and Sikkink, S. (2001) The justice cascade: The evolution and impact of foreign 
human rights trails in Latin America. Chicago Journal of International Law, 2: 1-33. 
Lynch, M. and Marchesi, B. (2015) The adoption and impact of transitional justice. In 
Nedelsky, N. and Stan, L. (eds) Post-communist transitional justice: Lessons from 
twenty-five years of experience. New York: Cambridge University Press, 73-98. 
Maat, E.D. (2011) Sleeping hegemons: Third-party intervention following territorial integrity 
transgressions. Journal of Peace Research, 48: 201-215. 
MacDonald, D. B. (2002) Balkan holocausts? Serbian and Croatian victim-centred 
propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Maier, C.S. (1988) The unmasterable past: History, holocaust, and German national identity. 
London: Harvard University Press. 
Mani, R. (2002) Beyond retribution: Seeking justice in the shadows of war. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
 323 
Mauthner, N.S., Parry, O. and Backett-Milburn, K. (1998) “The data are out there, or are 
they?” Implications for archiving and revisiting qualitative data. Sociology, 32: 733-
745. 
Mauthner, N.S. and Doucet, A. (2003) Reflexive accounts and accounts of reflexivity in 
qualitative data analysis. Sociology, 37: 413-431. 
McAuliffe, P. (2010) Transitional justice and the rule of law: The perfect couple or awkward 
bedfellows? Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 2: 127-154. 
McCombs, M.E. (2004) Setting the agenda: The mass media and public opinion. Oxford: 
Polity. 
McCombs, M.E., Shaw, D.L. and Weaver, D.H. (2014) New directions in agenda-setting 
theory and research. Mass Communication and Society, 17: 781-802. 
McEvoy, K. and McGregor, L. (2008) Transitional justice from below: Grassroots activism 
and the struggle for change. Oxford: Hart. 
McMahon, P.C. and Forsythe, D.P. (2008) The ICTY's impact on Serbia: Judicial 
romanticism meets network politics. Human Rights Quarterly, 30: 412-435. 
McQuail, D. (2010) McQuail's mass communication theory. London: Sage. 
Meares, T.L. and Kahan, D.M. (1998) Law and (norms of) order in the inner city. Law & 
Society Review, 32: 805-838. 
Meyer, C. O. (2005) Convergence towards a European strategies culture? A constructivist 
framework for explaining changing norms. European Journal of International 
Relations, 11: 523-549.  
Miethe, T. and Drass, K. (1999) Exploring the social context of instrumental and expressive 
homicides: An application of qualitative comparative analysis. Journal of Quantitative 
Criminology, 15. 
Milekić, S. (2016) Croatia’s ‘Banal’ Fascism on Display at Israel Match. Balkan Insight, 25 
March 2016.  Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/israel-match-
scandal-shows-banalization-of-croatia-s-fascism-03-24-2016. Accessed: 03 May 
2016. 
Millar, G. (2012) Between western theory and local practice: Cultural impediments to truth-
telling in Sierra Leone. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 29: 177-199. 
Miller, Z. (2008) Effects of invisibility: In search of the ‘economic’ in transitional justice. The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2: 266-291. 
Modrić, S. (2006) Kako se u Hrvatskoj može pobjeći od zatvora (how you can escape jail in 
Croatia). Jutarnji List, 02 November 2006.  Available at: http://www.jutarnji.hr/kako-
se-u-hrvatskoj-moze-pobjeci-od-zatvora/160584/. Accessed: 15 June 2014. 
Morgan, D.L. (1997) Focus groups as qualitative research. London: Sage. 
 324 
Moritz, M., Giblin, J., Ciccone, M., Davis, A., Fuhrman, J., et al. (2011) Social risk-
management strategies in pastoral systems: A qualitative comparative analysis. 
Cross-Cultural Research, 45: 286-317. 
Musheno, M.C., Gregware, P.R. and Drass, K.A. (1991) Court management of AIDS 
disputes: A sociolegal analysis. Law & Social Inquiry, 16: 737-774. 
Nagy, R. (2008) Transitional justice as global project: Critical reflections. Third World 
Quarterly, 29: 275-289. 
Narodne Novine. (1996) Zakon o općem oprostu (Law on general pardon NN 80/96). 
Available at: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/265079.html.  
Narodne Novine. (2000) Deklaracija o Domovinskom Ratu (Declaration on the Homeland 
War). Available at: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/265079.html. 
Narodne Novine. (2006) Deklaracija o Oluji NN (Declaration on Operation Storm). Available 
at: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/127530.html.  
Narodne Novine. (2015) Zakon o pravima žrtava seksualnog nasilja za vrijeme oružane 
agresije na Republiku Hrvatsku u Domovinskom ratu (Law on the rights of victims of 
sexual violence during the armed aggression against the Republic of Croatia in the 
Homeland War). Available at: http://narodne-
novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2015_06_64_1221.html.  
Nazor, A. (2011) Greater-Serbian aggression against Croatia in the 1990s. Zagreb: Croatian 
Homeland War Memorial and Documentation Centre. 
Nettelfield, L.J. (2010) Courting democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Hague tribunal's 
impact in a postwar state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Neuman, W.R., Just, M.R. and Crigler, A.N. (1992) Common knowledge: News and the 
construction of political meaning. London: University of Chicago Press. 
Neumann, I.B. (1999) Uses of the other: “The East” in European identity formation. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Norris, P. (1995) The restless searchlight: Network news framing of the post-cold war world. 
Political Communication, 12: 357-370. 
Novi List. (2004) Neka pregovori počnu (Let the negotiations begin)! 19 December 2004.  
Novi List. (2011) Suočavanje s Titovim zločinačkim pothvatom (Confronting Tito’s criminal 
enterprise). 02 May 2011.  
Novi List. (2013) Leko: Vukovar je Hrvatski grad i u njemu treba provoditi Hrvatske zakone 
(Leko: Vukovar is a Croatian city and Croatian laws have to be implemented in it). 08 
April 2013. 
Novi List. (2014) Arbitražni sud odbio Šimuniča: Nedvosmisleno je koristio ustaški uzvik (The 
court of arbitration has rejected Šimunič: He undoubtedly used an ustasha salute). 
 325 
12 May 2014. Available at: http://www.novilist.hr/Sport/Nogomet/Arbitrazni-sud-
odbio-Simunica-Nedvosmisleno-je-koristio-ustaski-uzvik. Accessed: 02 May 2016. 
Oakes, L. (2001) Language and national identity: Comparing France and Sweden. 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
Obradović-Wochnik, J. (2013) Serbian civil society as an exclusionary space: NGOs, the 
public and “coming to terms with the past”. In Bojičić-Dželilović, V., Ker-Lindsay, J. 
and Kostovicova, D. (eds) Civil society and transitions in the western Balkans. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 210-229. 
Obradović-Wochnik, J. (2013) Ethnic conflict and war crimes in the Balkans : The narratives 
of denial in post-conflict Serbia. London: I.B. Tauris. 
Osiel, M. (1998) Mass atrocity, collective memory and the law. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers. 
Osiel, M. (2009) Making sense of mass atrocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ostojić, M. (2014) Between justice and stability: The politics of war crimes prosecutions in 
post-Milošević Serbia. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Panakova, J. (2011) Law and politics of universal jurisdiction. Amsterdam Law Forum, 3: 49-
72. 
Pavlaković, V. (2007) Eye of the storm: The ICTY, commemorations and contested histories 
of Croatia's Homeland War. Wilson Center. Available at: 
https://wilsoncenter.org/publication/347-eye-the-storm-the-icty-commemorations-and-
contested-histories-croatias-homeland-war. Accessed: 23 November 2012. 
Pavlaković, V. (2008) Red stars, black shirts: symbols, commemorations, and contested 
histories of World War Two in Croatia. Seattle: The National Council for Euroasian 
and East European Research. 
Pavlaković, V. (2010) Croatia, the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
and general Gotovina as a political symbol. Europe-Asia Studies, 62: 1707-1740. 
Pavlaković, V. (2014) Fulfilling the thousand-year-old dream: Strategies of symbolic nation-
building in Croatia. In Kolstø, P. (ed) Strategies of symbolic nation-building in south 
eastern Europe. Farnham: Ashgate, 19-50. 
Pennings, P. (2003) Beyond dichotomous explanations: Explaining constitutional control of 
the executive with fuzzy-sets. European Journal of Political Research, 42: 541-567. 
Peruško, Z. (2007) Media and civic values. In Ramet, S.P. and Matić, D. (eds) Democratic 
transition in Croatia: Value transformation, education and media. College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 224-244. 
Peruško, Z. (2011) Assesment of media development in Croatia: Based on UNESCO's 
media development indicators. Paris: The International Programme for the 
Development of Communication. 
 326 
Peskin, V. and Boduszynski, M. (2003) International justice and domestic politics: Post-
Tudjman Croatia and the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
Europe-Asia Studies, 55: 1117-1142. 
Petrović, N. and Dulanović , M. (2011) Dometi i ograničenja ličnih sećanja u osvetljavanju 
traumatične prošlosti (The reach and limits of personal memories in highlighting a 
traumatic past). In Cipek, T. (ed) Kultura sjećanja: 1991. Povijesni lomovi i svladanje 
prošlosti (Culture of memory: 1991. Historical breaks and overcoming the past). 
Zagreb: Disput, 29-49. 
Prcela, F. (2009) Polog katoličkoga u Hrvatskom identitetu (The role of Catholicism in 
Croatian identity). In Horvat, R. (ed) Hrvatski identitet (Croatian identity). Zagreb: 
Matica Hrvatska. 
Price, M.E. and Thompson, M. (2002) Forging peace: Intervention, human rights, and the 
management of media space. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Radbruch, G. (1946) Gesetzliches unrecht und übergesetzliches recht. Süddeutsche 
Juristenzeitung, 1: 105-108. 
Ragin, C.C. (1989) The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative 
strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Ramet, S.P., Clewing, K. and Lukić, R. (2008) Croatia since independance: War, politics, 
society, foreign relations. München: R. Oldenbourg. 
Rangelov, I. (2013) Contesting the rule of law: Civil society and legal institutions. In Vesna, 
B.D., Ker-Lindsay, J. and Kostovicova, D. (eds) Civil society and transitions in the 
western Balkans. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 71-84. 
Rangelov, I. (2014) Nationalism and the rule of law: Lessons from the Balkans and beyond. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rangelov, I. and Teitel, R.G. (2011) Global civil society and transitional justice. In Albrow, 
M., Seckinelgin, H., Anheier, H., et al. (eds) Global civil society 2011: Globality and 
the absence of justice. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 162-177. 
Richter Malabotta, M. (2004) Semantics of war in former Yugoslavia. In Busch, B. and Kelly-
Holmes, H. (eds) Language, discourse and borders in the Yugoslav successor 
states. Buffalo: Multilingual Matters Ltd. 
Riessman, C. (1993) Narrative analysis. Newbury Park: Sage.  
Rihoux, B. (2006) Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related systematic 
comparative methods: Recent advances and remaining challenges for social science 
research. International Sociology, 21: 679-706. 
Risse, T., Ropp, S.C. and Sikkink, K. (1999) The power of human rights: International norms 
and domestic change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 327 
Ristić, K. (2014) Imaginary trials: War crime trials and memory in former Yugoslavia. Leipzig: 
Leipziger Universitätsverlag 
Roberts, S.P. (2012) Research in challenging environments: The case of Russia’s ‘managed 
democracy’. Qualitative Research, 13: 337-351. 
Rogers, E.M. and Dearing, J.W. (1987) Agenda-setting research: Where has it been? Where 
is it going? In Anderson, J.A. (ed) Communication yearbook 11. Newbury Park: 
Sage, 555-594. 
Roht-Arriaza, N. (2006) The new landscape of transitional justice. In Roht-Arriaza, N. and 
Mariezcurrena, J. (eds) Transitional justice in the twenty-first century: Beyond truth 
versus justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-16. 
Rudan, V. (2008) Vapaj iz vukojebine (The cry from the middle of nowhere). Nacional, 09 
June 2008. Available at: http://arhiva.nacional.hr/clanak/46312/vapaj-iz-vukojebine. 
Accessed: 21 June 2014. 
Ryan, M. (2004) Framing the war against terrorism: US newspaper editorials and military 
action in Afghanistan. The International Communication Gazette, 66: 363-382. 
Sabolić, M. (2013) Mirjana Krizmanić: Dok vukovarci još traže kosti svoje djece, ćirilicu ne 
treba uvoditi. Slobodna Dalmacija, 05 September 2013. Available at: 
http://slobodnadalmacija.hr/novosti/hrvatska/clanak/id/211217/mirjana-krizmanic-dok-
vukovarci-jos-traze-kosti-svoje-djece-cirilicu-ne-treba-uvoditi. Accessed: 15 June 
2014. 
Sampson, R.J. and Bartusch, D.J. (1998) Legal cynicism and (subcultural?) tolerance of 
deviance: The neighborhood context of racial differences. Law & Society Review, 32: 
777-804. 
Sarkin, J. (2015) The interrelationship and interconnectness of transitional justice and the 
rule of law in Uganda: Pursuing justice, truth, guarantees of non-repetition, 
reconciliation and reparations for past crimes and human rights violations. Hague 
Journal on the Rule of Law, 7: 111-139. 
Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Schäuble, M. (2014) Narrating victimhood: Gender, religion and the making of place in post-
war Croatia. Oxford: Barghahn. 
Sells, M. (2003) Crosses of blood: Sacred space, religion, and violence in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Sociology of Religion, 64: 309-331. 
Semetko, H.A. and Valkenburg, P.M. (2000) Framing European politics: A content analysis 
of press and television news. Journal of Communication, 50: 93-109. 
Shaw, R. (2007) Memory frictions: Localizing the truth and reconciliation commission in 
Sierra Leone. The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1: 183-207. 
 328 
Shklar, J.N. (1964) Legalism: Law, morals, and political trials. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Shoemaker, P.J. and Reese, S.D. (1996) Mediating the message: Theories of influences on 
mass media content. London: Longman. 
Sikkink, K. and Walling, C.B. (2007) The impact of human rights trials in Latin America. 
Journal of Peace Research, 44: 427-445. 
Simon Wiesenthal Center. (2016) Wiesenthal Center Calls for Sanctions Against Croatian 
Soccer Fans in Wake of Fascist and Anti-Semitic Chants at Recent Israeli-Croatian 
Friendly Match. 28 March 2016. Available at: 
http://www.wiesenthal.com/site/apps/nlnet/content.aspx?c=lsKWLbPJLnF&b=877654
7&ct=14838803. Accessed: 05 May 2016. 
Slaughter, A.M. (2004) A new world order. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Slobodna Dalmacija. (2001) Svi smo mi Mirko Norac (We are all Mirko Norac). 12 February 
2001. 
Smith, A.D. (1991) National identity. London: Penguin. 
Smith, A.L. (2004) Heteroglossia, "common sense," and social memory. American 
Ethnologist, 31: 251-269. 
Snyder, J.L. and Vinjamuri, L. (2003) Trials and errors: Principle and pragmatism in 
strategies of international justice. International Security, 28: 5-44. 
Söderström, J. (2010) Ex-combatants at the polls: Exploring focus groups and electoral 
meaning. Anthropology Matters Journal, 12: 1-16. 
Soldo, S., Puntarić, D., Petrovićki, Ž. and Prgomet, D. (1999) Injuries caused by 
antipersonnel mines in Croatian army soldiers on the east Slavonia front during the 
1991-1992 war in Croatia. Military Medicine, 164: 141-144. 
Sommers, M.R. (1994) The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network 
approach. Theory and Society, 23: 605-649. 
Spiering, M. (1999) The future of national identity in the European Union. National Identities, 
1: 151-159. 
Spoerri, M. and Freyberg-Inan, A. (2008) From prosecution to persecution: Perceptions of 
the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Serbian 
domestic politics. Journal of International Relations and Development, 11: 350-384. 
Sriram, C.L. (2007) Justice as peace? Liberal peacebuilding and strategies of transitional 
justice. Global Society, 21: 579-591. 
Stake, R. E. (1995) The art of case study research. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Stanley, L. (2016) Using focus groups in political science and international relations. Politics, 
36: 236-249. 
 329 
Stewart, D.W. and Shamdasani, P.N. (1990) Focus groups: Theory and practice. Newbury 
Park: Sage. 
Stover, E. (2005) The witnesses: War crimes and the promise of justice in The Hague. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.  
Stover, E. and Weinsten, H.M. (2004) My neighbor, my enemy: Justice and community in 
the aftermath of mass atrocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ströhle, I. (2010) The politics of reintegration and war commemoration. The case of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army. Südosteuropa, 58: 478-519. 
Ströhle, I. (2013) Kosovo Liberation Army veterans’ politics and contentious citizenship in 
post-war Kosovo. In Pavlović, S. and Živković, M. (eds) Transcending fratricide: 
Political mythologies, reconciliations, and the uncertain future in the former 
Yugoslavia. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 243-264. 
Subotić, J. (2009) Hijacked justice: Dealing with the past in the Balkans. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Subotić, J. (2015a) Genocide narratives as narratives-in-dialogue. Journal of Regional 
Security, 10: 177-198. 
Subotić, J. (2015b) The mythologizing of communist violence. In: Stan, L. and Nedelsky, N. 
(eds) Post-communist transitional justice: Lessons from twenty-five years of 
experience. New York: Cambridge University Press, 188-210. 
Tajfel, H. (1978) Social categorisation, social identity and social comparison. In Tajfel, H. 
(ed) Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of 
intergroup relations. London: Academic Press, 61-76. 
Tanner, M. (2001) Croatia: A nation forged in war. New Haven: Yale Nota Bene. 
Teitel, R.G. (2000) Transitional justice. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Teitel, R.G. (2005) The law and politics of contemporary transitional justice. Cornell 
International Law Journal, 38: 837-862. 
Thiem, A. (2011) Conditions of intergovernmental armaments cooperation in western 
Europe, 1996-2006. European Political Science Review, 3: 1-33. 
Tholens, S. (2012) International norms and local agents in peacebuilding: Small arms control 
in post-war Kosovo and Cambodia. PhD thesis. European University Institute. 
Thoms, O., Ron, J. and Paris, R. (2010) State-level effects of transitional justice: What do 
we know? The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 4: 329-354. 
Tladi, D. (2012) Cooperation, immunities, and article 98 of the Rome statute: The ICC, 
interpretation, and conflicting norms. ASIL Annual Meeting Proceedings, 106: 307-
308. 
Jović, I. and Romić. T (2012) Milanović i Josipovič generalima: Stoički ste podnijeli žrtvu, 
hvala! (Milanović and Josipovič to the generals: You took the sacrifice stoically, thank 
 330 
you!). Večernji List, 16 November 2012. Available at: 
http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/milanovic-i-josipovic-generalima-stoicki-ste-podnijeli-
zrtvu-hvala-475959. Accessed: 03 May 2016. 
Traianou, A. and Hammersley, M. (2012) Ethics in qualitative research: Controversies and 
contexts. London: SAGE. 
United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (2015) 
Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Croatia. 30 April 2015. 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2015) Draft mine action governance and 
management assessment for BiH. 13 May 2015. 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (1993a) Report of the Security Council Mission 
Established Pursuant to Resolution 819, addressed to the President of the United 
Nations Security Council. Document S/25700. 
United Nations Security Council. (1993b) Resolution 827. Document S/RES/827. 
Vale, G. (2016) Media in Croatia: A cause for alarm. Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, 11 
May 2016. Available at: http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Croatia/Media-in-
Croatia-a-cause-for-alarm-170599. Accessed: 03 May 2016.  
Van Ginkel, R. (1998) The repatriation of anthropology: Some observations on endo-
ethnography. Anthropology & Medicine, 5: 251-267. 
Van Gorp, B. (2007) The constructionist approach to framing: Bringing the culture back. 
Journal of Communication, 57: 60-78. 
Vis, B. (2009) Governments and unpopular social policy reform: Biting the bullet or steering 
clear? European Journal of Political Research, 48: 31-57. 
Vogt, T.R. (2000) Denazification in soviet-occupied Germany: Brandenburg 1945-1948. 
London: Harvard University Press. 
Wendt, A. (1999) Social theory of international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Werner, T. (2009) Congressmen of the silent south: The persistence of southern racial 
liberals, 1949–1964. The Journal of Politics, 71: 70-81. 
White, H. (1984) The question of narrative in contemporary historical theory. History and 
Theory, 23: 1-33. 
Williams, L. and Farrell, R. (1990) Legal response to child sexual abuse in day care. 
Criminal Justice and Behavior, 17: 284-302. 
Wodak, R., Cilia, R.d., Reisigl, M. and Liebhart, K. (1999) The discursive construction of 
national identity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Wolcott, H.F. (2005) The art of fieldwork. Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press. 
 331 
Yang, J. (2003) Framing the NATO air strikes on Kosovo across countries: Comparison of 
Chinese and US newspaper coverage. The International Communication Gazette, 
65. 
Yin, R. K. (2009) Case study research: Design and methods. Los Angeles: Sage.  
Zacklin, R. (2004) The failings of ad hoc international tribunals. Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 2: 541-545. 
Zadro, S. (2013) Ćirilica ni Srbima ni Hrvatima neće donijeti posao (Cyrillic will not bring jobs 
to Serbs or Croats). Večernji List, 16 October 2013. Available at: http:// 
vecernji.hr/hrvatska/cirilica-ni-srbima-ni-hrvatima-nece-donijeti-posao-628114. 
Accessed: 14 June 2014. 
Zaller, J. (1992) The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Zambelli, N. (2010) A journey westward: A poststructuralist analysis of Croatia's identity and 
the problem of cooperation with the international criminal tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia. Europe-Asia Studies, 62: 1661-1682. 
Zertal, I. (2005) Israel’s holocaust and the politics of nationhood. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Živić, D. (2003) Demografske odrednice i posljedice starenja stanovništva Hrvatske 
(Demographic determinants and consequences of the ageing of Croatia's 
population). Revija za socijalnu politiku, 10: 307-319. 
 
 
  
 332 
Appendix A – Interview guide (in Croatian) 
 
Uvod (5 minuta) 
• Pitaj osobe da se predstave 
• Predstavi teme:  
o Istraživanje analizira kako su različiti instrumenti tranzicijske pravde u Hrvatskoj 
(na primjer Međunarodni krivični sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju, tzv. Haški Tribunal, 
domaći sudovi za ratne zločine i razni projekti civilnog društva) utjecali na norme 
u državi.  
o Drugim riječima, istraživanje ispituje mišljenja o ovim institucijama i projektima 
tako da može analizirati njihove utjecaje na javnost i koje se poduke mogu izvući.  
o To će omogućiti istraživanju da procijeni uspjeh ili neuspjeh takvih inicijativa. 
 
Opća pitanja (15 minuta) 
• Je li mislite da imate dobro razumijevanje Domovinskog rata?  
• Kako bi vi definirali ratni zločin?  
• Može li se u obrambenom ratu učiniti ratni zločin?  
 
Ciljevi rata i  vladavini prava (20 minuta)  
• Je li mislite da je bilo dovoljno sudskih procesa za kršenja međunarodnog humanitarnog 
prava počinjenih tijekom rata? 
o U pogledu različitih strana u ratu 
o U pogledu domaćih i haškog suda, kao i o općoj ocjeni ishoda suđenja kao   
o O njihovoj procjeni učinkovitosti suđenja kao instrumenta postizanja pravednosti 
• Što mislite o tvrdnji da je Hrvatska država bila odgovorna za etničko čišćenje tijekom 
rata?  
 
Dodatna pitanja: 
• Što mislite, kakvo je bilo suđenje Anti Gotovini? Dario Kordić? Tihomir Blaškić?  
• Što mislite, kakvo je bilo suđenje Mirku Norcu? Tomislav Merčep? Branimir Glavaš? 
Lora? 
• Je li mislite da je bilo dovoljno sudskih procesa za kršenja međunarodnog humanitarnog 
prava počinjenih tijekom rata od strane Hrvata? 
 
Ratna narativa i otkrivanje činjenica (25 minuta) 
• Koliko su sljedeći izvori do sada bili vjerodostojni u davanju informacija o ratu?  
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§ Podpitanja bi išla u smjeru procjene što je bilo dobro a što loše.  
§ čim više postavi pitanje ZAŠTO? 
o  Od medija? 
o Od vlade? 
o Od Haškog tribunala?  
o Od domaćih sudova? 
o Od crkve?  
o Od udruga branitelja? 
• Što mislite, koje su činjenice o Domovinskom ratu poznate i koje su nepoznate? 
• Što se naglašava a što potiskuje i skriva?  
• Je li bi građani Hrvatske trebali biti ponosni na Domovinski Rat? 
• Što podrazumijevate pod dignitetom Domovinskog rata? 
 
 
Monopol na javnu raspravu i zajednička javna rasprava (15 minuta) 
• Što porazumijevate pod pomirenjem? 
• Je li mislite da su ustupci i kompromisi nužni u ime pomirenja? 
• Kako vi gledate na problem ćirilice u Hrvatskoj? 
o Kontrastirati to sa Istrom i talijanskim nazivima u mjestima ispod 33 % talijana; 
razmotriti kako poimaju tzv. Hrvatsku ćirlicu u BiH itd. 
 
 
Kraj (10 minuta) 
• Je li se vaše mišljenje o Domovinskom ratu promijenilo od kraja rata? 
• Kako bi se mogao poboljšati proces pomirenja u Hrvatskoj? 
 
Dodatna pitanja: 
• Što mislite da će biti nasljedstvo Haškog tribunala? 
• Je li mislite da je bila pogreška osnovati Haški tribunal? 
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Appendix B – Survey questionnaire (in Croatian) 
 
Prvi Dio 
 
1. Ime i prezime  
 
 
2. Godina rođenja 
 
 
3. Mjesto rođenja 
 
 
4. Koju ste najvišu 
stručnu spremu 
stekli? 
 
 
5. Gdje ste boravili 
od 1991 do 1995? 
 
 
6. Prebivalište? 
 
 
7. Koliko vas zanima 
vaša nacionalna 
povijest i sudbina 
vaše nacije? 
(označite 
kvaćicom ili 
križičem) 
 
 
 
Nimalo 
☐ 
 
 
Malo 
  
 
 
Puno 
  
 
 
Drugi Dio (Molimo Vas navedite u kojoj se mjeri slažete ili ne slažete sa sljedećim 
tvrdnjama) 
 
 Potpuno 
se 
slažem 
Donekle 
se slažem 
Nemam 
mišljenje  
Donekle 
se NE 
slažem 
Putpono 
se NE 
slažem 
8. Slažete li se i u kojoj 
mjeri sa slijedećom 
tvrdnjom: Hrvatski 
dužnosnici i 
branitelji osuđeni na 
Haškom Tribunalu ili 
na domaćim 
sudovima su heroji, 
ne zločinci.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
9. Slažete li se i u kojoj 
mjeri sa slijedećom 
tvrdnjom: Hrvatska 
strana nije mogla 
počiniti ratne zločine 
u obrambenom ratu. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
10. Slažete li se i u kojoj      
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mjeri sa slijedećom 
tvrdnjom: uđbenici o 
povijesti Hrvatske 
od 1990ih 
prezentiraju 
Hrvatsku povijest 
korektno.  
 
          
11. Slažete li se i u kojoj 
mjeri sa slijedećom 
tvrdnjom: 
predstavnici Srpskih 
manjina u Hrvatskoj 
trebali bi biti 
angažirani u razvoju 
muzeja o 20om 
stoljeću u Hrvatskoj. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Treći Dio (označite kvaćicom ili križičem 1-5, 1 znači da uopće nije važno i 5 znači da 
je vrlo važno) 
 
 1  
(nije 
važno) 
 
2 3 4 5  
(vrlo 
važno) 
12. Koliko vam je važno 
pokazati vašu narodnu 
pripadnost i vjernost 
prema narodnoj 
tradiciji?  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
13. Koliko su vam važna 
slijedeća načela 
ustava Republike 
Hrvatske? 
 
     
a. Osiguravanje ljudskih prava 
 
          
b. Etnička ravnopravnost 
 
          
c. Vladavina prava 
 
          
14. U kojoj bi se mjeri 
buduća vlast trebala 
usmjeriti na ostvarenje 
sljedećih ciljeva: 
 
     
a. Otkrivanje istine o 
događajima tijekom 
Domovinskog Rata 
 
          
b. Osiguravanje ljudskih prava           
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i sloboda 
 
c. Borba protiv korupcije i 
kriminala 
 
          
d. Zaštita digniteta 
Domovinskog Rata 
 
          
e. Harmonija između etničkih 
manjina i Hrvata  
 
          
f. Suradnja sa Haškim 
Tribunalom i ostalim 
međunarodnim tribunalima 
 
          
g. Kažnjavanje ratnih zločina 
 
          
 
 
 
 
